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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been deeply involved in economic 
governance in developing countries through its conditional lending since the late 
1970s. Despite the importance of the IMF in the economic and political life of its 
borrowers, we have, at best, an incomplete understanding of the roots of the 
institution’s behavior. This dissertation attempts to answer some important questions 
about the IMF’s lending activities, namely: why is there so much variation in the 
IMF’s treatment of its borrowers? I argue that the IMF is best viewed as a purposive 
actor driven by a set of economic ideas. These ideas shape the way the institution’s 
staff and management make decisions about the use of its resource in complex and 
unsettled political and economic circumstances. The IMF has political preference for 
policy teams composed of likeminded officials. I use new data to test the argument on 
three aspects of IMF treatment; the cross-national evidence shows that governments 
with a higher proportion of neoliberal policymakers receive larger loans with fewer 
binding conditions and are more likely to receive waivers for missed policy targets. 
Further, I show that the ability of top neoliberal economic officials to deliver better 
treatment from the IMF enables them to extend their time in office. Since the presence 
of the IMF confers political advantages to the policymakers that share the Fund’s 
economic worldview, I argue that neoliberals have greater political influence in 
countries that have spent many years under the institution’s conditional lending 
programs. The claims are tested using both quantitative analyses and a qualitative case 
study of Argentina’s relationship with the IMF over a quarter century (1976-2001).   
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Chapter One 
Introduction, Research Puzzle, and Overview 
As the Argentine economy collapsed in December 2001, Porteños (the 
nickname given to the residents of Buenos Aires) found ways in the midst of 
impending financial chaos to maintain their characteristic sense of gallows humor. 
Holiday shoppers could find a local knock-off of the “Monopoly” board game called 
Deuda Eterna (“Eternal Debt”) on stores’ shelves. In Deuda Eterna, players obtain 
capital and must maneuver around the board while avoiding a number of pitfalls: 
military coups, capital flight, protectionism in rich Northern countries, and, worst of 
all, International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality. The goal for the players of the 
game is simple: “overcome the disadvantages and dispense with the IMF!”1  
The existence of a popular anti-IMF board game is a testament to the powerful 
impact of the Fund’s activities on the daily lives of citizens in low- and middle-income 
countries. The IMF’s influence is derived from the mix of carrots (the size of the loans 
it can arrange and its ability to act as a seal of approval for private financial investors) 
and sticks (the conditions attached to loans and punishments for noncompliance with 
binding conditions) that it employs to reorient the economic policies of its borrowers.  
The IMF plays multiple roles in the world economy. Through its research 
department, data dissemination efforts, and Article IV consultations (widely known as 
“surveillance”), the institution monitors and advises its members on good 
macroeconomic practices. The IMF sometimes functions as a coordinating venue in 
which policymakers meet to hash out plans to manage systemic threats to the 
international financial system. The Fund’s main lever of influence – and the focus of 
this dissertation – is conditional lending. For countries suffering from balance of 
                                                 
1 Mary Anastasia O’Grady, “Play ‘Deuda Eterna’ and Learn all about the IMF,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 21, 2001, pg. 15.  
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payments problems, financial crises, or other macroeconomic disturbances, the IMF’s 
resources provide an economic lifeline. Governments that might otherwise be forced 
to pay very high rates of interest to borrow on private markets find Fund resources 
attractive, since the IMF charges at below-market rates.  
But borrowing from the IMF has other costs. For the Fund’s economists, the 
economic problems that drive governments to seek its resources usually require some 
tough medicine. The conditions attached to IMF loans typically involve cutting social 
spending, reducing subsidies for industrialists, trimming the government’s payroll, and 
devaluing the currency. Often ordinary citizens in the country in which the 
stabilization program is being implemented do not want their government to take the 
Fund’s medicine. This tension can generate explosive political dynamics, as evinced 
by violent IMF-linked riots in Morocco, Jordan, Peru in the 1980s and perhaps most 
notoriously, in Indonesia in May 1998.   
The resources that the IMF marshals are substantial: at the apex of its lending 
activities in 2003, the institution had outstanding loans worth nearly $71 billion in 
over 60 countries. With the possible exception of the World Bank, no other 
international institution can match the influence of the IMF on the daily lives of 
citizens in the developing world.2 The conditions that are included in lending 
arrangements have made the IMF a deeply controversial institution.3 The collection of 
                                                 
2 In 2006, 49 developing countries – the populations of which, in total, exceeded one billion people – 
participated in IMF programs (see Vreeland 2007: 1). IMF lending slackened in recent years, prompting 
some observers to question the institution’s relevance in light of massive capital flows the large 
amounts of reserves accumulated by many low and middle income countries. Since September 2008, 
the benign global economic situation has reversed, and the Fund is once again providing financial 
support to a number of countries (including Hungary, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine). 
Between the late 1970s, when the IMF signed agreements with the UK and Italy, and 2008, when the 
financial crisis forced Iceland to turn to the Fund, none of the wealthy democracies associated with the 
OECD sought IMF support; for this reason the discussion of IMF lending behavior that follows is 
limited to institution’s activities in the developing world. Prior to the April 2009 G20 meeting the 
IMF’s deployable financial resources amounted to just above $250 billion; as of writing, the 
institution’s resources have tripled thanks to new contributions led by Japan, the U.S., and the EU.  
3 For example, during the international financial institutions’ spring 2000 meetings, protesters unveiled 
a poster reading “IMF Plus World Bank Equals Hundreds Rich, Billions Poor” (Mallaby, 2004: 265). In 
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scholars and policymakers that created the IMF at the conclusion of the Second World 
War did not anticipate that their institution would generate much political controversy. 
The general perception at the time of founding was that the institution would be 
insulated from social and political pressures; in John Maynard Keynes’s view “the 
Monetary Fund, in particular, has the great advantage that to the average Congressman 
it is extremely boring.”4 
The IMF that Keynes helped design had a simple mandate: it would provide 
short-term liquidity for needy member countries. The institution was not intended to 
intervene in the economic policymaking process in borrowing countries. The Fund we 
observe today is radically different from Keynes’ brainchild. It has been deeply 
involved in economic governance in developing countries since the late 1970s. The 
extent of the Fund’s influence on the economies – and by extension, the politics – of 
borrowers has led to vigorous debate about the effects of the institution’s policies and 
its role in the global economic system. Unfortunately, the debate about the IMF’s role 
in the world generates more heat than light. We have, at best, an incomplete 
understanding of the roots of the institution’s behavior.  
The basic premise of this dissertation is that the economic ideas that shape the 
Fund’s purpose have an important effect on the ways in which the institution interacts 
with the governments that draw on its resources. My perspective differs from 
conventional approaches in important ways. Realists tend to treat the Fund as an 
institution beholden to the strategic interests of its most powerful members. Scholars 
writing from the public choice tradition focus on self-interested rent-seeking behavior 
                                                                                                                                            
the view of critics, the Fund, rather than ensuring global economic stability and helping to integrate 
countries into the world economy, reinforces patterns of unequal (and unfair) economic relations. The 
radical critique of the Fund is not new. In 1974, Cheryl Payer wrote that since its inception “the IMF 
has been the chosen instrument for imposing imperialist financial discipline upon poor countries under 
a façade of multilateralism and technical competence” (Payer, 1974: x).  
4 Mikesell 1994: 445 (quote).  
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by individual staff members, arguing that the IMF is subject to the kinds of 
bureaucratic pathologies that characterize all large organizations. Many economists, 
on the other hand, regard the IMF as an apolitical institution that applies a range of 
prescriptions based on economic fundamentals.  
The Research Puzzles 
None of the conventional approaches can fully explain the most interesting 
question about the IMF’s lending activities: why is there so much variation in the 
Fund’s treatment of its borrowers?   
This question presumes that there is in fact wide variation in the terms of 
individual IMF loans, a contention that is resisted by some well-known observers. For 
example, Joseph Stiglitz argues that by the early 1980s the IMF and the World Bank 
had both become single-mindedly devoted to market liberalism, applying excessively 
harsh conditions that depressed the economies of developing countries and unwisely 
opened domestic markets to the vagaries of international competition. In Stiglitz’s 
view, the IMF applies a “cookie cutter” approach to stabilization and reform, 
inflexibly imposing a rigid set of fiscal, monetary, and structural conditions on 
borrowers with scant attention to particularities of different cases.5 W. Max Corden 
and Martin Feldstein presented less caustic critiques of the IMF in the wake of the 
financial crises of the late 1990s, but also suggested that Fund programs invariably 
targeted structural areas of borrowers’ economies, even when there were important 
differences in the organization of the borrowers’ economic systems.6 In some 
countries, enforcing structural changes made sense, but in others the Fund’s strategy 
                                                 
5 Stiglitz’s criticism of the IMF is wide-ranging, but he focuses particular attention on the institution’s 
inattention to country-specific conditions. For example, he describes the practice of using 
interchangeable material in country reports; for evidence, he cites the (possibly apocryphal) case of a 
country report that was delivered with the name of the previous country (from which much of the report 
was taken) left in. See Stiglitz 2003: 47.   
6 Corden, 2001; Feldstein 1998.  
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was inappropriate. These critics look at the Fund and see an inflexible institution that 
fails to appreciate the variety of economic and political conditions in the low- and 
middle-income countries that form the institution’s clientele.  
Yet the IMF is simultaneously accused of inconsistent treatment of borrowers. 
The view has a lengthy pedigree. Donald T. Regan, the first Treasury Secretary in the 
Reagan administration, told reporters in 1981 that “the IMF could be a little more 
strict with some of the larger developing countries and some of the more prominent 
less-developed countries.” Regan indicated in his comments that the US would take a 
more active interest in the Fund’s activities: “our representatives will be watching 
their lending policies, and insisting upon more strict fiscal policies and more strict 
monetary policies within the countries themselves, as conditions for the loans.”7 
Twenty years later the Meltzer Commission’s report to the US Congress argued that 
the proliferation of unwieldy and inconsistently applied targets rendered conditional 
lending ineffective. It suggested that the IMF should get out of the business of long-
term lending altogether. 
The first step in solving the puzzle is to explore the extent of variation in IMF 
conditionality. For many years scholars could not gain access to the documents that 
contained the terms of IMF agreements.8 Quantitative studies of IMF lending, 
consequently, treated the programs as constant across countries and over time. 
Qualitative work on the Fund had to infer the content of conditions from leaked 
documents and news reports.9 I take advantage of the IMF’s opening of its archives to 
                                                 
7 Hobart Rowen, “World Bank, IMF: Santas Or Scrooges?” Washington Post, September 27, 1981, H1.  
8 The IMF’s secrecy has long been recognized as an impediment for researchers interested in aspects of 
program design. Richard Eckaus noted that “there is little first-hand official information or quantitative 
data by which to judge the detailed implications of the terms of the IMF conditionality” (1982: 768). 
Jeffrey Sachs complained in 1994 that “the IMF’s performance has not been properly scrutinized” 
because “all IMF operational documents, including IMF advice as well as the terms of the loan 
agreements, are treated as confidential in perpetuity” (1994: 523).  
9 The majority of statistical research uses a dichotomous variable to measure IMF influence; see, for 
example, Vreeland, 2003.  See Kahler, 1992 and Stiles 1990, 1991 for informal attempts to measure the 
toughness of conditionality.  
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external researchers to measure variation in the terms of a large number of IMF 
lending arrangements. I focus on the three main instruments of IMF policy: the size of 
the loans given by the institution, the extent of the conditions included in lending 
agreements, and the waivers that the Fund applies to borrowers that fail to meet 
performance criteria. I can answer the first puzzle here in the introductory chapter: 
there is indeed a wide range of variation in the IMF’s treatment of countries.10 The 
evidence to support the claim is presented in the next chapter.  
The fact that there is so much variation suggests the second puzzle, which is 
central to the dissertation. This puzzle concerns the sources of variation in the IMF’s 
treatment of its members. Why, for example, did Panama receive a large loan (222 
percent of its quota) with nine binding conditions in 1983, while four months prior 
Argentina accepted a smaller loan (187 percent of quota) with thirteen binding 
conditions? Does objective economic need explain why the size of IMF loans ranges 
from 15 percent of the member’s quota (Bulgaria’s 1994 loan, for example) to 1,300 
percent of quota (Turkey’s massive 1999 program)? I argue below that the existing 
explanations we have to explain this puzzle are unsatisfying both analytically and 
empirically. I develop an alternative theoretical framework to help explain why the 
IMF systematically favors certain borrowing governments over others. The evidence 
suggests that the IMF discriminates in favor of governments with neoliberal economic 
policymakers; the theory involves a mechanism that explains why this should be the 
case.  
A third question that I take on in the dissertation concerns the effects of IMF 
programs on the political survival of top economic officials in borrowing countries. 
There is a massive literature on the impact of the Fund on economic outcomes in 
                                                 
10 Previous research has also demonstrated significant variation across countries and over time in IMF 
programs. See Edwards, 2002; Gould, 2003, 2006; Killick 1995; Killick and Malik, 1992; Stiles 1990, 
1991; Steinwand and Stone, 2008; Stone, 2002, 2004, 2008; Williamson, 1983: 358.  
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borrowing countries. Much of the sophisticated empirical research on the effects of 
conditional lending portrays the IMF as an ineffectual or even malignant institution: 
IMF programs are shown to lower GDP growth11, raise income inequality12, have 
minimal effects on inflation and fiscal and monetary targets13, and actually drive 
foreign investors away.14  
Research on the consequences of IMF programs for political processes in 
borrowing countries is by comparison underdeveloped. The theoretical framework I 
develop suggests an interesting observable implication: if the Fund favors certain 
types of policymakers, these agents have political advantages. This dissertation 
supplies a mechanism that links the presence of the IMF to the durability of neoliberal 
policymakers. The mechanism implies that the IMF has been an engine driving the 
diffusion of neoliberal economic ideas throughout the developing world in the past 
three decades.  
The Argument in Brief: How Ideas Shape the Institution’s Behavior 
The argument emerges from a set of observations about the environment in 
which the Fund operates. Unlike sovereign states in the international system, the IMF 
does not face strong competitive pressures; unlike private banks, the IMF does not 
face a serious risk that its borrowers will default on the loans. More directly, I argue 
that structural constraints do not select a set of optimal policies for the Fund. We 
cannot assume that the IMF’s interests are derived from the dynamics of the world 
economy and the constellation of state interests therein. Rather, the IMF is best viewed 
as a purposive actor in world politics that relies on a set of economic ideas to manage 
                                                 
11 Barro and Lee, 2005; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2004; Dreher, 2006; Przeworski and Vreeland, 
2000; Vreeland, 2003. 
12 Pastor, 1987, Garuda, 2000, and Vreeland, 2001; 2003 
13 Bird, 2001; Conway, 1994; Hutchison and Noy, 2003 
14 Jensen 2004. The question of whether IMF programs have any catalytic effect on private finance is 
explored in Bird and Rowlands, 2001a; Rowlands, 2001 
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uncertainty.  
What kinds of ideas shape the worldview of the IMF’s staff members and top 
management? The IMF is dominated by economists who share a set of neoliberal 
economic ideas. In the next chapter I provide a tractable definition of neoliberalism. 
The set of economic ideas that I refer to as “neoliberal” throughout the dissertation 
were crystallized in top American economics departments. The data demonstrate that 
the majority of upper level IMF officials were trained in American economics 
departments. The neoliberal ideas held by these officials help shape the institution’s 
self-defined purpose.   
The second step of the argument involves showing how the IMF’s neoliberal 
purpose actually influences the way in which the institution deals with its borrowers. I 
argue that the ability of the institution’s staff and management to calculate the 
prospects for the success of programs is limited, due in large part to the complexity of 
the political processes that shape economic policymaking. The IMF has to place bets 
based on its beliefs about the relative risk of the political and economic environment 
prevailing in the borrowing country. The Fund’s decision making process reflects, in 
part, the institution’s political preferences: it uses the tools at its disposal to support 
governments for which it has an affinity. In difficult (and frequently opaque) 
circumstances the IMF fixates on the presence (or absence) of likeminded 
policymakers; when fellow neoliberals are in charge of policymaking in a borrowing 
country, the Fund is more likely to trust the policy team and, consequently, will 
provide relatively generous loans with lenient conditions and is more likely to issue 
waivers for noncompliance with binding conditions.  
The IMF’s pattern of systematic discrimination in favor of certain types of 
policymakers has political consequences at the domestic level. The second major 
component of my argument in the dissertation focuses on the political survival of top 
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economic officials – namely, finance ministers and central bank governors – in low- 
and middle-income countries. Because neoliberal economic policymakers are able to 
extract better terms in the loans they negotiate with the IMF, neoliberals in 
governments that draw on IMF resources become particularly valuable to the political 
masters that determine their fate. The costs of removing an economic official increases 
when that individual can credibly promise to deliver tangible benefits to the leader in 
the form of better relations with the IMF. Top neoliberal economic officials can appeal 
to the fact that the IMF regards them as more credible agents of reform to bolster their 
position, thus lengthening their time in office. Since the presence of the IMF confers 
political advantages to the policymakers that share the Fund’s economic worldview, I 
argue that neoliberals have greater political influence in countries that have spent 
many years under the institution’s conditional lending programs.  
Testing the Arguments 
 All research strategies involve tradeoffs. In my view, the issue is not whether 
quantitative strategies are superior to qualitative research designs, or vice versa. The 
question of hierarchy of strategies is misplaced; increasingly, political scientists 
steeped in research methodology are arriving at the conclusion that both styles of 
analysis can be fruitfully combined in a single logic of inquiry.15 I make use of both 
quantitative data analysis and qualitative process tracing in the dissertation.  
The methodological strategy reflects my view that mechanisms are only tested 
through their observable implications. There is no reason to a priori limit the number 
of observed implications of a proposed causal mechanism by fixating on a single 
methodological tool. James Mahoney defines a mechanism as the “unobserved entity 
                                                 
15 Brady and Collier (2004) suggest that there is an emerging consensus on shared research standards 
which does not force social scientists to choose between methods of inquiry. Individual contributions in 
their edited volume take on the question of how quantitative and qualitative evidence can be 
accommodated in a single research design more directly.  
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that – when activated – generates an outcome of interest.”16 A mechanism is the 
process that lies between a set of theoretical propositions and the outcome of interest. 
We can indirectly observe the mechanism that links the IMF’s decision making 
process to the presence of neoliberal economic policymakers through correlations 
observed in large-N datasets (do borrowing governments with likeminded 
policymakers receive larger loans with fewer conditions?) and causal process 
information contained in interviews and archival materials (for, do IMF economists 
indicate that they prefer to work with governments consisting of likeminded economic 
officials?). The goal of the mixed-method strategy adopted in the dissertation is to 
increase analytical leverage by gathering lots of evidence at different levels of 
aggregation. If the evidence conforms to the observable implications from the 
proposed mechanism, then we can be reasonably confident in the explanation.17  
The first tests of the argument rely on quantitative tools and make use of new 
data on IMF treatment and economic policymakers. In order to measure three main 
aspects of treatment of borrowers, I collected documents from the IMF’s archives that 
specify the size, phasing of disbursements, and conditions for nearly every high-
conditionality agreement signed by the IMF and a borrower between 1980 and 2000.18 
The conditionality dataset I use in the quantitative analysis consists of 503 separate 
                                                 
16 Mahoney 2001: 580. There is a voluminous literature on causal mechanisms in the social sciences 
(and a wide range of definitions) which Mahoney usefully surveys.  
17 My position is strongly influenced by Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004: 10-14. I make probabilistic 
claims in the dissertation: for example, I argue that, on average, the IMF gives more generous loans 
with fewer conditions to borrowing governments with neoliberal economic officials. In contrast to 
political scientists who take a deterministic view of causation, I am not proposing that my claim 
represents a total explanation for IMF treatment in one or a few cases. There is room for the explanatory 
factor that I identify (shared economic ideas) to operate alongside other factors (such as the strategic 
importance of the borrower to the United States, etc). My main contribution is suggesting that the 
analytical foundations upon which many of the existing explanations were built are flawed, which has 
led analysts to ignore an important explanatory factor.  
18 When agreement is reached officials produce two documents (the letter of intent and memorandum of 
understanding) that are submitted to the Executive Board for approval. These documents outline the 
terms of the agreement. These documents were confidential until very recently. A handful of 
agreements have not been released to the archives by the country’s officials in the IMF.  
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agreements signed by the IMF and a borrower in the two decade window.19 The data 
allow me to create indicators for the first two aspects of IMF treatment: I measure IMF 
generosity as the size of the loan (as a percentage of the country’s quota) and the 
extent of conditionality by counting the number of binding conditions in each 
agreement.20 I also develop a measure of the IMF’s treatment of countries that fail to 
comply with conditions. I obtained a record of every decision by the Executive Board 
to issue a waiver for noncompliance between 1980 and 1997 from the IMF archives.21 
Countries that receive waivers for noncompliance (allowing them to continue to draw 
on Fund resources) experience better treatment compared to countries that have 
programs suspended.  
 To test the central arguments in the dissertation I created a dataset that covers 
the precise dates of entry into and exit from office for over 2,000 key economic 
policymakers in 90 developing countries observed between 1980 and 2000.22 My 
                                                 
19 Mine is not the first attempt to code IMF agreements, but it is the most extensive dataset. Gould 
(2003, 2006), for example, examines the number of conditions in a sample of 249 agreements from 20 
countries between 1952 and 1995; Copelovitch (2004) only considers short-term Standby Agreements 
from 47 countries between 1984 and 2003; Dreher and Jensen (2007) code 206 agreements between 
1997 and 2003 that were posted on the IMF’s website; Kang (2007) infers the number conditions from 
agreements described in the IMF Survey (1983-1997); Stone (2008) gained access to a confidential IMF 
database on the scope of IMF conditionality in agreements between 1992 and 2002. In chapter 3 I 
explain the logic of choosing 1980 as the start date for the analysis.   
20 IMF agreements contain a number of elements, including “indicative” (nonbinding) targets, prior 
actions (reforms that policymakers should initiate prior to the first disbursement), phasing of 
disbursements, and a schedule of program reviews. These additional elements may be controversial 
items in negotiations, but are relatively toothless since violation does not put the survival of the 
program into question. I focus in the dissertation on binding conditions, which, if violated, can trigger 
the suspension of the program. Binding conditions can include a range of different policy areas, 
including fiscal and monetary policy and “structural” conditions related to economic liberalization 
(dismantling of tariffs, reduction of subsidies, privatization of state-owned enterprises, etc). I draw on 
the 52 policy areas identified in Gould’s (2006) conditionality dataset to categorize each of the binding 
conditions in an agreement.  
21 There is a 10 year moving wall for Executive Board decisions (as opposed to the five year wall for 
documents related to IMF agreements).  
22 The policymakers included for each country are the executive (as identified by Goemans et al 2008), 
finance minister (in some countries referred to as economy minister), and head of the central bank. For 
some countries I also gather information on additional policymakers (planning ministers, for example) 
that are important actors in the negotiating and economic policymaking process. I identify the important 
economic policymakers by noting the name and position for each of the signatories of a country’s IMF 
agreements. Details on the development of the dataset are found in chapter 3.  
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argument depends on the ability to distinguish neoliberal policymakers that share 
causal beliefs with the Fund’s staff and management. Since it is not possible to survey 
the thousands of policymakers that comprise the dataset for their ideological self-
placement, I rely on background information that indicates the policymaker has 
internalized neoliberal ideas. A number of scholars suggest that professional training 
in American economics departments imparts a set of normative beliefs about 
economic policy that resonates with the similarly-trained staff of the IMF.23 Similarly, 
Checkel (2005) and Nelson (1990) argue that international institutions are sites of 
socialization for individuals, specifically when individuals have sustained and 
repeated contact with officials from the institution. Consequently, I identify the 
educational background and professional experience for each policymaker in the 
dataset. I code policymakers that have received a master’s degree or above from a 
highly ranked American economics department and/or have significant work 
experience with the IMF or the World Bank as “neoliberal.”24 
  The large-N analysis provides some evidence in favor of my explanation. This 
type of evidence has the advantages of demonstrating the average effect of my 
variable of interest over a large number of programs and countries over a two decade 
period and the relative strength of the effect compared to a number of indicators for 
other plausible explanations. I find that governments with a higher proportion of 
neoliberal economic policymakers benefit from better treatment by the IMF.  
                                                 
23 For example, Babb 2001; Chwieroth 2007a; Kogut and MacPherson 2008; Klamer and Colander 
1993. 
24 The next chapter provides a definition of “neoliberal,” which is a controversial term in political 
science. I rely on a number of different resources to gather information about economic policymakers, 
including direct contacts with government ministries and central banks, the CIA’s Chiefs of State and 
Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, The Statesman’s Yearbook, digital archives of the Financial 
Times and New York Times, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Who’s Who in the World, 
International Who’s Who, Proquest’s Digital Dissertations database, Gale’s Biography Resource 
Center database, Who’s Who in International Organizations, and country-specific secondary sources. 
Given the heterogeneity of sources, I cross-check the background for each policymaker against multiple 
sources to confirm that the information is correct. Again, more detail on the construction of these data is 
given in chapters 3 and 4. 
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I also use quantitative techniques to examine the covariates of political survival 
of top policymakers in developing countries. I construct a set of event history models 
to test, using the data on several thousand economic policymakers in 90 countries, 
whether neoliberal economic officials in borrowing countries survive in office longer 
than non-neoliberal officials. The survival models, in tandem with the models of 
variation in treatment, enable me to provide evidence about how much neoliberal ideas 
matter compared to other possible explanations.    
I draw on a detailed case study of the Argentina-IMF relationship over a 
quarter century (1976-2001) for more fine-grained evidence of the causal mechanisms. 
Argentina is an important case because it experiences variation in both the dependent 
variable (treatment by the IMF) and independent variable (the ideological consonance 
of policymakers and IMF officials) over time. Rather than a single observation, the 
case turns into multiple observations because of the country’s repeated experiences 
under IMF programs.25 Because the case generates multiple observations, I can 
maximize causal leverage while avoiding the pitfall of making the implausible claim 
that two countries are similar in every way except for the variable or outcome of 
interest. I use several different methods to reconstruct the IMF’s relationship with 
Argentina in order to highlight the centrality of shared and competing ideas about 
economic policy: archival research26, interviews with IMF and Argentine officials 
involved in the negotiations, and close reading of the secondary literature and news 
reports.  
Causal mechanisms, to the extent that they capture the chain that links a 
variable (or set of variables) to an outcome of interest, generate evidence at multiple 
                                                 
25 Argentina had 14 separate programs in the years between 1976 and 2001. 
26 The IMF has a twenty year moving window for documents from staff missions and internal memos 
related to Fund-borrower relations, unfortunately. Nonetheless, the amount of archival material on 
Argentina is massive – 30 boxes from the Central Files collection and 14 boxes from the Western 
Hemisphere Department’s country files.  
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levels: we should observe correlations between variables in a large sample; in 
addition, we should see evidence produced by the causal process that does not fit into 
an N × K dataset. If the explanation is important, there must be some evidence that 
IMF officials actually care about the degree of shared economic ideas in the borrowing 
country; evidence of this type can be found in interviews and archival documents.  
The Argentina case study, then, provides two distinct types of evidence in the 
dissertation. In the same way that there should be an observed correlation between the 
key explanatory variable and IMF treatment in quantitative tests, IMF’s treatment of 
Argentina should be better when the country’s top economic policymaking positions 
are occupied by neoliberals. If I observe that neoliberals received tough treatment by 
the Fund, it forces me to ask whether the explanation needs to be refined. If the facts 
of the case broadly fit the explanation, it increases our confidence that the key 
explanatory variable is not a trivial cause. And if the mechanism operates in the 
Argentine setting, we should observe references in IMF archival documents to the 
staff and management’s trust in likeminded officials, or discussion among IMF 
officials of uncertainties that they faced in designing IMF programs for various 
Argentine governments.  
It is important to note, however, that there should be a unified logic of inquiry 
in multi-method research. A research design that includes quantitative tests implies 
that relationships between variables are probabilistic. If I thought that the variable 
measuring the degree of neoliberal influence explained 100 percent of variation in 
IMF treatment, there would be no reason to include the kinds of quantitative tests that 
I use as evidence in chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation. It would be unfair, then, to 
hold the case study to deterministic standards of explanation. The large-N data 
analysis merely suggests that there is an important relationship between the presence 
of neoliberal policymakers and the IMF’s treatment of borrowing countries. Along 
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with my explanation, other factors should also influence aspects of the Fund’s 
relationship with Argentina. What the case study should do is to show that the 
explanation that focuses on shared economic ideas is a non-trivial cause. I do not (and 
cannot) show that it is the sole cause of variation in the IMF’s treatment of Argentina 
over time; rather, the case-level evidence is used to make the case that it is an 
important cause of variation.     
Roadmap of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The second chapter situates my 
explanation of the IMF’s lending behavior in the context of its alternatives. I start with 
an overview of the conventional analytical models of the IMF before explaining why 
an ideational approach to the IMF is built on better theoretical foundations than the 
alternatives. I then lay out my argument in two stages; the first step shows how 
neoliberal economists have come to shape the IMF’s purpose, and the second explains 
how this shapes the Fund’s decision making. The Fund’s staff and management have 
to make bets about the prospects that the institution’s purpose will be served in various 
contexts; they are more likely to trust policymakers that share a core set of economic 
ideas, and will adjust their treatment accordingly. 
In chapter 3 I test the explanations of the treatment of borrowers on a new 
source of data consisting of nearly IMF every agreement signed between 1980 and 
2000. In a set of statistical tests that include variables for many other plausible 
explanations of IMF behavior, an indicator of the proportion of neoliberals in 
government is strongly related to variation in IMF treatment: when dealing with 
governments with likeminded policymakers, the IMF is more likely to (1) give larger 
loans, (2) apply less onerous conditionality to the terms of loans, and (3) issue waivers 
for borrowers that miss binding targets. 
 In the fourth chapter I turn to the domestic political effects of IMF programs. 
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One of the observable implications from the theory developed in chapter 2 is that 
neoliberal policymakers should have political advantages in countries under IMF 
programs. The chapter makes use of the data on the entry and exit dates and 
biographical information on economic policymakers in 90 developing countries to test 
the argument that the political survival of neoliberal officials is extended by IMF 
programs. I develop a mechanism that links political survival to the costs that leaders 
pay when they choose to replace a top official; the presence of the IMF raises the costs 
of removing a neoliberal official who can credibly promise to deliver better relations 
with the Fund. I use the findings from a set of survival models to speculate on the role 
that the IMF has played in the spread of neoliberal economic ideas throughout the 
developing world. A straightforward test reveals that neoliberals have more influence 
over policymaking in countries that spent significant time under IMF programs.  
 I transition to a detailed case study of Argentina in chapter 5. I ask whether the 
facts of the many IMF programs signed by Argentina conform to the predictions 
generated by my theoretical framework. The chapter is organized around four distinct 
periods in recent Argentina history. In the first two episodes, the influence of 
neoliberal economists on Argentine policymaking was high (1976-81 and 1991-2001). 
In the other periods, the influence of sympathetic interlocutors varied: neoliberals 
were excluded from the policymaking process in favor of a set of policymakers that 
were skeptical of Fund’s ideas (1981-85); later, neoliberals returned to positions of 
influence in Argentina but were constrained in ways that differentiate the period from 
the first two episodes (1985-89). The logic of the chapter is comparative: I compare 
the Fund’s relationship with the Argentines across each of the four periods. Where 
possible I look for evidence from IMF negotiations with the Argentine government to 
indicate that the economic ideas held by top economic officials mattered to Fund 
economists.  
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The concluding chapter summarizes the argument and findings in the 
dissertation and discusses the implications of the research for ideational work in 
International Political Economy. I take some space in the conclusion to address 
possible alternative interpretations of the evidence presented in the empirical sections. 
The final section of chapter 6 reflects on how the findings relate to the ongoing debate 
about the future role of the IMF in the world economy. The IMF faces a legitimacy 
problem at a time when its resources are in strong demand. Proposals to reform the 
institution focus on two areas: (1) expanding the resources that it can marshal in the 
event of systemic crises and (2) redistributing the voting weight accorded to the 
country representatives on the Executive Board. That the Fund’s governance structure 
fails to reflect the true distribution of economic power in the international system is 
undeniable; however, this study implies that real change in the institution will occur 
when there is a shift in the underlying ideas held by the staff and management. 
Policymakers in developing countries recognize the need for a circulation of new ideas 
within the institution. South Africa’s long-serving finance minister, Trevor Manuel, 
recently expressed frustration with the Fund’s intellectual rigidity: “[There is] a sense 
of sameness about the people. They are all very smart. They go to the same Ivy 
League Universities and get their PhDs. It is not innovative.”27 The global economic 
crisis has opened a space for reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. The evidence 
marshaled in the dissertation implies that lasting change depends on a reorientation of 
the IMF’s purpose – and this hinges on a shift in the economic beliefs held by top 
management and staff. 
 
 
27 Quoted in Quentin Peel, “Political will for meaningful reform of IMF is still lacking,” Financial 
Times, March 17, 2009: pg. 2.  
Chapter Two  
Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding the IMF 
 In this chapter I review the various explanations for the lending activities of the 
IMF and present a new theoretical framework. Conventional explanatory frameworks 
can be placed in two categories: (1) explanations that highlight factors located within 
the institution (bureaucratic incentives and institutional culture, for example); (2) 
explanations that focus on external influences (the geopolitical interests of powerful 
states and strategic behavior of borrowers in the international system, or the interests 
of private financiers). A smaller branch of research on the IMF identifies important 
causal factors in the interaction between domestic political conditions in the borrowing 
countries and the interests of the institution.  
All explanations of political phenomena rest on an underlying set of claims 
about how agents – whether states, institutions, or individuals – perceive the world and 
their place within it. Much of the empirical research on the IMF relies on implicit 
models of the interests of the institution, its staff members, and its borrowers; for 
example, IMF officials are assumed to maximize budgets, or are assumed to respond 
to the strategic interests – which are both obvious and communicable – of the 
institution’s powerful principals. The fuzzy connections between the underlying 
theoretical framework and the empirical results in many studies of the IMF are 
problematic.1 I try to make the models animating different explanations explicit, and I 
provide a justification for a reexamination of the behavioral foundations upon which 
most of the research on the Fund rests.  
                                                 
1 Thomas Willett makes a similar argument with regard to narrow public choice analyses of the IMF. 
He argues that “a disinterested look at the evidence shows that most of these specific theories have 
some explanatory power, and that none of them have complete explanatory power. The scholarly 
community needs to begin to think more systematically about the problem” (2002: 65). Recent work by 
Stone (2002), Vreeland (2003), and Barnett and Finnemore (2004) are exceptions: each make the 
assumptions underlying the framework they use to explain the Fund’s behavior explicit (in the cases of 
Stone and Vreeland, the assumptions are formalized).  
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This theoretical framework proposed in this chapter diverges from the 
conventional approaches to the IMF’s lending activities in important ways. Because 
there is a well developed theoretical literature that focuses exclusively on the Fund, 
the first part of the chapter reviews the existing explanations in some detail. The 
remaining sections focus on my own analytical framework that I use to explain the 
IMF’s treatment of borrowing countries. The argument consists of two steps. In the 
first step I explore the IMF’s self-defined purpose. Rather than viewing the Fund as an 
institution beholden to the whims of its most powerful member states, I contend that 
the structural constraints on the Fund are much looser than typically portrayed by 
international relations specialists. Further, I argue that the IMF’s staff members and 
top management rely on a set of neoliberal economic ideas to guide the institution.  
The second step of the argument links the ideational purpose of the Fund to 
variation in the institution’s treatment of its borrowers. The dilemma face by the 
Fund’s staff and management is that the prospects for the success of a lending 
program depends not only on the correct diagnosis of the macroeconomic and 
structural problems which drove the borrower to seek Fund resources, but also on 
unpredictable, complex, and opaque political dynamics which can drive programs off 
course. The central contention of this part of the dissertation is that ideas have a 
powerful effect on how the IMF navigates the politics of conditional lending: the Fund 
has greater trust in policymakers who share neoliberal economic beliefs. The IMF 
makes a political choice to support policymaking teams with which it shares an 
affinity based on common understandings of economic stabilization and reform. 
Consequently, I expect to observe that the Fund discriminates in its treatment of 
borrowers in favor of policy teams populated with likeminded officials.  
This chapter focuses on a different way of viewing the Fund’s decision making 
process; chapters 3 and 4 present a set of tests of the observable implications from the 
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theoretical framework using new data collected from the IMF’s archives.    
The IMF as a Technocracy 
If one were to ask an average IMF economist about the sources of the 
institution’s behavior, she would likely reply that her institution attempts to design 
programs that are commensurate with the depth of macroeconomic distortions in 
borrowing countries. Political pressures are unimportant; the Fund’s decision making 
reflects the best economic theory and data available at the time. Before developing a 
model of IMF behavior that accords a central role for either domestic or international 
political forces, we should consider how the Fund’s basic economic approach to the 
resolution of balance of payments problems shapes conditional lending. The purpose 
and facilities of the IMF have evolved over time, and a detailed discussion of the 
evolution of conditionality is beyond the scope of the dissertation.2 A view of the 
Fund as an essentially apolitical institution that adjusts its advice and policy 
prescriptions according to the economic facts of the situation forms the null hypothesis 
in this study; consequently, I briefly explore some of the economic theory behind the 
IMF’s lending behavior.    
                                                
A Brief History of IMF Conditional Lending 
Lending by the Fund was justified in the Articles of Agreement, the document 
ratified by 44 countries at the Bretton Woods conference that established the financial 
architecture of the postwar era: “to give confidence to members by making the general 
resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus 
providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of 
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international 
prosperity.”  
 
2 A number of detailed histories of the IMF are available; the best include Boughton (2001), de Vries 
(1965, 1986, 1987), Horsefield (1969), and James (1996). Babb (2007), Gould (2006), and Woods 
(2006) also provide recent, useful overviews of the development of conditional lending.  
 20
It is important to note, however, that conditionality was not originally a part of 
the Fund’s mandate. The IMF emerged out of the debate between the United States 
and Britain over the structure and purpose of the new institution.3 Both sides agreed 
on the necessity of a pool of funding that would allow countries to adjust without 
resort to the competitive devaluations and exchange restrictions of the interwar 
period.4 The British delegation preferred an informal clearing union that would 
provide resources for adjustment without interference in ostensibly national econom
policymaking. Keynes’ vision was not of a semi-permanent international institution
governed by elites from powerful states; instead, “he viewed the new institution as an
essentially passive dispenser of large-scale credits, governed by rules that prevented 
substantial discretionary intervention or oversight.”
ic 
 
 
 
ences 
tence.  
                                                
5 The Americans favored a 
permanent institution, guided by representatives of national governments through a
weighted voting system, headquartered in Washington, and possessing some 
enforcement powers.6 The eventual design of the institution reflected the prefer
of the American delegates, but the issue of conditionality was not settled into the first 
decade of the Fund’s exis
 
3 The U.S. was represented at the Bretton Woods conference by Harry Dexter White, a relatively 
unknown former economics professor at Lawrence University and analyst in the Treasury Department; 
Britain’s representative was perhaps the most influential economist of the twentieth century, John 
Maynard Keynes. Why the U.S. design triumphed over the British plans is a puzzle taken up by James 
Boughton, “Why White, not Keynes? Inventing the Postwar International Monetary System,” IMF 
Working Paper WP/02/52 (March 2002). The conventional answer is summarized in a note (authorship 
unknown) recovered from White’s personal papers: “In Washington Lord Halifax once whispered to 
Lord Keynes: ‘It’s true they have all the money bags but we have all the brains’” (see Boughton 2002: 
3). Superior American power explains the outcome. Boughton contests the conventional wisdom, 
arguing that White’s plan was multilateral in orientation, which earned it broader appeal in comparison 
to Keynes’ plan that “depended on perpetuation of the system of Empire preferences and – despite 
American opposition to that system – development of a bilateral economic partnership with the United 
States” (2002: 4). For additional perspectives on the founding of the IMF, see Best, 2005; Eckes 1971; 
Helleiner, 1994: 25-50; Kahler 2002; Ikenberry, 1993.  
4 de Vries, 1985: 85-86. 
5 Kahler, 2002: 51.  
6 One of the American delegation’s central goals for the IMF was to eliminate exchange restrictions and 
multiple currency practices; this preference was enshrined in the Article VIII provision, which 
committed signatories to eliminate current account restrictions.  
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In the immediate postwar period the IMF functioned like a credit union for its 
members, whereby countries paid in funds (quotas, calculated using a complicated 
formula based mainly on the relative size of the country’s economy) for the right to 
draw on the resources of the Fund in the event of a temporary payments 
disequilibrium. From its inception the Fund had a twofold purpose: it would vet and 
sanction departures from the par value system (as well as approving the imposition of 
temporary exchange restrictions), and the institution would provide financing to make 
economic adjustment less domestically painful. From the outset, there was continued 
tension between the proponents (mainly European and Latin American) of the IMF as 
an automatic disbursement mechanism and the American vision of the IMF as an 
international institution providing oversight and financing on a conditional basis.  
Two decisions helped to establish the practice of conditionality. The first was 
the decision of March 10, 1948 to allow the Fund to reject, postpone, or subject a 
member’s request for funding to conditions if the request was not consistent with the 
Articles of Agreement.7 The second was Managing Director Ivar Rooth’s proposal in 
1952 that smaller drawings (less than 25 percent of a country’s quota) be condition-
free, while larger drawings would be subject to scrutiny by the Fund’s staff members.8 
The conditional lending guidelines agreed to in October 1952 established the Standby 
Arrangement (SBA), which would become the workhorse of conditional lending.9 
SBAs were designed to be short to medium term in length (6 to 18 months), and were 
to be disbursed gradually (“phasing”), upon compliance with previously-agreed policy 
targets (“performance criteria”).  
Once conditionality was officially adopted as part of the IMF’s mandate, the 
focus turned to the development of a financial programming model that would enable 
                                                 
7 Executive Board Decision No. 284-4; see also IMF Staff Memoranda SM/68/128, July 23, 1968.  
8 See Gould, 2006: 46-48. 
9 Executive Board Decision No. 155-(52/57), October 1, 1952.  
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staff members to design semi-uniform programs that could help borrowers resolve 
their payment problems and ensure the timely repayment of loans.10 Largely based on 
experiences in Mexico and Chile in the late 1940s and early 1950s, an economist in 
the IMF’s research department named Jacques Polak proposed a simple economic 
approach that focused on excess domestic demand as the source of balance of 
payments disequilibrium.11 The Polak model formed the intellectual grounding for the 
conditional lending facilities of the next half century.12  
That is not to say that the Fund’s approach to conditionality remained static. 
As conditions in the world economy changed, the Fund adapted by developing new 
lending facilities. When the Fund’s constituency permanently shifted from wealthy 
democracies to developing countries in the early 1970s, a longer-term facility (the 
Extended Fund Facility, or EFF) was created to “address the problems of members 
whose balances of payments could be turned around only over an extended period.”13 
Conditional lending was reviewed in 1978 and 1979 over concerns about unequal 
treatment of developing countries.14 The policy approved in March 1979 maintained 
                                                 
10 This search for a more uniform approach to conditionality is emphasized in the 1968 conditionality 
review: “as an increasing number of members began, after 1956, to turn to the Fund for assistance in 
meeting balance of payments problems, it was realized that the most fruitful way in which the Fund 
could render this assistance was to support, by means of a standby arrangement, the implementation of 
a specific set of policies designed to rectify the imbalance.” Memoranda to Members of the Executive 
Board, SM/68/128, July 23, 1968.  
11 Woods, 2006: 40-43; see also Babb, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 51-55. Each author notes 
that the attraction of the Polak model was enhanced by its simplicity and measurability: according to 
Woods (2006: 41), “the great advantage of Polak’s new approach was that it used data on assets and 
liabilities in the banking system, which were more widely available and reliable than the national 
accounts data that other previous approaches to analyzing the balance of payments required.”  
12 Fischer 1997 gives a succinct overview of the IMF’s conceptual approach to balance of payments 
disequilibrium. See also R.R. Rhomberg and H.R. Heller, “The Monetary Approach to the Balance of 
Payments: A Survey of the Fund’s Contribution to the Literature,” DM/77/25, March 21, 1977. 
Critiques of the monetary approach are plentiful; examples include Bacha 1987; Krugman and Taylor 
1978; Scheetz 1988; Bird 1996; Easterly 2006. 
13 Polak, 1994: 8. The EFF was created in 1974, and enabled signatories to draw on Fund resources over 
three years. 
14 The perception of unequal treatment had been a sensitive issue following the UK’s standby in 1967, 
which was a large drawing that contained no binding conditions. In a statement before the Managing 
Director, the Brazilian Executive Director Alexandre Kafka called this agreement a “watershed,” noting 
“that standby brought the Fund holdings of the member’s currency practically to the 200 percent mark, 
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that “while no general rule as to the number and content of performance criteria can be 
adopted in view of the diversity of problems and institutional arrangements of 
members, only in special circumstances will performance criteria relate to other than 
macroeconomic variables.”15  
Global economic conditions quickly deteriorated after the 1979 guidelines 
were accepted, and the scope of conditions was expanded to include “structural” 
targets. Staff members came to recognize that distortionary policies often aggravated 
payments crises, and that macroeconomic reforms were not likely to be sustainable in 
the absence of deeper reforms.16 By the time the Structural Adjustment Fund was 
established in 198617 many programs included conditions related to domestic credit 
creation, government spending (and sometimes revenue creation), foreign borrowing, 
and exchange restrictions, as well as structural conditions for eliminating subsidies, 
freeing prices of goods, trade liberalization, and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises.  
 A review of the theoretical background of the IMF’s conditional lending 
implies that the Fund has built an approach to conditionality based on economic 
fundamentals. There is no reason to look for political influence if the Fund’s staff and 
management respond only to objective economic criteria in an effort to maximize the 
utility of the institution. Economic conditions are uncertain and programs can go off 
track, but the IMF makes a good-faith effort to achieve positive outcomes in countries 
in need of balance of payments support.   
                                                                                                                                            
which was then considered the effective maximum available. Nevertheless, the staff proposed neither 
phasing nor performance criteria. While their proposal was supported by the Executive Board, it was 
also noted that a similar absence of conditionality had not been available to most other members.” 
Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, EBM/86/190, December 3, 1986.  
15 Memorandum to the Executive Board, SM/78/296, December 15, 1978.  
16 The Fund’s internal review of structural conditionality emphasized that, by the mid-1980s, most of 
the staff and management were in agreement that structural reforms were necessary to restore economic 
growth. Memorandum to the Executive Board, SM/01/60, supplement 2, February 16, 2001.   
17 The SAF was replaced by the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fund (ESAF) in 1987; the ESAF was 
replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in 1999.  
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 But economic policymaking – either at the domestic or international level – is 
unavoidably political.18 Accepting this makes the task of understanding the IMF more 
difficult, but allows us to develop a more realistic model of the institution’s decision 
making process. In contrast to a purely technocratic explanation, cross-national 
evidence suggests that political variables, which had previously been treated as 
“residual variation which is left unexplained by economic characteristics,” are in fact 
important determinants of Fund behavior.19 I turn now to perspectives that focus on 
the politicization of IMF lending.  
Politicization of Fund Lending Practices I: Internal Influences 
 If the IMF is prone to political influences, where do those influences emerge, 
and how do they shape the relationship with borrowers? A common approach looks 
within the institution for the determinants of the institution’s activities. Within this 
broad framework, three types of explanations have been posited.  
The first explanation treats the IMF as captive to the rent-seeking behavior of 
individual staff members. Dreher and Vaubel provide a succinct summary of the 
public choice approach: “the International Monetary Fund is a bureaucracy and ought 
to be analyzed as such. According to the economic theory of bureaucracy, bureaucrats 
try to maximize their budget, staff, discretion, and amenities.”20 One of the observable 
implications from the public choice perspective is that the Fund’s lending behavior is 
influenced by exogenous tightening and loosening of constraints on the institution’s 
bureaucrats. For example, during periods when states’ quota contributions are being 
reviewed, the Fund’s staff engages in “hurry-up” lending to obtain a quota increase.21 
Alternatively, when the demand for IMF credit grows, the staff uses this opportunity 
                                                 
18 This is similar to a central argument in Jonathan Kirshner’s edited volume, which is that “monetary 
phenomena are always and everywhere political” (2003: 3).  
19 Bird 1995.  
20 Dreher and Vaubel 2004: 26-27.  
21 Vaubel 1991. 
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to push for greater influence (conditionality) and disbursements.22 
The staff’s autonomy is relatively unconstrained in the public choice model of 
IMF behavior. A second theoretical framework that focuses on the internal dynamics 
of the institution treats the staff’s autonomy as a variable. Martin (2007) draws on a 
principal-agent framework to explain variation in conditionality. The principals in her 
model are the powerful states that express their interests through representation in the 
Executive Board.23 The terms of lending programs proposed by the staff members are 
subject to approval by the Executive; in practice, the Board rarely questions the 
proposals from the staff.24 Nonetheless, Martin takes the possibility of Executive 
Board influence seriously, arguing that the staff’s autonomy depends primarily on the 
heterogeneity and content of powerful members’ interests. The staff has significant 
autonomy when major member states’ interests diverge, when powerful states dislike 
the status quo, and when states believe that their preferences are aligned with the 
preferences of the staff. Evidence indicates that these conditions are frequently 
satisfied: “overall, the process by which the IMF makes decisions on 
conditionality…show[s] that the staff does, in fact, have substantial autonomy and 
                                                 
22 Dreher and Vaubel, 2004: 31.  
23 State interests are represented through the 24 Executive Directors (EDs) that constitute the Executive 
Board. Eight EDs represent their own countries (the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, 
China, and Russia). The remaining EDs represent their own country as well as the countries in their 
region. Regional definitions are loose: for example, the Swiss ED represents Azerbaijan and other 
central Asian states; the Canadian ED represents the Caribbean states.  
24 The Executive Board votes on official Fund policies, with voting rights weighted by quotas (which 
are determined in a complex formula that includes the size of the country’s economy). Policy changes 
require an 85 percent majority – since the US has 17 percent of the votes, it has an effective veto. 
However, voting on lending proposals from the staff is informal and recorded on an up-or-down basis. 
The Board never rejects a staff proposal. The only post-1973 example of official intervention by the 
Executive Directors to modify the content of a proposed loan occurred in 1979, when the Board reduced 
the size of a proposed loan for Sierra Leone (Gould 2006: 235, fn. 7; Kapur et al 1997: 496). 
Interestingly, the World Bank’s Executive Directors are more active. Catherine Weaver notes that 
between 1990 and 1993 the American EDs in the Bank voted against staff proposals on 22 occasions 
and abstained 98 times (2008: 53). Nonetheless, all 120 loan proposals were eventually approved. The 
evidence from the Bank suggests that there are limits on the power of member states to shape the 
content of loans, a theme that is explored with reference to the Fund in the next section of the chapter.  
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influence.”25 Given their apparent independence, what do staff members want? For 
Martin, the IMF’s staff and management “are driven primarily by economic 
(‘technocratic’) considerations.”26 
The third explanation also focuses on the internal operations of the Fund, but 
adopts a different view of the interests of the institution’s individual staff members. 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that the IMF’s behavior is a function of its 
bureaucratic culture, rather than budget- and discretion-maximizing behavior or purely 
technocratic concerns. Within the wide range of action accorded to the IMF by states, 
the institution’s behavior is mainly shaped by the training of its staff members and the 
rules and practices that are part of the IMF’s culture.27 The interests of the Fund’s 
economists are shaped by the expertise they possess, knowledge that “alerts 
individuals to the problems that exist in the world, the connections between these 
problems, and the appropriate solutions to these problems.”28  
Internally-oriented approaches have weaknesses. Some contend that they 
portray an unreasonably autonomous institution, as outlined in the following section. I 
argue that a major drawback of these approaches is that they are too indeterminate: 
while Martin’s (2007) and Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) models can explain broad 
shifts in the Fund’s approach to conditionality, they provide few observable 
implications related to the cross-national variation in IMF treatment.29 The public 
                                                 
25 Martin, 2007: 164.  
26 Martin, 2007: 142.  
27 According to Barnett and Finnemore, states delegate to international organizations “tasks which they 
cannot perform themselves and about which they have limited knowledge…IOs are conferred authority, 
and this authority enables them to use discursive and institutional resources to induce other to defer to 
their judgment” (2004: 22, 29).  
28 Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 67. This does not mean that the analytical models they employ are 
“correct” in an objective sense, although Barnett and Finnemore admit that Fund programs are 
“undergirded by a body of economic analysis that is accepted by a large number of economists in many 
countries” (2004: 68).  
29 In Barnett and Finnemore’s defense, their main interest is explaining broad patterns in IMF 
conditionality over time. I would argue that the more interesting questions relate to the wide cross-
national variation in the terms of the IMF’s treatment of borrowers, which is explored in more detail in 
the next chapter.  
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choice explanation, on the other hand, portrays a spare and unrealistic image of IMF 
staff members.30 I agree with Barnett and Finnemore that the fact that the Fund is 
dominated by American-trained economists has important consequences. The 
theoretical framework I develop in following sections generates more specific 
observable implications about the behavior of the Fund based on the notion that IMF 
officials share a set of economic beliefs. 
Politicization of Fund Lending Practices II: External Influences 
 The explanations surveyed in the previous section presume that the Fund is 
relatively insulated from external pressures. This runs strongly against a fundamental 
approach to the study of international relations. For realists, states are the core units of 
analysis in international politics. States are primarily oriented to maximizing their own 
interests, which are derived from the anarchic structure of the international system; 
since security is scarce, states will use international institutions to protect and advance 
their interests.31 Several empirical studies of IMF lending suggest that powerful 
countries – namely, the United States – frequently intervene in the Fund’s 
operations.32 In Randall Stone’s influential studies of lending in Eastern Europe and 
sub-Saharan Africa, the treatment of borrowers varies according to their strategic 
importance to the United States.33 Important countries were able to get gentler 
                                                 
30 See Willett 2002.  
31 For fundamental realist perspectives on international institutions see Gruber 2000; Strange 1983; 
Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994. The realist view of international institutions is contested by Keohane 
(1984) and Ikenberry (1993, 2001), among others. Because institutions such as the IMF provide benefits 
that would be very costly to provide unilaterally, powerful states are willing to delegate to these 
organizations. States like the U.S. are restrained from constantly intervening in the activities of 
international institutions because effective, credible institutions are in their interests.   
32 Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Harrigan, Wang, and El-Said, 2005; Momani, 2004; 
Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Stone, 2002, 2004; Thacker, 1999. Proxies for U.S. interest in this line of 
research include voting similarity within the UN General Assembly (Barro and Lee, Dreher and Jensen, 
Oatley and Yackee, Thacker), foreign aid (Stone, Oatley and Yackee), bilateral trade with the U.S. 
(Barro and Lee), and a variable indicating whether a country signed a peace treaty with Israel (Harrigan, 
Wang, and El-Said). 
33 Stone 2002, 2004. Stone’s measure of strategic importance is the amount of U.S. aid given to a 
country.  
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treatment; for example, “both Russian and Ukrainian officials pointed to their special 
relationship with the United States as the key reason why they could afford to flout 
IMF conditions.”34 
Others focus more on Wall Street than the State and Treasury Departments.35 
The IMF’s resources are frequently insufficient to cover the financing gap that a 
borrower faces. A significant portion of many IMF rescue packages is provided by 
supplementary financiers – either commercial banks, creditor states, or other 
multilateral lending institutions. If Citibank, for example, contributed $500 million to 
an IMF-led rescue package, we might expect that the bank’s preferences were 
communicated to the Fund’s staff and management during the negotiation process. 
Consequently, the IMF’s treatment of borrowers should reflect in part the preferences 
of those supplementary financiers. 
Empirical research has not been very clear on how the interests of external 
actors are transmitted to the staff and management of the Fund.36 Three transmission 
mechanisms are possible. The Executive Board is the avenue for strategic interests 
built into the IMF’s institutional architecture. The distribution of votes among the 
Executive Directors is determined in a complex formula that, in theory, reflects the 
relative importance of each member states in the world economy.37 Five countries – 
the U.S., UK, Germany, France, and Japan – have a majority of the votes, with the 
                                                 
34 Stone, 2002: 238. Stone’s main argument is about political interference by the U.S., but his research 
also highlights domestic political factors, such as partisanship and government stability, that influence 
IMF lending.  
35 Broz and Hawes, 2006; Copelovitch, 2004; Gould, 2003, 2006. The evidence from this emerging area 
of research is somewhat unclear. Gould (2003, 2006) finds that the inclusion of what she calls “bank-
friendly” conditions in IMF agreements is influenced by private financiers; however, this argument is 
not tested on other aspects of IMF treatment. Results presented in Gould 2006 indicate that the more a 
borrower is indebted to creditor states, the fewer conditions are included in agreements. Copelovitch 
(2004) suggests that the composition of a borrower’s private debt affects the influence of both private 
creditors and powerful states on IMF treatment.  
36 Stone 2002 is an exception; see also Woods 2003.  
37 How well current arrangements actually mirror the global distribution of economic power is 
debatable. Many observers object to a voting system in which Belgium and the Netherlands have more 
power than China and India. 
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United States controlling the largest share (around 17 percent). Based on the 
distribution of voting power, we might expect to find that the U.S. and other powerful 
members use the architecture of the Executive Board to influence the terms of the 
loans given by the Fund.  
However, the power of the Executive Directors vis-à-vis the staff and 
management is circumscribed. Voting on lending proposals from the staff is informal 
and recorded on an up-or-down basis, and the Board almost always unanimously 
approves proposed lending programs.38 This fact is not enough to prove the weakness 
of the Board, because it may still have significant gatekeeping power. Perhaps the 
Board does not have to reject the staff’s proposals because, by the time proposals are 
brought for discussion by the Executive Directors, the preferences of the powerful 
Board members have already been incorporated by the staff in the program’s design. 
Ngaire Woods, for example, argues that the institution’s staff members “would 
virtually never present a recommendation which risked US disapproval.”39 This 
implies that the Executive Directors (EDs) from powerful countries such as the U.S. 
are in contact with staff members during the negotiation process over loans, and are 
able to communicate their home country’s preferences to the economists.40 To the 
extent that powerful states exert influence on the content of IMF programs, the 
pressure is likely to take place informally through back channels. Location and 
                                                 
38 See footnote 24 in this chapter.  
39 Woods 2003: 107. Barnett and Finnemore make a similar claim: “[staff members] rarely send 
proposals to the board that they believe it will reject” (2004: 50).  
40 Personal interviews confirmed that staff are aware of the general preferences of Board members and 
will rarely propose a program that has major sticking points for the EDs. Because of their politically 
sensitive positions, none of the Executive Directors I interviewed wanted to be identified by name. 
Several interviewees described informal lobbying by EDs about aspects of programs. One Executive 
Director from a European country argued that the staff and the managing director will not allow a 
proposal to be brought before the Board if they feel that the program does not have adequate support 
(Executive Director Interview No. 4, January 17, 2008). Other Executive Directors described programs 
that have been supported despite vociferous opposition from powerful members; one mentioned that 
certain EDs promise to “make some noise” during Board meetings if they do not like aspects of the 
proposal, but that these proposals are approved nonetheless (Executive Director Interview No. 6, 
January 24, 2008).   
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resources matter: the IMF is headquartered several blocks from the White House and 
the Treasury Department, and the United States’ “extensive diplomatic corps” enable 
it to expend time and energy to lobby individual staff members and keep them 
apprised of U.S. interest in specific lending arrangements.41 
Evidence, however, suggests that the staff have been able to wrest control of 
the crucial aspects of the lending process from the Executive Directors. Only the 
Executive Director representing a borrowing country is part of the negotiation 
process.42 EDs frequently complain that they are not briefed by staff members during 
missions to prospective borrowers. The Board meeting in which the Letter of Intent is 
discussed may be the first time that Directors have seen the content of the final version 
of the agreement. This has long been a problem for country representatives on the 
Board: in a January 1987 memo from the Saudi Executive Director Yusuf Nimatallah 
to Sterie Beza, Associate Director of the Western Hemisphere Department, the 
Executive Director complained that “members of the Board are put in an embarrassing 
position every time their authorities learn before them in detail about important 
country adjustment programs supported by the Fund.” Referring to the withholding of 
information about lending arrangements with Mexico and Argentina, Nimatallah 
stated: “I do not appreciate the Board to be perceived as a rubber stamp that learns 
about cases only after the whole world has learned there is an ‘agreement’ between the 
Fund and member countries.”43  
Alternatively, powerful states might be able to influence the Fund’s behavior 
by influencing staffing decisions. As I discuss in more detail in the next section of this 
                                                 
41 Randall Stone refers to this as “informal governance” of the IMF. Stone, 2008: 595 (quote).  
42 Stone 2008: 595. In nearly every interview I conducted the Executive Director described his or her 
role as a mediator between the borrowing country and the IMF during the negotiation process. The ED 
acts as a liaison, explaining the staff’s position to the negotiator and alerting the staff members to the 
government’s preferences.  
43 Office Memorandum from Yusuf A. Nimatallah (Executive Director) to Sterie Beza (Associate 
Director, Western Hemisphere Department), “Argentina,” January 16, 1987.  
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chapter, while the vast majority of the staff are not from English-speaking countries, 
most of the IMF’s economists are trained in economics departments in the United 
States and Britain.44 One implication of the prevalence in the IMF and World Bank of 
American-trained economists is that “US ‘knowledge’ is embedded in both 
international financial institutions and is yet another instrument through which US 
economic and political interests are furthered.”45 
The third mechanism of external influence is essentially functionalist. 
According to Gould, “supplementary financing is often crucial for the success of 
individual Fund programs, because the Fund only provides a fraction of the amount of 
money necessary for a borrowing country to balance its payments and implement the 
Fund-designed program successfully.”46 Because the Fund’s management works to 
cobble together additional private funding to supplement its resources, private 
financiers can informally apply pressure to influence the content of agreements. 
Statistical analyses have demonstrated a relationship between indicators of 
external interest and aspects of IMF treatment, but the mechanisms linking the 
strategic interests of the United States and the preferences of private and official 
creditors to the behavior of the Fund are not always clear.47 Evidence for the influence 
of supplementary financiers is limited.48  In some high-profile cases, the influence of 
                                                 
44 For example, nearly 90 percent of PhD economists hired in 1996 earned the degree in an American or 
Canadian economics department (see Clark 1996).   
45 Woods 2003: 108.  
46 Gould, 2003: 555. The IMF adopted “concerted lending” as a strategy during the debt crisis of the 
early 1980s to keep private capital flowing to debtors from highly exposed banks. The collective action 
problem inherent to this strategy was a major obstacle; for example, when the Mexican crisis erupted in 
August 1982 over 500 creditor banks were involved in the effort led by the Fund’s managing director, 
Jacques de Larosiere (Boughton, 2001: 309).  
47 This point is also made by Ngaire Woods, who writes that “the findings from correlations between 
U.S. preferences and IMF lending patterns suggest that U.S. influence is significant in the institution but 
that it is difficult to precisely track” (2006: 36).  
48 Empirical research on this model of IMF behavior is just emerging. As I discuss in the next chapter, 
there are issues with the measures of financial influence used in this line of research; in addition, the 
mechanisms linking private financiers to the decision making process within the IMF are unclear. 
Gould admits that the influence of supplementary financiers “is often at the margins” (2003: 561).  
 32
the United States is obvious – meddling by American officials in the Russian 
agreements in the mid-1990s and the Korean bailout in 1997, for example, has been 
adequately demonstrated.49 Other cases demonstrate the limits of international 
influence. In January 1983 the IMF approved a loan to Argentina, despite the fact that 
the Argentines maintained discriminatory exchange practices against one of the 
institution’s more influential members, Britain.50 The Fund refused to buckle under 
strong pressure from the U.S. Treasury to restore a suspended program to Argentina in 
1988.51 It extended the largest loan in its history up to that point – with few conditions 
– to India in 1981 against the heavy resistance expressed by American policymakers.52 
The Executive Board approved a waiver for non-observance of a number of 
performance criteria in a 1994 Standby Arrangement with Vietnam despite the a litany 
of concerns about the program detailed by Karin Lissakers, the American ED, and the 
United States’ official abstention from the Board’s decision.53  
Much of the IMF’s lending activities take place in countries that are peripheral 
to American strategic interests. As noted above, there are instances that suggest that 
American influence is limited even in large countries.54 The role of external pressures 
is ultimately an empirical question, and in the following chapters I subject these 
                                                 
49 Stone, 2002: 128-45; Blustein, 2001.  
50 The Argentine case is discussed in detail in chapter 5.   
51 See Boughton, 2001: 472-75; Polak, 1994: 32-37; Woods 2006: 51.  
52 The Washington Post reported that “the United States appears to be making an effort to put the brakes 
on a scheduled $5.5 billion loan to India, the biggest in IMF's history - which according to IMF insiders 
is being made ‘without agonizing conditions.’ For the United States, the IMF loan to India (which over 
the years has been IDA's biggest client) appears to epitomize all of its complaints about the unecessary 
generosity of both the World Bank and the IMF.” Treasury Secretary Regan added the following public 
statement: “I'm just suggesting that there are a lot of questions about the loan to India. There are a lot of 
questions about it that we'll have to ask, because if we don't, they will be asked for us by our friends on 
the Hill.” Hobart Rowen, “World Bank, IMF: Santas Or Scrooges?” The Washington Post, September 
27, 1981, pg. H1.  
53 Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, EBM/94/52, June 8, 1994.  
54 Additionally, new research on the evolution of conditionality and the IMF’s position on capital 
account liberalization minimize the role that the U.S. played in internal organizational shifts. See Gould 
2006 on conditionality and Abdelal 2007, Chwieroth 2008, and Leiteritz 2005 on capital account 
openness.  
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explanations to tough tests. I argue that the evidence is most consistent with Woods’ 
argument that the U.S. sets the broad parameters in which the institution operates; 
within these expansive parameters, the IMF can pursue a wide range of activities.55  
International and Domestic Interactions 
Other research treats conditional lending as a bargain struck between the IMF 
and a borrowing government.56 The work described in the preceding pages focuses on 
the Fund-side of the bargain. Given that programs are the outcome of negotiations 
between the Fund and government officials, it seems important to consider domestic-
level factors that might influence how the government views the Fund, and vice versa. 
Inspired by pioneering work in the interaction of domestic and international levels, a 
handful of scholars have turned to domestic institutions – broadly defined – to explain 
treatment by the IMF.57 The list of “important” domestic institutional variables is 
large and growing. Researchers have identified regime type, fractionalization in 
national legislatures, partisanship, the presence of veto players, and the election c
as possible determinants of outcomes in IMF negotiations.
ycle 
58 
                                                
There is a common logic to this line of research. The international institution 
and the government want to maximize the utility they derive from the relationship, but 
 
55 Woods writes that “powerful countries define the outer perimeter within which each organization 
works…This sets down a general direction for the institution, but seldom defines the detail of what each 
of the IMF and World Bank do” (2006: 180).   
56 Boughton 2006: 20; Conway 2006.  
57 Foundational efforts to conceptualize the interaction of domestic and international levels can be found 
in Katzenstein 1978 and Gourevitch 1978. Important extensions to international institutions, inspired by 
Schelling 1960, include Putnam 1988 and Milner 1997.   
58 On regime type, see Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006, Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000, Smith and 
Vreeland, 2006; on fractionalization, Edwards, 2002 and Stone, 2002; on partisanship, Pop-Eleches, 
2003, Stone 2002, 2004; on veto players, Vreeland 2003; on elections, Dreher, 2006. Interactive models 
of IMF-borrower relations present a dilemma: there is a huge variety of domestic factors that could be 
expected to have some kind of impact on the design of IMF programs. Unless the implicit assumptions 
that motivate the IMF and domestic actors are examined, the line of research will look less like a 
coherent research program and more like “an almost endless list of domestic conditions, institutions, 
bargaining tactics, personalities, and factors that might ‘matter.’” Beth Simmons expressed this caution 
in her study of international monetary cooperation during the interwar period. See Simmons 1994: 283. 
Robert Putnam expressed a similar concern about “ad hoc lists of countless ‘domestic influences’ on 
foreign policy” (1988: 430). 
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both sides operate under constraints. It is typically assumed that the Fund prefers to 
expand its influence over domestic policymaking and wants its programs to be 
successful. A major obstacle to the Fund’s ability to maximize its utility is that the 
borrowing government possesses private information about its “true” commitment to 
the program, and has incentives to misrepresent its degree of commitment in order to 
obtain the best possible terms.59 Domestic institutional variables are important 
because they can mitigate – but not eliminate – the information problem: for example, 
the IMF observes that governments are more likely to pursue profligate policies in the 
run up to elections; governments dominated by left parties are less likely to be able to 
carry out painful adjustment measures; regimes with fewer veto players might be more 
insulated from societal pressures to scale back reforms, and so on. If the IMF is a 
strategic actor, domestic factors should influence its treatment of borrowers: the 
design of programs should reflect the level of predictable political risk that the IM
takes on when it ex
F 
tends a loan.60  
                                                
An Alternative Perspective: Ideas and the Purpose of the Fund 
 The conventional explanations are spotlights: they illuminate one part of the 
institution’s behavior while many other important aspects of the Fund’s decision 
making process remain obscured. Proponents of a technocratic view of the IMF rightly 
observe that the Fund has an underlying economic model that shapes its basic 
approach to economic stabilization and reform in the developing world – but they fail 
to recognize that its decision making process cannot be isolated from political 
dynamics. The political explanations that focus exclusively on the institution itself – 
portraying the Fund as in thrall to the interests of bureaucrats or external actors – miss 
half the story: we need to understand something about the characteristics of the 
 
59 Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991; Kahler 1992: 102.  
60 Koremenos 2005 develops a similar idea in her model of institutional design in the presence of weak 
information about the future behavior of states.  
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borrower as well as the IMF. Research that highlights the interaction between the 
domestic and international levels fixes attention on the domestic political institutions 
and processes that provide information to the Fund and influence borrowing 
governments’ negotiating strategies. But this view ignores the way in which the ideas 
held by IMF economists shape how the institution interprets signals about the political 
environment in the borrowing country.    
 The effort to develop a different model of IMF lending behavior starts with the 
observation that the Fund is less constrained by structural forces than is typically 
recognized. Over time the Fund’s staff members have attained significant autonomy, 
as evinced by the relative weakness of the Executive Directors. Back channels may 
provide informal means of control of the Fund’s agenda for interested governments in 
powerful member states, but the numerous episodes in which the Fund made decisions 
that were opposed by the United States (or other important countries) suggest that 
there are limits to states’ abilities to meddle in the lending process. The IMF should 
not be treated as simply a foreign policy instrument of the U.S. Treasury or Citibank.61  
Nor should the Fund’s strategic environment be confused with that facing the 
institution’s member states. Realists argue that states within the international system 
are constrained by competitive pressures “in a way analogous to the manner in which 
the range of choices presented to consumers and firms is expressed by market forces 
that derive from the collective behavior of all participants but that are beyond the 
control of any particular actor.”62 Unlike sovereign states the Fund does not face 
                                                 
61 Even scholars writing on the IMF that are sympathetic to the realist view of international institutions 
admit that the Fund has significant autonomy. For example, Randall Stone argues that “in ordinary 
times, the United States and other shareholders have no compelling interest in intervening in the details 
of conditionality, and the Fund creates policies autonomously” (2008: 593). Many have observed a 
congruence “between IMF conditions and U.S. material and strategic interests” (Kirshner 2003: 279). 
But the fact that the U.S. generally approves of the Fund’s policies does not mean that the institution is 
the handmaiden of its most powerful member.  
62 Kirshner 2007: 19. Note that Kirshner is illustrating (not advocating) the claim that the anarchic 
international system is analogous to a competitive market, a view that was popularized most forcefully 
by Waltz (1979).  
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threats to its survival from competing institutions.63 The Fund’s resources dwarf those 
possessed by the regional development banks.64 Despite its extensive involvement 
with poor countries since the late 1970s, the IMF is not a development organization 
like its neighbor on H Street in Washington, the World Bank, or the other bilateral and 
multilateral foreign aid organizations. The only potential alternative sources of 
funding for countries that might need Fund resources are private capital markets or 
creditor states. Because capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical, low and middle income 
countries that are in economic trouble frequently find that the IMF is their only 
economic lifeline.65 For many of the Fund’s client states, access to private capital is 
limited even when global financial conditions are benign.   
The IMF is far less constrained in its activities than profit-seeking private 
agents. Investors in developing countries have to consider the possibility that 
borrowers will renege on their debts. It is reasonable to assume that investors that want 
to turn a profit (which is to say all investors that plan to keep their jobs) will rationally 
update their beliefs about the type of government based on its observed 
                                                 
63 Attempts to create alternative multilateral lending arrangements have not made much headway. In 
1976 a consortium of six private American banks attempted to impose conditionality in exchang
additional loans, but the banks were spectacularly unsuccessful in enforcing the conditions and 
eventually Peru was forced to go to the Fund (Rodrik 1996: 179). In the early 1980s the Ande
Reserve Fund was proposed as an alternative to the IMF in Latin America, but few countries 
contributed funding; only in 1991 did a new country, Costa Rica, join. Japan’s proposal to create
Asian Monetary Fund af
e for 
an 
 an 
ter the financial crisis of 1997-98 was stymied by American opposition 
 
apan, the U.S. and the core EU countries, pledged to 
y 
 
 
, 2008; “Rebuffed by China, Pakistan May Seek IMF Aid,” The New York Times, 
(Kirshner 2003: 279).   
64 As of writing the IMF has just over $250 billion in resources to distribute to its members. During the
April 2009 G20 meetings member states, led by J
more than triple the Fund’s available resources.  
65 The recent experience of Pakistan offers lessons in this regard. Following the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in September 2008, the Pakistani central bank’s reserves dwindled to just $3.4 billion b
November, an amount that only covers one month of imports. Pakistan sought funds from the United 
States, which has a strong security interest in backing the stability of the government, and from China, 
which possessed over $1 trillion in reserves and had provided a $500 billion bilateral loan in 1996 when
Pakistan teetered on the brink of default. Neither the Americans nor the Chinese were willing to help 
President Zardari’s government, and Pakistan was forced to turn to the IMF for a $7.6 billion standby 
arrangement. See Jane Perlez, “Monetary Fund Approves $7.6 billion Loan to Pakistan,” The New York
Times, November 25
October 19, 2008.  
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performance.66 But unlike private investors, the Fund does not face the risk that its 
borrowers will default. It has preferred creditor status, meaning that by custom IMF 
loans are repaid before any other outstanding (including private) debts.67 Only a 
handful of countries that experienced severe economic or political trauma have fa
into protracted arrears
llen 
 to the IMF.68  
                                                
There is another way in which the IMF is insulated from external political 
pressures. The IMF does not depend on contributions from member states to fund its 
operations.69 Rather, the budget for the institution comes from the interest paid by 
members that make purchases of IMF currency. At intervals (usually every five years) 
the quotas for member states are increased, and in the United States any changes must 
be approved by the legislature, but the Fund “does not have to negotiate on a regular 
basis with states and, more importantly, rely on nonexpert branches of government 
like the U.S. Congress, which would have to appropriate money.”70  
The upshot is that structural pressures do not select a set of optimal policies for 
 
66 See Tomz 2007 (esp. chapter 2, pp. 14-36).  
67 Stone 2002: 11.  
68 In 2002 five countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe 
– were more than six months behind in loan repayments (the point at which the IMF considers a country 
to be in protracted arrears). The five countries accounted for 98 percent of all overdue obligations. 
Zimbabwe has remained in arrears to the Fund since 2001. Woods notes that the repayment problem 
was more pressing at the end of the 1980s, when 11 countries were in protracted arrears (2006: 165). 
However, the point remains: nearly all countries eventually clear their debts to the Fund.  
69 Funding is another way in which the IMF is distinguished from the World Bank. The Bank is split 
into several agencies; most of the Bank’s activities in developing countries are through the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association 
(IDA). The IBRD is funded through the sale of triple-A rated bonds to private investors; the IDA, which 
focuses on lending to the world’s poorest countries, is funded through payments by donor countries. 
Both sources of funding increase the leverage of the United States over the Bank’s activities compared 
to the Fund. Weaver points out that during the postwar era “nearly 85 percent of the Bank bonds sold on 
private capital markets were denominated in American dollars and traded on U.S. markets. This 
theoretically meant that the United States could influence the Bank’s policy and practices by 
threatening to deny it access to the U.S. private capital market” (2008: 51). The U.S. contribution to the 
IDA has to be approved annually by Congress.  
70 Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 49-50. It is worth noting that the Fund also has in its reserves 3,217 
metric tons of gold, valued (in March 2009) at just under $100 billion. The Fund’s large gold holdings 
reflect a historical quirk: in 1945, the institution’s new members were required to pay a quarter of their 
first quota in gold. Some members also chose to repay their loans in gold during the Bretton Woods 
period.   
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the Fund. We cannot assume that the IMF’s interests are derived from the dynamics of 
the world economy and the constellation of state interests therein. Rather, I argue that 
the IMF should be viewed as a purposive actor in world politics that relies on a set of 
economic ideas to manage uncertainty. In order to understand how the IMF makes 
decisions about the prudent use of its resources in the developing countries that 
constitute its main constituency, we need to explore the ideas held by the institution’s 
top officials. Economic ideas shape the institution’s activities by defining problems 
and suggesting solutions. A very brief review of the IMF’s history demonstrates how 
the purpose of the institution has been defined and re-defined over time.  
The IMF was created in 1945 to provide balance of payments support on a 
short-term basis for countries on the system of fixed exchange rates. As noted above, 
the Fund’s support was intended to allow countries to adjust without resorting to the 
competitive devaluations that characterized the interwar period. For the first 25 years 
of the Fund’s existence, most of the IMF’s resources went to the advanced industrial 
countries of Western Europe. When the United States closed the Gold Window on 
August 16, 1971 and countries were allowed to float their currencies, the IMF was 
essentially rendered irrelevant. The United States and other powerful members showed 
little interest in taking advantage of the uncertainty over the Fund’s mandate to use the 
institution for strategic purposes.71  
The growing integration of international financial markets in the mid-1970s, 
which enabled the wealthy democracies to borrow privately for financing purposes, 
further eroded the IMF’s mandate. In response, the IMF turned its attention to the 
                                                 
71 It is worthwhile noting that the Nixon administration, perhaps the most realpolitik American 
presidency of the postwar period, treated the IMF with contempt. Harold James’s magisterial 
International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods contains a revealing anecdote: Bob 
Haldeman, the White House chief of staff, noted in his diaries that Nixon threatened to fire his top 
advisor on international economic affairs, Peter Peterson, after the advisor went to lunch with the 
Fund’s Managing Director, Pierre Paul Schweitzer. In Richard Nixon’s view, “international cooperation 
appeared to be suspect; international agencies futile” (James 1996: 209).  
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developing world. Outside of Latin America, the institution had rather limited 
experience in lending to low- and middle-income countries. History was a poor guide 
for the institution. The problems experienced by developing countries were deeper 
than the temporary disequilibria that drove countries such as Great Britain to the Fund 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The new set of countries that sought IMF support “were often 
poor, their economies were incompletely marketized, their financial systems were 
rudimentary, and most had balance-of-payments problems.”72  
The IMF also confronted a rapidly changing international economic 
environment between the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. The increase in oil prices and 
major hike in international interest rates conspired to render many developing 
countries incapable of servicing their debts. During this unsettled period the carriers of 
neoliberal economic beliefs took the reins of the institution.73 The officials in the 
regional departments of the Fund and the top management increasingly were drawn 
from graduate programs in top-ranked American economics departments. The ideas 
carried by these agents provided a map to make sense of the highly uncertain policy 
environment and, in turn, enabled them to reshape the institution’s purpose. From the 
late 1970s the IMF faced challenges to global financial stability that were individually 
highly unique – the debt crisis of 1982, the transition from communism to market 
democracy after 1989, the financial crises originating in East Asia in 1997, the global 
credit crisis that emerged in September 2008 – and in each case neoliberal economic 
ideas provided a way for the Fund’s economists to reduce the uncertainty of the 
situation.74 
                                                 
72 Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 59.  
73 Chwieroth 2007c: 18-19. The early 1980s marked a period of intellectual transformation for both the 
World Bank and the Fund. The Bank also became a center for neoliberal thinking; see Stiglitz 2003: 12-
14; Weaver 2008: 76-79.  
74 My argument mirrors Blyth’s claim that “in moments of economic crisis, ideas are important 
explanatory devices that themselves reduce uncertainty” (2002: 37).  
 40
It is important to understand that the IMF is dominated by a group of 
neoliberal economists.75 The term “neoliberal” denotes an evolving group of 
economic ideas that constitute a shared mental model.76 Neoliberalism as a concept 
signifies a broad consensus organized around some basic theoretical assumpt
economics and a set of auxiliary policy implications.  
ions from 
                                                
The theoretical core of neoliberalism is a revived version of classical liberal 
economics. Three assumptions are widely shared within the consensus: the market is 
the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources; market actors have rational 
beliefs; and free exchange of goods across borders is desirable.77 Three widely-held 
policy recommendations flow from these assumptions: governments should pursue 
fiscal discipline; a country’s economic orientation should be outward; countries should 
rely on markets for the allocation of goods and resources and for the setting of 
prices.78 
 
75 This claim resembles Barnett and Finnemore’s observation that “it matters, for instance, that the IMF 
is staffed by economists and not anthropologists or political scientists” (2004: 47). Where I differ from 
Barnett and Finnemore is that my argument focuses on a set of shared neoliberal economic ideas held 
by the Fund’s economists, rather than the technical skills possessed by trained economists. 
76 Denzau and North (1994) define shared mental models broadly as sets of causal beliefs, widely 
shared, that help individuals interpret the world.  
77 I have adopted these three from Hay’s (2007: 54) more extensive list of characteristics of 
neoliberalism. I chose these three because they had the most universal support in Colander’s surveys 
(1987, 2005) of the beliefs of PhD students in economics departments at Chicago, Harvard, MIT, and 
Stanford. It is important to note that I refer to neoliberalism as a consensus in the broadest sense; there 
are certainly disagreements among top economics departments, but these conflicts are marginal 
compared to, for example, the contrast between the views of an IMF economist and an interventionist 
Tanzanian finance minister. I should also note that neoliberalism as a shared mental model does not 
mean that these ideas were widely accepted by policymakers in low- and middle-income countries. A 
comment by former Kenyan central bank governor Duncan Ndegwa exemplifies the skepticism with 
which many developing country policymakers viewed neoliberal ideas: “I remain dubious whether the 
price mechanism is the dominant leverage for allocation of resources in less developed economies…If 
indigenous economic specialists are asked, they will probably say it is kinship and natural and political 
factors that play a more dominant role, with price and religious factors playing secondary roles” (quoted 
in Alan Cowell, “The IMF’s Imbroglio in Africa,” The New York Times, March 14, 1982, pg. 4; see 
chapter 3 in van de Walle 2001 for more evidence on anti-neoliberal views held by many indigenously-
trained African economists). I am referring to ideas that constituted “the common core of wisdom 
embraced by all serious economists” (Williamson 1993: 1334 [italics added for emphasis]).  
78 John Williamson suggested ten policy orientations that constituted the “Washington Consensus;” 
Nicolas van de Walle narrows the list down to the three that I adopt in the dissertation. See Williamson 
1993: 1329-36; van de Walle 2001: 140. Charles Gore highlights three slightly different broad 
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Neoliberalism emerged from the top American economics departments, and to 
the extent that American-trained economists diffused through the IMF and World 
Bank, these institutions became centers for neoliberal thinking. To demonstrate the 
degree to which neoliberal ideas have been diffused within the institution, I collected 
from the IMF’s archive a complete record of the appointments of upper-level 
management between 1980 and 1995. An institutional rule requires that the Managing 
Director notify the Executive Board of all appointments at or above the rank of 
division chief; the documents that are circulated to the Board contain information on 
the nationality, work experience, and educational background of appointees to senior 
positions.79 The data collection yielded a record of 554 separate appointments to 
senior positions within the IMF.80 The two figures below present descriptive statistics 
on the backgrounds of upper-levels appointments at the Fund.81  
                                                                                                                                            
neoliberal policy recommendations: control inflation and reduce deficits; open to trade and capital 
flows; free domestic product and factor markets through deregulation and privatization (2000: 789).  
79 Rule N-12 was established on September 25, 1946 and amended in 1959 and 1979 because of 
changes in the internal organization of the Fund. It was not until the 1979 amendment that background 
information on appointees was provided to the Executive Board. A complete record of the staffing of 
the IMF from newly hired economists to senior staff would be ideal, but a record of internal hiring is 
unavailable and internal surveys are spotty. Momani 2005 presents data on recruitment to its training 
program.  
80 Rule N-12 requires notification of the appointment of upper-level administrative staff, but I only 
included appointments to positions within the IMF that have an involvement in the design and 
evaluation of lending policies in the dataset.  
81 Note: in figure 2.1, diamonds denote appointments with an MA or PhD from American economics 
departments; triangles denote appointments with an MA or above from top-30 ranked American 
economics departments; squares denote appointments with an MA or above from an American 
economics department or economics departments at Oxford, Cambridge, LSE, and the University of 
London. Figure 2.2 illustrates the proportion of American (denoted by diamonds) and British (triangles) 
nationals appointed to upper level positions each year.  
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Figure 2.1: Training of Upper-Level Staff Appointees at the IMF, 1980 – 1995 
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Figure 2.2: Proportion of Anglo-American Upper-Level Staff Appointees 
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The figures confirm what many observers suspect: at its upper levels, the IMF 
is a remarkably intellectually homogenous institution.82 From 1988 through 1995 
around 70 percent of upper-level appointments received graduate training in either an 
American economics department or at one of the major British institutions (Oxford, 
Cambridge, London School of Economics, and University of London). For most of the 
period for which I have data, between 40 and 60 percent of senior appointments were 
trained in highly ranked, mainstream American economics departments, which are 
typically regarded as incubators of neoliberal ideas.83 The Fund is a far less 
homogenous institution at the upper levels in terms of nationality: figure 2.2 shows 
that the proportion of American nationals promoted to senior positions is usually 
between 10 and 20 percent of all appointments. While Americans and Brits are 
overrepresented in top management positions, more than half of top-level 
appointments come from other countries.  
Neoliberal Ideas and the Fund’s Brand of Politics 
In the first step of my argument I made the case that the Fund’s lending 
behavior cannot be fully explained by the narrow material interests of member states, 
private financial actors, or individual staff members. The rich and powerful member 
countries – which have proven incapable or unwilling to deal with intractable 
problems in the developing world – delegated an enormous amount of authority to the 
IMF over time.84 The Fund’s purpose in the world, in turn, is shaped by the neoliberal 
                                                 
82 For example, Ngaire Woods, writing on the Fund and the Bank, observes that “the similar graduate 
training shared by staff in each organization gives them a shared, albeit narrow, methodology and 
particular understanding of its problems and their solutions” (2006: 54).   
83 There is no accepted methodology for ranking academic departments. Nonetheless, I take some 
comfort from the stability in rankings among the top-30 departments over the past twenty years; there is 
significant movement among the top-30, but little movement across methodologies in and out of the 
group of 30 economics departments in U.S. universities. I generated the list by examining rankings 
published in major economics journals from 1975 to the present; the list includes Davis and Papanek 
1984; Dusansky and Vernon 1998; Graves et al 1982; Hirsch et al 1984; Hogan 1984; Scott and Mitias 
1996.  
84 Barnett and Finnemore 2004. 
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economic ideas held by the Fund’s top officials. Jonathan Kirshner’s formulation 
accurately captures the missionary spirit that drives IMF staff members in their work 
in developing countries: “confident in their faith, and with a sincere hope to improve 
the world, they are more Billy Graham than Bismarck.”85  
I deemphasize the role of international and bureaucratic politics in defining the 
Fund’s environment and guiding the activities of its officials. But this does not mean 
that the international financial institutions are insulated from political relations. The 
second step in my argument follows Ngaire Woods’ observation that “the IMF and the 
World Bank operate in a marketplace not just of ideas but of politics and social 
forces.”86 In the remaining sections of the chapter I trace how the shared economic 
ideas that shape the Fund’s purpose impart a political bias to the IMF’s lending 
activities: I argue that the IMF has a clear preference for governments that feature 
likeminded neoliberal officials in top policymaking positions.   
Publicly, the IMF frames its relationship with member governments in 
technocratic, apolitical terms; indeed, the Fund’s Articles of Agreement require the 
institution’s staff members to avoid political bias in their work.87 The technical skills 
possessed by the staff are an important reason why states delegate authority to the 
institution, and the Fund’s basic approach to stabilization and reform rests on a large, 
sophisticated body of economic research.88 But serving the institution’s purpose 
requires that the staff and management go beyond deductive theorizing and data-
driven economic forecasting.  
The IMF has to make choices about the prudent use of its resources in 
                                                 
85 Kirshner, 2003: 279.  
86 Woods 2006: 69.  
87 Swedberg 1986.  
88 Barnett and Finnemore 2004. Staff members in the IMF’s Research Department produce analyses that 
stay within the institution, but are also are deeply engaged in broader professional debates and 
contribute to frontier research in macroeconomics.   
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countries that face complex and unsettled political circumstances. Assume that the 
IMF is willing to lend its resources for the purposes of inducing a set of policy 
changes in the borrowing country; these changes are intended to lead to better 
economic performance in the future through more disciplined macroeconomic policies 
and fewer structural impediments to productive economic activity in borrowing 
countries. The ability of the IMF to achieve its purpose in borrowing countries is not 
simply a matter of correctly diagnosing the problems and convincing policymakers to 
take steps to correct the distortions; Fund officials have to contend with unpredictable 
economic and – in particular – political dynamics which can drive programs off 
course.  
Evidence of the difficult lending environment confronting the IMF comes from 
an internal staff review of the implementation of structural adjustment programs.89 
The record of implementation in low income countries is poor. Programs were 
interrupted due to noncompliance in 28 out of 36 developing countries that concluded 
Structural Adjustment and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF/ESAF) 
between 1986 and 1994. Less than a quarter of the arrangements signed during the 
period were completed without significant deviations. Even more remarkable than the 
low success rate is the diversity of factors that are blamed for forcing programs off 
track in the staff’s review memorandum. In some countries economic officials and 
IMF staff were unable to agree on the pace or depth of adjustment once the program 
was underway. For example, the interruption of Benin’s 1990 program is attributed to 
protracted negotiations with labor unions that altered the government’s approach to 
fiscal management; the failure of Mauritania’s program in the early 1990s is blamed 
on disagreement about the need to improve macroeconomic policies in the face of 
                                                 
89 Staff Memorandum for the Executive Board, “Review of Experiences under ESAF-Supported 
Arrangement – Staff Studies, Volume 2,” EBS/97/112, Supplement 2, July 7, 1997.  
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declining levels of foreign assistance. Political disruptions, ranging from widespread 
ethnic violence in Burundi, to the introduction of multiparty government in Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, and Guinea that “deflected the attention of the authorities from the 
economic program,” to the “pre-electoral climate” in Sri Lanka and Bolivia, impacted 
a number of programs. External shocks – unanticipated declines in commodity prices, 
sudden drops in external financing commitments, and droughts, floods, and other 
natural disasters – led to noncompliance in at least a third of structural adjustment 
programs concluded between 1986 and 1994. Other programs that failed did so 
because of weak administrative and technical capabilities.  
How does the Fund navigate complex political dynamics in borrowing 
countries?  Evidence from interviews and public statements indicates that upper-level 
officials at the Fund pay close attention to the character of the small group of 
policymakers involved in program negotiations.90 In personal interviews two separate 
Executive Directors, one from a southern African country and the other representing a 
country in Latin America, described the “commitment” of the economic policymaking 
team in a borrowing country as the single most important factor in their evaluations of 
the prospects for a lending program.91 Another highly experienced official explained 
that a key function of the IMF is “to build ownership in a borrowing country. If you 
manage to create the necessary credibility of the economic team, you have changed a 
lot.”92 A line from the IMF’s former deputy managing director, Stanley Fischer, in his 
farewell address is revealing in this regard. In his comments, Fischer noted that “often 
we do our job by reinforcing people struggling under enormous pressures to do the 
                                                 
90 Woods notes that until very recently the Fund “negotiated exclusively with one small group of 
officials – those at the head of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Central Bank, or the like” 
(2006: 77).  
91 The African Executive Director opined that a “coherent and capable policymaking team is essential. 
It is the most important thing for a program to succeed.” Interview number 9, February 12, 2008 and 
interview number 12, February 14, 2008.  
92 Executive Director interview number 8, February 12, 2008.  
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right thing.”93  
The IMF and Likeminded Policymakers in Borrowing Governments  
The IMF has a political affinity for policy teams consisting of fellow neoliberal 
travelers. For the Fund’s staff and management, the institution’s purpose can best be 
served in settings in which they and the top economic policymakers share a set of core 
economic ideas.94 One straightforward reason for the IMF’s bias is that the presence 
of likeminded officials makes the task of persuading the borrower to carry out difficu
reforms relatively easier.
lt 
                                                
95 Further, in a political environment in which reforms can be 
easily reversed, the presence of ideationally aligned interlocutors communicates that 
there are allies within the policy team that can be trusted to follow the Fund’s 
preferred set of policies.  
In the first step of my argument, I contested the view of the Fund as a vessel 
for the interests of powerful external actors. It is also inaccurate to treat the IMF’s 
decision making process in isolation from social relations. The level of the Fund’s 
trust in the policymaking team has important consequences for the institution’s 
lending activities.  
If the IMF could compute the risk that its programs will fail in different 
settings with a reasonably high degree of accuracy, then its decisions could be made 
purely on the basis of rational calculation. Consider the decision making process 
undertaken by organizations that face an environment characterized by calculable risk. 
The dilemma facing all private lenders is that they cannot be certain that borrowers 
 
93 Fischer’s speech was quoted in the Financial Times, August 16, 2002: pg. 18. 
94 The nature of the neoliberal ideas held by the Fund’s officials and likeminded authorities is difficult 
to characterize. For Goldstein and Keohane, there are three types of ideas: worldviews (broad 
conceptions of possibility and the nature of the world); principled beliefs (“normative ideas that specify 
criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust”); and causal beliefs (ideas about 
cause-effect relationships) (1993: 8-10; for other attempts to distinguish types of ideas, see Campbell 
1998, 2002). Neoliberalism, as defined in this dissertation, involves elements of all three types of ideas: 
it defines the realm of legitimate economic behavior; it has an important normative content (certain 
policies are right, while others are unacceptable); and it makes claims about causal relationships.  
95 Woods 2006: 73.  
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will honor their debts. In the market for personal credit cards, large American banks 
were able to transform a lending environment marked by uncertainty to one of risk.96 
Alya Guseva and Akos Rona-Tas suggest that situations of manageable risk are 
characterized by three conditions: (1) individual events can be grouped among a larger 
class of instances; (2) events and processes are similar across time; (3) there are a 
large number of previous events to compare. All three conditions are satisfied in the 
American credit market; institutions enable private banks to “calculate the chances 
they take when they extend credit to new customers; they can then factor those 
probabilities into their prices.” Decisions about extending credit to consumers are 
routinized and the relationship between consumers and banks in the U.S is “largely 
disembedded from social relations.”97 
In the absence of institutions that enable organizations to convert underlying 
uncertainty into calculable risk, social and political relations become an important part 
of the decision making process. In the case of the IMF, the ability of the institution’s 
                                                 
96 Uncertainty, as conceptualized by the economist Frank Knight, implies that probabilities cannot be 
attached to an outcome with much accuracy, because our theories are not sufficiently developed or the 
situation that a decision maker confronts is sufficiently unique. In this study, uncertainty implies that 
IMF officials cannot accurately forecast the probability that a program will succeed. While individual 
staff members of the Fund might have a belief about the likelihood of program success (for example, a 
Division Chief might hazard a guess that a program has a 70 percent chance to work), there is no 
theoretical or empirical basis for verifying the probability – it is, in essence, just a guessing game. 
Contrast the IMF’s situation with an example of risk: auto manufacturers can estimate the chance that a 
car’s brakes will fail after a certain number of miles based on known probabilities of failure under 
different conditions (climate, traffic patterns, etc.) generated from many repeated tests in a laboratory 
setting. On the distinction between risk and uncertainty, see Knight 1921: 229; Beckert 1996, 2002; 
Blyth 2002, 2006, 2007; Elster 1983: 185-207; Keynes 1921, 1936: 162-63; Woll 2008: 8-12. It is 
interesting to note that according to two eminent economists, “for most of the interesting issues in 
political and economic markets, uncertainty, not risk, characterizes choice-making” (Denzau and North 
1994: 2). 
97 Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001: 626-27. The discussion of risk and uncertainty in this section draws 
heavily on Guseva and Ron-Tas’s illuminating comparison of the American and Russian credit card 
markets. The institutional differences between the U.S. and Russia have important consequences for 
decision making by banks. In the U.S., banks can rely on credit rating agencies that provided 
standardized information on consumers; the Internal Revenue Service is able to verify income 
information; and “the American economy’s stability allows for inferences from the past to future.” 
These institutional prerequisites are absent in Russia; whereas the consumer-bank relationship does not 
depend on social relations in the U.S., “by contrast, in Russia, trust remains an important part of the 
lending decision” (2001: 627).   
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staff and management to calculate the prospects for the success of programs is limited, 
due in large part to the complexity of the political processes that shape economic 
policymaking. The IMF has not developed a way to systematically assess the 
prospects for programs in varying political and institutional environments among 
borrowing countries. Alexandre Kafka, the long-running Executive Director from 
Brazil, highlighted the limits of the IMF staff’s knowledge of and interest in the 
vagaries of domestic politics in a statement before the Executive Board in 1978. He 
stated that “the Fund is in the habit of hiring recent university graduates without any 
practical experience. However technically competent such people may be…they lack a 
dimension which is essential in our type of business. This is a sensitivity for political 
and social realities which in the last analysis define the constraints within which 
technical considerations can in practice prevail.”98 In a similar vein, Miles Kahler 
observes that “the institutional memory of the IFIs [International Financial 
Institutions] regarding the politics of adjustment episodes is very short; there is little 
systematic attention to collecting or making available to their staffs the political 
lessons of particular programs.”99  
When the Fund is asked by policymakers in member countries to make its 
resources available in exchange for policy changes, the prospective borrower is 
typically experiencing severe economic distress. In unstable (and frequently opaque) 
situations the Fund’s officials face some difficult questions: will the institution’s 
resources be used prudently? Will the reforms be sustainable? Answering these 
                                                 
98 Statement by Alexandre Kafka on Upper Credit Tranche Conditionality, EBM/78/79, June 2, 1978. 
99 Kahler 1992: 121. Ngaire Woods suggests that in recent years both the World Bank and the IMF have 
adopted “the view that they must go beyond ensuring that their counterparts are intellectually convinced 
about new policies, prepared to initiate reforms, and use their political will to implement new policies 
and build consensus around them. Each institution has begun to work with and to consider more 
systematically a wide range of processes within borrowing countries” (2006: 78). The Bank has made 
much progress in devoting resources to systematic analysis of the politics of lending arrangements than 
the Fund (but see Ivanova et al 2003 for incipient empirical work by Fund economists on domestic 
institutions and program implementation).    
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questions forces the Fund’s staff and management to wade into murky political waters. 
The central contention of the dissertation is that ideas have a powerful effect on how 
the IMF navigates the politics of conditional lending: the Fund has greater trust in 
policymakers who share neoliberal economic beliefs. Consequently, I expect to 
observe that the Fund discriminates in its treatment of borrowers in favor of policy 
teams populated with likeminded officials.  
The IMF’s brand of politics is elite-centric; the Fund’s staff members tend to 
fixate on the coterie of top-level economic officials in borrowing countries that are 
primarily responsible for negotiating lending arrangements.100 The IMF, as an 
international institution composed of similarly-trained economists, has limited 
capacity to monitor and evaluate broader political and social conditions in the low- 
and middle-income member states that form its main constituency. Without the 
institutional capacity to transform uncertainty over the prospects for lending programs 
into calculable risk, the Fund makes political choices on the basis of a clear preference 
for governments that feature fellow neoliberals in positions of influence.  
Testable Implications 
 The analytical framework developed in the previous pages generates a set of 
testable claims about the IMF’s lending activities. The IMF has three basic tools at its 
disposal: it controls the extensiveness of the conditions that it attaches to its loans, it 
can increase or decrease the size of its lending packages, and it can suspend programs 
when borrowers fail to achieve binding conditions or, alternatively, it can choose to 
                                                 
100 As illustrated in the case study of Argentina (1976-2001) in chapter 5, and implied by the appearance 
of IMF officials in Santiago in the months following the military coup in Chile in 1973, the Fund’s 
narrow focus on the top economic leadership has led it to provide generous financial support for 
regimes that were engaged in serious human rights abuses. Some critics have argued that the Fund 
prefers to deal with autocratic governments; in my view of the Fund’s decision making process, it is 
more interested in the ideational character of the officials in charge of the program than the type of 
regime. But this fixation on the policy team can lead to a political insensitivity; radical critics of the 
Fund in the 1970s seized upon this issue, sometimes portraying the institution as actively seeking to 
encourage and support right-wing military coups in the developing world (for example, Payer 1974).   
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waive the missed conditions and allow the borrower to continue to draw on the 
institution’s resources. The argument predicts that the Fund’s treatment of 
governments composed of likeminded officials will be more lenient on all three 
counts. The conditions that are included in the Letter of Intent signed by the borrowing 
government and the Fund serve a dual purpose: they are intended to induce beneficial 
policy changes, and, by making the disbursement of financing contingent on 
observable policy targets, they are a way to protect the Fund’s resources. Borrowers 
generally want loans with fewer strings attached, because there are political costs to be 
paid by governments that sign agreements that require sweeping reforms and painful 
austerity measures.101 Borrowers also prefer larger lending packages. As explained in 
the previous section, the IMF is more likely to trust policy teams that contain officials 
who share neoliberal economic beliefs and will attempt to provide political support for 
likeminded governments. The Fund believes that placing bets on governments with 
fellow neoliberal is less risky and would like to support governments that, in the words 
of Stanley Fischer, are more likely to “do the right thing.” Consequently, I expect to 
find that as the proportion of neoliberals in the borrowing government increase,  
(1) The number of binding conditions in IMF programs will decrease; 
(2) The size of loans will increase.  
The IMF also has to make decisions once a program is underway about withdrawing 
or continuing to support a lending program that has gone off track. Here the 
differences between my political explanation for IMF lending behavior and an 
                                                 
101 Vreeland (2003) describes these as “sovereignty costs.” Vreeland argues, however, that reformist 
governments sometimes lobby for more conditions as a way to bind opposition elements to supporting 
economic stabilization efforts. If this is the case, I should observe that loans signed by governments 
with neoliberals contain, on average, more binding conditions. However, the evidence presented in the 
next chapter suggests that Michael Mussa’s claim that low- and middle-income countries almost always 
prefer weaker conditions (“virtually all members prefer to deal with the sympathetic social worker 
rather than the tough cop”) is correct (2002: 68). The IMF makes a political choice to acquiesce to 
demands for less extensive conditionality expressed by governments for which the Fund’s staff and 
management have an affinity.   
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explanation based on the signaling role of neoliberals become clear. The standard 
approaches to the dilemma faced by private banks and investors emphasize two 
devices that lenders use to mitigate uncertainty about whether the borrower will honor 
the loan: (1) ex ante screening to select borrowers based on beliefs about the risk of 
default; (2) ex post sanctioning to punish borrowers that fail to repay.102  
Lenders in sovereign debt markets, for example, may have limited information 
about a government’s willingness and ability to repay (or, in the Fund’s case, the 
willingness of the government to carry out the set of reforms specified in the loans-
for-policies bargain). In this view, the presence of neoliberal policymakers in 
government provides a signal about the government’s intentions.103 If neoliberal 
policymakers are ex ante signaling devices that help the Fund mitigate uncertainty 
associated with the government’s intentions, then we should observe that the 
likelihood of obtaining a waiver decreases as the proportion of neoliberals in 
government increases.104 The logic follows Tomz’s (2007) discussion of sovereign 
lending: borrowers that are reputed to be “stalwarts” (unlikely cases for debt 
repudiation) will be punished by investors for failure to repay regardless of the 
circumstances under which noncompliance occurred. We would expect to see the 
same kind of updating by the IMF: neoliberal policy teams that fail to meet specified 
policy targets communicate information to the Fund’s staff and management that the 
borrower is not trustworthy.  
 But the political explanation developed above suggests a different expectation 
about the issuance of waivers. I argued that the IMF maintains a greater degree of trust 
in governments that contain likeminded officials in top policymaking positions. The 
                                                 
102 Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001: 624.  
103 Stiglitz (2000) reviews the development of information economics and discusses the role of 
signaling.   
104 I thank Tom Pepinsky for bringing this point to my attention.  
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institution’s staff and management believe that the chances for a program’s success 
are greater when fellow neoliberals are in charge. Consequently, the IMF’s decision 
making is politicized: it chooses to support its preferred borrowers with more generous 
treatment because the Fund would like to ensure that the relationship is sustained. In 
this view, the IMF is more likely to issue waivers for missed conditions to 
governments dominated by likeminded officials. Policymakers that preside over 
lending programs that are suspended face real risks of losing office; for example, the 
IMF’s withdrawal of support for the first economic policy team under Argentine 
President Raul Alfonsin in February 1985 led directly to their removal and 
replacement with more ideationally sympathetic officials. The logic of my argument 
suggests a third testable implication: as the proportion of neoliberals in the borrowing 
government increase,  
(3) The IMF is more likely to issue waivers for countries that fail to observe 
binding policy targets.   
The next chapter focuses on testing these implications using data on a large number of 
programs concluded between 1980 and 2000.  
Conclusion 
 The central argument in the dissertation hinges on a straightforward 
observation: in order to understand how the Fund works, we need to understand how 
the officials that shape the institution’s policies think. Most existing research on the 
Fund has not been concerned with the ideas that shape the institution’s purpose; after 
all, economic ideas are unimportant if the Fund’s interests are defined by the 
geopolitical ambitions of powerful member states or simple budget- and power-
maximizing behavior by individual staff members. By overstating the structural 
constraints on the IMF – which, in my view, are relatively loose – prior empirical 
research on the institution has omitted an important variable. The degree of ideational 
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consensus or discord between the Fund and its borrowers matters. In the first step of 
the argument I showed that during a period in which the institution’s role in the world 
economy was unclear and the environment that the officials confronted was rife with 
uncertainty, neoliberal economic ideas provided a roadmap to guide the institution.   
I am not the first to note that the IMF is dominated by neoliberal 
economists.105 But I go beyond the observation that the Fund has a neoliberal purpose
shaped by its officials to explore how this claim can help explain an important puzzle: 
why is there so much variation in the IMF’s treatment of its borrowers? I argue that 
the Fund has an affinity for governments containing likeminded officials. The IM
political preferences are rooted in the uncertainty that characterizes the lending 
process: the IMF cannot predict with any calculable certainty whether a program will
succeed or fail. Because of this fact the IMF’s decision making process cannot be 
separated from political and social relations in the borrowing countries that seek to 
make use of its resources. The Fund has to make bets about the prospects that its 
purpose will be served in various contexts; the staff and management are mor
to trust policymakers that share a core set of economic ideas, and will adjust their 
treatment accordingly. If my explanation is correct, we should observe that 
discriminates in its treatment of borrowers in favor of governments with fellow 
neoliberals in top economic policy positions. New data allows me to rigorously test 
this explanation. I turn to an empirical examination of the argument in the following 
pages.  
 
 
 
 
105 Chwieroth 2007c; Woods 2006.   
Chapter 3 
 The Determinants of IMF Treatment 
 In the previous chapter I developed a theoretical framework that emphasized 
how shared neoliberal economic beliefs among IMF staff members and economic 
officials influence the IMF’s treatment of its borrowers. Several testable implications 
emerged from the theory: when dealing with governments with sympathetic 
policymakers, the IMF is more likely to (1) give larger loans, (2) apply less onerous 
conditionality to the terms of loans, and (3) issue waivers for borrowers that fail to 
comply with binding conditions. 
This chapter focuses on testing my explanation against its alternatives on a 
sample consisting of nearly every conditional IMF loan signed between 1980 and 
2000. The analysis proceeds in steps. First, I describe the construction of cross-
national time series data on the treatment of borrowers and the presence of neoliberal 
policymakers. I then briefly review the alternative explanations and discuss the 
variables included in the statistical models before explaining the methodology 
employed to test the argument. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
findings. The evidence presented in this chapter provides strong support for my 
explanation of variation in IMF treatment.  
Measuring Variation in IMF Treatment 
 The IMF performs a number of different activities in the world economy aside 
from conditional lending, including “surveillance” of member states’ economies 
through its Article IV consultations, gathering and disseminating economic data, and 
making macroeconomic projections and policy recommendations via its World 
Economic Outlook publication, among numerous other functions.1 Conditional 
lending is, however, the main avenue through which the institution has exerted 
                                                 
1 See Pauly 1997.  
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influence in the developing world. Conditionality is also the most controversial aspect 
of the Fund’s activities: in requiring borrowers to make policy changes in ord
receive disbursements, the IMF’s lending programs often force borrowing 
governments to make difficult choices. Violent anti-IMF protests in Peru, Jordan, 
Indonesia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, and Sudan (among others) at various
points over the past thirty years are evidence that the political stakes are high for 
borrowers.
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and structures are frequently the most controversial and onerous aspects of lending 
                                                
2 Given that conditionality can have important political (in addition to 
economic) consequences, it is important to explore the sources of 
onality.  
Identifying the determinants of conditionality requires a method for comparin
the conditions included in different agreements. Ideally, a measure of conditionality
would be able to assess the “toughness” of individual conditions. A relatively easy 
program, for example, would offer a large amount of funding while requiring o
minor policy changes. Tougher conditions imply greater distance between the 
performance on an economic indicator in the period leading up to the agreement an
the performance required at some future date. As the distances between economic 
conditions at time t and macroeconomic targets at time t + 1 increase, governments 
gher choices, and, consequently, the political risks for policymakers incre
Four problems make the ideal measure unattainable in practice. First, the 
heterogeneity of programs makes it difficult to settle on a common set of conditions to 
compare across cases. The Fund does apply a general economic model to its programs, 
but within that framework there is significant space for country-specific conditions to
be included. Second, “structural” conditions involving changes in economic policies
 
2 On the IMF and political instability, see Auvinen 1996; Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Franklin 1997; 
Haggard 1988; Siddell 1988; Walton and Ragin 1990.  
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programs.3 There is no way to quantify and compare country-specific structural 
conditions, and omitting these important conditions from the analysis would be a 
mistake. A third obstacle is that agreements contain different deadlines for targets to 
be met; for example, one program might specify a target for the level of international 
reserves to be achieved in three months, while another may set a target for 10 months 
after the date of agreement. The ideal approach also elides data problems that plague 
the setting of quantitative conditions. Quantitative targets (for money growth, reserves, 
government borrowing, budgets, etc) are based on data provided by the government, 
which is frequently faulty; consequently, the targets are revised after the initial 
agreement is signed.4  
Scholars of the international financial institutions have handled the 
measurement issue by adding up the total number of binding conditions in loan 
agreements. The counting approach is an imperfect but defensible way of comparing 
the content of different programs. Paul Mosley, who first employed the technique in 
an analysis of World Bank lending, argues that programs with more conditions are 
“politically and administratively most demanding.”5 It becomes more challenging for 
a borrower to carry out a program as binding conditions accumulate. Increasing the
number of conditions implies a higher probability that a program will go off track; 
consequently, it is reasonable to regard programs with more conditions as 
comparatively more difficult. While the counting approach cannot account for the 
toughness of individual conditions, the number of conditions included in an agreement 
is frequently the major point of contention in loan negotiations. The counting approach 
 
                                                 
3 As one of many examples, the main sticking point in negotiations between the IMF and Jamaica in the 
mid-1980s was the inclusion of devaluation as a binding condition (Nelson, 1990: 194).  
4 See Easterly 2006. It should also be noted that the data that form the basis for quantitative conditions 
are sometimes intentionally falsified by governments; examples include falsification of data by the 
central bank in the Ukraine in the 1990s (see Stone 2002: 205-206) and, more recently, evidence that 
officials in Kazakhstan manipulated data on foreign reserves.   
5 Mosley et al 1991: 125; also quoted in Kahler 1992: 108. See also Mosley 1988.  
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enables researchers to conduct systematic empirical tests of competing explanations 
across the universe of IMF agreements. In my view the benefit vastly outweighs any 
costs of a less than ideal measure of conditionality.6 
How much variation in IMF conditionality do we observe? As previously 
noted, answering this question in a systematic fashion was impossible until the IMF 
opened its archives to external researchers. Informal attempts to describe the relative 
toughness of programs indicated a considerable degree of variation.7 These suspicions 
receive confirmation in more recent work that systematically explores the extent of 
conditionality in IMF programs.8 However, the conclusions we can draw about the 
degree (to say nothing of the determinants) of variation in conditionality are limited by 
the irregular sampling methods used in the research. Researchers have employed 
samples based on different sets of countries and time periods and have pursued unique 
ways of counting conditions.9 It is not surprising, given the disorganized state of 
recent empirical research, that there is no consensus on the determinants of 
conditionality in IMF agreements.  
I attempt to develop a better measure of conditionality in this chapter. The 
documents submitted by the staff and country officials to the Executive Board (the 
Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding) outline the terms of the 
agreement, including the size of the loan, the phasing of disbursements, binding and 
non-binding conditions, and policy commitments and goals set out by the country’s 
                                                 
6 To quote Bearce and Bondanella (themselves paraphrasing Voltaire): “it is foolish to let the perfect 
stand in the way of the good” (2007: 705).  
7 For example, Kahler 1992; Stiles 1991 
8 Copelovitch 2004; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Gould 2003, 2006;  
9 I briefly mentioned in footnote 19 in the introductory chapter that recent attempts to systematically 
code IMF conditionality have been incomplete. Gould (2003, 2006), for example, examines the number 
of conditions in a sample of 249 agreements from 20 countries between 1952 and 1995; Copelovitch 
(2004) only considers short-term Standby Agreements from 47 countries between 1984 and 2003; 
Dreher and Jensen (2007) code 206 agreements between 1997 and 2003 that were posted on the IMF’s 
website; Kang (2007) infers the number conditions from agreements described in the IMF Survey 
(1983-1997); Stone (2008) draws on a proprietary IMF database of agreements signed between 1992 
and 2002.   
 59
economic authorities. I collected these documents from the IMF’s archives for nearly 
every high-conditionality agreement signed between 1980 and 2000.10 The texts of 
typical IMF arrangements contain lengthy descriptions of policy commitments and 
targets that the government intends to implement; sometimes these commitments are 
codified in the agreement as “indicative targets” or “benchmarks” that are monitored 
by Fund staff but do not trigger a suspension or cancellation of the program if 
violated.11 Many agreements include a description of actions that the government 
carried out (or promises to carry out) prior to the acceptance by the IMF’s Board and 
management of the terms of the arrangement. However, it is unclear whether prior 
actions were required by the Fund or were autonomously taken by the government as a 
signal of its commitment; regardless, the precise terms of prior actions are not 
specified in agreements signed before 2000.  
Rather than include all aspects of conditionality, I focus on the number of 
binding conditions (referred to in Fund parlance as performance criteria).12 Unlike the 
other types of conditionality noted in the previous paragraph, these are the conditions 
with teeth: violating a performance criterion will trigger the suspension of the 
program, unless a country can obtain a waiver for noncompliance from the Executive 
Board. In addition, performance criteria are unambiguously spelled out in the texts of 
IMF agreements.  
                                                 
10 I state “nearly” because a handful of agreements have not been released to the archives by the 
country’s representatives. For example, the texts of Turkey’s 1999 agreement and Brazil’s 1998 SBA 
were unavailable at the time that I gathered the agreements from the Fund’s archives. By “high-
conditionality agreements” I refer to loans that are larger than 25 percent of a country’s quota. 
Agreements within the “first credit tranche” (smaller than 25 percent of quota) are typically not subject 
to conditionality. The dataset includes each of the conditional lending facilities: Standby Arrangements 
(SBA), Extended Fund Facilities (EFF), Structural Adjustment Fund (SAF), Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Fund (ESAF), and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  
11 The IMF does have some enforcement power with respect to indicative targets and structural 
benchmarks: management sometimes delays program reviews that are necessary for disbursements to 
be released. However, this is irregularly enforced, and, unlike performance criteria, there is no legal 
basis in the Fund for suspension of a program when benchmarks are missed.  
12 I use the terms “performance criteria” and “binding conditions” interchangeably throughout the 
dissertation.  
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Binding conditions encompass a wide range of different policy areas, including fiscal 
and monetary targets and structural conditions related to economic liberalization and 
rationalization (dismantling of tariffs and restrictive trade practices, 
reduction/elimination of subsidies, privatization of state-owned enterprises, financial 
market liberalization, civil service reform, etc).13 The data collection effort yielded the 
most comprehensive extant dataset on IMF conditionality, consisting of the terms 
from 503 separate agreements between 1980 and 2000.14  
Descriptive statistics from the conditionality dataset are presented in the 
figures below. The first figure illustrates the average number of total performance 
criteria and the average number of structural performance criteria in IMF programs 
over the two decades between 1980 and 2000.15  
                                                 
13 I categorized each of the binding conditions in the agreements in one of 54 separate categories, 
drawing on Gould’s (2006) initial categorization scheme.  
14 I selected the decades between 1980 and 2000 as the time frame for the data analysis for two primary 
reasons: (1) the IMF’s general approach to conditional lending in the developing world was solidified 
after the 1979 review of conditionality; (2) the period between the debt crises of the early 1980s and 
financial crises of the late 1990s marks the era of the IMF’s most sustained and active involvement in 
developing countries through its lending facilities.     
15 The IMF identifies 14 sectors of the economy subject to structural conditions: the exchange system; 
trade regime; capital account; pricing and marketing; public enterprises reform and restructuring; 
privatization; fiscal sector; social security system; social safety net; financial sector; agricultural sector; 
labor market; economic statistics and reporting; and “systemic reforms.” The most common structural 
conditions are (in order of frequency) in the fiscal sector, the trade regime and exchange system, and 
financial sector; the least common are the capital account and social safety (each accounting for around 
one percent of total structural conditions between 1987 and 1999). Memorandum to the Executive 
Board, “Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs – Overview,” SM/01/60, February 20, 2001.  
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Figure 3.1: Avg. Number of Binding and Structural Binding Conditions, 1980-2000 
Figure 3.1 is notable for evidence of the steady increase in conditionality over 
time. The average program contained between 7 and 8 conditions in 1980; by 2000, 
the average number of conditions had increased to 15. The pattern for structural 
conditionality, while less dramatic, follows the general upward trend in conditions per 
program.16 However, averaging across countries obscures substantial variation in the 
number of conditions included in different programs. Figure 3.2 provides an alternate 
view of the evolution of conditionality through a time series of annual boxplots of the 
number of performance criteria in IMF programs. In figure 3.2 the bottom of each box 
is formed by the lower (25th) percentile, the mid-line of each box is the median (50th) 
percentile, and the top of the box is the upper (75th) percentile in terms of the 
                                                 
16 It is notable that the increase in conditionality evoked criticism from within the IMF. In an attempt to 
reduce the number of conditions in lending programs, in 2002 the Executive Board approved new 
Conditionality Guidelines that emphasize the inclusion of only those conditions that are “critical” to the 
program’s success. See International Monetary Fund, Guidelines on Conditionality (Washington, DC: 
2002).   
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distribution of conditionality in the agreements signed each year. The plot also 
displays the upper and lower bounds of the data, as well as outlying agreements 
(represented by the solid dots).17 Here the upward trend in conditionality is less 
remarkable than the wide variation in the design of programs in each year.  
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Figure 3.2: Time Series of Boxplots of Annual Binding Conditions, 1980-2000 
Figure 3.3 displays a frequency distribution of the number of conditions in the 
503 programs included in the conditionality dataset. The most common number of 
binding conditions is 12 (accounting for 18 percent of all programs in the dataset), but 
the distribution of conditionality is surprisingly expansive, with a number of programs 
containing many fewer and many more conditions than the modal program.  
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17 Outlying agreements above the boxes are defined as observations that are greater than 1.5 times the 
interquartile range (the 75th percentile minus the 25th percentile); the dots below the boxes are 
observations that are smaller than 1.5 times the interquartile range.   
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Binding Conditions, 1980-2000 
Conditionality is not the only instrument at the IMF’s disposal. The Fund also 
controls a large pool funding that can be drawn on by borrowers for balance of 
payments support. Officially, the underlying condition for the use of IMF resources is 
that a country must have a demonstrated “need because of its balance of payments or 
its reserve position or developments in its reserves.”18 A country’s “need” is a vague 
and malleable concept, and, as Vreeland (2003) demonstrates, some borrowers have 
drawn when reserves were plentiful. There is built-in ambiguity in the Fund’s 
approach to organizing loans: a member is required to represent that it has a need for 
IMF resources, but the institution cannot challenge its claim.19 IMF drawings are 
                                                 
18 Article V, section 3(b)(ii) of the Articles of Agreement. It should be noted that the resources for 
Standby and Extended Fund Facility agreements come from the Fund’s general resources, while funds 
for the SAF/ESAF/PRGF facilities for low-income countries come from concessional sources and are 
intended for countries experiencing “protracted balance of payments problems.”  
19 The Fund has a remedial sanction against misrepresentation of need: if it discovers after a 
disbursement has been approved that the purchase was unnecessary, it can impose a limit on future 
drawings or declare a borrower ineligible for future purchases from the institution’s general 
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officially limited to 100 percent of a country’s quota20, but this limit is commonly 
waived by the Executive Board. The flexibility of rules governing access to Fund 
resources and guidelines for the size of drawings means that variation in the size of 
lending packages is more dramatic than variation in the extent of conditionality: the 
size of loans in the conditionality dataset varies between a minimum of 14 percent of 
quota to a maximum of just over 1,500 percent. Figure 3.4 illustrates the range of the 
size of IMF loans over time.   
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Figure 3.4: Boxplots of Loan Size (Logged), 1980-2000 
The third instrument possessed by the Fund is the ability to sanction borrowers 
that fail to comply with binding conditions. A government that misses the targets 
spelled out in performance criteria may find its program suspended: the schedule of 
                                                                                                                                            
resources.emorandum to the Executive Board, “Need as a Condition for the Use of Fund Resources,” 
SM/94/299, December 16, 1994.  
20 Article V, section 3(b)(iii) of the Articles of Agreement.   
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drawings specified at the outset of the program is delayed until the indicators can be 
brought in line with the targets or the original criteria are modified. If deviations from 
the program are severe, the agreement might be cancelled by the Fund. As is the case 
for conditionality and the size of lending packages, institutional flexibility leads to 
unexplained variation in the Fund’s treatment of noncompliant borrowers. 
Enforcement of binding conditions is uneven because governments can obtain waivers 
for missed targets that allow drawings to continue without interruption.21  
 Records of waivers were unavailable to external researchers prior to the 
opening of the archives. Consequently, scholars relied on two indirect measures of 
enforcement. First, by comparing the proportion of funding actually drawn to amount 
agreed at the outset of the program, investigators inferred whether the program was 
cut off by Fund officials.22 This approach assumes that any country which did not 
draw 100 percent of the loan was punished for noncompliance. The other approach 
compares the schedule of planned disbursements to the observed pattern of 
disbursements, assuming that gaps indicate punishment intervals by the IMF for 
noncompliance.23  
Both measures are problematic because they cannot differentiate between 
programs that were legitimately suspended for noncompliance and programs that were 
concluded early by country officials that simply did not want or need the program.24 I 
                                                 
21 The staff, management, and country representatives within the IMF rely on their discretion in 
supporting and approving requests for waivers. Interviews indicate that the Fund is cautious with 
respect to waivers. A European Executive Director emphasized the risks he takes when recommending 
waivers for countries in his constituency. Supporting the continuation of a program that proves to be 
untenable erodes his credibility with other Executive Directors and, most importantly, the upper-level 
management; in his words, “the most important role of the Executive Director is to be credible for the 
Managing Director…to be able to say ‘yes, you can take that risk, these people are serious.” Executive 
Director interview number 7 (February 7, 2008). 
22 Killick 1995 pioneered this approach, which is critically examined in Vreeland 2006: 364-65.  
23 Edwards 2005; Stone 2002, 2004.  
24 Stone 2002 tries to avoid this problem by using evidence from interviews and press reports to confirm 
that programs were suspended for noncompliance. Stone, however, did not have access to archival 
materials for his work, and thus admits that “a considerable amount of uncertainty remains in the 
measurement” of punishment intervals. Internal reviews of the enforcement of conditionality 
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avoid this problem in my construction of a measure of enforcement by relying on 
newly available records of the issuance of waivers. I recovered from the Fund’s 
archives a complete record of the decisions by the Executive Board to approve waivers 
for noncompliance between 1980 and 1997.25 The Board’s decisions are used to 
construct a new, behavioral indicator of IMF treatment that improves upon the 
previous efforts that relied on outcomes to infer the variation in enforcement.  
Data and Methods 
 Up to this point the chapter has focused on the construction of the three 
measures of IMF treatment. In the next sections I turn to testing the explanations of 
variation in IMF treatment of borrowers. I describe the variables and methodology 
employed in the analysis before moving to a discussion of the main findings.  
Dependent Variables 
 Recall that the empirical analysis is organized around three testable 
implications: as the proportion of neoliberals policymakers in government increases, 
the IMF’s loans will be (1) more generous, (2) less onerous in terms of conditionality, 
and (3) the institution will be more lenient with respect to enforcement. Generosity is 
measured as the size of the loan as a percent of the country’s quota.26 Because these 
data are skewed to the right by some extremely large loans, I use the natural log of 
loan size/quota. Conditionality is measured as the number of binding conditions in an 
agreement. Conditions that require major structural changes are often treated as more 
difficult for governments to carry out; to provide an additional test of the argument, I 
                                                                                                                                            
demonstrate that it is essential for researchers to use Fund documents to confirm that programs were 
suspended by the IMF and not allowed to lapse for other reason. In a review of program implementation 
staff members describe a gap in Uganda’s programs in the mid-1990s as a result of “continued 
commitment to reform and strong performance.” A coarse measure of enforcement would mistakenly 
infer that Uganda was being punished at the time for noncompliance. Staff Memorandum for the 
Executive Board, “Review of Studies under ESAF-Supported Arrangements – Staff Studies, Volume 
2,” EBS/97/112 Supplement 2, July 7, 1997.  
25 The 10-year moving wall for Executive Board decisions explains the end date for the waivers data.  
26 Both the size of the loan and the quota are measured in millions of SDRs (standard drawing rights, 
the IMF’s unit of account).  
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construct a dependent variable that counts the number of structural performance 
criteria in each agreement.27 The average number of conditions in the sample is just 
over 12; the average number of structural conditions in agreements signed between 
1980 and 2000 is one and a half.  
The measure of enforcement is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 
one when a waiver is approved by the Executive Board, and zero during other years 
when a program is active and a waiver has not been issued. To distinguish waivers for 
minor slippages from more substantial noncompliance that goes unpunished, I 
construct a second variable that takes the value of one only if waivers for multiple 
binding conditions are issued in a single decision by the Fund’s Executive Board. This 
is a stricter test of the argument: waivers are issued in 19 percent of observations in 
which countries are under IMF programs and thus “at risk” of receiving a waiver; less 
than 9 percent of the sample is coded positively for the tougher measure of multiple 
waivers.28  
Explanatory Variables 
 Below I describe the explanatory variables in the analysis. The section is 
structured so that each variable’s inclusion is justified within the different theoretical 
frameworks outlined in the previous chapter. I describe the indicators I use to account 
for the most prominent explanations of IMF behavior, starting with the construction of 
the variable to measure the extent of neoliberal influence within the borrowing 
government. More details on the measurement and sources for the variables are found 
in appendix A. 
                                                 
27 See footnote 15 in this chapter for the IMF’s list of structural areas of the economy that are subject to 
conditionality. 
28 As noted in the previous paragraphs, measuring enforcement of conditionality is difficult, and my 
measure, while an improvement over other attempts, is imperfect. Ideally, I could compare the 
probability that waivers are requested/needed to the probability that waivers are granted. However, 
records of requests for waivers are unavailable; researchers can only observe whether a waiver is 
approved.    
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Ideational Explanation: In order to test my argument against the alternatives, it 
is necessary to develop a variable that captures the economic ideas held by 
policymakers. Ideally one could survey policymakers to gauge their support for 
neoliberal economic beliefs shared by the majority of the staff members at the IMF. 
The enormous costs and complexities involved in surveying the beliefs of thousands 
of policymakers in the developing world during the period in my study require an 
alternative approach. The strategy adopted here focuses on experiences that are likely 
to transmit neoliberal economic beliefs to individual economic policymakers. Two 
socializing experiences are regarded as particularly important transmission 
mechanisms.  
The first is the educational background of policymakers. A number of 
researchers provide evidence that graduate training in economics “is a transformative 
experience for doctoral students that creates strong professional identities.”29 David 
Colander and co-authors conducted surveys of graduate students at top departments 
between the mid-1980s and early-2000s, finding that training in economics has a 
powerful assimilating effect on students.30 It would be inaccurate to treat the 
economic beliefs imparted by major departments as constant across all universities, 
but research demonstrates a remarkable degree of convergence on fundamental as
of the economic worldview.
pects 
 of the 
                                                
31 Economics departments do not reproduce automatons, 
but the evidence suggests that they do impart a lasting set of broadly neoliberal beliefs 
to their trainees. Marion Fourcade, in a sociological study of the globalization
 
29 Kogut and Macpherson 2008: 114. See Chwieroth 2007a, 2007c; Fourcade 2006, 2009. 
30 Reflecting on this research, Colander writes that “the replicator dynamics of graduate school play a 
larger role in determining economists’ methodology and approach than all the myriad papers written 
about methodology” (2005: 175). See Colander and Klamer 1987; Colander and Brenner 1992; 
Colander 2005; Klamer and Colander 1991; Fourcade 2009.  
31 For example, graduates from the University of Chicago are more rigidly pro-market and anti-
intervention than colleagues at Harvard and MIT.  See Kohut and Macpherson 2008: 114; Colander and 
Klamer, 1987; Colander 2005.  
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economics discipline, argues that “the universalism of economic knowledge” produces 
“relative consensus… on basic economic policy prescriptions.”32  
The other important sites for the socialization of individual policymakers are 
international institutions. Recent work demonstrates that international institutions 
promote the socialization of state actors into the norms, rules, and beliefs embedded in 
the institution.33 When international institutions are dominated by a single profession 
or discipline such as economics, the socializing effect is particularly strong. 
Policymakers that have significant experience working within an international 
institution can be expected to internalize the dominant beliefs shared by the 
institution’s officials. As Finnemore and Sikkink write, “professional training does 
more than simply transfer technical knowledge; it actively socializes people to value 
certain things above others.”34 
I have argued that academic departments and international institutions are good 
places to look for socialization. However, beliefs must be widely held in these 
environments for socialization to be meaningful. Within the realms of academia and 
the international institutions, which departments and institutions are most likely to 
transmit neoliberal beliefs?   
It is widely recognized that mainstream American economics departments 
shaped the neoliberal consensus. Consequently, I code a policymaker as a neoliberal if 
she earned a masters degree or above from a highly-ranked American economics 
                                                 
32 Fourcade 2006: 161. Fourcade argues further, in a rich comparative study of the economics 
profession in the United States, Britain, and France, that “[American] graduate training tends to be 
homogenous across higher education institutions, even though differences in style or clearly 
perceptible. As a result, an economics doctorate is a general certification mechanism for academic as 
well as nonacademic jobs” (2009: 73). 
33 For example, Checkel 2005; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999. This research is generally focused on the 
socialization of individual actors, but Bearce and Bondanella (2007) find that membership in inter-
governmental organizations leads to a convergence of interests at the level of the nation-state.  
34 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 905 (also quoted in Chwieroth 2007b: 9).  
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department.35 This approach assumes a broad consensus within the discipline around a 
basic set of neoliberal beliefs; because faculty at prestigious departments publish in 
journals such as the American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Review of Economic Studies, and Journal of Political Economy that primarily 
publishes research that is foundationally neoclassical, it is reasonable to expect that the 
top programs are relatively intellectually consistent.36  
Policymakers that have sustained experience within the IMF and the World 
Bank are also coded as neoliberal.37 I have already demonstrated the extent to which 
neoliberal economists diffused within the upper-level management of the Fund; while 
American-trained economists are a less dominant presence in the World Bank, owing 
largely to the Bank’s more expansive mandate in developing countries, it too remains 
                                                 
35 I am aware of only one other effort to code the educational backgrounds of a large sample of 
policymakers. Chwieroth 2007 looks at policymakers in 29 countries between 1977 and 1999, which is 
a considerably smaller sample than the one I collected for this study. Chwieroth also makes some 
questionable coding choices. He records finance ministers and central bank chiefs as neoliberal if they 
earned a PhD from one of the top ten economics departments, defined in terms of publication frequency 
in the American Economic Review. Chwieroth’s restrictive approach excludes some well-known 
neoliberals. For example, Miguel Mancera, Mexico’s central bank governor between 1982 and 1997, 
only obtained an MA in economics from Yale – in Chwieroth’s approach, Mancera would not be coded 
as a neoliberal. Similarly, Leslie Delatour, a Haitian finance minister whose “radical ‘free-market’ 
economic policies helped transform him into a national demon soon after his appointment in April 
1986” did not complete his dissertation at the University of Chicago (New York Times Magazine, June 
21, 1987). According to Chwieroth’s criteria, Delatour does not have neoliberal beliefs because he 
never defended the dissertation.  
36 I code policymakers that earned advanced degrees from top-30 ranked economics departments as 
neoliberal. Rankings are inherently subjective and their construction is controversial. I argue that my 
approach is defensible because it casts a wide net by including all of the major departments; 
consequently, it is less prone to including/excluding departments because of the ranking criteria 
(publication records, surveys, etc.) employed by the analyst. My strategy for selecting the top 
departments was to compare a large number of different rankings over the past thirty years – the 
approach showed that while the ranking of different departments can vary widely in terms of placement 
on the list, there is consistency in terms of the universities that are ranked somewhere within the top 30 
over time and across rankings. I surveyed a number of rankings of economics departments in the U.S.; 
see Davis and Papanek 1984; Dusansky and Vernon 1998; Graves et al 1982; Hirsch et al 1984; Hogan 
1984; Scott and Mitias 1996.  
37 By sustained experience I refer to employment in either of the institutions in Washington DC in a 
position involved in the day-to-day operations of the institution. It is important to make this distinction 
because many policymakers are appointed as their country’s representative on the IMF’s Board of 
Governors, which only meets once per year. These fleeting, mainly symbolic experiences with the 
institutions are unlikely to have the kind of socializing effect that deep involvement in the institution as 
a staff member, advisor, or Executive Director imparts.  
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a center for neoliberal thinking.38 
The key explanatory variable in the analysis (Proportion Neoliberal) is 
constructed by recording the proportion of the economic policymaking team that holds 
neoliberal beliefs. This measure ranges from 0 (no neoliberal policymakers) to 1 (a 
unified neoliberal policy team).39 It is important to consider the ideational coherence 
of the policymaking team because strong divisions within the government enervate the 
potential impact of neoliberals on policy outcomes. For example, in Joan Nelson’s 
edited volume on policy adjustment in the 1980s, reform programs failed in a number 
of countries, in part because economic policymakers with dissimilar beliefs pursued 
contradictory agendas.40 The IMF is more likely to perceive a program as credible if 
neoliberal ideas are shared among the important policymakers; governments that are 
divided between sympathetic and skeptical officials will be viewed with suspicion by 
the Fund’s staff and management. To identify the important policymakers, I turned to 
the IMF’s own documents. The Letter of Intent specifying the terms of the agreement 
is signed by the major economic officials in the country; from the documents I am able 
to identify the key economic policymakers in each country.41 Because the executive 
has the ultimate authority over policymaking, the economic policy team is composed 
in the analysis by the signatories to the agreement (usually finance minister and central 
bank head) and the chief of government. Ideologically unified policy teams are very 
infrequent but do exist: for example, all three of the key economic policymakers 
                                                 
38 A 1991 World Bank survey of employment in the Policy, Research, and External Affairs departments 
revealed that 80 percent of senior staff received their training in economics departments in either the 
U.S. or the UK (Woods 2006: 53).  
39 I experimented with a number of different measures of the presence of neoliberals before settling on 
the indicator described in this section. The findings reported in the analysis are attenuated but generally 
robust to different specifications of the neoliberal variable, including a dummy indicating the presence 
of a neoliberal in the government, a measure that only counts the finance minister and central bank 
governor, and a broader measure of neoliberals that includes training in any American economics 
department.  
40 See Nelson 1990: 339-40.  
41 The majority of programs are signed by the finance minister and central bank governor, although in 
other countries the planning minister, prime minister, or special economic advisor is a signatory.  
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responsible for Mexico’s 1995 Standby agreement were neoliberals.42  
The dates of entry and exit from office for policymakers were mainly collected 
from two sources: the CIA’s Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign 
Governments and Keesings Record of World Events. The data were supplemented (and 
precise dates were confirmed) with additional records of entry and exit dates from the 
archives of the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Financial Times, New York 
Times, and, in some cases, from direct correspondence with finance ministries and 
central banks. The data collection resulted in a complete record of the entry and exit 
dates for over 2,000 policymakers in 90 countries observed between 1980 and 2000. I 
relied on several different sources to gather background information for policymaker, 
including Proquest’s Digital Dissertations database, Gale’s Biography Resource 
Center, International Who’s Who, The Statesman’s Yearbook, Who’s Who in 
International Organizations, and numerous country- and region-specific editions of 
Who’s Who.43  
Technocratic Variables: If technocratic considerations dominate the design of 
IMF programs, treatment by the Fund should be proportional to the depth of the 
economic problems that the borrower faces. The analysis includes two indicators of 
the severity of the external economic constraints: international reserves as a 
percentage of external debt and debt as a percent of gross national income (GNI). I 
also include measures for the growth rate of GDP per capita and the natural log of 
GDP. Economic problems in large countries are more threatening to global economic 
                                                 
42 Finance minister Guillermo Ortiz has a PhD from Stanford; central bank governor Mancera has an 
MA from Yale; President Zedillo earned his PhD in economics from Yale. A number of executives in 
Latin America earned advanced degrees in economics, including Miguel Rodriguez Echeverría in Costa 
Rica (PhD, Berkeley), Ricardo Lagos Escobar in Chile (PhD, Duke), Ernesto Samper Pizano in 
Colombia (PhD candidate, Columbia), and Alvaro Magaña in El Salvador (MA, Chicago).  
43 Some finance ministries and central banks provide biographical information on their websites. I also 
obtained digital records of the American Economic Review’s membership survey. Because the 
background information was generated from a wide range of sources, I made sure to cross-check the 
coding against multiple sources to ensure consistency.  
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stability, so the IMF is likely to treat economically important countries more 
generously, with fewer conditions, bigger loans, and weaker enforcement.  
I add several economic variables to the specific models of different aspects of 
IMF treatment. Structural performance criteria are less likely to be included in 
agreements with countries that have already pursued a broad program of economic 
liberalization. Unfortunately, reliable cross-national measures of different aspects of 
economic liberalization are not available. I use the variable openness, a dichotomous 
measure of trade liberalization first developed by Sachs and Warner and improved and 
updated by Wacziarg and Welch.44 Research has linked compliance with binding 
conditions to inflation and government consumption; consequently, these measures are 
included in the models of waivers.45   
Intra-Institutional Variables: Intra-organizational politics and routines are 
expected to influence the behavior of the IMF. Barnett and Finnemore suggest that the 
expansion of conditionality is a consequence of the IMF’s progressive elaboration of 
the monetary approach to balance of payments crises “to incorporate more and more 
aspects of domestic life into its stabilization programs.”46 I use a simple counter 
variable that starts at zero in 1980 to account for bureaucratic expansion.  
The public choice approach to IMF lending suggests two additional 
variables.47 As global financial conditions worsen, the interest rate subsidy provided 
by the Fund (since interest on Fund loans is below world rates) becomes more 
attractive, enabling the staff to increase both lending and conditionality. The Fund 
should be tougher in enforcing conditions when alternative sources of funding for 
                                                 
44 Sachs and Warner 1995; Wacziarg and Welch 2003, 2008.  
45 Stone 2002; Pop-Eleches 2003. Domestic credit creation and budget outlays are typical targets that, if 
exceeded, would force a program off course if a government could not obtain a waiver. I use the 
measures of inflation and government consumption in their place because data on domestic credit and 
budgeting are unavailable for many countries.    
46 Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 71.  
47 Dreher and Vaubel 2004.  
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borrowers are scarce. To account for global financial conditions I include the nominal 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate in the models. I also include a measure of the total annu
of IMF credit and administrative resources as a percent of the total quota of the IMF
provided by the institution’s members (both measured in billions of SDRs). This is an 
indicator of the general demand for IMF resources and is expected to be positivel
related to the number of conditions and negatively related to the amount of fundin
al use 
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Extra-Institutional Variables: Geopolitical interests are commonly invoked 
explain variation in the IMF’s treatment of borrowers. The challenge is to identify 
variables that can serve as proxies for a borrower’s strategic importance to the most 
powerful influential member of the IMF, the United States. I use two measures. First, 
Stone argues that political significance is indicated by the flows of foreign aid.48 A
measure of strategic importance I include a variable that records annual American
military aid and grants to a borrowing country.49 Dreher and Jensen suggest that
voting in the UN General Assembly is a better variable to measure the effect of 
geopolitical interests on the IMF’s behavior.50  The similarity of voting profiles in the
UNGA is used as an indicator of the closeness of a borrower and powerful state
number of studies of the IMF.51 The measure I use captures the similarity of a 
borrower’s and the United States’ voting decisions on UNGA resolutions. The 
variable (U.S. Affinity) ranges from   -1 to 1, with higher values indicating closer 
relations, as proxied by votes in the UN.52 If the United States intervenes in the IM
lending behavior, we should observe that friendly, politically influential countri
 
48 Stone 2002, 2004.  
49 I also ran tests with total American aid (economic and military aid). This measure was not significant 
in any of the models.  
50 Dreher and Jensen 2007. 
51 Barro and Lee 2005; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Thacker 1999.  
52 Taken from Gartzke 2006.  
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receive bigger loans with fewer conditions and are more frequent recipients of 
waivers
 a 
 is a 
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To capture the effect of supplementary financiers on IMF treatment, I create
dichotomous variable that is coded positively when a Paris Club debt restructuring 
agreement was reached in the six months preceding or following the initiation of an 
IMF program. This approach follows Gould’s logic: “private debt restructuring
key moment when PFIs [private financial influences] may be able to organize 
themselves, develop a coherent bargaining strategy, and articulate their preferences to
Fund representatives.”53 I focus on Paris Club agreements because creditor states are 
in Gould’s (2006) work to have the most powerful effect on conditionality.54
Domestic Institutional Variables: Several domestic political variables aside 
from the presence of neoliberals can be identified as plausible determinants of IMF 
treatment. A well established literature on the economic effects of the electoral cycle 
suggests that governments are more prone to adopt irresponsible policies in the p
preceding elections. An internal review by the IMF staff identified pre-election 
dynamics as an important cause of deviations from binding conditions in at least
major programs in the 1980s and 1990s.55 If this is the case, the IMF should be 
tougher on countries before elections.56 On the other hand, in the “honeymoon” pe
following an election the IMF might be more lenient on the new government. To 
measure the electoral cycle, I used the World Bank’s Database of Political Instituti
to gather the dates of elections in countries in the sample. Since political business 
 
53 Gould 2003: 566.  
54 A better test of the supplementary financiers explanation would measure private bank exposure as 
well as creditor state influence, but data on bank exposure in the developing world is variable in quality 
and unavailable for many of the countries in the analysis.  
55 Memorandum for the Executive Board, “Review of Studies under ESAF-Supported Arrangements – 
Staff Studies, Volume 2,” EBS/97/112 Supplement 2, July 7, 1997 
56 Indeed, Dreher (2004) provides evidence that program interruptions are more frequent around 
elections.  
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cycles should only be present in competitive elections, I only included elections w
multiple candidates/parties (denoted by a score of 5 or above in the Database of 
Political Institution’s electoral competitiveness index). Two dichotomous variables 
were generated from this process: an indicator that takes a value of one if a legis
or executive election is scheduled in the next six months (Pre-Election), and an 
ith 
lative 
indicato
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r for elections that occurred in the previous six months (Post-Election).57  
Partisanship may influence the design of programs. Some accuse the I
conservative bias in its lending behavior.58 To measure the effect of partisan 
dynamics, I include an indicator for the presence of Left governments.59 The eff
three other domestic institutional variables are examined. Vreeland argues that 
executives might seek to bring in the IMF when there are many veto players that can
prevent policy change; on the other hand, the IMF might be tougher with countries 
with many veto players because ambitious reforms are less likely to be carried out in
these cases.60 Both conjectures lead us to expect that increasing the number of veto
players will mean tougher treatment: more conditions, smaller loans, and a lower 
probability of receiving a waiver. The measu
e Database on Political Institutions.  
The effect of regime type on IMF treatment is controversial. Vreeland sugg
 
57 I ran analyses with separate indicators for legislative and executive elections, and experimented with 
different lengths of time for pre- and post-election variables; the results did not change significantly 
using these alternative specifications.  
58 Pastor, 1987; Payer, 1974; Pop-Eleches, 2003: 279. It is important to note that my shared neoliberal 
ideas explanation is not the same as a “rightist bias” argument. While competing ideas about economic 
policy may line up along partisan lines, this is not always the case. Much more important than partisan 
identification in my framework are the shared ideas about economic stabilization and development 
between the IMF and policymakers; these ideas can and do transcend partisan labels, as the examples of 
neoliberal reforms under the Left governments of Fujimori in Peru, Menem in Argentina, and Cardoso 
in Brazil in the 1990s illustrate. As Miguel Centeno writes, “rather than sharing an ideology, 
technocrats may be seen as sharing a mentality or cognitive framework” (1993: 312).  
59 The Database of Political Institutions records the political party of the chief of government and the 
largest party in government. I code the variable as “1” when either the executive or the largest party in 
the governing coalition is recorded as a Left party.  
60 Vreeland 2003.  
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that the IMF might prefer negotiations with dictatorships, which can more readil
commit to and carry out tough conditions.
y 
 
ility 
hanges (in either direction) by at least three points during a three year 
period.
e 
ervations due to missing data on some of the independent variables.    
riate for 
distribution. I estimate a negative binomial model of the determinants of the number 
                                                
61 On the other hand, the “democratic 
commitment” literature emphasizes that democracies can more credibly commit to
policies, which suggests that the IMF would be more generous in its treatment of 
democratic regimes.62 To test the effect of regime type on IMF treatment, I include a 
measure drawn from the Polity IV scores, which range from -10 (fully autocratic) to 
+10 (fully democratic), referred to here as regime type. To account for the possib
that the IMF is more likely to issue a waiver for countries experiencing political 
instability, I include a variable (instability) that is coded 1 if the Polity IV regime type 
indicator c
63 
Tables showing descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in th
data analysis can be found in appendix A; the summary statistics are based on the 
comprehensive statistical models reported in the next section, which reduces the total 
number of obs
Methodology 
 I use several estimation procedures because of the different properties of the 
data on IMF treatment. For the total number of binding conditions, I specify a Poisson 
model with robust standard errors clustered by country. The Poisson is approp
these data because they are slightly right-skewed and overdispersion is not a 
problem.64 However, the data on the total number of structural conditions is 
overdispersed – there are more zeros in the data than predicted by the Poisson 
 
61 Vreeland 2003: 88.  
62 For example, Schultz and Weingast 2003.  
63 This approach to measuring political instability follows Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
64 The Poisson distribution assumes that the mean and variance are equal; overdispersion implies that 
the variance exceeds the mean. See King 1989: 48-52.  
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of structural performance criteria to account for this issue.65 To test the determinants 
of the size of loans, I estimate a Prais-Winsten regression with panel corrected 
standard errors and an AR(1) correction.66 Finally, when the dependent variable 
measures whether a country under an IMF program receives a waiver I estimate a logit 
model with robust standard errors clustered by country. To account for time 
dependence in this model I include three natural cubic splines, which are not 
substantively interesting and are not reported in the results section.67 I do not include 
country- or time-fixed effects in any of the models because of the nature of the data. 
Including fixed effects washes out the effects of slow-moving variables. In a number 
of countries the proportion neoliberal variable does not change – in these cases, no 
neoliberals have ever held prominent positions in the government.68 In addition, fixed 
effects models may return inconsistent estimates when the structure of the data 
includes many groups (countries) and few time periods.69 Most of the explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year to minimize the risk of endogeneity.70  
                                                 
65 As robustness checks I ran the models of the number of binding conditions and number of structural 
conditions using both Poisson and negative binomial estimators. The findings are largely the same 
regardless of the estimating procedure.   
66 The panel corrected errors follow the recommendation of Beck 2001 for cross-sectional time series 
data such as my data. The AR(1) correction is added because the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
(implemented in Stata with the xtserial command) shows that I should reject the null hypothesis of no 
first-order autocorrelation (F = 5.123, Prob > F = 0.0325). 
67 See Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998 for an explanation and justification of the use of natural cubic 
splines in models with limited dependent variables. 
68 As an alternative to country fixed effects, I ran each of the statistical models with five regional 
dummies (sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and 
the Middle East and North Africa – South Asia was the omitted reference category). Including regional 
fixed effects did not affect the findings reported in the next section, and the coefficients for the regional 
dummies were generally quite far from achieving statistical significance. These results are available 
upon request 
69 See Abrevaya 1997. This is certainly the case for my data: for example, in the comprehensive model 
of loan size (which includes each of the covariates described in the previous section of the chapter), 
there are 78 countries with an average of 5.7 observations per group – and several countries appear only 
once in the dataset because they signed a single program during the two decades in the analysis.  
70 Since I have the date of approval for all the programs signed by the IMF and a borrower, I can 
identify the period of the year in which the program is concluded. For more accurate estimates, when a 
program is signed in December I include data for the year of the observation; otherwise, all variables 
noted in the table with the t – 1 subscript are lagged by one year. The number of programs signed in the 
last month of a year is small, and the list is available by request.  
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 Before getting to the results, it is worth noting that the sampling method is 
different from most statistical studies in international relations. For the conditionality 
and loan size models, the sample includes only countries that received a program in 
the years between 1980 and 2000. The variation I am interested in explaining is not 
whether a country received a program, but rather the variation in the treatment of 
countries under IMF programs. The data are organized in the typical country-year 
structure, but could also be thought of as program-year observations. The sample is 
slightly different for the waivers dataset: here the sample consists of countries that are 
under active IMF programs and thus at risk of receiving a waiver (or multiple waivers) 
at some point during the calendar year.71   
Results and Discussion 
 Simple descriptive statistics indicate that there is a relationship between the 
presence of neoliberals and treatment by the Fund. The average number of binding 
conditions is 12.4 when there are no neoliberals in government. The average declines 
to 11.8 conditions in countries where less than half of the economic policy team is 
neoliberal, and in countries where neoliberals make up more than half of the policy 
team the average number of conditions is 11.6. These are not dramatic differences, and 
the ability to make generalizable claims from descriptive statistics is limited – 
                                                 
71 A discussion of sampling necessitates consideration of selection issues. Understanding and correcting 
for biased selection is prominent in the statistically-oriented literature on the IMF, for good reason: 
much of the empirical literature is interested in exploring the effects of Fund programs on outcomes 
(growth, inequality, etc). The distribution of IMF programs is not random: countries choose to go to the 
IMF for some reason, and the factors that influence the choice to approach the Fund might also be 
systematically related to the outcome variable (see Vreeland 2003: 112-18 for a good discussion). The 
solution to the problem of selection depends on whether the factors that motivate selection into IMF 
programs can be observed or are unobservable – and there are drawbacks to both types of approaches 
(for example, see the debate between von Stein 2005 and Simmons and Hopkins 2005). My goal in this 
chapter is to understand the determinants of variation in the IMF’s treatment of borrowers, not the effect 
of IMF programs, so selection is not such a pressing concern. Selection would be a problem here if 
some aspect of the selection process that determines which countries receive programs is also related to 
the design of programs. This becomes an omitted variable problem. I contend that the inclusion of all 
theoretically important domestic and international variables should mitigate concerns about omitted 
observable variables.    
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nonetheless, the numbers suggest that my explanation has at least face validity. 
Structural conditions show a similar pattern: the average number for observations with 
no neoliberals is 1.7; when the proportion of neoliberals is half or greater, the average 
declines to 0.6. The bivariate correlations between the proportion neoliberal variable 
and loan size (r = 0.16, p = 0.0003) and between neoliberals and the presence of 
waivers (r = 0.16, p = 0.0000) are also suggestive.72 Does my explanation stand up in 
statistical tests against other plausible determinants of variation in Fund treatment?  
 Before moving to the presentation of the results, it is important to review the 
strategy I employ in the following pages. Rather than presenting one comprehensive 
model in which each of the explanatory variables described in the previous section are 
included on the right hand side of the equation, I take a more cautious approach. I start 
with simple models that include just the key explanatory variable, proportion 
neoliberal and one or two “controls” on the right hand side, and explore whether the 
relationship between my key variable and the dependent variables remains as 
additional explanatory variables are incrementally added. There are good reasons to 
proceed cautiously. The critiques offered by Achen, Clarke, and Ray of the “garbage 
can” approach to statistical inference describe a litany of problems that can 
accompany statistical models with long lists of independent variables.73 The risk that 
we fail to capture the true impact of an important explanatory factor is multiplied in 
complicated models: for example, nonlinearities in an independent variable can 
obscure the relationship between other variables and the outcome of interest74, and the 
                                                 
72 Pairwise correlations between the proportion neoliberal variable and the number of binding 
conditions (r = -0.111, p = 0.01) and number of structural conditions (r = -0.117, p = 0.01) are also 
negative and significant. 
73 See the essays by Achen (2005), Clarke (2005), and Ray (2005) in the special issue of Conflict 
Management and Peace Science. Kadera and Mitchell (2005) provide an example of an attempt to 
apply simplified statistical models in studies of international conflict.  
74 Achen (2005) presents simulations that show how even small nonlinearities can skew results of 
standard regression models.  
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es.  
                                                
inclusion of a control variable that intervenes between the key explanatory variable 
and the outcome can generate misleading estimates.75 These issues can overwhelm 
any possible biases from omitted explanatory variabl
It is worth heeding the advice of methodologists that more is not always better. 
The central goal in this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between neoliberal policymakers and the IMF’s treatment, not to create a 
statistical model that explains as much variation in IMF treatment as possible. I 
present the results from fully specified models only after showing that the associations 
between proportion neoliberal and the dependent variables hold in simpler models. 
The exercise is intended to demonstrate that the central findings in the chapter are not 
dependent on modeling choices.   
Determinants of the Number of Conditions 
 In table 3.1 I present the results from a series of Poisson models of the number 
of performance criteria; table 3.2 displays findings from a set of negative binomial 
models of the determinants of the number of structural conditions. In both tables I 
begin in column (1) with a basic specification that includes only the time counter 
variable and the proportion neoliberal indicator; in each subsequent specification I 
add and remove potentially confounding variables to observe the changing impact of 
the central explanatory variable on the extent of conditionality.76 
 
 
75 Ray (2003) explains that the relationship between key explanatory X and outcome Y can be muted if 
an intervening variable Z is included on the right hand side of the equation.  
76 There is no set of guidelines for which variables should be included, and it would be unwieldy to 
present results from all possible configurations of variables. I try to account for theoretically important 
factors that, if omitted, might lead to inflated and inaccurate estimates of the impact of proportion 
neoliberal on IMF treatment of borrowers. 
Table 3.1: Models of the Determinants of the Number of Binding Conditions in IMF 
Agreements
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent 
variables Basic model Add Affinity Add T-Bill 
Drop 
Counter  
Econ. 
controls 
Time Counter 0.02*** 0.021*** 0.012***  0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
Proportion Neolib. -0.174*** -0.198*** -0.201*** -0.192*** -0.201*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.056) 
U.S. Affinity t-1  -0.086* -0.088** -0.068* -0.073* 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) 
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1   -0.025*** -0.048***  
   (0.005) (0.004)  
Reserves/Debt t-1     -0.0001 
     (0.0003) 
Log GDPt-1     0.004 
     (0.009) 
Regime Type t-1      
      
Left Government      
      
Debt Resched.      
      
No. of obs. 503 498 498 498 452 
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 Table 3.1 (continued) 
 (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables Add Regime 
Add Left 
Gov. Add Debt  
Time Counter 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Proportion Neolib. -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.185*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 -0.088* -0.084* -0.066 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1    
    
Reserves/Debt t-1    
    
Log GDPt-1    
    
Regime Type t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left Government  0.017 0.013 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Debt Resched.   0.059** 
   (0.020) 
No. of obs. 474 474 474 
Poisson regressions, robust standard errors clustered by country 
in parentheses. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%
 87
 Table 3.2: Models of the Determinants of the Number of Binding Structural 
Conditions in IMF Agreements 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
variables 
Basic 
model Add Affinity Add T-Bill Drop Counter 
Time Counter 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.059***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.018)  
Proportion Neolib. -1.134* -1.353** -1.412** -1.502*** 
 (0.477) (0.459) (0.448) (0.429) 
U.S. Affinity t-1  -0.865*** -0.857*** -0.704* 
  (0.236) (0.242) (0.258) 
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1   -0.091* -0.202*** 
   (0.042) (0.030) 
Openness t-1     
     
Log GDPt-1     
     
Regime Type t-1     
     
Left Government     
     
Debt Resched.     
     
No. of obs. 502 497 497 497 
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 Table 3.2 (continued) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
Econ. 
controls Add Regime Add Left Gov Add Debt 
Time Counter 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.10*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Proportion Neolib. -1.042* -1.165* -1.165* -1.164* 
 (0.493) (0.547) (0.462) (0.458) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 
-
0.806*** -0.730** -0.729** -0.746** 
 (0.227) (0.240) (0.243) (0.250) 
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1     
     
Openness t-1 -0.132    
 (0.163)    
Log GDPt-1 -0.091    
 (0.077)    
Regime Type t-1  -0.027* -0.027* -0.027* 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Left Government   0.003 0.008 
   (0.175) (0.170) 
Debt Resched.    -0.062 
    (0.133) 
No. of obs. 465 474 474 474 
Negative binomial regressions; robust standard errors clustered by country 
in parentheses. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%
The results are supportive of the claim that governments with neoliberal 
economic policymakers receive programs with fewer conditions. The coefficient for 
the proportion neoliberal variable is negative and significant in every specification. 
More importantly, the substantive impact of the key explanatory variable is very 
consistent across the various models: holding other variables equal, increasing the 
proportion of neoliberal policymakers by half a point reduces both the total number of 
conditions and the number of structural conditions by close to one, regardless of the 
specification.77 The impact of likeminded policymakers on conditionality is robust to 
                                                 
77 The interpretation of coefficients from count models is, unlike linear regression, not straightforward. 
To assess the substantive importance of different variables, I used the formula (β * [change in variable] 
* mean number of conditions) (see King 1989: 203). The weakest effect of a half point increase in 
proportion neoliberal in the table 3.1 is -1.08 (column 1); the strongest effect is -1.24 (columns 3 and 
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 the addition of variables to account for global financial conditions (the U.S. Treasury 
Bill rate), strategic interests of the U.S. (the Affinity measure), economic conditions in 
borrowing countries, domestic political factors (regime type and partisanship of the 
government), and the interests of creditor states.78  
Several other interesting findings emerge from the exercise: countries that 
share similar voting profiles with the U.S. seem to benefit from this relationship by 
receiving fewer conditions, but this relationship is more fragile in the models of the 
number of binding conditions than in the models of the number of structural 
conditions. Democratic countries appear, in table 3.2, to receive programs with fewer 
structural conditions, but the substantive effect of the variable is small: a country that 
transitions from a full autocracy (Polity score of -10) to a fully consolidated 
democracy (Polity score of 10) can expect under 1 fewer structural condition per 
program.  
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrated that the statistical association between 
proportion neoliberal and conditionality is not fragile. With confidence that the 
relationship is not an artifact of modeling decisions, I move to comprehensive models 
in which proxies for a variety of plausible explanations are included. Column (1) of 
table 3.3 displays results for the explanations of the total number of binding 
conditions.  
                                                                                                                                            
4). For the models of the number of structural conditions the effect of a half point increase in the 
explanatory variable ranges from -0.79 (column 5) to -1.13 (column 4).  
78 The relationship between partisanship and neoliberal policymakers is of particular interest, since 
many qualitative studies suggest that left governments will be less likely to appoint neoliberals. 
However, there is essentially no meaningful correlation in my datasets between proportion neoliberal 
and left government (r = 0.02, p = 0.62).   
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 Table 3.3: Determinants of Binding Conditions in IMF Agreements, 1980-2000 
 No. perf. criteria No. struc. PCs 
Independent variables (1) Poisson (2) Negative binomial 
Time Counter 0.016*** 0.086*** 
 (0.003) (0.024) 
Total Use of IMF Credit/Quota t-1 0.338** 1.360 
 (0.119) (0.965) 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate t-1 -0.020*** -0.111* 
 (0.006) (0.054) 
Reserves/Debt t-1 0.0001 -0.005 
 (0.0002) (0.003) 
Debt/GNI t-1 0.0001* -0.0002 
 (0.00007) (0.0007) 
Log GDPt-1 0.012 -0.080 
 (0.009) (0.068) 
GDP Per Capita Growtht-1 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.001) (0.012) 
Proportion Neoliberal -0.227*** -1.201* 
 (0.061) (0.511) 
Pre-Election Period 0.021 0.319 
 (0.040) (0.296) 
Left Government 0.019 -0.037 
 (0.021) (0.162) 
Regime Type t-1 0.0001 -0.010 
 (0.002) (0.018) 
Veto Players  -0.007 -0.052 
 (0.010) (0.069) 
U.S. Military Aid t-1 1.69x10-8 3.87x10-7* 
 (1.75x10-8 ) (1.74x10-7) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 -0.045 -0.513 
 (0.041) (0.281) 
Debt Rescheduling 0.053* -0.085 
 (0.022) (0.137) 
Openness t-1  -0.241 
  (0.168) 
Constant 2.081*** 1.875 
 (0.242) (1.648) 
No. of observations 423 423 
Log likelihood -1001.86 -659.11 
Wald χ 2 366.89 89.62 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
Bureaucratic factors seem to have an important effect on conditionality: the total use 
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 of IMF resources, U.S. T-bill rate, and time counter variables are all significant 
determinants. The Fund becomes tougher when its resources are in demand; increasing 
the value of the total use of IMF resources from its minimum to maximum value leads 
to slightly more than 1 additional condition. Time is a factor here, as well: for each 5-
year period that passes, another condition is added to the typical agreement. The effect 
of the measure of the desirability of the Fund’s lending facilities is very surprising. 
Contrary to expectations, a 4 point increase in the nominal Treasury bill rate leads to 
one less condition per program, on average.79 
 The technocratic explanation, as anticipated by previous work by political 
scientists on the IMF, does not perform well. The only economic variable in the 
analysis of the number of conditions in column (1) of table 3.3 that achieves a 
conventional level of significance is the measure of external indebtedness. The 
political variables also have a weak effect on the number of conditions. In contrast to 
the realist argument, I do not find evidence in the comprehensive model that countries 
of geopolitical value to the U.S. are rewarded with programs with fewer binding 
conditions overall.80 The U.S. Affinity measure has the expected sign, but the 
coefficient is quite small and the standard error is large, indicating that the effect is not 
estimated with much precision. It is important to keep in mind, however, that U.S. 
Affinity showed a significant negative relationship with the total number of conditions 
in the barebones models in table 3.1. I find that periods preceding and following Paris 
Club debt rescheduling are positively and significantly related to the number of 
                                                 
79 It is important to note that the high correlation between the time counter and U.S. T-bill rate variables 
probably attenuate their substantive impact when they are included together. In column (4) of table 3.1, 
the substantive effect of a four point increase in the Treasury bill rate – without the counter variable – is 
just under two and a half fewer conditions.   
80 This finding fits with Dreher and Jensen’s results. They find evidence that US interests lower the 
number of total conditions – measured without distinguishing binding from nonbinding conditions – but 
find no effect of voting with the US in the UNGA on the number of performance criteria, the dependent 
variable on interest in this chapter.  
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 conditions, but the substantive effect of the variable is small and hard to interpret 
(two-thirds of a condition is added when a country is or has been involved in debt 
negotiations).  
 Bureaucratic factors also influence the number of structural conditions in 
agreements, as shown in column (2) of table 3.3. The results indicate that a structural 
condition is added to the average program per each decade that passes, and that a six 
point increase in the Treasury bill rate results in one fewer structural condition. The 
evidence for the effect of geopolitics is particularly interesting: U.S. interest measured 
as closeness of voting profiles in the UNGA (U.S. Affinity) has a big (though not quite 
statistically significant) effect on the number of structural conditions. In the stripped-
down models in table 3.2, a one and half point increase in the Affinity score – roughly, 
moving from Iran’s record of voting in the UN General Assembly over the past three 
decades to Israel’s voting record – results in programs with about one fewer structural 
condition, all other variables held constant. This effect is attenuated somewhat in the 
comprehensive model. However, the effect of American military aid runs in the 
opposite direction. Perhaps the types of countries that have high U.S. Affinity scores 
systematically differ from countries that receive American military aid. Another 
possibility suggested by Dreher and Jensen is that American officials focus their 
efforts to influence lending to its allies that, for political reasons, do not receive much 
aid.81   
 My main interest in this chapter is examining the effect of neoliberals on 
aspects of IMF treatment. The evidence presented in the full specification in table 3.3 
provides strong confirmation that policy teams staffed with neoliberal officials get 
better treatment: in the analysis of both the number of conditions and the number of 
                                                 
81 Dreher and Jensen 2007. It is notable that the correlation between U.S. Affinity and U.S. military aid 
is slightly negative (r = -0.08, p = 0.09).  
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 structural criteria, controlling for a range of different explanations, the proportion 
neoliberal variable is negative and highly significant. Table 3.4 provides a substantive 
interpretation of the impact of the variable on IMF conditionality based on the results 
from the comprehensive model. The table shows the predicted number of conditions in 
a program when the explanatory variables are held constant at different values and the 
proportion neoliberal measure is allowed to vary.82  
Table 3.4: Predicted No. Conditions at Different Levels of Proportion Neoliberal 
Proportion Neoliberal varies, 
other variables held at 
mean/minimum 
Predicted Number of Conditions 
# total conditions 
(95% conf. interval) 
# structural conditions 
(95% conf. interval) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0 12.16 (11.74, 12.62) 
1.55 
(1.14, 2.09) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0.25 11.48 (11.07, 11.93) 
1.14 
(0.79, 1.59) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0.50 10.84 (10.26, 11.51) 
0.86 
(0.49, 1.39) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0.75 10.24 (9.45, 11.19) 
0.65 
(0.29, 1.29) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 1 9.67 (8.67, 10.85) 
0.51 
(0.16, 1.22) 
As the proportion of the government occupied by neoliberals incrementally 
increases the predicted number of conditions decreases. Moving from a government 
with no neoliberals to a unified neoliberal government shaves two conditions off 
lending programs. The influence of neoliberals on the predicted number of structural 
conditions is less dramatic but still substantively important. This is the first set of 
compelling evidence in favor of my argument.   
Determinants of the Size of IMF Loans 
 The next set of results explores the determinants of the generosity of IMF 
loans. As in the previous section, I test the effect of the proportion neoliberal variable 
                                                 
82 I hold the continuous variables at their means, and the dichotomous variables (Left Government, Debt 
Rescheduling, Pre-Election Period, and Openness) at their minimum value (0) to simulate a typical 
borrower. The predicted values are calculated using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001).  
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in several different specifications before presenting the comprehensive model of the 
determinants of the size of loans. 
I start in table 3.5 with a barebones model: with the just the log of GDP and 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate included as covariates alongside my main explanatory variable, 
the results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in proportion neoliberal 
leads to a 7 percent increase in the size of the average loan. The positive, significant 
relationship between proportion neoliberal and loan size holds across a number of 
different specifications. The substantive impact on the size of IMF loans of a transition 
from a government without neoliberals to a unified neoliberal policy team ranges 
between 35 and 45 percent in the different specifications in table 3.5. The relationship 
between the key explanatory variable and loan size remains strong and consistent as I 
build from a minimal specification to more complicated models. This finding stands in 
contrast to the fragility of the relationship between loan size and the indicator of 
American political influence (U.S. Affinity). The point estimate of the effect of a one 
unit change in the Affinity score on loan size ranges between 13 percent in the 
barebones model in column (2) and 33 percent in column (3), and only in the third 
column does the coefficient for the indicator of the friendliness of the relationship 
between the borrower and the United States reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  
 Table 3.5: Models of the Determinants of the Size of IMF Loans 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables Basic model Add Affinity  Add Reserves 
Log GDPt-1 0.106*** 0.101*** 0.111*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) 
Proportion Neoliberal 0.372* 0.424* 0.458* 
 (0.175) (0.168) (0.171) 
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) 
U.S. Affinity t-1  0.134 0.328* 
  (0.118) (0.119) 
Reserves/Debt t-1   -0.004*** 
   (0.001) 
Regime Type t-1    
    
Left Government    
    
Post-Election Period    
    
No. of observations 483 479 460 
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 Table 3.5 (continued) 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables Add Regime Add Left Gov Add Election 
Log GDPt-1 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.102*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) 
Proportion Neoliberal 0.426* 0.401* 0.352* 
 (0.168) (0.166) (0.129) 
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 0.154 0.210 0.203 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.111) 
Reserves/Debt t-1    
    
Regime Type t-1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Left Government  0.204*** 0.200** 
  (0.064) (0.064) 
Post-Election Period   0.299* 
   (0.118) 
No. of observations 475 475 475 
Prais-Winsten coefficients, panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%
 Table 3.6 gives the results from the more fully specified model of the relative 
generosity of IMF loans.   
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 Table 3.6: Determinants of Size of IMF Loans, 1980-2000 
 Natural log of loan size/quota 
Independent variables PCSE, AR(1) 
Total Use of IMF Credit/Quota t-1 -0.838 
 (0.572) 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate t-1 0.102*** 
 (0.015) 
Reserves/Debt t-1 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Debt/GNI t-1 0.0006 
 (0.0004) 
Log GDPt-1 0.128*** 
 (0.031) 
GDP Per Capita Growtht-1 -0.011 
 (0.007) 
Proportion Neoliberal 0.400* 
 (0.168) 
Post-Election Period 0.317** 
 (0.107) 
Left Government 0.143* 
 (0.062) 
Regime Type t-1 -0.005 
 (0.005) 
U.S. Military Aid t-1 -3.73x10-7*** 
 (1.03x10-7) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 0.277 
 (0.149) 
Debt rescheduling 0.067 
 (0.060) 
No. of observations 445 
R2 0.25 
Wald χ 2 164.33 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 
Prais-Winsten coefficients, panel corrected standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%
Several findings stand out. The results are more supportive of the technocratic 
explanation than the results of the statistical models of the total number of binding 
conditions. Balance of payments problems in larger economies are more threatening to 
global economic conditions, and the findings show that the IMF takes the threat 
seriously by consistently giving larger loans to bigger countries. As reserves increase – 
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 and hence need decreases – the average size of loans decrease. Political factors also 
matter. Borrowers in the post-election “honeymoon” period are rewarded with loans 
that are approximately 37 percent larger.83 In contrast to arguments that claim that the 
IMF is biased in favor of conservative parties, Left governments actually receive more 
generous disbursements: the point estimate from the results in table 3.6 indicates that 
governments dominated by left parties see an increase in loan size of 15 percent.  
The contradictory effects of the proxies for U.S. interest emerged in the 
analysis of the number of conditions, and the finding is similar when the dependent 
variable is the logged size of loans. In column (1) of table 3.5, political proximity with 
the U.S. (as measured by UN voting profiles) exerts a big impact on the generosity of 
loans. A one standard deviation increase in the Affinity score is associated with a 7.7 
percent increase in loan size as a percent of quota. However, as noted in the discussion 
on the previous page, the effect of U.S. Affinity is not very robust, and the variable 
fails to achieve significance in the comprehensive model of the determinants of loan 
size. The direction of the U.S. military aid variable remains surprising. Countries that 
receive more American military aid receive, on average, slightly smaller loans: a one 
standard deviation increase in military aid from the United States (in absolute terms, 
an increase of $140,360) is linked to a 5 percent decrease in the generosity of high-
conditionality Fund lending arrangements.  
The results provide additional evidence in support of the argument that the 
IMF systematically favors governments with neoliberal economic policymakers. The 
substantive effect is dramatic: loans to unified neoliberal governments are 
                                                 
83 The effect of dummy variables in log-linear regression is calculated as an arc elasticity, using the 
formula eβ – 1 (see Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007: 47). I included the pre-election variable as well, 
which was not significant.  
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approximately 40 percent larger than loans to governments with no neoliberals.84 
According to table 3.6, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion neoliberal 
variable increases the average loan by 7 percent. The cautious strategy I employ in this 
chapter should provide reassurance that the relationship between likeminded 
policymakers and the IMF’s treatment in terms of the generosity of loans does not 
depend on the presence or exclusion of any number of other explanatory variables.   
Determinants of the Issuance of Waivers 
The third and final aspect of IMF treatment examined in this chapter is 
enforcement of conditionality. Table 3.7 confirms that there is a strong positive 
relationship between proportion neoliberal the issuance of waivers by the IMF, and, 
further, that the association is not sensitive to different specifications. Including 
potentially confounding variables such as political proximity to the U.S., regime type, 
and partisanship does not affect the substantive impact or the significance of my key 
explanatory variable.  
 
84 The results are entirely consistent with the theoretical expectations from chapter 2, but it is important 
to note that the confidence interval around this point estimate is fairly large: the 95 percent confidence 
interval is 0.072 on the lower bound and 0.729 on the upper bound of the estimates.  
 Table 3.7: Models of the Determinants of Waivers
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  (1) (2) (3) (5) 
Independent variables Basic model Add Affinity Econ. controls Add GDP  
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1 -0.092* -0.091* -0.083* -0.083* 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
Proportion Neoliberal 1.868** 1.827* 1.919* 1.757* 
 (0.672) (0.696) (0.705) (0.696) 
U.S. Affinity t-1  -0.174 -0.236 -0.291 
  (0.399) (0.435) (0.429) 
Gov’t Consumption t-1   0.021 0.025 
   (0.018) (0.019) 
Inflationt-1   0.0004** 0.0003** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log GDPt-1    0.058 
    (0.064) 
Regime Type t-1     
     
Left Government     
     
Instability t-1     
     
No. of observations 776 768 739 738 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
 (6) (7) (8) 
Independent variables Add Regime  Add Left Gov. Add Instab.  
U.S. T-Bill rate t-1 -0.076* -0.074* -0.077* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Proportion Neoliberal 1.950** 1.997** 2.021*** 
 (0.678) (0.635) (0.619) 
U.S. Affinity t-1    
    
Gov’t Consumption t-1 0.019 0.021 0.019 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Inflationt-1 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log GDPt-1    
    
Regime Type t-1 0.003 0.006 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Left Government  -0.239 -0.253 
  (0.200) (0.195) 
Instability t-1   -0.365 
   (0.260) 
No. of observations 739 739 739 
Binary logit, robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses, with three 
cubic splines (not reported). *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%
 Table 3.8: Determinants of Waivers, 1980-1997 
 Waiver issued Multiple waivers  
Independent variables (1) Logit (2) Logit 
Use of IMF credit/quota t-1 2.149 0.117 
 (1.713) (2.467) 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate t-1 -0.099* -0.026 
 (0.046) (0.066) 
Reserves/debt t-1 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Debt/GNI t-1 -0.0007 0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Log GDPt-1 0.086 0.099 
 (0.074) (0.087) 
GDP Per Capita Growtht-1 0.008 -0.024 
 (0.020) (0.026) 
Gov’t Consumption/GDPt-1 0.038 0.044 
 (0.020) (0.023) 
Inflationt-1 0.0003* -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Proportion Neoliberal 2.051** 2.656*** 
 (0.668) (0.734) 
Election  -0.100 -0.265 
 (0.274) (0.375) 
Left Government -0.346 -1.150** 
 (0.216) (0.372) 
Regime Type t-1 0.014 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.026) 
Instability t-1 -0.237 -0.004 
 (0.263) (0.368) 
US Military Aid t-1 -1.43x10-6 -3.59x10-6  
 (8.13x10-7) (1.88x10-6) 
UN Voting Affinity t-1 -0.306 -0.089 
 (0.489) (0.733) 
Debt Rescheduling 0.315 0.310 
 (0.237) (0.332) 
Constant -4.041* -5.505* 
 (1.898) (2.308) 
No. of observations 697 697 
Log likelihood -308.950 -189.602 
Wald χ 2 49.32 46.73 
Probability > χ 2 0.0002 0.0004 
Binary logit, robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses, with 
three cubic splines (not reported). *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
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 Column (1) in table 3.8 reports the results of a more comprehensive logistic 
regression when the dependent variable is the issuance of a waiver that allows a 
country to continue its program despite missing one or more binding condition; 
column (2) present results of a logistic model of the determinants of multiple waivers. 
The results are disappointing for most of the explanations of variation in the IMF’s 
treatment – few variables show a strong and significant relationship to the issuance of 
waivers. The negative (and significant) sign on the U.S. Treasury Bill Rate variable 
indicates that the IMF is less lenient when global financial conditions worsen for 
borrowers in the developing world. Only one macroeconomic variable is a significant 
determinant in column (1): inflation is positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood that a country receives a waiver. Government consumption (measured as a 
proportion of GDP) is also positively related to the presence of waivers, but just 
misses the conventional cutoff for significance (p = 0.056). The positive relationships 
between these two economic indicators and the outcome variable in table 3.8 is likely 
a consequence of the fact that countries under IMF programs that experience high 
inflation rates and high government spending are more apt to need waivers to keep 
their programs on track, and thus are more likely to agitate for lenient treatment.  
Political variables, aside from the presence of sympathetic interlocutors in 
borrowing countries, by and large do not have important effects on the probability that 
a waiver is issued. The analysis of the tougher measure of waivers lends some 
credence to the view that the IMF has a rightist bias. Left governments are less likely 
to receive multiple waivers than other types of governments. The indirect measures of 
strategic importance to the U.S. do not show clear relationships with the measure of 
enforcement of conditions.  
The most powerful determinant of the likelihood of receiving a waiver is the 
presence of neoliberal economic policymakers in the borrowing government. As the 
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 proportion of the economic policy team taken by neoliberals increases, countries under 
programs become increasingly likely to receive waivers. Table 3.9 provides a view of 
the substantive impact of changing levels of the proportion of neoliberals in 
government on the predicted probabilities of waivers for noncompliance with program 
dictates will be issued.85  
Table 3.9: Predicted Probabilities of Receiving Waivers Based on Changes in the 
Proportion Neoliberal Variable 
Proportion Neoliberal varies,  
other variables held at 
mean/minimum 
Predicted Prob. Of Waiver 
Waiver 
(95% conf. interval) 
Multiple Waivers 
(95% conf. interval) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0 0.15 (0.10, 0.20) 
0.07 
(0.04, 0.12) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0.25 0.22 (0.17, 0.28) 
0.13 
(0.08, 0.19) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0.50 0.32 (0.22, 0.44) 
0.22 
(0.13, 0.33) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 0.75 0.44 (0.25, 0.64) 
0.35 
(0.18, 0.55) 
Proportion Neoliberal = 1 0.56 (0.29, 0.81) 
0.51 
(0.24, 0.77) 
The table shows the dramatic effect of changes in the proportion neoliberal 
measure on the likelihood that the IMF will overlook noncompliance by a borrowing 
government: unified neoliberal policy teams are 41 percent more likely to receive a 
waiver and 44 percent more likely to receive multiple waivers than governments 
without neoliberal economic policymakers. The predicted probabilities in table 3.9, 
combined with the rest of the results described in this chapter, are strong evidence that 
shared neoliberal ideas shape the way in which the IMF engages with its borrowers.  
Sensitivity of the Statistical Results to Unusual Observations 
 The data analysis strategy I pursued in the chapter was cautious. I started with 
                                                 
85 In the simulation all of the continuous variables are held at their mean value, and dichotomous 
variables are held at their minimum value (Election, Instability, Debt Rescheduling, and Left 
Government are all set to zero). Predicted probabilities are calculated using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, 
and King 2001).  
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 minimal specifications featuring just the key explanatory variable (the proportion of 
important neoliberal economic policymakers in borrowing governments) and a small 
number of additional covariates before moving to more comprehensive models with 
many covariates. There is a good reason to proceed carefully: recent methodological 
critiques suggest a range of potential problems caused by relationships among the 
covariates on the right hand side of the estimating equation.86 The sequential model-
building exercises reported in the preceding pages gives confidence that the main 
findings are robust. The consistency of the relationship between proportion neoliberal 
and the measures of IMF treatment across multiple specifications indicates the results 
are not artifacts of arbitrary decisions about which explanatory variables remain in the 
analysis and which variables are omitted.  
I also take steps to make to make sure that the results are not driven by a few 
particularly influential observations. Diagnostic tests can reveal clusters of data points 
that are poorly explained by the statistical model; these outliers might be a 
consequence of errors in the coding or data entry process, or might signal that, for a 
subset of observations, the data-generating process that produced the outcome differs 
from the rest of the sample. In either case the presence of outliers and other influential 
data points pose a threat to the conclusions we can take from data analysis. Given that 
the number of observations in each of the models is not particularly large, outlying 
data points could be problematic for my analysis. While IMF agreements are, in 
general, fairly consistent, I want to guard against the possibility that an aberrant (or 
miscoded) agreement is driving the findings.87 
                                                 
86 Achen 2005; Clarke 2005; Ray 2005.  
87 I mentioned in footnote 10 in this chapter that some IMF loans could not be accurately coded for the 
extent of conditionality because important sections of the agreement were missing or withheld by the 
request of the country’s IMF representative; this was a problem for a very small number of lending 
arrangements – specifically, loans to Brazil, Turkey, and Pakistan in the mid- to late-1990s. The 
material found in the archives for these agreements did not allow me to distinguish binding from non-
binding conditions; consequently, they are excluded from the conditionality dataset. However, each of 
 109
  A more detailed discussion of the approach I use to identify outliers – and a 
discussion of the results of the models of the determinants of IMF treatment once the 
outlying observations are removed – follows this chapter in an appendix. I give a very 
brief overview of the strategy and the sensitivity of the main findings in this section. 
As a first step I generated deviance residuals for each of the comprehensive statistical 
models. The residuals were inspected visually, which allowed me to identify 
observations that were poorly predicted by the statistical models.88 As a rule of thumb, 
deviance residuals that are greater than an absolute value of 2 (larger absolute values 
indicate that the model seriously over- or under-predicts the outcome) indicate that the 
data points are outliers.  
A quick perusal of the plotted deviance residuals in Appendix B shows that, 
for each aspect of IMF treatment, the majority of the observations fall between -2 and 
+2. There are several agreements that stand out due to very large residuals; notably, 
the Korean agreement signed in December 1997 is an outlier both in terms of the 
extent of conditionality and the size of the disbursement. This is not surprising: the 
Korean agreement has been put forth by several high-profile observers as an example 
of an excessively intrusive IMF lending arrangement.89  
                                                                                                                                            
the agreements for which I am missing the text listing the binding conditions are included in the models 
of the size of loans and the models of the issuance of waivers.   
88 Residuals – the difference between fitted and observed outcomes – are commonly used to assess 
model fit in linear regression (see Fox 1991), but are also very useful for non-linear models. Cameron 
and Trivedi advocate the use of residuals for count models of the type used here, noting that: “residual 
analysis, particularly visual analysis, can potentially indicate the nature of misspecification and ways 
that it may be corrected, as well as provide a feel for the magnitude of the effect of the 
misspecification” (1998: 140).  
89 Consider, for example, Dani Rodrik’s assessment of the Korean program: “the Korean government 
accepted an extensive program of reform that, carried to its fruition, would completely overhaul the 
structure and governance of the Korean economy…[the Korean letter of intent] contains one-and-a-half 
pages on macroeconomic policy and twelve densely-packed pages on privatization, financial sector 
restructuring, prudential regulation and supervision, corporate restructuring, trade and capital account 
liberalization, and transparency, monitoring, and data reporting. The extent to which the conditionality 
imposed on Korea departs from the traditional approach – with its focus on quantitative macro and 
fiscal policy indicators – is striking…In effect, the reforms in labor market institutions, trade and capital 
accounts, and government-business relations entail a remolding of the Korean economy in the image of 
a Washington economist’s idea of a free market economy” (1999: 5-6).  
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 I use the visualizations of the distribution of the residuals to identify the subset 
of IMF agreements that are outliers. To assess the sensitivity of the statistical findings, 
I re-analyze each model with the outlying observations omitted. Details on the 
procedure and tables displaying the new results are given in the appendix. For each of 
the measures of IMF treatment, the impact of the proportion neoliberal variable on is 
consistent with the findings reported in the previous section of the chapter; in fact, 
removing outliers from the models of the size of IMF loans and the issuance of 
waivers strengthens the relationship between the outcome and my key variable of 
interest.  
Conclusions 
 Three testable implications emerged from the theoretical framework I 
developed in the previous chapter: when dealing with governments with sympathetic 
policymakers, the IMF is more likely to (1) give larger loans, (2) apply less onerous 
conditionality to the terms of loans, and (3) issue waivers for borrowers that miss 
binding targets. Testing the hypotheses across a large number of cases is not an easy 
task; it requires good data on the three aspects of IMF treatment as well as a method 
for assessing the likelihood that the key economic policymakers in borrowing 
countries hold neoliberal economic beliefs.  
The first sections of the chapter explained how I developed indicators for 
conditionality, loan size, and enforcement (as dependent variables) and a measure of 
the proportion of the economic policymaking team that can be considered neoliberal. 
From these new data a series of statistical models were constructed. Other plausible 
explanations of the IMF’s behavior generate variables that should be linked to the 
three aspects of treatment; these explanations were included alongside the variable 
(proportion neoliberal) that accounts for my explanation in each of the statistical tests. 
To make sure that the relationship between the presence of neoliberals and the IMF’s 
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treatment of borrowers is not dependent on the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
variables, I started with minimal specifications with just a few variables before 
presenting the comprehensive models. The results showed that shared neoliberal 
beliefs – while not the sole determinant of variation in the IMF’s treatment – have a 
statistically significant and substantively powerful impact on the number of binding 
conditions attached to loans, the generosity of those loans, and the likelihood that a 
borrower will receive a waiver for noncompliance with binding conditions. Other 
noteworthy findings came from the tests: evidence suggests that bureaucratic factors 
play a role in explaining variation in treatment, but the evidence was very mixed for a 
common explanation of IMF behavior, the strategic interests of the United States. 
Similarly, the results were mixed for the effect of domestic institutional factors on the 
aspects of IMF treatment.   
In the presence of a wide range of “control” variables, the impact of 
neoliberals on IMF treatment is impressive. It suggests a systematic pattern of 
discriminatory treatment by the IMF in favor of governments populated with 
likeminded economic policymakers. Does discriminatory treatment by the IMF have 
political consequences in borrowing countries? In the next chapter I turn to an analysis 
of the effect of IMF programs on the political survival of key economic policymakers. 
The dissertation then proceeds from aggregate analyses to a more fine-grained test of 
the explanation in a case study of Argentina’s relationship with the Fund.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Endangered Species: The IMF and the Political Survival of Economic Policymakers 
The analysis to this point has focused on the relationship between a domestic-
level variable – the proportion of neoliberal economic policymakers in government – 
and the IMF’s treatment of borrowing countries. The results from a set of statistical 
tests suggested that governments in which neoliberals occupy the top economic 
policymaking positions receive, on average, larger loans with fewer conditions and are 
more likely to receive waivers for non-compliance with binding conditions.  
The principal theoretical claim in the previous sections of the dissertation is 
that in order to understand the Fund’s decision-making we need to know something 
about (1) the neoliberal purpose of the institution (because the IMF is in most 
instances less constrained than is typically assumed by political scientists) and (2) the 
manner in which the Fund’s decision making reflects political choices in the presence 
of deep uncertainty (because the institution’s staff and management face complex, 
unsettled situations in borrowing countries and have an affinity for policy teams led by 
fellow neoliberals). The framework helps explain why we observe so much variation 
in the Fund’s treatment of borrowers and provides a baseline for understanding how 
the IMF makes choices about the use of its resources in developing countries.   
Most existing research on the IMF focuses on the determinants of the 
institution’s lending behavior. That this is the case is not surprising: the study of 
international political economy was shaped in good part by scholars interested in the 
origins and activities of international institutions. Asking how international institutions 
such as the IMF work requires engagement with fundamental questions related to the 
definition of state interests, the distribution and uses of power, and incentives for 
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international cooperation.1  
But there is another way in which the study of international institutions can be 
useful. The policies that the international institutions pursue – regardless of their 
origins – have impacts on domestic political processes. A growing body of research 
demonstrates that exploring the role of international institutions in a variety of 
outcomes at the domestic level offers empirical payoffs.2  
In this chapter I develop and test a mechanism that ties the IMF to the political 
survival of economic policymakers in borrowing governments.3 I focus on an 
observable implication from the theory described in the second chapter: because 
neoliberal economic policymakers are able to extract better terms in the loans they 
negotiate with the IMF, neoliberals in governments that draw on IMF resources 
become particularly valuable to the political masters that determine their fate. Top 
neoliberal economic officials can appeal to the fact that the IMF regards them as more 
credible agents of reform to bolster their position (which is almost always precarious 
in developing countries), thus lengthening their time in office. In the pages that follow 
                                                 
1 Perhaps for this reason the study of international institutions has inspired new thinking and provided a 
testing ground for the major analytical approaches in international relations. For example, international 
institutions have been the focus for important work from liberal (Keohane 1984), realist (Krasner 1985) 
and constructivist perspectives (Abdelal, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hurd 2007).  
2 A detailed review of this emerging literature is beyond the scope of the chapter. Some recent work 
demonstrates the variety of domestic outcomes that have been linked to pressure from international 
institutions.  For example, Pevehouse (2002) shows that membership in international institutions is 
positively correlated with democratic consolidation; Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) link human rights 
policies to World Bank structural adjustment loans; Epstein (2008) and Johnson (2006) explore how 
international institutions in post-communist Europe influenced the adoption of independent central 
banks; Kelley (2004) explains how the language and minority protection policies adopted by Eastern 
European countries were shaped by regional institutions’ political conditionality.  
3 A limited number of studies have linked Fund programs to political outcomes at the domestic level. 
The main focus for empirically-oriented researchers has been on the IMF’s effect on economic outputs 
(GDP growth, inflation, current account balance, wealth distribution, etc) in borrowing countries. The 
impact of the IMF on domestic politics remains relatively unexplored territory. There are a few notable 
(and recent) exceptions:  Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) examine how IMF programs affect social 
spending in democracies and autocracies; Smith and Vreeland (2006) test the impact of IMF programs 
on the survival of leaders in different institutional contexts; Dreher (2004) investigates how the IMF 
affects prospects for reelection. A few exceptions notwithstanding, there has been a general lack of 
attention to the mechanisms linking the IMF to political dynamics in low- and middle-income countries. 
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I explore this claim in greater detail and present a set of tests of the argument using 
event history models. I find that the evidence hews closely to the theory: the risk of 
losing office is significantly reduced for neoliberal finance ministers and central bank 
governors under IMF programs. In the concluding section I extend the analysis by 
asking whether countries with long experiences under the IMF become more 
neoliberal over time. The evidence that I present is not definitive, but it suggests that 
the IMF operated as a diffusion mechanism for the spread of neoliberalism throughout 
the developing world in the past three decades. The mechanism related to political 
survival explains why this might be so.  
The IMF and the Political Fortunes of Policymakers 
Life can be difficult for the government officials that determine their country’s 
macroeconomic policies. They are tasked with the management of a sensitive and 
highly unstable system that is subject to all sorts of possible shocks: crises in the 
financial system, sudden outflows of capital, commodity price crashes, wars, and other 
dramatic political and economic events. They are blamed for economic problems that 
occur on their watch, whether the problems were of their own making or not.  
Some economic policymakers prove adept at handling economic and political 
events. Domingo Cavallo of Argentina, for example, kept his job for nearly five and a 
half years (2,007 days, to be precise) in a country that is inhospitable to finance 
ministers: the mean duration in office for the 22 officials that preceded him between 
1970 and 1991 was just 340 days. Interestingly, his first foray into economic 
policymaking was not quite as successful: as central bank governor in 1982 Cavallo 
lasted in office for 54 days.  
The varying political fortunes of Domingo Cavallo illustrates how the presence 
of the IMF can empower officials that share the neoliberal economic beliefs held by 
the Fund’s staff and management. During his time as economy minister Cavallo, who 
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earned a PhD in economics from Harvard, negotiated a series of generous IMF loans 
with light (and rather weakly enforced) binding conditionality. Opposed by a number 
of Peronist party stalwarts – and in the face of an oft-contentious personal relationship 
with President Carlos Menem – Cavallo’s ability to gain the confidence of the IMF 
and the broader financial community was essential to ensuring his political survival. 
Indeed, Judith Teichman argues that Cavallo’s power was rooted in “his preeminent 
role in debt negotiations and his international ties. With Cavallo as economy minister, 
Argentina’s relations with the IMF became cordial.”4 Ngaire Woods makes a similar 
argument: “Cavallo’s special relationship with the Fund and Bank gave him leverage 
over other agencies within the Argentine government, making him the gatekeeper of 
the country’s access to loans as well as to the ongoing support of the institutions.”5 
Impressionistic evidence suggests that Cavallo’s experience under the IMF is 
not unique. Several retrospective surveys of post-debt crisis adjustment experiences in 
the developing world noted an apparent correlation between the presence of the IMF 
and the strengthening of the political position of neoliberal policymakers. Miles 
Kahler, for example, argues that the IMF and World Bank seek to identify and 
empower “allies within the government whose interests are aligned more closely with 
the policy preferences of the IFIs [international financial institutions].”6 The IMF in 
particular attempted to “create such interlocutors and allies….ensuring that this critical 
transnational link is sustained over time.”7 Harold James, in his official history of the 
IMF, notes that “one of the main functions of the IMF has been concerned with the 
transmission of ideas…by bolstering the position of reformers in the bureaucratic 
                                                 
4 Teichman 2001: pg. 121 (quote); see also Teichman 1997: pg. 48.  
5 Woods 2006: 68.  
6 Kahler recognizes that despite the efforts of the IMF and World Bank to strengthen their neoliberal 
allies in borrowing countries, “in many cases, the technocratic allies of external actors are in vulnerable 
political positions, despite their importance for a government’s reputation and its access to external 
finance.” Kahler, 1992: 126, 130.  
7 Kahler 1993: 377.  
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structures, usually the finance ministry and the central bank.”8 Summarizing the 
findings from a variety of detailed case studies of adjustment episodes, Haggard and 
Webb assert that the presence (or absence) of “conditional external support…can 
bolster (or weaken) the standing of reformers within the government.”9  
Anecdotal evidence from cases outside of Argentina provides additional 
support for the claim that the IMF strengthens the political position of likeminded 
policymakers. In August 1982 the Mexican government shocked the global financial 
community with the announcement that it was suspending payments on the country’s 
external debt. In the wake of the debt crisis a cadre of young American-trained 
economists and a group of economic nationalists that were openly skeptical of 
neoliberal policy recommendations vied for influence over Mexican policymaking. 
Ngaire Woods’ analysis of the Mexican case reveals that “the power and status of the 
young technocrats was immediately enhanced by their role in dealing with the debt 
crisis and the IMF.”10 The example of Miguel Mancera is illustrative. Immediately 
following the announcement of the debt moratorium and the imposition of exchange 
controls Mancera, the Yale-trained central bank governor, was replaced in September 
1982 by “radical economist” Carlos Tello Macias.11 The new central banker only 
lasted two months. Mancera was brought back by President de la Madrid to head the 
central bank just as the details of a massive three year IMF loan were being finalized. 
Mancera would be involved in the negotiation of three additional multi-year IMF 
agreements before he turned the leadership of the central bank over to a Stanford-
trained economist, Guillermo Ortiz, at the end of 1997.  
Similar dynamics can be identified in other settings. The involvement of the 
                                                 
8 James 1996: 133.  
9 Haggard and Webb, 1994: 25.  
10 Woods 2006: 91.  
11 James 1996: 367 (quote).  
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IMF and World Bank in the early 1980s in the Philippines helped neoliberals gain 
control of the top economic policy positions – including the central bank, which had 
for many years been led by a policymaker, Gregorio Licaros, whose views on 
economic policy contrasted sharply with those of the neoliberals in both Washington 
and Manila. A confidential World Bank document implies that the institution was 
cognizant that its resources could be used to support likeminded policymakers: the 
memo noted that the increased presence of the Bank and Fund in the Philippines 
would have the effect of “strengthening the position of highly capable technical 
leaders in the Government and helping them to achieve policy objectives, which we 
endorse.”12  
The consolidation of policymaking power by neoliberals in Chile in the mid-
1970s is another well known story.13 Reflecting on the rise of neoliberals in Chilean 
government, Rolf Lüders, a University of Chicago economics PhD and finance 
minister in the early 1980s, stated that “the support of the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank was crucial to us. They were very enthusiastic because our team 
thought the way they did; we were following their prescriptions more closely than any 
other country.”14 
How the IMF Valorizes Neoliberal Economic Policymakers  
A theme emerges from the scattered research on the IMF and domestic 
economic policymaking: the presence of the IMF can be a boon to policymakers that 
share the Fund’s neoliberal economic beliefs. Extant research does not go much 
beyond speculation about why this might be the case, and there has been no systematic 
study of the claim. I attempt to fill the gaps in the pages that follow.   
One possible mechanism linking the IMF to the fortunes of economic 
                                                 
12 Broad 1988: 74 (quote).  
13 For example, Valdes 1995. 
14 Quoted in Hira 1998: 99.  
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policymakers is through coercion. Borrowers go to the IMF because they face a 
payments crisis; the IMF, in turn, can use its leverage to influence political and 
economic decision making. For example, in Madagascar the head of the central bank, 
Raoul Ravelomanana, was reportedly fired due to pressure from the IMF after 
evidence of his involvement in a series of questionable financial dealings emerged.15 
But outright coercion by the IMF is exceedingly rare. The analytical framework I 
developed in chapter 2 and the statistical tests I presented in chapter 3 suggest a more 
plausible mechanism through which IMF programs affects a specific type of domestic 
political process – namely, the political survival of top economic officials.  
The mechanism I propose is simple but requires some exposition. The first step 
is to show that the IMF favors some types of policymakers over others.16 My claim is 
strengthened if I can show that favoritism goes beyond rhetorical support and actually 
manifests in a pattern of systematic discriminatory treatment in favor of neoliberals. 
This is not a difficult case to make. Chapter 3 provides evidence showing that the 
                                                 
15 Keesings Record of World Events, January 1995: pg. 40349. Ngaire Woods, in her work on the 
Fund’s and Bank’s involvement in Mexico in the 1980s, indicates that the World Bank was at times 
willing to use coercive tactics to retain an intellectually unified policy team: “some within the Bank 
even thought that if a member of the cabinet did not ‘play ball,’ they could now make it clear to the 
government that they would find it easier to work with someone else.” Woods 2006: 96.  
16 Existing research is not very clear on how this actually plays out. Favoritism is portrayed in terms of 
the greater approval or support that the international financial institutions show to neoliberals compared 
to non-neoliberals; in most cases it is assumed (but not demonstrated) that neoliberals receive bigger 
loans and better terms. For example, Miguel Centeno suggests that “the need to attract capital will 
support those personnel and institutions that can most easily obtain the confidence and approval of 
those who can provide financial resources…[Neoliberal credentials] enable these persons to present 
arguments that their fellow alumni at the World Bank and the money centers understand and consider 
legitimate.” Likewise, Dezalay and Garth, in their study of the transformation of markets and 
institutions in Latin America, argue that neoliberals “are the only individuals with the financial 
expertise (and credibility) necessary to negotiate effectively with their counterparts in Washington.” 
The economic sociologist Marion Fourcade claims that it is “vital for countries’ representatives and 
negotiators to share the economic culture and language of their counterparts in international 
organizations.” Stephan Haggard notes that politicians are willing to delegate to neoliberals in times of 
economic distress because “such delegation enhances their credibility with crucial external actors, 
including the international financial institutions.” The literature is silent about how we can observe the 
IMF’s preferences toward certain kinds of policymakers. In chapter 3 I remedy this problem by 
developing three ways of measuring variation in IMF treatment. See Centeno 1993: pp. 325-26; 
Dezalay and Garth 2002: pg. 174; Fourcade 2006: pg. 179; Haggard 1994: pg. 469.   
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Fund favors fellow neoliberals in borrowing countries. The statistical tests suggest that 
as the proportion of neoliberals in the top economic policymaking positions increases, 
the loans that the IMF makes available tend to be less onerous (in terms of the number 
of binding conditions) and more generous (in terms of their size relative to the 
borrowing country’s quota). Once a program is underway, governments with 
neoliberal policymakers are much more likely to receive a waiver for noncompliance 
with binding conditions.  
In this way neoliberal economic policymakers in borrowing countries become 
more valuable for the executive. The second step in my argument is to link the Fund’s 
favorable treatment of neoliberal economic policymakers to the incentives facing 
government leaders. Leaders ultimately control the appointment and retention of top 
economic officials. Executives are themselves concerned with political survival, and 
these concerns are heightened during period of economic distress. Leaders in all types 
of regimes face a rising hazard in the context of economic crisis. If a member of the 
policy team can credibly claim to deliver better treatment by an international 
institution that is the economic lifeline for many low- and middle-income countries, 
then the executive has strong incentives to retain that policymaker in a position of 
influence.17  
Executives incur some cost when they engineer the removal of top economic 
officials. In normal times leaders may face pressure to jettison neoliberal policymakers 
in favor of officials that hold different economic beliefs; assuming that leaders appoint 
                                                 
17 The argument is similar to a claim made by Robert Bates, who observes: “technocrats possess 
expertise – private information. Most politicians cannot directly evaluate that expertise; they can only 
evaluate its results.” Bates goes further to argue that neoliberal economic policymakers (he uses the 
term “technocrats”) become secure in their positions when the policies they pursue “serve the interests 
of powerful groups” (1994: 32). But several scholars – including Bates – have demonstrated that 
economic interests are extremely fluid and malleable in periods of economic crises, such that referring 
to the interests of producer groups does not tell us much about the stabilization process (Bates and 
Krueger, 1993; Schneider, 2004). I make the case that negotiations with the IMF provide a good 
opportunity for neoliberals to clearly demonstrate the value of their credentials to politicians.   
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neoliberals in low- and middle-income countries with the expectation that they will 
pursue a set of market-conforming policies, leaders have to weigh the costs of rolling 
back reform efforts against the political benefits of changing course. For example, in 
Argentina in the 1990s President Menem was subjected to withering criticism from his 
political opponents as well as members of his own party for filling the top economic 
positions with reform-oriented neoliberals. Upon the replacement of Domingo Cavallo 
by Chicago-trained economist Roque Fernandez one Argentine politician expressed 
the view that shared neoliberal beliefs were more far more important than the 
personalities of different policymakers: “we must change the dog, not its collar.”18   
The cost of removing a neoliberal finance minister or central bank governor 
increases when the IMF is involved. For crisis-stricken governments, replacing a 
neoliberal policymaker with a non-neoliberal risks souring the relationship with the 
IMF – which implies the possibility of tougher conditions and stingier loans in the 
future, not to mention more contentious relations with private financial actors since the 
IMF acts as a gatekeeper for the international financial community.19 Perhaps leaders 
could swap one American-trained economic policymaker for another, but this implies 
that there is an endless supply of neoliberal economists that are suitable (and willing) 
to be pulled into the policy team in borrowing countries, which is clearly not the 
case.20  
                                                 
18 “Argentina: Dropping the Pilot,” The Economist, August 3, 1996, pg. 37 (quote).  
19 After the debt crisis in 1982 private banks and official creditors usually made debt rescheduling 
contingent on the debtor having signed an IMF agreement (see Boughton 2001). There is a small 
empirical literature on the catalytic effect of the IMF, which provides mixed evidence. Bird and 
Rowlands (2003) do not find evidence the IMF programs lead to greater portfolio investment, and the 
results in Jensen (2004) suggest that IMF programs actually reduce flows of FDI to developing 
countries. Brune, Garrett, and Kogut (2004) find evidence, on the other hand, that privatization 
proceeds are higher in countries that are under IMF programs compared to non-IMF countries, which 
they attribute to the Fund’s seal of approval for reform efforts.  
20 I focus on the survival of individual policymakers in the tests in the next section rather than the issue 
of replacement suggested here. I provide some indirect evidence of this dynamic in the concluding part 
of the chapter, where I show that the proportion of neoliberal policymakers in government is higher in 
countries that spend more time under IMF programs.  
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The mechanism linking the political survival of policymakers to the presence 
of IMF lending programs is based on an observable empirical regularity: the IMF 
gives preferential treatment to governments in which the top economic officials are 
neoliberals. Leaders of governments that are under IMF programs have strong 
incentives to keep policymakers that deliver results in office. Without offering some 
tangible benefits for the leader that controls their political fates, the cooperative spirit 
and shared culture among likeminded economic authorities and the IMF’s staff and 
management is unlikely to have much of an effect on the political survival of 
neoliberals.21  
The mechanism I propose suggests a primarily materialist explanation that can 
be applied to the spread of neoliberal economic ideas in the developing world. This 
runs against important work that highlights the persuasive power of international 
institutions as teachers of norms and ideas.22 In part this reflects a difference in 
purpose: I am interested in how the Fund’s lending behavior affects the political 
survival of economic policymakers whereas the more self-consciously constructivist 
work on international organizations tends to focus on how external agents convince 
domestic audiences of the legitimacy of certain policies through normative suasion. 
                                                 
21 This is not to say that the IMF’s role in shaping a normative consensus around neoliberal ideas was 
unimportant. By the early 1980s neoliberal policymakers clearly found a receptive audience among the 
wealthy democracies and powerful international organizations, even if their ideas were not widely 
shared within their own countries. But the links between an intellectual consensus emanating from the 
United States, Wall Street, and the Fund on the one hand and the prospects for political survival on the 
other are fuzzy. Simmons and Elkins (2004: 173-74) suggest that there are reputational costs to 
governments that fail to ascribe to the dominant economic ideas. If this is the case, then there should be 
many more neoliberal policymakers in the developing than we actually observe (I provide some 
descriptive statistics on the share of neoliberals in government in the next section of the chapter). The 
shared neoliberal ideas that animate the IMF are important in this context because they shape how the 
Fund interacts with its borrowers, but it is the tools that Fund possesses which influence political 
processes in borrowing countries.  
22 For example, Checkel 2005; Epstein 2008; Finnemore 1993; Kahler 1992; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett point to the teaching function of international 
institutions: “international institutions are another natural conduit for learning, and, especially, for 
organized pedagogy. The IMF, for example, regards its research function as a way to disseminate the 
lessons of earlier liberalizers (usually developed countries) to the rest of the world (primarily the 
developing countries)” (2006: 798).   
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My aims in this chapter are limited. I develop an explanation rooted in domestic 
political processes from which I derive a straightforward testable implication: 
neoliberal economic policymakers in governments under IMF programs have a lower 
hazard than non-neoliberal policymakers in countries under IMF programs. I regard 
the analysis in this chapter as a complement to the branch of research that views 
international institutions primarily through the lens of normative suasion.23 The 
remaining sections of the chapter focus on testing the arguments.  
Testing the Argument 
For the event history models of political survival I draw on the data I collected 
on the backgrounds of key economic policymakers in 90 low- and middle-income 
countries between 1980 and 2000. The analysis is limited to the two top economic 
officials in borrowing countries: finance ministers and central bank governors. In most 
– but not all – countries these are the officials that negotiate and sign the IMF 
agreements.24 I do not examine the survival of heads of governments; there is by now 
an active literature on leaders, and the dynamics that govern the removal of leaders are 
very different from the processes by which economic policymakers gain and lose 
office.25 
                                                 
23 The IMF clearly makes some attempts to teach neoliberal economic ideas to government officials, as 
evinced by its training institutes. That said, I confess some skepticism about the Fund’s ability to 
persuade governments through the power of the better argument. If the IMF’s goal is to convince policy 
elites of the legitimacy of its recommendations, then it has been remarkably unsuccessful. Some recent 
comments by an Asian finance minister capture a widely-held view of the Fund in many quarters: “most 
Asian countries would rather be dead than turn to the IMF.” Quentin Peel, “Political will for meaningful 
reform of IMF is still lacking,” Financial Times, March 17, 2009: pg. 2.  
24 In a subset of countries other policymakers (for example, the prime minister, planning minister, or 
special economic advisor) are signatories in addition to the central bank head and the finance minister. I 
gathered data on these additional policymakers for the purposes of creating the proportion neoliberal 
variable utilized in the previous chapter. Since the data on other types of policymakers were gathered 
for relatively few countries I restrict the tests to finance ministers and central bankers, for which I have 
reliable data for a large number of countries over a twenty year period (1980-2000).   
25 Since Bienen and van de Walle’s path-breaking analysis, quantitative studies of the factors that affect 
the tenure of executives have proliferated. A comprehensive review is far beyond the scope of this 
article; for some important research, see Bienen and van de Walle 1991; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; 
Goemans 2008; Londregan and Poole 1990; Marinov 2005; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003.  
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The argument that I develop above applies to both finance ministers and 
central bank governors. It might seem odd to argue that both types of economic 
policymakers are subject to similar political forces. After all, finance ministers are 
political appointees that are members of cabinets, whereas central banks in many 
countries are in principle insulated from political pressures. Most countries have a 
legal term of appointment for central bank governors; in wealthy democracies, the 
executive’s ability to intervene in the functioning of central banks is severely 
proscribed.26 But the independence of central banks in many, if not most, developing 
countries is more myth than reality. Take Argentina as an example. The legal duration 
of central bank governors is four years, but few Argentine central bankers have made 
it past their first year, let alone served for the duration of their term. The average time 
in office for the 25 individuals that ran Argentina’s central bank between 1970 and 
2000 was 372 days. When I remove the four neoliberals that occupied the position 
(who survived on average for 1,096 days), the average duration of the heads of the 
Argentine central bank declines to just 213 days in office. For this reason Cukierman 
and others measure central bank independence in low- and middle-income countries 
using the turnover rate of governors rather than the bank’s legal independence.27 
While it is true that there has been a move toward greater independence in developing 
countries, this movement did not gather steam until the 1990s.28 For my purposes it is 
reasonable to treat finance ministers and central bank governors as similarly 
vulnerable to political currents in the 90 low- and middle-income countries that 
                                                 
26 It is worthwhile, however, to note that Adolph (2004), Grabel (2000, 2003), Hall (2008), and 
McNamara (2002), writing from very different analytical perspectives, each describe how independent 
central banks are fundamentally political projects. 
27 Cukierman 1992; Dreher, Sturm, and de Haan 2008.  
28 Alan Blinder remarks that around two dozen countries – he does not distinguish between developed 
and developing worlds – embarked on a path of greater central bank independence after 1989 (2004: 
65). McNamara, using a legal definition based on Cukierman (1992), provides data showing that, 
worldwide, the number of legally independent central banks jumped from 5 in 1990 to 37 in 2000.  
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comprise the sample.  
Below I describe the construction of the dependent variable and the covariates 
that are included in the event history analysis.  
Dependent Variable: I measure the length of time in days between the date of 
entry and date of exit for finance ministers and central bank governors. Following 
Goemans (2008), I divide each policymaker’s time in office into annual observations. 
This allows me to include covariates that change in value from year to year.  
 The dates of entry and exit from office for policymakers were collected from 
two main sources: the CIA’s Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign 
Governments and Keesings Record of World Events. The data were supplemented with 
additional records of entry and exit dates from the archives of the Financial Times, 
New York Times, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, and, in some cases, from direct 
correspondence with finance ministries and central banks. The data collection effort 
yielded two separate datasets. I have complete data for 905 separate finance ministers 
(810 of which are “failures,” meaning that they exit the dataset at some point during 
the twenty year observation window) and 471 central bank governors (396 failures). 
The smaller number of central bankers is a consequence of longer average duration 
compared to their counterparts in the finance ministry, the exclusion of a number of 
African countries that are in monetary unions and do not have independent central 
banks, and difficulties identifying precise entry dates for central bankers in several 
countries that appear in the finance ministers dataset. When the entry or exit dates are 
uncertain, the official (or country, if information is very unreliable) is excluded from 
the dataset. The data are right-censored, meaning that policymakers that remain in 
office after December 31, 2000 contribute information on survival but are not recorded 
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as failures.29 The average duration for the 810 finance ministers that exited office at 
some point in the two decades was 711.6 days.30 Central bank governors fare better 
than their counterparts in the finance ministry. The mean duration for the 396 central 
bankers that entered and exited the dataset was 1,200 days.  
Explanatory Variables: My main interest in this chapter is testing the central 
observable implication from the causal mechanism developed in the previous pages: 
neoliberals survive in office longer than their non-neoliberal counterparts when both 
are under IMF agreements. I include a range of covariates that are theoretically linked 
to the survival of policymakers to make sure that my findings hold in the presence of 
potentially confounding factors. To my knowledge, this is the first systematic test of 
the determinants of the survival of economic policymakers in developing countries; 
consequently, I turn to research on the survival of leaders and cabinets to guide the 
selection of additional covariates.  
To examine the relationship between the IMF, neoliberals, and political 
survival I follow the same approach as in chapter 3 to assess whether finance ministers 
and central bank governors hold neoliberal economic beliefs.31 Policymakers that 
received a masters degree or above from a highly ranked American economics 
department and/or have sustained experience as an official within the IMF and the 
                                                 
29 I also treat policymakers that exit by death from natural causes or from an incapacitating illness as 
censored. The complete list for both finance ministers and central bankers includes the following 
policymakers: Cesar Barrientos, Paraguay (died of natural causes at an advanced age); Gibson Chigaga, 
Zambia (died of a heart attack); Sheriff Seesay, Gambia (resigned due to ill health); Ousman Koro-
Ceesay, Gambia (murdered); Miguel Roig, Argentina (died of heart attack after a week in office); 
Ariston Chambati, Zimbabwe (died of AIDS-related pneumonia); Bernard Chidzero, Zimbabwe (left 
office after suffering stroke); Moulay Hassan Ben-el-Mehdi, Morocco (died after long illness); Amir 
Jamal, Tanzania (resigned due to illness); Enzo Debernardi, Paraguay (resigned due to illness), Gerhard 
de Kock, South Africa (resigned in June 1989 due to cancer, died in August).  
30 This does not mean that there are 810 different finance ministers that exit the dataset at some point 
between 1980 and 2000; if a policymaker is removed but returns to office at a later date, I record the 
entry as a new policymaker.  
31 In chapter 2 I give a tractable definition of the term neoliberal; chapter 3 justifies the use of 
educational background and experience with the Fund and World Bank as proxies for holding 
neoliberal economic ideas. I do not rehash the extended discussion of the measurement of neoliberals in 
the previous chapter here.  
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World Bank are coded as neoliberals. To give a sense of the distribution of neoliberal 
policymakers across the countries in the sample over time, figures 4.1 and 4.2 trace the 
proportion of developing countries with a neoliberal finance minister (figure 4.1) and 
neoliberal central banker (figure 4.2) between 1980 and 2000.32  
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of Countries with a Neoliberal Finance Minister 
 
 
                                                 
32 An interesting pattern emerges in the plots of the distribution of neoliberals over time: while the 
proportion of countries with neoliberal finance ministers stays relatively consistent over time, the 
number of neoliberal central bankers follows an upward trajectory, particularly after 1991 (perhaps 
corresponding to the move toward greater central bank independence at the time). Given that my 
interest is in political survival, I leave the question of why we observe a greater number of neoliberals 
heading the central banks in the countries in my sample for future work.   
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of Countries with a Neoliberal Central Bank Governor 
I draw additional covariates from two types of explanations for the survival of 
top economic leadership.   
In the first approach the risks that individual economic policymakers face are 
mainly influenced by specific attributes of the governments in which they serve (for 
example, the ideological distance between parties in the government), the broader set 
of political institutions related to regime type (democratic or autocratic), and political 
events such as elections, no-confidence votes, and coups that lead to the replacement 
of the head of government. 
  The most extensive branch of research on survival concerns the duration of 
governments. Thirty years of research has produced a degree of consensus on the 
factors that explain the duration of governments in about twenty rich Northern 
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democracies.33 But for my purposes the cabinet duration literature offers few lessons. I 
am interested in the survival of top economic officials in low- and middle-income 
countries, most of which are either autocratic, mixed regimes, or non-parliamentary 
democracies. Further, evidence suggests that even within the pool of rich 
parliamentary democracies many government officials are removed prior to a 
government termination or retain their positions after a termination and the formation 
of a new government. According to data collected by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 
the “factors affecting government terminations should be only loosely related to 
factors affecting ministerial terminations.”34  
A better place to look for possible covariates of durability of economic 
policymakers is the growing body of research on the tenure of political leaders. Here 
the evidence suggests that regime type has an important effect on the prospects for 
survival. Leaders in democratic regimes have more uncertain futures than autocratic 
leaders.35 The argument indicates that we should also expect to find that economic 
policymakers face greater hazard in democratic regimes. Consequently I include a set 
of dichotomous variables as proxies for the domestic institutional explanation of 
varying survival times. I use the same approach as Chiozza and Goemans: dummies 
for mixed regimes, parliamentary democracies, and presidential democracies are 
created based on scores from the Polity IV dataset, with autocratic regimes as the 
excluded reference category. Democracies are countries that receive a score of 7 or 
higher on the 21-point Polity scale; regimes between -6 and +6 are considered mixed, 
and the remaining countries are coded as autocratic. Among the pool of democratic 
countries, Chiozza and Goemans distinguish parliamentary from presidential 
                                                 
33 For example, Browne et al 1988; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; King et al 1990; Warwick 1992, 
1994; One very recent attempt to extend the models of government survival to the post-communist 
setting is found in Somer-Topcu and Williams 2008.   
34 Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008: pg. 171.  
35 For the logic of the argument see Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003.  
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systems.36 I rely on their coding of political systems in the analysis. I expect to find 
that the odds of losing office are higher in democracies than in autocracies, and, 
among democracies, should be higher in parliamentary systems due to the greater 
instability in coalition governments.  
I include two other covariates to capture political factors that influence 
survival. Frequently the replacement of the leader of a country leads to turnover 
among all of the important officials from the previous government. To account for this 
dynamic I create an indicator (∆Leader) that takes a value of one if the chief of 
government was replaced at any point in the policymakers’ tenure.37 I also create a 
variable (Caretaker/Transition) that measures whether a finance minister was a 
member of an interim government (the variable does not apply to central bankers, who 
are not cabinet members).38 Both of these covariates are expected to dramatically 
increase the odds of replacement for policymakers.   
Economic performance affects the prospects for policymakers in all types of 
regimes. The most consistent finding from duration models of leaders and 
governments is that hazard rises as the economy worsens. Leaders and ministers that 
preside over spiraling inflation and shrinking GDP frequently find themselves out of 
power. The relationship between macroeconomic conditions and political survival 
should be heightened for finance ministers and central bank governors. After all, their 
jobs involve the management of the economy. If the economic situation degrades, they 
bear primary responsibility. It has long been recognized that the stewards of the 
economy face special risks. Richard Cooper’s (1971) classic study, for example, 
                                                 
36 Chiozza and Goemans 2004: pg. 617.  
37 This includes the policymaker’s last day in office. The measure captures the replacement of an entire 
government, for example, after an election or a coup. The list of leaders and their dates on entry and 
exit from office comes from the Archigos, Version 2.8 dataset put together by Hein Goemans, Kristian 
Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza.  
38 I relied on the Keesings Record of World Events resource to generate the caretaker variable.  
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revealed that in a majority of the 24 cases he studied the finance minister was removed 
after a large devaluation of the currency. 
I rely on three variables to assess the impact of economic conditions on 
political survival. High inflation is an indicator of poor economic performance. 
Consequently, I use a transformed measure of annual change in consumer price 
inflation.39 Economic growth has been linked to the survival of leaders in many 
studies, and it is included in both of the models reported here.40 Finally, I incorporate 
a covariate to account for the impact of dramatic events in the exchange market. The
currency crisis indicator comes from Laevan and Valencia; it takes a value of one in 
the year in which a country experiences a nominal devaluation of at least thirty percent 
that is also at least a ten percent hike in the rate of depreciation compared to the 
previous year.
 
                                                
41 High inflation, low (perhaps negative) GDP growth, and the presence 
of severe exchange market pressure are all expected to heighten the risks for finance 
ministers and the heads of central banks. 
 Methodology 
Before discussing the estimation techniques I employ in the analysis, it is 
necessary to explain the manner in which the tests are designed. Recall that I am 
evaluating the claim that the hazard for neoliberal finance ministers and central bank 
governors is lower under IMF programs. To observe the impact of being a neoliberal 
on political survival I condition on the presence of the IMF; in other words, 
conditional on being under an IMF program, neoliberals should remain in office 
 
39 To reduce skewness due to episodes of hyperinflation, I transformed the measure of inflation by the 
following formula: (π /100)/(1+(π /100)), where π is the annual percent change in the consumer price 
index. This is the same formula used in Dreher, Sturm, de Haan 2008. 
40 Data for inflation and GDP growth are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
41 Laevan and Valencia (2008) update the measure of currency crisis originally developed by Frankel 
and Rose (1996).  
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longer than non-neoliberals after accounting for other factors.42 Consequently I restrict 
the sample to only those countries under active IMF programs during the 1980 to 2000 
period.43 This strategy, coupled with some missing data on the economic covariates, 
reduces the number of finance ministers I observe to 539 (401 are failures) and central 
bankers to 295 (192 failures).  
I make use of the workhorse of event history modeling, the Cox proportional 
hazards model, in the data analysis. The Cox model has become the preferred 
approach to analyzing survival data because of its flexibility: although the covariates 
are parameterized, the shape of the baseline hazard is not specified.44 Unless we have 
a very strong prior belief about the shape of the underlying hazard over time (rising, 
decreasing, constant), there is no reason to risk biased estimates by forcing the hazard 
to take a specific form. I use the Efron method to handle coterminous failure events in 
                                                 
42 The wrong test would be to compare the survival of neoliberals under IMF programs to the survival 
of non-neoliberals that are not under IMF programs; in this case it would be impossible to tell whether 
differing hazards were due to the IMF or neoliberal credentials. Looking only at IMF borrowers enables 
me to observe whether being a neoliberal under the IMF offers the anticipated payoff in terms of lower 
hazard. This approach also mitigates some of the concerns about selection effects. For example, if I 
compared the survival of neoliberals in countries that are under IMF programs to neoliberal 
policymakers in countries without IMF programs, one might reasonably ask whether officials that are 
more durable (for reasons that are potentially unobservable) disproportionately seek out IMF funding. It 
does not make sense to claim that more durable policymakers, once in office, obtain neoliberal 
credentials, since the experiences that transmit neoliberal economic beliefs in my coding scheme must 
occur prior to gaining office. That said, there may be unmodeled aspects of the appointment process 
that differ between neoliberals and non-neoliberals and subsequently affect survival rates – but without 
strong priors about why the appointment process should be different for the two populations, there is no 
reason to be overly concerned with selection issues in the models. Research in political science on 
selection effects in survival models of the type used here is in its infancy (see Boehmke, Morey, and 
Shannon 2006).  
43 I use data from Vreeland (2003) and my own archival research on IMF lending arrangements to 
create an indicator that takes a value of 1 for each year that a country is under an active program and 0 
otherwise. Some countries remain under Fund lending arrangements for nearly the entire observation 
period.   
44 The Cox model takes the form: h(t) = h0(t)exp(Xitβ), where Xit is the vector of covariates and h0(t) 
represents the unspecified baseline hazard. For a very lucid discussion of the Cox model, see Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: pp. 47-67. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones make their view about handling 
multivariate analysis of duration data clear: “apply the Cox model…The Cox model makes no 
assumptions about the distributional characteristics of the baseline hazard rate, yet can provide 
estimates of the covariates of interest that have desirable properties allowing the usual kinds of 
hypothesis tests” (2004: 193).  
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the data.45  
 I make two modifications to the basic Cox hazard model. The first 
modification concerns country-level heterogeneity in the durability of policymakers. It 
is clear from a quick perusal of the data that the rate of turnover of economic 
policymakers is very high in some countries and relatively low in others. Based on her 
country’s record, Maria Elsa Viteri, the current Ecuadorian finance minister, should 
not get too comfortable: between 1981 and 2000 there were 25 different finance 
ministers in Ecuador. By comparison Colombia, which shares a border with Ecuador, 
had 11 finance ministers during the same period. For some (possibly unobservable) 
reason, policymakers in certain countries may be more prone to failure. To handle 
country-specific heterogeneity, I add a parameter to the specification (a “frailty” term) 
which is akin to a random effect. For identification, the unmeasured frailty parameter 
(ν) is sampled from a Gamma distribution and is assumed to have a mean of 1 and an 
unknown variance equal to θ.46       
 The other modification concerns the proportionality assumption of the Cox 
model. The assumption of proportional hazards implies that the effect of covariates on 
the hazard is constant over the time that each policymaker is in office. If the 
proportionality assumption is violated, a correction (an interaction between the 
covariate and the natural logarithm of time) has to be applied to obtain the correct 
estimates.47 I first implemented global tests for nonproportionality in both datasets, 
which were easily rejected. I then followed standard practice and examined plots of 
scaled Schoenfeld residuals against survival times.48 The only covariate that displayed 
clear patterns of nonproportionality was the transformed inflation variable. 
                                                 
45 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 55.  
46 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: pp. 142-48; Chiozza and Goemans 2004: 607.  
47 Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003.  
48 Blossfeld, Golsch, Rohwer 2007: pp. 233-37; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: pp. 120-21, 131-39.  
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Consequently, the models include inflation as well as an interaction between the 
covariate and the log of time.  
 I report coefficients rather than hazard rates in the presentation of the results in 
the next section. Negative coefficients imply a decreasing hazard (longer survival); 
positive coefficients indicate that the covariate increases the risk of losing office.49 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 give descriptive statistics for each of the datasets employed in this 
part of the chapter’s data analysis.  
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Based on Model of Survival of Finance Ministers) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Max. 
Neoliberal 1,253 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Caretaker 1,253 0.02 0.13 0 1 
∆Leader 1,253 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Mixed 1,253 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Parliamentary 1,253 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Presidential 1,253 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Currency Crisis 1,253 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Inflation 1,253 0.16 0.19 -0.13 0.97 
Inflation × ln(t) 1,253 0.98 1.10 -0.85 7.08 
GDP growth 1,253 2.53 4.98 -32.12 18.66 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (Based on Model of Survival of Central Bankers) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Max. 
Neoliberal 846 0.27 0.44 0 1 
∆Leader 846 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Mixed 846 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Parliamentary 846 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Presidential 846 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Currency Crisis 846 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Inflation 846 0.21 0.21 -0.13 0.97 
Inflation × ln(t) 846 1.32 1.20 -0.85 6.64 
GDP growth 846 2.50 5.08 -32.12 18.66 
 
                                                 
49 I interpret the substantive impact of coefficients in terms of percentage change in the hazard. I use the 
following simple formulas to assess the impact of unit changes in a covariate on either increasing or 
decreasing the hazard rate for policymakers: [1 - eβ *100] for negative coefficients and [(eβ  - 1) * 100] 
for positive coefficients obtained from the Cox model. See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 60) for 
a different formula which produces the same point estimates.  
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Do Neoliberal Policymakers Survive Longer under IMF Programs? 
Before presenting the full set of results from the multivariate analysis, I use 
basic descriptive statistics and diagnostic plots to get a sense of whether there are any 
significant differences in survival rates between neoliberal and non-neoliberal 
policymakers under IMF programs. In table 4.3 I compare the mean duration (in days) 
of neoliberal and non-neoliberal policymakers under IMF programs.50 
Table 4.3: Average Duration of Policymakers under IMF Programs (1980-2000) 
Type 
Mean Duration of Economic Policymakers (in days) 
Yes No T-stat for diff. of means (p-value) 
Neoliberal Finance 
Minister? 
958.23 
(N = 48) 
689.16 
(N = 381) 
2.17 
(0.03) 
Neoliberal Central 
Banker? 
1,477.95 
(N = 40) 
999.53 
(N = 156) 
2.45 
(0.01) 
The differences are striking. The average duration for neoliberal finance 
ministers under IMF programs is 958 days compared to 689 days for non-neoliberals. 
The hypothesis test for difference of means produces a p-value of 0.03, indicating that 
the difference is statistically significant. The same exercise for the heads of central 
banks produces similar results: neoliberal central bankers survived, on average, 479 
days longer than non-neoliberals in borrowing countries. The difference is not trivial (t 
= 2.45, p = 0.01).  
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 below provide another cut at the issue. In the figures I 
compare Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for neoliberal and non-neoliberal finance 
ministers (figure 4.3) and central bank governors (figure 4.4) in IMF countries. 
                                                 
50 I only include policymakers that have “failed” on or before December 31, 2000 in the table. The 
right-censored policymakers are not included in the construction of the mean durations.  
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Figure 4.3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Finance Ministers under IMF 
Programs, Stratified by Neoliberal 
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Figure 4.4: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Central Bankers under IMF 
Programs, Stratified by Neoliberal 
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The figures tell an interesting story. Only 62 percent of non-neoliberal finance 
ministers in countries under active IMF programs make it past the one year mark, 
while one year after the date of appointment 73 percent of neoliberals remain in office. 
By two years after the date of appointment the differences between neoliberal and 
non-neoliberal finance ministers are more pronounced: 35 percent of non-neoliberals 
make it past the 730 day mark, whereas 58 percent neoliberals in borrowing countries 
are still in office after two years. Only after five years do the survivor functions 
intersect (9 percent of non-neoliberals and 10 percent of neoliberals in countries with 
IMF programs survive past 1,882 days).51   
Figure 4.4 illustrates that difference in survivor functions between neoliberals 
and non-neoliberals is even greater for central bank governors. By the end of the first 
year following appointment there is a ten point gap between neoliberals (84 surviving 
to that point) and non-neoliberals (75 percent). The gap increases as time passes: after 
four years 48 percent of neoliberal central bank governors in countries under IMF 
programs are still in power, compared to just 30 percent of bankers that do not have 
neoliberal credentials.52  
 To see whether these differences persist when a range of other explanatory 
variables are included in the analysis, I estimated Cox models of the survival of 
finance ministers (table 4.4) and central bank governors (table 4.5) with the set of 
covariates described in the previous section. 
I start with the model of the survival of finance ministers. Several interesting 
patterns emerge.53 Compared to their counterparts in autocratic regimes, finance 
                                                 
51 I used logrank tests to assess whether the differences in survivor functions were statistically 
significant. The test reveals that the difference between neoliberal and non-neoliberal finance ministers 
under IMF programs is in fact significant (χ2 = 4.22, p = 0.04). 
52 The logrank test confirms that the difference is survivor functions between neoliberal and non-
neoliberal central bankers is highly significant (χ2 = 6.03, p = 0.01). 
53 Note that the country-specific frailty parameters (θ) are significant, which indicates that they should 
be included in the models.   
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ministers in democracies and mixed regimes face greater odds of removal. For finance 
ministers under IMF programs, presidential regimes provide the riskiest institutional 
setting: the coefficient on the presidential democracy covariate indicates a 57 percent 
increase in the hazard of removal. Other domestic political factors that increase the 
hazard include whether a finance minister is a member of a caretaker government 
(which almost by definition involves a shorter duration) and turnover of the head of 
state. According to the results in table 4.4, replacement of the leader in countries under 
IMF programs increase the odds that a finance minister will be removed by 250 
percent.  
Table 4.4 shows that economic conditions matter; it is noteworthy, however, 
that in the sub-sample of IMF borrowers two covariates expected to be related to 
survival – currency crises and economic growth – do not achieve conventional levels 
of statistical significance. Inflation has an interesting impact on the political survival 
of finance ministers in the subsample: in the early stages of a policymaker’s time in 
office, high inflation is deadly; however, the impact of the inflation covariate 
dissipates over time (based on the negative coefficient for the interaction between 
inflation and the log of time). Few finance ministers can survive a bout of 
hyperinflation, but for those that do continued price instability has diminishing effects 
on their prospects for survival.   
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Table 4.4: The Survival of Finance Ministers in Borrowing Countries 
Covariates DV: Survival of Fin. Mins. (in days) 
Neoliberal  -0.343* 
 (0.175) 
Caretaker/Transition Govt. 2.241*** 
 (0.317) 
Inflation  15.642*** 
 (1.017) 
Inflation × ln(t) -2.556*** 
 (0.266) 
GDP growth -0.013 
 (0.011) 
Currency Crisis 0.259 
 (0.196) 
Mixed Regime 0.298 
 (0.160) 
Presidential Democracy 0.453* 
 (0.182) 
Parliamentary Democracy 0.372 
 (0.210) 
∆Leader 1.253*** 
 (0.122) 
  
Number of observations 1253 
Number of subjects 539 
Number of failures 401 
Time at risk 310212 
Frailty parameter (θ) 0.085, p = 0.013 
Log-likelihood -1914.401 
Wald χ 2 261.41 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 
Note: coefficients from Cox proportional hazard model with country-
specific frailty terms sampled from a gamma distribution; standard errors 
in parentheses below coefficients. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
 The significant negative relationship between the neoliberal covariate and the 
survival of finance ministers under IMF programs provides evidence in favor of the 
mechanism I lay out in the early sections of the chapter. Based on the estimates in 
table 4.4, neoliberal finance ministers are approximately 29 percent less likely to be 
removed from office than non-neoliberals in countries that borrow from the Fund. The 
most important implication from the results of the Cox hazard model of the survival of 
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finance ministers is that neoliberal policymakers receive a political boost under IMF 
programs – and that this finding persists when a range of additional explanatory 
factors are measured and included alongside the neoliberal covariate. 
The results of the survival analysis of central bankers in countries under IMF 
programs dovetail with the findings for finance ministers in several ways. Inflation 
damages the prospects for survival (though the impact decreases with time), economic 
growth is helpful, and central bankers find it difficult – though less difficult than 
finance ministers – to survive the removal of chief of government (the hazard is 
increased by 67 percent for central bank governors when the executive is replaced 
compared to an increase of 250 percent for finance ministers). The main difference in 
findings for the two types of top economic officials is that the proxies for regime type 
have no impact on the duration of central bank governors. There are apparently no 
significant differences in the risks for central bankers in democratic, mixed, or 
autocratic regimes among the pool of countries that borrower from the IMF. 
The relationship that I am most interested in is between the indicator of 
neoliberal economic beliefs and the duration of central bankers in borrowing 
countries. A negative and significant coefficient is additional evidence in favor of the 
argument that neoliberal policymakers become more valuable under IMF programs, 
and this is indeed what I observe: holding other covariates constant, the hazard for 
neoliberal central bankers in countries that turn to the IMF is 39.6 percent lower. The 
big coefficient and small standard error on the neoliberal covariate implies that its 
relationship with the political survival of the heads of central banks is substantively 
important and unlikely to be spurious.  
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Table 4.5: The Survival of Central Bank Governors in Borrowing Countries 
Covariates DV: Survival of Cent. Bankers (in days) 
Neoliberal  -0.505* 
 (0.214) 
Inflation  13.331*** 
 (1.962) 
Inflation × ln(t) -2.008*** 
 (0.317) 
GDP growth -0.035* 
 (0.017) 
Currency Crisis 0.071 
 (0.296) 
Mixed Regime -0.124 
 (0.247) 
Presidential Democracy -0.128 
 (0.280) 
Parliamentary Democracy -0.092 
 (0.337) 
∆Leader 0.513* 
 (0.199) 
  
Number of observations 856 
Number of subjects 295 
Number of failures 192 
Time at risk 240442 
Frailty parameter (θ) 0.396, p = 0.000 
Log-likelihood -798.174 
Wald χ 2 79.50 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 
Note: coefficients from Cox proportional hazard model with country-specific 
frailty terms sampled from a gamma distribution; standard errors in 
parentheses below coefficients. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
  Thus far I have presented several types of evidence – including 
comparisons of the average duration of economic policymakers, survivor functions, 
and multivariate Cox hazard models – and each piece of evidence has indicated that 
neoliberal policymakers outlast their non-neoliberal counterparts within the pool of 
countries that draw on the IMF’s resources. It is hard to regard the findings as 
anything but supportive of the central claim of the chapter, which is that 
discriminatory treatment in favor of neoliberal economic policymakers by the IMF 
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increases the value of these political agents to the executive, thus lengthening their 
expected time in office.     
Alternative Explanations for the Findings 
 But there are alternative explanations that might account for the patterns 
observed in the data on the survival of economic policymakers. Perhaps the 
policymakers with experiences that transmit neoliberal ideas are simply more effective 
stewards of the economy. In this view, neoliberal finance ministers and central 
bankers acquire superior technical skills that endow them with a greater capacity to 
handle the waves of political and economic events that buffet all policymakers (and 
cause many to lose their grip on political power). If this is true then the presence or 
absence of the IMF is relatively unimportant. Neoliberal policymakers have the right 
ideas and the politicians that appoint them understand that fact.   
Two observations belie this view. Many successful policymakers in low- and 
middle-income countries were not trained in economics. Kwesi Botchwey, “Ghana’s 
long-serving finance minister and high priest of that country’s economic recovery,” 
earned law degrees from Yale and Michigan.54 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who 
served as finance minister before becoming Brazil’s president, was a French-trained 
sociologist who achieved recognition in his academic career for his work on 
dependency theory.55 Argentina’s Jose Martinez de Hoz, hailed as an economic savior 
during General Videla’s military regime (1976-81), was a lawyer who forged his 
reputation as chairman of Acindar, Argentina’s largest steel company. Manuel Ulloa 
Elias, the Peruvian finance minister who “had established a reputation as a 
wunderkind” under President Belaúnde, was also trained in law rather than 
                                                 
54 Toye 1994: 40 (quote). Botchwey headed the Ghanaian finance ministry between May 1982 and 
August 1995; he received an LLM from Yale and SJD from the University of Michigan Law School.  
55 Cardoso and Faletto 1979.  
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economics.56 Officials with experience in the top American economics departments 
may have expertise that enables them to identify rational, welfare-enhancing policies, 
but this is clearly not a necessary condition for political success.57  
Nor is it the case that neoliberal policymakers are uniquely insulated from 
normal political dynamics in developing countries.58 It is implausible to assume that 
leaders appoint policymakers and keep them in office solely because they accept the 
legitimacy (or inevitability) of the ideas promoted by neoliberals. Interests and ideas 
coexist in the decision-making of political leaders. A neoliberal finance minister that is 
able to express views “veiled by a cloak of economic legitimacy” may have a good 
deal of authority, but if the ideas do not offer any tangible political benefits the 
policymaker is not likely to remain in office.59 Policies that constitute good economics 
are not always politically palatable. The IMF plays an important political role in this 
sense by raising the costs that a leader expects to pay when a neoliberal economic 
                                                 
56 Williamson 1994: 581 (quote). Dezalay and Garth (2002, esp. chapter 2) provide a fascinating 
sociological account of the how U.S.-trained economists wrested control of policymaking in Latin 
America from the “gentleman lawyers” that traditionally held the top positions.  
57 The case of Indonesia demonstrates that ostensibly rational approaches to policymaking are in fact 
suffused with ideological and, by extension, political implications. Throughout the Suharto era two 
groups of experts, economists (the so-called “Berkeley mafia”) and industrial engineers, promoted 
views couched apolitically in terms of efficiency which diverged “not merely on the issue of which 
economic sectors should be put on priority over others, but more principally, the way development 
ought to be pursued” (Amir 2008: 316). Control of Indonesian economic policy shifted between the two 
factions over time, depending on the changing political incentives facing the country’s political 
leadership.  
58 Neoliberal economists are also not above venality. For example, Daudi Balali, who served as 
Tanzania’s central bank governor from 1998 to 2008 after spending more than 20 years with the IMF 
(rising to the lofty post of Deputy Division Chief), was dismissed by President Jakaya Kikwete after 
evidence that the central bank had engineered false payments to non-existent companies emerged 
(Keesings Record of World Events, January 2008, pg. 48342). The Indonesian central bank head Syahril 
Sabirin (PhD in economics from Vanderbilt University and a former World Bank economist) was 
sentenced to three years in prison for his role in approving the release of state funds to fund a failing 
company linked to the ruling Golkar party (the conviction was later overturned; see Keesings Record of 
World Events, March 2002, pg. 44680).  
59 Kirshner 2003: 4 (quote). Kirshner goes further by suggesting that the legitimacy of much of what 
constitutes modern mainstream economic theory rests of wobbly empirical foundations; “the aggregate 
economic benefits of various policy decisions [financial liberalization, inflation fighting, central bank 
independence, etc.] are ambiguous, modest, and dwarfed by their political and differential effects” 
(2003: 4).  
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official is replaced.  
 If neoliberals are more durable in general, they should outlast, on average, non-
neoliberals in countries that are not under IMF programs, as well. The results of 
simple hypothesis tests comparing the mean duration of neoliberals and non-neoliberal 
policymakers in cases that are not under IMF lending arrangements are shown in table 
4.6.60  
Table 4.6: Average Duration of Policymakers Not under IMF Programs (1980-2000) 
Type 
Mean Duration of Economic Policymakers (in days) 
Yes No T-stat for diff. of means (p-value) 
Neoliberal Finance 
Minister? 
852.67 
(N = 36) 
677.50 
(N = 345) 
1.46 
(0.14) 
Neoliberal Central 
Banker? 
1,355.72 
(N = 36) 
1,288.74 
(N = 164) 
0.28 
(0.78) 
The impact of the IMF appears to be decisive. While the average duration of 
neoliberal finance ministers exceeds the duration of non-neoliberals by 175 days, the t-
statistic and its associated p-value (0.14) suggests we should view the difference with 
caution. The bottom row in table 4.6 shows that there is essentially no difference in the 
average survival of the two types of central bankers when the subsample consists of 
countries not under IMF programs (t = 0.28, p = 0.78).  
The data summarized in table 4.6 imply that neoliberal policymakers are not in 
general more durable than non-neoliberals. This is strong evidence in support of the 
claim that the presence of the IMF confers special political advantages to likeminded 
policymakers in borrowing countries. But there is another plausible alternative 
explanation for the results of the survival analysis of top economic policymakers 
reported in tables 4.4 and 4.5. To this point in the chapter I have assumed that 
neoliberal policymakers and non-neoliberals enter Fund programs under similar 
                                                 
60 I use the same method in table 4.3 to construct the t-tests. Only policymakers that exited the datasets 
at any time between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2000 are included.  
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economic circumstances. I attributed the observed differences in the survival rates of 
neoliberals under IMF programs to the political incentives leaders face to keep IMF-
friendly officials in office.  
Perhaps there is a different dynamic driving the results. The findings could 
reflect a threshold effect. Neoliberals might be more willing to seek Fund support at 
the first signs that the economic situation is worsening; non-neoliberal policymakers, 
by comparison, might try to weather macroeconomic disturbances without IMF 
funding and its attendant conditions. If non-neoliberal officials only go to the Fund 
when the situation is truly dire, then the differences in survival rates among 
policymakers under IMF lending arrangements are driven mainly by the severity of 
the economic problems at the time that the programs are signed. It would not be 
surprising, then, that non-neoliberals in countries under IMF programs face greater 
risks if the economies they manage are consistently in worse shape.    
I use simple difference of means tests to determine whether there are any 
systematic differences in the circumstances that drive different types of governments 
to the IMF. I start by selecting a set of six economic indicators that measure the 
relative health of a country’s economy. Four of the measures – the current account 
balance, external debt, foreign reserves, and private capital flows – are intended to 
capture the degree of the borrowing country’s need; borrowers with high current 
account deficits, high debt burdens, weak reserve positions, and abrupt reversals of 
foreign capital flows, face tight external constraints.61 We can expect that 
policymakers in countries on the brink of economic collapse face a more tenuous 
                                                 
61 The data on external debt as a proportion of gross national income and the ration of reserves to 
external debt are taken from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance CD-ROM. I take the 
measure of the current account balance (as a proportion GDP) from the World Development Indicators. 
I rely on Ahlquist’s (2006) dataset for the measure of portfolio capital flows (as a proportion of GDP); 
Ahlquist takes the raw data on net inflows of bonds and equity provided by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database.  
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political future.  
I also gathered data on two basic indicators of macroeconomic conditions 
(inflation and GDP growth). If there are major differences in the economic conditions 
under which neoliberal-led governments and governments without neoliberal 
economic policymakers enter Fund programs, then we should see some evidence of 
these differences in typical measures of macroeconomic performance. 
Since I want to compare economic conditions at the time that an agreement is 
signed, the results reported in table 4.7 are limited to years in which a new IMF 
agreement was negotiated among the 90 countries observed between 1980 and 2000 
that form the sample. For example, if a country signs a three-year Extended Fund 
Facility agreement, I only look at the values of the economic measures in the year that 
the program was initiated. This approach is intended to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem generated by the fact that Fund programs influence the economic variables.  
I create a dichotomous indicator that records whether any of the borrower’s top 
economic policymakers – finance minister, central bank governor, or executive (or any 
other economic official, as identified by the signatories for each country’s agreements) 
– was a neoliberal in the year that a new IMF program was concluded.  
Table 4.7 displays the averages for each economic indicator, comparing 
countries with at least one neoliberal policymaker to countries without neoliberals in 
the first year of a new Fund program. There is no clear evidence from the simple t-
tests that non-neoliberals enter into IMF programs when economic problems are more 
severe than those confronted by governments with top officials that share the Fund’s 
economic beliefs. Out of the six economic indicators, only the debt/GNI ratio is 
consistently better in countries with neoliberals: on average, governments without 
neoliberals that seek IMF lending have a debt burden that is 13 points higher than the 
other type of government in the analysis (p = 0.09). The other measures of economic 
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health, however, suggest that neoliberals do not benefit from better conditions at the 
time of signing. Based on the average values, neoliberal governments that go to the 
Fund actually have higher inflation and lower levels of reserves than their non-
neoliberal counterparts – although it is worth noting that the test statistic is too small 
to regard these differences as meaningful. Nonetheless, the comparisons in table 4.7 
do not provide much evidence to suggest that the situation facing neoliberal 
policymakers is consistently better than the situation facing non-neoliberal economic 
officials.  
Table 4.7: Economic Conditions in Countries That Negotiate New IMF Loans 
Economic 
Indicators 
Avg. Value of Econ. Indicators in Year of New IMF Loan 
Neoliberal Policymaker 
in Government 
 No Neoliberals 
in Government 
T-stat for diff. of 
means (p-value) 
Current 
Account/GDP 
-4.45 
(N = 159) 
-5.40 
(N = 326) 
1.35 
(0.18) 
Debt/GNI 83.08 (N = 156) 
96.95 
(N = 344) 
1.69 
(0.09) 
Reserves/Debt 11.43 (N = 152) 
14.61 
(N = 344) 
1.36 
(0.17) 
Inflation 64.90 (N = 153) 
46.61 
(N = 343) 
0.84 
(0.40) 
GDP Growth 2.10 (N = 164) 
2.28 
(N = 360) 
0.34 
(0.74) 
Capital 
Flows/GDP 
0.19 
(N = 160) 
0.13 
(N = 359) 
0.77 
(0.44) 
Putting all of the evidence in the chapter together, a clear pattern emerges: 
neoliberal policymakers find that their political fortunes are improved under IMF 
programs. The next section of the chapter asks whether this dynamic helps explain the 
diffusion of neoliberal policymakers throughout the developing world in the past three 
decades.    
The IMF and the Diffusion of Neoliberal Policymakers 
 I used data on the duration of policymakers to test a straightforward 
proposition: do IMF programs confer political advantages to neoliberal policymakers? 
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The evidence that the odds of removal for neoliberal finance ministers and central 
bankers decline in countries that borrow from the Fund suggests that the answer is yes. 
In this part of the chapter I use the findings to speculate about the relationship between 
the IMF and the spread of neoliberal economic ideology in the developing world.  
 Waves of low- and middle-income countries adopted market-conforming, 
externally-oriented economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Many explanations 
have been supplied to account for the “silent revolution” in economic policymaking.62 
One factor that is often suggested (but rarely tested) is the emergence of the carriers of 
neoliberal economic ideas in positions of political influence.63 Writing specifically on 
the Latin American experience in the 1990s, Vittorio Corbo observes that many 
countries “have experienced drastic changes in economic policy during the past 
decade, moving decisively toward more stable and more open market systems…a new 
generation of highly trained economists, many of them graduates of first-rate 
academic programs in North America and Europe, has played a key role in the design 
and implementation of these policies and selling them to society at large.”64 The 
observation is not limited to the South American setting. My data show that neoliberal 
economists, to varying degrees, gained control of the top economic policymaking 
positions in developing countries in all regions of the world after 1980. It is not 
difficult to draw a connection between the worldwide move to economic liberalization 
and the spread of neoliberal policymakers.   
Is there a relationship between the IMF and the diffusion of neoliberal 
                                                 
62 The “silent revolution” is Boughton’s (2001) term. Simmons and Elkins (2004) test a wide range of 
explanations for the worldwide move toward liberalization in the late 20th century.  
63 Kogut and Macpherson (2008), Macpherson (2006), and Chwieroth (2007) are exceptions. Kogut and 
Macpherson purport to show that countries with more American-trained economists are more likely to 
privatize; Chwieroth contributes evidence that countries with neoliberal policymakers are more likely to 
pursue capital account liberalization.  
64 Corbo 2000: 63. Nicolas Arditto-Barletta, the former Panamanian president, expresses a similar claim 
about the spread of neoliberal economic ideas in the Latin countries: “this thinking has been introduced 
into Latin America by the significant number of foreign-trained Latin American PhD economists and by 
the international financial organizations” (1994: 459).   
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policymakers in the developing world? If the presence of the IMF confers political 
advantages to the policymakers that share the Fund’s economic worldview, then there 
is reason to believe that neoliberals might have more influence in countries that have 
spent many years under the institution’s conditional lending programs.  
The remainder of this part of the chapter brings some preliminary evidence to 
bear on the question. To measure the relative influence of neoliberal policymakers in 
developing countries I rely on the logic that motivated the construction of proportion 
neoliberal, the key variable in the analysis of IMF treatment in chapter 2. Recall that 
the proportion neoliberal variable is an index that attempts to capture the ideational 
coherence of the policy team:     
Proportion 
Neoliberal = 
Number of Neoliberals in Top Policymaking Positions 
Total Number of Important Economic Policymakers 
The Letter of Intent that specifies the terms of IMF agreements is signed by 
each country’s top-ranking economic officials; I used these documents, recovered 
from the Fund’s archives, to identify the important policymakers for each country. The 
policy team consists of the officials that sign the IMF agreements plus the head of 
government.65 In chapter 3 the proportion neoliberal variable was only recorded for 
countries under high-conditionality IMF agreements between 1980 and 2000; here I 
extend the measure to all years for the 90 countries that comprise the sample.66 As in 
chapter 3, proportion neoliberal ranges in value between 0 (no neoliberals in 
important economic policy positions) and 1 (a fully unified policy team in which 
                                                 
65 For the handful of countries that did not sign IMF agreements during the twenty year observation 
window (1980-2000) I record the policy team as consisting of the finance minister, central bank 
governor, and executive. It is worth noting that out of a total of 462 leaders in the dataset only 12 are 
coded as neoliberal by the criteria I develop in the dissertation (and half of the neoliberal leaders were 
in Latin American countries). Out of the 12 neoliberal executives, seven were in power while under an 
IMF program.  
66 In practical terms this means that if the finance minister, central banker, and planning minister signed 
an agreement in 1980, the policy team for that country consists of the three policymakers (plus the 
executive) for all years, including years that there was no IMF agreement, unless one of the positions is 
eliminated.   
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neoliberal economists occupy each of the top policy positions).67 Whereas the measure 
was used to explain variation in IMF treatment in the previous chapter, proportion 
neoliberal becomes the dependent variable in this section of the dissertation.  
Table 4.8 provides the first set of evidence in favor of the hypothesized link 
between time spent under IMF programs and the degree of neoliberal influence on 
economic policymaking in low- and middle-income countries. To measure the degree 
of engagement with the IMF, I create a variable that records the cumulative number of 
years spent under IMF programs for each country from 1970 onward.68 I then divide 
the cumulative IMF programs variable into 5-year slices and calculate the average 
proportion neoliberal score for each time slice. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that countries become more neoliberal as 
they spend more time under IMF programs. The average proportion neoliberal score 
for countries that had spent between 10 and 15 years under IMF programs since 1970 
(0.175) is nearly twice the average for countries with the lowest level of experience 
with the Fund’s conditional lending arrangements (0.094). The table shows an 
apparent positive relationship between time spent under IMF programs and the degree 
to which neoliberals control the important policymaking positions.69  
                                                 
67 To get a better sense of the global distribution of neoliberal policymakers, I examined the average 
value of proportion neoliberal for each of the countries in the sample over the twenty year observation 
window (1980-2000). Among the Latin American countries, the countries with the highest proportion 
neoliberal scores are Mexico (avg. = 0.72), Chile (0.57), Argentina (0.43), Costa Rica (0.40), and Brazil 
(0.38). For the post-Communist countries, the Czech Republic (0.21), Hungary (0.13), and Poland 
(0.06) are leaders. The sub-Saharan African countries with high proportion neoliberal scores include 
Botswana (0.45), Togo (0.24), Malawi (0.22) and Benin (0.21). Egypt (0.36), Israel (0.30), and Jordan 
(0.25) are the countries in the Middle East with the highest degree of neoliberal influence on economic 
policymaking. In South Asia, India (0.39) and Sri Lanka (0.30) have historically been most receptive to 
neoliberal policymakers. The Philippines (0.43), Indonesia (0.37), and Thailand (0.30) are the East 
Asian countries with the highest proportion of neoliberal policymakers in the period between 1980 and 
2000.  
68 To give an example, Haiti is one of the most prolonged users of IMF resources. By 1981 Haiti had 
spent 11 years under IMF programs; in 2000 the country had been under IMF programs for a total of 26 
years.    
69 The correlation between the two measures is relatively strong and highly significant (r = 0.187, p < 
0.0000).  
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Table 4.8: Average Value of Proportion Neoliberal Variable (1980-2000) by 
Cumulative Number of Years in IMF Programs (5-year Increments, 1970-2000) 
Cumulative Years in IMF Programs Avg. Proportion Neoliberal Score  (# Observations) 
0 to 5 0.094 (816) 
5 to 10 0.135 (585) 
10 to 15 0.175 (416) 
15 to 20 0.164 (253) 
20 to 25 0.218 (73) 
25 to 30 0.218 (13) 
 It is possible that I am picking up a relationship in the data that moves in the 
opposite direction – perhaps governments in which neoliberals occupy the top 
economic posts are more likely to seek out IMF funding. To address this possibility, I 
create a different variable that counts the total number of years each country spent 
under active IMF lending arrangements between 1970 and 1979. The single best 
predictor of future participation in IMF programs is past participation.70 The total 
number of years spent under IMF programs in the 1970s has the qualities of a good 
instrument: it is highly correlated with future participation in IMF programs, but is not 
contaminated by the outcome variable (the proportion of neoliberals in the policy team 
between 1980 and 2000).     
 Table 4.9 is a tougher test of the hypothesis. Similar to the exercise in the 
previous page, I divide the measure of the number of years under IMF programs 
between 1970 and 1979 into 2-year slices, but rather than calculating the average 
proportion neoliberal score for each time slice over the entire observation period I 
                                                 
70 Vreeland notes that “past participation is such a strong predictor of present participation that this 
factor is statistically significant even after one controls for economic factors” (2007: 57). See also 
Nooruddin and Simmons 2006: 1018; Vreeland 2003: 89-94.  
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only look at the decade following 1990. By construction there is no avenue through 
which the proportion of neoliberal policymakers in countries observed between 1990 
and 2000 could influence the degree of involvement with the Fund in the 1970s.   
Table 4.9: Average Value of Proportion Neoliberal Value (1990-2000) by Number of 
Years under Fund Programs (2-year Increments, 1970-79) 
Years in IMF Programs, 
1970-79 
Avg. Proportion Neoliberal Score (1990-2000) 
(# Observations) 
0 to 2 0.102 (678) 
2 to 4 0.179 (363) 
4 to 6 0.217 (231) 
6 to 8 0.222 (55) 
8 to 10 0.190 (66) 
Table 4.9 suggests that there is good reason to think that a relationship between 
the IMF and the diffusion of neoliberal policymakers exists. The descriptive statistics 
are consistent with the claim that the presence of the IMF strengthens the political 
position of neoliberal policymakers in borrowing countries. Based on the raw 
averages, countries with extensive IMF experience in the 1970s were more likely to 
have neoliberals in top economic posts in the 1990s.71 I interpret these findings as 
compelling, if incomplete, evidence that the IMF has acted as a transmission 
mechanism for the spread of neoliberal economic beliefs throughout the developing 
world.  
 As an additional test I look at whether the bivariate relationship holds up when 
a set of possibly confounding variables are included in a statistical model of the 
determinants of the proportion neoliberal variable. Because the dependent variable in 
                                                 
71 The correlation between proportion neoliberal and the number of years under IMF programs in the 
1970s is suggestive (r = 0.198, p < 0.0000).   
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the analysis is constrained to lie between 0 and 1, the standard OLS estimator is 
inappropriate. Instead I estimate a fractional logit model, which produces correct 
estimates when the outcome is a ratio within the [0,1] interval.72   
 In addition to the indicators of IMF influence (the cumulative years under IMF 
programs after 1970 and the total number of years in IMF lending arrangements 
between 1970 and 1979) I include covariates to cover a set of possible alternative 
explanations for the degree of neoliberal control over economic policymaking. Richer, 
more democratic countries are expected to have a greater proportion of neoliberal 
policymakers in office. This is due to differences in the supply of neoliberal 
economists: students in poor, repressive countries simply have fewer opportunities to 
attend top foreign universities.73 Four other variables that are expected to have 
negative effects on proportion neoliberal are included: a dichotomous indicator for 
whether a country has a socialist legal history74; a measure of per capita oil wealth75; a 
dichotomous variable that takes a value 1 if the executive is from a Left party and/or a 
Left party is dominant political force in government; and an indicator that measures 
the number of veto players in government.76  
                                                 
72 The fractional logit was developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) (see also Wooldridge 2002: 
661). In the statistical package I use (Stata 8.0), the parameters are estimated in a generalized linear 
model with a binomial distribution and a logistic link function. Use of this estimation technique in 
political science is rare, but recent applications can be found in Tomz (2007: 180-82) and Min (2008).  
73 I measure wealth using GDP per capita and regime type using the Polity IV scores; both variables 
were used in the analysis in chapter 3. 
74 The indicator of socialist legal tradition comes from La Porta et al 1998.  
75 The measure is taken from Humphreys 2005. Sachs and Warner (2001) suggest that natural resource 
wealth diverts attention from more productive economic activities; Ross (2001) argues that oil income 
retards social changes that might otherwise lead to better governance. It is no great leap to expect that 
the supply of and demand for neoliberal economists is weaker in countries in which oil is the main 
driver of economic activity.  
76 Both the Left Government and Veto Players variables come from the Database of Political 
Institutions; see the appendix in chapter 3 for details. I expect that neoliberal economic policymakers 
will be less common in countries with dominant Left parties, though, as I point out in footnote 58 in 
chapter 3, the experiences of several left-leaning governments in Latin America that appointed U.S.-
trained economists to important economic positions suggests otherwise. Chwieroth (2007a: 453) argues 
that governments that are constrained by multiple veto players will be less likely to appoint neoliberal 
policymakers, hence the inclusion of the veto players variable.  
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The results of the fractional logit model in which the dependent variable is the 
proportion of neoliberal policymakers in government are given in table 4.10. In the 
first model (column 1) the key explanatory variable is the cumulative years under IMF 
programs from 1970 through 2000; the second model uses the number of years under 
IMF arrangements in the 1970s as an instrument to avoid the possibility that 
governments with neoliberal policymakers disproportionately seek out IMF funding.  
The purpose of the test is not to construct a definitive model to explain as 
much variation in the proportion neoliberal variable as possible; rather, I simply want 
to see if the story suggested in the descriptive statistics – the more experience a 
country has with IMF lending arrangements, the more likely it is that neoliberals 
occupy that country’s top economic posts – finds backing when the measures of IMF 
influence are included in a multivariate model alongside proxies for other explanatory 
factors. The results are supportive: both measures of IMF influence are positive and 
significant. The finding that the number of years a country spent under IMF programs 
in the 1970s is linked to increases in the proportion of neoliberals in government in the 
two decades after 1980 gives confidence in the direction of the relationship.  
The findings, coupled with the results of the event history models of the 
survival of finance ministers and central bankers, lead me to two central conclusions: 
(1) the IMF, through its conditional lending facilities, has been an engine driving the 
diffusion of neoliberal policymakers throughout the developing world in the past three 
decades; (2) there is a political story to explain how the IMF became the engine – by 
discriminating in favor of likeminded officials in borrowing countries, the Fund 
increased these agents’ value, making it politically advantageous to appoint and retain 
officials that have neoliberal credentials. 
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Table 4.10: The IMF and the Proportion of Neoliberal Policymakers in Government 
Covariates (1) (2) 
Cumulative years in IMF Programs 0.024***  
 (0.007)  
Years in IMF Programs, 1970-79  0.039* 
  (0.015) 
GDP per capita 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Regime Type Score 0.025** 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Oil Production per capita -6.039*** -6.071*** 
 (1.232) (1.310) 
Socialist Legal History -1.530*** -1.544*** 
 (0.183) (0.186) 
Left Government 0.115 0.121 
 (0.095) (0.096) 
Veto Players -0.009 -0.00002 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
Constant -2.145*** -2.046*** 
 (0.125) (0.106) 
   
Number of observations 1,750 1,750 
Log-pseudolikelihood -528.774 -529.825 
Note: coefficients from fractional logit model of the proportion of neoliberal 
policymakers (1980-2000); Huber-White robust standard errors in 
parentheses below coefficients. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%
Conclusion 
 This chapter was motivated by a question: if the IMF systematically favors the 
policymakers that share the institution’s neoliberal economic beliefs through its 
lending activities, how does this affect domestic political processes? Do likeminded 
economic policymakers have political advantages in countries that borrow from the 
Fund? Inspired by impressionistic evidence that links the IMF to the rise of neoliberal 
economic officials, I developed a mechanism that highlights the role that the IMF 
plays in valorizing the agents that possess neoliberal ideas. In my view, it is not that 
the IMF convinces the politicians that control the fates of top economic officials that 
neoliberal ideas are just good economics. Rather, appointing and retaining neoliberal 
economists is good politics: for countries that need the IMF’s resources, the ability of 
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likeminded officials to deliver tangible benefits in the form of more generous, less 
onerous loans makes them valuable.  
The bulk of the chapter focused on designing rigorous tests of the argument. I 
found evidence of a decreased hazard for neoliberal finance ministers and central bank 
governors under IMF programs. I drew further evidence to support the claim that the 
IMF valorizes likeminded policymakers in borrowing countries from a set of simple 
difference of means tests: the differences in durability between neoliberals and non-
neoliberals in countries not under IMF programs are small, and there does not appear 
to be major differences in the economic circumstances that drive the two types of 
policymakers to seek IMF funding. In addition, I tested to make sure that the findings 
were not driven by the presence of a few influential observations in the data; the tests 
and new results are discussed in appendix that follows this chapter. Removing possible 
outliers actually strengthens the relationship between political survival and neoliberal 
credentials held by top economic policymakers.  
In a second set of quantitative tests, I found evidence that countries with 
extensive experience under IMF lending arrangements are more likely to count 
neoliberals as members of the economic policy team. The perceptive observers of who 
noted an apparent link between the political fortunes of neoliberal economic officials 
and the presence of the IMF in low- and middle-income countries were right. My goal 
in the chapter was to explore the logic of the argument and to see if the argument held 
over a large number of cases in the two decades after 1980.  
The findings suggest that the political effects of IMF programs are at least as 
consequential as the economic effects. It is widely acknowledged that economic 
liberalization in many developing countries over the past two decades was managed 
by neoliberal economists who gained access to power. The lives of billions of ordinary 
citizens have been affected – whether for the better or worse is a subject of intense 
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debate – by the freeing of markets around the world. The findings in this chapter 
provide the logic that ties the IMF to the growing influence of American-trained 
economists over economic policymaking. In this perspective, the Fund’s role in the 
diffusion of neoliberalism comes not through its enforcement powers (i.e., 
conditionality), but through the institution’s political role in enhancing the political 
fortunes of the carriers of neoliberal beliefs.   
Thus far the evidence has been at a high level of aggregation. This style of 
analysis can be very useful: quantitative tests enabled me to see if the explanations 
about variation in IMF treatment and the political effects of Fund programs were 
generalizable. But to be certain that the relationships identified in the aggregate data 
are meaningful, it is necessary to dig into the details of individuals cases for the kinds 
of evidence that cannot be accommodated in a large-N analysis. The next chapter 
focuses on the relationship between the IMF and one of its historically most important 
borrowers, Argentina. I use the case to see if the details of the Fund-Argentine 
relationship conform to the patterns identified to this point in the dissertation.  
Chapter 5 
The IMF and Argentina, 1976-2001 
 In this chapter I turn from testing the argument on a large number of cases to a 
detailed reconstruction of one country’s experience with the Fund over a 25 year 
period. The country in question is Argentina, and it has had an extensive, complicated 
relationship with the IMF: between the March 1976 coup that brought the military 
government to power and the financial meltdown in December 2001, the IMF and 
Argentina negotiated 14 separate Letters of Intent.  
There is a tragic element to the Fund’s relationship with the Argentines. The 
massive amounts of financial and intellectual resources that the Fund deployed in 
Argentina proved incapable of preventing the country from careening through a series 
of boom and bust cycles, a pattern which culminated in the largest sovereign debt 
default in history. It is tempting to view the Fund-Argentina relationship through the 
lens of fatalísmo that some observers apply to the whole of the country’s experience in 
the twentieth century: Argentina appears to be a country of enormous promise that 
cannot be saved from itself. This is wrong, for reasons that become clearer in the 
pages that follow. The IMF made good and bad choices in Argentina. The goal of the 
chapter is to understand the process by which those decisions – about the 
extensiveness of the conditionality, the generosity of the support, and whether the 
strictures of the program would be enforced with a light or heavy hand – were made.  
The Argentine case provides an excellent testing ground for the argument 
linking the presence of neoliberal policymakers to variation in the IMF’s relationship 
with its borrowers.1  The case study provides another source of correlative evidence, 
                                                 
1 It is important to note at the outset of the chapter that my main focus is on the degree to which the 
facts of the Argentine case conforms the explanation for variation in IMF treatment that I developed in 
chapter 2, rather than the impact of the IMF on the political survival of policymakers, which is explored 
in chapter 4. There is a practical reason for the narrower focus in this chapter. The IMF and Argentina 
had a lengthy, tortuous relationship in the period covered in this study, and an accurate reconstruction 
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albeit with more fine-grained measures and attentiveness to context than is possible in 
the quantitative data analysis. If I observe an episode in which an Argentine 
government dominated by neoliberal economists received tough treatment by the 
Fund, it forces me to examine why the episode is unusual; if many episodes do not fit 
the predictions of the theory, then there is good reason to rethink the assumptions in 
the analytical framework and the results from the data analysis in chapter 3. I should 
also see some evidence in archival materials and interviews that the IMF’s officials 
expressed a greater degree of trust in reform efforts carried out by neoliberal policy 
teams. More generally, any good explanation of the Fund’s lending behavior should be 
able to account for the important aspects of the institution’s relationship with 
Argentina.  
Why the Argentine Case is a Good (and Tough) Test for the Argument 
This chapter proceeds differently than most case studies. Rather than following 
a strictly chronological narrative, I break the case into four distinct periods. The 
Argentine case is bookended by two periods in which neoliberal policymakers were 
ascendant. Economic policy under General Jorge Videla’s repressive military regime 
(1976-81) was guided by a group of economic policymakers led by the Economy 
Minister José Martinez de Hoz and central banker Adolfo Diz that shared the IMF’s 
worldview. A decade after the Martinez de Hoz-Diz policy team was swept from 
office, another group of American-trained economists consolidated their hold on the 
top policymaking positions in Argentina. Neoliberals controlled economic 
policymaking in Argentina between 1991 and 2001. As I document in detail in the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the relationship, using multiple sources of evidence (including archival materials and interviews with 
participants), takes significant time and attention to detail and context. A longitudinal case study is best 
suited to examining the explanatory power of a single hypothesis (or a small number of hypotheses) 
when compared to the alternatives. Where possible, I suggest evidence linking the IMF to the political 
survival of Argentine policymakers, but the core focus of the chapter is on variation in the IMF’s 
relationship with Argentina over time. I leave the task of a rigorous exploration of the IMF’s effects on 
the political survival of policymakers in a case study setting for future work  
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next sections of the chapter, the IMF’s treatment of the country was lenient during the 
two periods in which neoliberal influence was high.  
In the years between 1981 and 1984, which spans the disastrous war in the 
South Atlantic and the transition to democracy under President Raul Alfonsin, 
neoliberals had minimal influence over economic policymaking in Argentina. This 
period, not coincidentally, marks the nadir of Fund-Argentine relations.  
If the first two cases account for periods in which neoliberal influence is high, 
and the period between 1981 and 1984 is a low-water mark for neoliberals in 
Argentina, the 1985-1989 period sits somewhere in the middle. American-trained 
economists were able to gain access to power, but their influence over policy was 
circumscribed in important ways. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the four periods that 
form the basis of comparison in the chapter, along with predictions about the character 
of the IMF’s treatment of the country in each period.  
Table 5.1: Organization of the Chapter 
Time Frame Degree of Neoliberal 
Influence 
Predicted Character of Relationship 
with IMF 
1976-1981 High Lenient 
1981-1985 Low Tough 
1985-1989 Medium Variable 
1991-2001 High Lenient 
  Argentina provides fertile ground for testing the argument because each of the 
competing explanations that I outlined in chapter 2 can be plausibly applied to the 
case, thanks to the country’s unique political and economic characteristics. It is useful 
at the outset of the chapter to review the predictions that each approach makes about 
the pattern of relations between the Fund and Argentina.  
The Technocratic Explanation. In this view, the IMF is an apolitical, impartial 
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arbiter of economic advice. For the technocratic explanation to have power, an 
informed but unbiased observer of the Argentine-Fund relationship would have to 
conclude that, ex post, the IMF’s treatment of the country reflected the best economic 
theory and data available at the time. Loans should be commensurate with need, 
conditions should match the degree of macroeconomic dislocation, and waivers should 
only be issued when deviations are minor or economic circumstances drastically 
change in unpredictable ways. If the government behaved badly during the two 
periods in which neoliberal influence was high (perhaps failing to meet fiscal targets) 
and the Fund suspended the program, this would be strong evidence in favor of the 
technocratic explanation. But if the toughness of IMF treatment changed dramatically 
between periods even though economic circumstances were similar, we can be sure 
that technocratic factors are not the main cause of the Fund’s lending activities in 
Argentina.  
There are some good reasons to expect that the Fund’s decision making in 
Argentina resembled the technocratic ideal. Argentina’s economic health is important 
to the performance of other major countries in the region. While the period in which 
Argentina was one of the world’s largest and most dynamic economies ended in the 
1920s2, it remained an important economic power in the Southern Hemisphere, due in 
large part to its powerhouse agricultural sector.  More importantly, Argentina has been 
an economically vulnerable country. In the 1980s, Argentina was the third largest 
debtor in Latin America (after Mexico and Brazil) and teetered on the brink of default 
at several points between 1982 and 1992, posing grave risks to the balance sheets of 
                                                 
2 In 1929, Argentina’s output per capita was 38% of the United States’ output per capita; by 1950, the 
ratio dropped to 23%, and in 1983 the figure was 15%. Argentina dropped from the 18th largest 
economy in the world in 1929 (measured in terms of per capita output) to number 25 in 1983. Data are 
taken from Llach 1987: 27; also reported in Smith 1989: 17.   
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highly exposed U.S. banks.3  In the late 1990s a crisis of investor confidence coupled 
with Argentina’s deep integration into the international financial system posed a 
systemic risk through contagion to other emerging markets.4 With so much at stake in 
Argentina, we would expect to see that the Fund put its best economists on the task of 
managing the country’s reform and stabilization efforts. Political concerns fall by 
wayside when the threats to global financial stability are great.  
Bureaucratic Interests. If bureaucratic forces shaped the IMF’s decision 
making in Argentina, I should observe that the IMF’s treatment of the country in each 
period reflected the self-interest of the institution and its staff members. Factors such 
as competition from the World Bank or the level of the Fund’s financial exposure in 
Argentina should have some influence on the staff and management’s decision 
making. I will also see evidence that the staff members in the Western Hemisphere 
Department used loans to expand their influence and budgets. Since these incentives 
do not change over time, there is consistency in the Fund’s treatment of Argentina 
between the four periods. We might also observe evidence that the staff and 
management associated with the Western Hemisphere Department took a more lenient 
position on lending to Argentina compared to officials within the Fund that did not 
deal regularly with the country.   
External Influences on the Fund. The prediction from the external influences 
explanation is straightforward: the IMF’s treatment of various Argentine governments 
over the 25-year observation window reflected the preferences of either powerful 
member states or influential private banks.   
                                                 
3 In addition to the threat of default for highly exposed financial institutions, bankers feared that an 
Argentine debt moratorium would have powerful demonstration effects, perhaps triggering a wave of 
debt repudiation throughout Latin America. For a detailed discussion of Argentina’s debt situation in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, see Aggarwal 1996: 409-56. 
4 Argentina floated a large amount of sovereign debt during the period, making it the largest borrower 
among low- and middle-income countries on international financial markets by the year 2000. On the 
threat of contagion from Argentine troubles, see Mussa 2002: 25-27, 38; Blustein 2005: 175.  
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The case offers a good test for the realist explanation, because there is 
variation in the IMF’s geopolitical position during the period examined in the chapter: 
a pariah state during the repressive years of the Proceso in the late 1970s, the election 
of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought Argentina back into the fold as a valued ally in the 
Southern Hemisphere.5 In 1982 it fought and lost a war against one of the Fund’s most 
powerful and influential member states; the enmity between the UK and Argentina 
persisted for years, and spilled over into the IMF’s dealings with later Argentine 
governments, as will be detailed in the pages that follow. Compared to a country like 
Russia, the strategic interests over Argentina are not so intense that the country is a 
special case. But Argentina is not a peripheral country where geopolitical concerns 
play little role. Similarly, the high exposure of large banks and private lenders in 
Argentina gives reason to expect to find evidence that the Fund’s staff and 
management were influenced by these external agents at different points in the 
relationship.   
Domestic Politics. This explanation focuses on the domestic institutions and 
processes that influence economic policymaking in predictable ways. If this approach 
offers insights, we should see evidence that the Fund’s treatment of Argentina was 
influenced by a few select domestic-level factors: regime type, partisanship, and the 
electoral clock have each been cited as important determinants of variation in IMF 
treatment.  
The Argentine case provides a particularly clean test of the explanation. In 
December 1983 the country experienced a transition to democracy under the newly 
elected President Raul Alfonsin. Some claim that the IMF prefers to deal with 
autocratic regimes, because autocratic leaders are better able to suppress anti-reform 
interest groups and can more readily commit to and carry out tough stabilization 
                                                 
5 Kirshner 2007: 183. 
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programs of the kind the IMF advocates.6 On the other hand, a large (and growing) 
body of literature in international relations argues that democratic institutions enable 
governments to credibly commit to policies.7 Either way, I should observe a 
qualitative change in the IMF’s treatment of Argentina after the 1983 transition.  
Overview of the Chapter 
 This chapter demonstrates that the pattern of relations between the IMF and 
Argentina matches my theoretical expectations. When the proportion of neoliberals in 
government was high, the IMF’s treatment of the country was generous; when 
neoliberals were jettisoned in favor of officials that did not share the Fund’s basic 
worldview, the IMF’s treatment became much tougher. My confidence in the 
ideational argument is strengthened by the fact that the Fund’s treatment moves in 
directions not predicted by the alternative theoretical approaches. In the two periods in 
which neoliberals were ascendant, the Fund’s leniency flew in the face of mounting 
evidence that the country was pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies. I find 
comparatively little evidence that powerful states or private banks exerted pressure on 
the Fund to extend generous loans to the Argentines or to tighten conditions. 
Moreover, I find evidence in a variety of archival materials that the character of the 
policy team plays an important role in shaping the perception of the country’s 
credibility, from the staff level all the way to the Executive Directors.  
That said, my explanation does not explain 100 percent of the variation in the 
Fund’s treatment of Argentina in the four periods. I do not expect that it should. 
Rather, the importance of the episodes for the general framework in the dissertation is 
                                                 
6 Doug Bandow contends that “the IMF has rarely met a dictatorship that it didn’t like” (1994: 26).  See 
also Vreeland 2003: 88.  
7 There are multiple mechanisms proposed in the IR literature that link democratic institutions to 
outcomes; the provision of information, the presence of veto players, and the turnover of executives are 
all suggested as reasons for differences between democracies and dictatorships. A review of this 
literature is far beyond the scope of this dissertation; Nathan Jensen provides a succinct overview in 
Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation, pp. 77-82.  
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that they demonstrate, in combination with the statistical results, that shared ideas are 
an important cause of variation in the IMF’s treatment of its borrowers. As shown in 
chapter 4, the pattern of systematic discrimination in favor of certain types of 
borrowers has important political consequences.  
 The analysis begins with two periods in which neoliberals retained control over 
economic policymaking. The two “high neoliberal influence” cases are characterized 
by easy negotiations, relatively light conditionality that is weakly enforced, generous 
loans, and a general sense of enthusiasm on the part of the Fund for the officials 
running the Argentine economy. The third section considers the IMF’s treatment of 
Argentina during a period in which the influence of neoliberals was low (1981-84). 
The events in the period conform to the theoretical expectations: the IMF’s took a 
tough line with the Argentine government at a time when the country’s economic 
position was particularly precarious. In the fourth section I discuss the relationship 
during an interesting period in the mid- to late-1980s in which policymaking in 
Argentina was divided between neoliberals and non-neoliberals. In each episode I 
assess how well the contours of the Fund’s relationship with the various governments 
are explained by the degree of neoliberal influence compared to the other approaches.  
Episode 1: Neoliberals to the Rescue, 1976-81 
 The trajectory of the Fund’s relationship with the military government in the 
years between 1976 and 1981 follows the pattern predicted by the theoretical 
framework: the presence of neoliberal economists in top policymaking positions 
reassured the IMF’s staff and management that the country was serious about reform. 
In turn, the government was rewarded with lenient treatment. In retrospect, there is 
little indication – aside from the presence of likeminded authorities in the central bank 
and economy ministry – that the military government had the either ability or desire to 
pursue disciplined macroeconomic policies of the type preferred by the Fund. 
 165
Unfortunately, this episode, like the second episode of high neoliberal influence 
(1991-2001) described in the following section of the chapter, ended in financial 
collapse.  
This section of the chapter is organized around the two lending arrangements 
that the Fund negotiated with the military regime during the period. I also devote some 
attention to the historical position of neoliberal economic ideas in Argentina. Not only 
was the 1976-81 era the first time that neoliberals exerted significant influence of 
economic policymaking, but the openness of the military regime to the propagators of 
neoliberal economic ideas set the path for a second generation of American-trained 
economists to gain a foothold on policy and reshape the country’s relationship with the 
Fund, a decade after this period came to its conclusion.     
The Proceso Takes Power 
When IMF officials arrived in Buenos Aires two months after the March 24, 
1976 coup that swept Isabel Peron from the presidency, they were immediately 
confronted with the fact that Argentina was a country mired in deep political and 
economic crisis. Members of the IMF mission team received word that they were 
possible targets for assassination by the leftist guerrilla organization the People’s 
Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo, or ERP), and were forced to 
conduct the negotiations with the new military government in secret.8 The briefing for 
the members of the IMF mission that would arrive in Buenos Aires on May 26 
cautioned that “few Fund members have experienced financial deterioration to the 
extent now present in Argentina and neither the Argentine authorities nor the Fund 
staff have had much experience in dealing with such situations.”9 
                                                 
8 Interview with Christian Brachet, Washington DC, May 31 2009. Brachet was an economist in the 
River Plate division in 1976; later, he became Deputy Division Chief of the Western Hemisphere 
Department, a position he held between 1981 and 1984.  
9 “Briefing for Mission to Argentina,” prepared by the Western Hemisphere Department, May 20, 1976.  
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 The IMF welcomed the new military government led by General Jorge Rafael 
Videla. In light of the terrible human toll that the regime would exact over the next 
four years – estimates of the number of murdered “subversives” range as high as 
25,000 – the IMF’s favorable attitude seems objectionable.10 Yet support for the coup 
was widespread at the time. Many (if not most) Argentines regarded the coup as an 
inevitable response to excesses of the Peronist years.11 An editorial in the Buenos 
Aires Herald noted that the military “only had to organize the funeral” for a period of 
nationalist populism in Argentine political life that had passed.12  
 The Videla regime envisioned a reconstruction of Argentine society to purge 
the corruption, subversion, and moral degradation that they saw as endemic to the 
Peronist movement. Reflecting on the ideological objectives of the Proceso de 
Reorganización Nacional (Process of National Reorganization or, more commonly, 
the Proceso), William Smith writes that “according to their ideologues, the armed 
forces were locked in a true crusade as the lonely and misunderstood guardians of one 
of the most vulnerable outposts of ‘Western Civilization.’”13  
The Emergence of the Neoliberals  
 In a briefing from May 20, 1976, the leaders of the IMF mission to Argentina 
noted, with approval, that “the new economic team, headed by Minister of Economy 
Martinez de Hoz and Central Bank Governor Diz, has espoused an economic 
                                                 
10 While few could have predicted the extent of the Videla’s crimes, public statements by the members 
of the junta indicated the regime’s violent intentions. In a speech in Montevideo in 1975, Videla stated 
that “as many people will die in Argentina as necessary to restore order.” The IMF’s management had 
some awareness of the repression that began immediately after the coup; I found a clipping from a May 
20, 1976 New York Times article entitled “Repression in Argentina” among the policy memos and 
briefings in the Fund’s archives. Videla’s statement in Montevideo is quoted in Pion-Berlin 1987: 97.  
11 From October 1973 until the March 1976 coup, the Peronist party controlled Argentine politics, led 
first by Juan Peron himself (invited back from exile in Spain), and after his death in 1974 by his second 
wife, Isabel. Under the Peronists the exchange rate, trade policy, and government subsidies were all 
directed toward supporting the urban industrial sector. The Peronists’ policies accelerated the economic 
and social breakdown that had been ongoing in Argentina since the late 1960s.  
12 Buenos Aires Herald, March 24, 1976. Also quoted in Veigel 2005: 94.  
13 Smith 1989: 231.  
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philosophy radically different from that of the previous government.”14 The 
policymakers assembled by the Armed Forces were adherents to the collection of 
economic ideas and policies that I described in chapter 2 as “neoliberal.”  
Adolfo Diz, the new central bank governor, completed a PhD in economics 
from the University of Chicago in 1966 with a dissertation entitled “Money and Prices 
in Argentina, 1935-62.” Diz had taught in one of the few relatively neoliberal-friendly 
economics departments in Argentina at Universidad de Tucúman (and was teaching at 
Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA) in Mexico City at the 
time of the coup), and had worked as an Executive Director with IMF from 1966-68.15 
Diz retained Ricardo Arriazu, a Minnesota-trained economist and holdover from the 
final months of the Peronist period, as his deputy. The planning ministry went to 
Guillermo Walter Klein, Jr., who held a master’s degree from Harvard.16  
The key appointee, “superminister” José Martinez de Hoz, did not possess 
neoliberal credentials; nonetheless, he was someone with strong international ties and 
a preference for economic policies that were closely aligned with the IMF’s views on 
stabilization.17 Tall, impeccably dressed, and aristocratic in manner (he was on safari 
in Kenya when the coup occurred), Martinez de Hoz hailed from a wealthy land-
owning family and had served as economy minister for six months in 1963. Trained in 
law at Universidad de Buenos Aires in 1949, Martinez de Hoz “was deeply influenced 
by anti-Keynesian, libertarian thinking,” particularly through the work of the Austrian 
                                                 
14 “Briefing for Mission to Argentina,” prepared by the Western Hemisphere Department, May 20, 
1976. Italics added for emphasis.  
15 See Veigel 2005: 96.  
16 El Cronista Commercial, April 9, 1976. His father, Guillermo Walter Klein, Sr. was an Executive 
Director with the Fund from 1960 to 1964.  
17 Martinez de Hoz denied that he followed any particular “academic” theory; The New York Times 
reported that “he describes himself as a ‘pragmatist,’ rather than an economic liberal in the sense of 19th 
century capitalism” (Juan de Onis, “Argentina’s Planner,” New York Times, April 1, 1976, pg. 2). See 
also Manzetti 1991: 94.  
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economist Friedrich von Hayek.18 His closest links were with the Argentine and 
international business communities (he counted David Rockefeller as a friend), forged 
through his role as the chairman of Acindar, Argentina’s largest steel company. When 
Walter Robichek, the director of the Fund’s Western Hemisphere Department, related 
the news of the coup to the Executive Board, he reported that “he had learned that the 
Government was trying to co-opt Mr. José Martinez de Hoz, a civilian who had 
already been Minister of Finance, and who was well-known not only to the Fund but 
throughout the Western world.”19 
The economic policy team under Videla marked a breakthrough for neoliberal 
economic ideas in Argentina. Proponents of neoliberalism had competed with votaries 
of the other major Latin American intellectual paradigm, structuralism, in the battle to 
shape economic policymaking throughout the postwar period. The ideational 
competition was personified by the rivalry between Alvaro Alsogaray, an economic 
minister in several governments, and Argentina’s most influential economist, Raul 
Prebisch. Throughout Alsogaray’s nearly 40 year career in politics, he “was driven by 
the goal of controlling economic policy and charting Argentina on a course toward a 
free-market economy.”20 Like Martinez de Hoz, Alsogaray’s views were shaped by 
exposure to the ideas of Friedrich Hayek: “I had seen that Peronism here was leading 
us exactly down the road that Hayek had warned against, and I became convinced of 
the need to put a free-market system in place in Argentina.”21 Alsogaray was a 
staunch defender of the IMF’s role in Argentina and Latin America more generally
an editorial published in The Washington Post, Alsogaray wrote: “if I had an
; in 
y 
                                                 
18 Quote from Veigel 2005: 98. It has been mistakenly reported that Martinez de Hoz was a Harvard 
graduate; for example, The Economist referred to him as “a graduate of the Harvard Business School” 
(“Argentina, Brains – and Brawn,” July 10, 1976, pg. 84). 
19 Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Board, EBM/76/52, March 26, 1976; italics added for 
emphasis. 
20 Gibson 1996: 109. Alsogaray discusses his economic beliefs in de Pablo 1977: 33-42. 
21 Alsogaray quoted in Gibson 1996: 110.  
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observation to make regarding the attitude of the Fund, it would not be its strictness 
but the extreme tolerance it is at times compelled to exercise due to the political 
pressure irresponsibly exerted by those same demagogues [populists and leftists].”22 
Against neoliberalism stood the ideas of Raul Prebisch, who served as the 
executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA). Prebisch and his acolytes were pessimistic about the consequences of market 
liberalization for developing countries. In their view, the deck is stacked against 
peripheral economies: the primary commodities that countries (such as Argentina) 
export are subject to deteriorating terms of trade, low elasticity of demand in external 
markets, and price volatility, while new industrial enterprises are suffocated due to 
their low capacity to generate internally the investment necessary to expand and the 
excessively high cost of borrowing on private markets.23 Structuralists like Prebisch 
advocated a development strategy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI). In the 
ISI model, the policies at the government’s disposal – the exchange rate, selective 
tariffs, credit creation and subsidies – are used to protect the domestic manufacturing 
sector by driving out consumer goods that were previously imported from abroad in 
exchange for goods produced by domestic firms.24    
From the mid-1950s through the 1976 coup the two dominant forces in 
Argentine politics – the armed forces and the Peronists – rejected neoliberal economic 
ideas in favor of interventionist and nationalist policies. Whereas the “Chicago Boys” 
were able to gain control of Chilean economic policymaking by the early 1970s, 
Argentina was relatively inhospitable for American-trained economists.25 Klaus 
                                                 
22 Alvaro Alsogaray, “The IMF and Argentina,” The Washington Post, March 20, 1968. Newspaper 
clipping found in the IMF archives.  
23 An early and clear statement of the structuralist view is in Prebisch 1950; see also Canitrot 1980:  
922; Manzetti 1991: 27-28.  
24 For example, Frieden 1991: 46-51.  
25 Biglaiser 2002: 277.  
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Veigel notes that “lacking attractive opportunities in Argentina, many Chicago 
graduates, such as Pedro Pou, Roque Fernandez, Mario Blejer, Claudio Loser, and 
Carlos Rodriguez, remained in the United States working for international 
organizations or as university professors.”26 There was no shortage of US-trained 
Argentines: by the late 1950s top American economics departments such as Harvard, 
Chicago, MIT, Yale, and Columbia were admitting Argentines to their graduate 
programs.27  
The Videla administration provided an opportunity for neoliberals to carve out 
a permanent space in Argentine society from which to influence policymaking in the 
future. The creation of two separate research institutions following the coup would 
prove to be particularly important. In June 1977 a group of Argentine industrialists 
founded Fundación Mediterranea (FM), an economic research institute that provided 
a sanctuary for a number of American-trained economists.28 The next year a newly-
minted Harvard economics PhD named Domingo Cavallo was invited to run a new 
project (El Instituto de Estudios Economicos sobre la Realidad Argentina y 
Latinoamericano, IREEAL) under the auspices of the FM. It was through the 
FM/IREEAL that Cavallo and a handful of neoliberal economists developed a 
diagnosis of Argentina’s illness: “capitalism without the market and socialism without 
a plan.”29 1978 also marked the founding of Centro de Estudios Macroeconomicos de 
Argentina (CEMA), which became the home for a second set of neoliberal 
                                                 
26 Veigel 2005: 96. Rodriguez taught economics at Columbia; Blejer and Loser had distinguished 
careers with the IMF; Pou, Fernandez, and Rodriguez will figure into the story in the next part of the 
chapter as important neoliberal policymakers under President Carlos Menem.  
27 Dagnino Pastore and Fernandez Lopez 1988.  
28 Heredia 2004: 313-77; Ramirez 2000; Corrales 1997: 56. By the late 1980s Fundación Mediterranea 
had expanded to include offices in every major Argentine city  
29 Cavallo 1984: 26. FM was home to a number of US-trained economists in the late 1970s, including 
Humberto Petrei and Aldo Dadone (Chicago), Aldo Arnaudo (Yale), and Carlos Givogri (Vanderbilt). 
Cavallo would bring many of his FM associates into government when he became finance minister in 
January 1991. Heredia 2004: 328; Ramirez 2000: 69.   
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economists.30  
The Martinez de Hoz Plan and Relations with the IMF 
The new economic policy team wasted little time in reversing the policies of 
the Peronist era. Martinez de Hoz outlined the new government’s economic agenda in 
a televised speech to the nation on April 2, 1976. Immediately, the military 
government would pursue a radical program aimed at liberalizing the economic 
system to control inflation which had wreaked havoc at the end of the Peronist 
interregnum: the agricultural marketing board was abolished; restrictions on foreign 
investment were relaxed; real wages were slashed and new taxes implemented; the 
currency was devalued and exchange restrictions eliminated. The program was 
consistent with an effort to minimize government intervention and restore the 
discipline of the market to Argentina.31  
Contact with the IMF after the March 24 coup was initiated by the central bank 
governor, Adolfo Diz. On April 5 he placed a phone call to Jorge del Canto of the 
Fund’s Western Hemisphere Department to discuss the possibility of a standby 
arrangement. The Fund was amenable to sending a mission as soon as possible, but 
Diz wanted to wait until the beginning of June to allow time to implement the first 
round of reforms.32 It was clear from the outset that the relationship between the IMF 
and Videla’s government would be better than what prevailed in the final months of 
the Peronist period. The IMF perceived the Diz-Martinez de Hoz team to be both well-
intentioned in the sense of having correctly diagnosed the problem and formulating the 
                                                 
30 Economists associated with CEMA include Pedro Pou, Roque Fernandez, and Carlos Rodriguez (all 
Chicago PhDs). Heredia 2004: 328; Veigel 2005: 96.   
31 In his speech of April 2nd, Martinez de Hoz argued that “the state should not operate in spheres of 
action best left to the market…in a modern world economy, of highly fluid inter-relations, it is not 
possible to keep a country’s economy isolated from the rest of the international community” [translated 
from the Spanish]. See also Veigel 2005: 98-99. Martinez de Hoz’s speech is summarized in an IMF 
memorandum from Martin Hardy to Jorge del Canto, “Argentina: New Economic Measures,” April 5, 
1976; also see Canitrot 1980: 917.   
32 Memorandum from Jorge del Canto to the Managing Director, “Argentina,” April 12, 1976.  
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right package of reforms and credible in the sense of showing the “willing[ness] to see 
it [the reform program] through.”33 The neoliberal economic beliefs of the key 
Argentine policymakers helped reassure the IMF that this government was serious 
about reform. Vito Tanzi, a senior economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department and 
participant in the 1976 missions, remarked that the ideas held by the Argentine 
officials were “much closer to those of the Fund: trust in the market, not too many 
controls, balance of payments…We spoke the same language.”34 
The IMF and international financial actors were optimistic about the Diz-
Martinez de Hoz team’s chances of carrying out a wide-ranging reconstruction of the 
economy in a neoliberal direction, but in reality, the Argentine officials’ room to 
maneuver was far more constrained than the IMF recognized at the time. From the 
outset it was made clear to Martinez de Hoz that any package of reforms must not 
increase unemployment; the military regime was engaged in a pitched battle against 
perceived enemies from the labor movement and the universities, and the armed forces 
were concerned that job losses would generate sympathy for the resistance, if not add 
to the ranks of the insurgency.35  
The policy team’s efforts at reining in spending were severely circumscribed by the 
state of perpetual war initiated by the armed forces, which was initially directed 
inward against “subversives” but later turned outward against Argentina’s Western 
neighbor, Chile, and its former colonizer, Britain. Cuts in military spending were off 
the table; privatization was limited to state-owned enterprises that were not deemed 
                                                 
33 Memorandum from Argentina-IMF mission head Jack Guenther to the Managing Director, “Mission 
Review,” June 15, 1976.  
34 Quoted in Veigel 2005: 105. Tanzi’s comments dovetail with Luigi Manzetti’s analysis of the 1976 
economic team; Manzetti writes that their “sharing of the economic approach dominant in the 
international financial community at the time enhanced the country’s international credibility and its 
ability to obtain new loans to solve the balance-of-payments problems” (1991: 95).  
35 Erro 1994: 101-02; Epstein 1987: 996. One of Martinez de Hoz’s opponents in the military regime, 
Admiral Emilio Massera, proclaimed: “For every guerrillero that I kill, the Minister of Economics is 
creating five new ones.” Quoted in Veigel 2005: 129. 
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essential to national security – but nearly every important state enterprise was 
considered vital, no matter how costly or wasteful the enterprise.36 The military itself 
was divided. Videla was sympathetic to his economic team’s viewpoint, but economic 
nationalist and interventionist beliefs were deeply rooted in the armed forces, 
particularly among the top leaders of the air force.37  
It is important to note that the IMF’s staff members did report some concerns 
to the Managing Director about the military’s commitment to a difficult set of reforms. 
The head of the mission to Argentina, Jack Guenther, referring to the recession that 
would result from an IMF-supported austerity program, commented that “the 
economic team knows this, regards it as inevitable, and seems to be willing to see it 
through. The military also say that they understand, but I am not sure that they 
comprehend fully the short-run difficulties which are ahead to lay the basis for 
renewed economic growth.”38 
Serious discussion about a standby arrangement with the Fund began in mid-
June, per the central bank governor’s preferences. Negotiations proceeded smoothly, 
and two top officials from the Western Hemisphere Department, Jack Guenther and 
Marcelo Caiola, left Washington for Buenos Aires on June 29 to iron out the final 
details of a $300 million (SDR 260 million) purchase under the standby arrangement. 
Discussions between the Fund and the Argentines proceeded alongside Martinez de 
Hoz’s efforts to gain additional support from Western banks, efforts that proved 
fruitful: IMF officials reported that the Argentines had secured up to $500 million 
from US banks during the meetings between Martinez de Hoz and a consortium of 
                                                 
36 Erro 1994: 102.  
37 Erro 1994: 103; Veigel 2005: 125.  
38 Memorandum from Argentina-IMF mission head Jack Guenther to the Managing Director, “Mission 
Review,” June 15, 1976.  
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bankers in New York.39 The financing from private sources, coupled with the fact 
Argentina did not have an excessively large financing gap in 1976, makes the 
generosity of the IMF’s terms all the more surprising. According to Luigi Manzetti, 
“the IMF was so appreciative of the ‘new course’ taken by Martinez de Hoz that it 
granted Argentina more funds than were given to any other Latin American country at 
the time.”40  
The standby agreement – Argentina’s first high-conditionality IMF loan since 
1968 – was unanimously approved by the Executive Board on August 6. The SBA 
involved five binding conditions, none of which were particularly controversial or 
onerous.41 The agreement included limits on the cash deficit of the Treasury to keep 
the fiscal deficit below 5 percent of GDP. The minutes of the Executive Board 
meeting demonstrate unified support for the new economic team and an optimistic 
view of the prospects for success. Only one Executive Director expressed concern that 
“the intermingling of economic, political, and social problems in Argentina” should 
give IMF staff members pause before “making judgments on the speed with which 
measures could be taken to correct the economic position, although it was not difficult 
to make a broad judgment of the steps needed.”42 
Performance under the 1976 Standby Agreement 
Two problems attracted the Fund’s attention as staff members prepared an 
evaluation of the government’s policies for the next disbursement of funds. Monthly 
consumer price inflation dropped in the first four months after the coup, but climbed 
                                                 
39 Memorandum from Jorge del Canto to the Managing Director, “Argentina – Status of Negotiations,” 
June 29, 1976.  
40 Manzetti 1991: 112.  
41 The agreement included the following performance criteria (binding conditions): (1) limits on the 
cumulative cash deficit of the Treasury; (2) limits on the net domestic assets of the central bank; (3) 
reductions in the total amount of exchange rate guarantees; (4) limits on the decline of net foreign assets 
of the central bank; (5) a commitment to eliminate any remaining price controls and to “continue to 
allow prices to be freely determined by market forces.” See Text of the Standby Arrangement, 
EBS/76/340, supplement 1 (“Argentina – Standby Arrangement”), August 9, 1976.   
42 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/76/124, August 6, 1976.  
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back to 10 percent in September 1976 and hit 15 percent in December. Unable to cut 
wages or employment any further, Diz and Martinez de Hoz resorted to unorthodox 
measures to get a handle on the rise in consumer prices. In March 1977 the 
government imposed a six month price freeze on the 800 largest Argentine firms; the 
“price truce” was to be enforced officially through administrative monitoring (an 
ineffective approach in a government rife with corruption) and unofficially through 
voluntary self-restraint on the part of industrialists.43 The authorities also lowered 
tariffs in an effort to impose price discipline on previously protected firms.44  
More concerning from the Fund’s perspective was the failure of the 
government to meet the fiscal target in the August standby arrangement. The IMF set a 
modest target of 575 billion pesos (52% of total expenditures) for the cumulative 
deficit of the Treasury; in December, the Argentines reported a deficit of 590 billion 
pesos (60% of total expenditures), making the country out of compliance when the 
staff members considered the government’s request for the final disbursement from 
the SBA. The IMF’s economists were concerned about the fiscal situation; a 
November briefing from upper-level management for the mission to evaluate the 
status of the program emphasized that “the fiscal situation remains the critical aspect 
of the Argentine stabilization plan.”45 The final disbursement was delayed at the end 
of 1976 as the IMF and Argentine officials negotiated new targets on net domestic 
credit of the Central Bank and the fiscal deficit for the first quarter of 1977. Despite 
the missed fiscal target in the last quarter of the previous year and concern that “the 
progress on the control of inflation has been disappointing,” the staff members 
recommended approval of the final tranche of the SBA.46 One could draw the 
                                                 
43 Erro 1994: 107; Smith 1989: 237.  
44 Fernandez 1985: 874. 
45 Western Hemisphere Department, “Briefing for Mission to Argentina,” November 22, 1976.  
46 Staff report, “Argentina – Consultation under Standby Arrangement,” EBS/77/109, April 15, 1977.  
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conclusion from these events that the Fund’s staff was willing to overlook problems 
with the Diz-Martinez de Hoz program for fear of failing to support a group of 
neoliberals working against great odds to pursue policies broadly in line with the 
IMF’s agenda.  
The Second Standby Arrangement 
The Economy Minister unveiled a major policy initiative in June 1977 just 
before IMF officials arrived in Buenos Aires for negotiations on a second standby 
arrangement. Martinez de Hoz announced a far-reaching liberalization of the financial 
system. Private financial institutions were once again allowed to dispense credit at 
interest rates of their choosing, and for the first time since the Peronist period, real 
interest rates became positive. The financial sector’s close links with the government 
meant that they were able to slip a clause into the financial reform that would have 
important repercussions at a later date: the government promised to fully back all 
banking deposits in the nation’s financial institutions.47 As a result, when financial 
crisis eventually came to Argentina in 1980, the liabilities of finance institutions 
assumed by the government amounted to more than 3 percent of GDP.48 But the June 
reform served its desired purpose: foreign capital returned to Argentina in droves.  
Negotiations over a second SBA to support the economic team’s program took 
place in June and July of 1977. The IMF’s negotiators, led by Marcello Caoila, 
remained optimistic about the prospects of the Argentine officials’ management of the 
stabilization effort. While fiscal policy was still identified as the wobbly plank of the 
stabilization, the IMF’s staff allowed Diz and Martinez de Hoz to offer vague 
promises of improvement without imposing tough conditions. The staff’s leniency was 
noted by an Executive Director, W.A. Beveridge, who complained in a memo to Fund 
                                                 
47 Epstein 1987: 996; Erro 1994: 109. 
48 Fernandez 1985: 889.  
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management that the proposed SBA contained “no reflection of efforts to intensify 
fiscal policies in the letter of intent,” despite the suggestion in Caoila’s briefing paper 
that “in order to strengthen the fiscal situation, the authorities should implement a 
substantial tax package.”49 
On September 2, 1977 the Argentines submitted the letter of intent, drafted 
with the IMF’s staff members from the Western Hemisphere department, which 
outlined policies for a new standby arrangement. The proposal was brought before the 
Executive Board on September 16. Several Executive Directors immediately seized 
upon a highly unusual aspect of the proposed loan: “the proposed standby arrangement 
contained the broad lines of a program for 1978 rather than any quantified targets.”50 
The performance criteria included in the SBA were only set for the quarter following 
the date of approval; one experienced Executive Director remarked that he was not 
familiar with another program in which the Board was asked to approve a 12 month 
program with binding conditions specified for half the length of the program. The staff 
and management defended the odd structure of the proposed program, arguing that 
delays in the preparation of the government’s budget prevented the staff from 
formulating targets for the entire duration of the loan, and, in any case, the Argentines 
had indicated that they would not draw on the program. The last point is important: the 
current account balance was in surplus, and the June reform of the financial system 
spurred massive capital inflows. Argentina’s need for balance of payments support 
had eroded in the time between the mission to Buenos Aires and the Executive Board 
meeting.  
With the caveat that the 1977 SBA should not be seen as setting a precedent 
for future Fund lending behavior, the Board approved the SDR 159.5 million loan. In 
                                                 
49 Note from W.A. Beveridge to Sanson and Walter Robichek, “Argentina,” July 7, 1977.  
50 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, EBM/77/138, September 16, 1977.  
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spite of concerns about the structure of the agreement and lingering questions about 
the weakness of the program vis-à-vis inflation and fiscal policy, the record of the 
Board meeting indicates that, for many of the Executive Directors, approval of the 
program was intended as a signal of the Fund’s continued support for the Diz-
Martinez de Hoz policy team.  
The End of the First Era of Neoliberal Influence in Argentina 
Argentina’s economic situation deteriorated in 1978. In March the authorities 
notified the IMF that, in light of the strong balance of payments performance, they 
would not need to draw on the SBA and would not seek to negotiate a new agreement 
after the current agreement expired.51 In any case, the IMF’s patience with the Diz-
Martinez de Hoz team had run out: inflation reached 170 percent in 1978 (the program 
envisioned an increase in prices of no more than 80 percent), the fiscal deficit 
significantly exceeded the program’s targets, and the expansion of domestic monetary 
assets began to accelerate by the end of the year. The only good news on the economic 
front was the balance of payments, but this was mainly a consequence of inflows of 
“hot money” from abroad in the wake of the reform of the financial system.52 
The end of the first period of neoliberal control over Argentine economic 
policymaking came relatively quickly. To arrest the spiraling inflation – driven, in 
part, by the military government’s adventurism in the south Atlantic and unwillingness 
to tolerate unemployment – the Economy Minister and his team formulated a new 
approach that, like the price truce of March 1977 and the punitive tariff reductions, 
relied on the management of price expectations. The tablita was introduced in 
December 1978; it consisted on a pre-announced schedule of devaluations (literally a 
small monthly table published by the government – hence the name tablita) that would 
                                                 
51 Memorandum from Marcello Caoila to the Acting Managing Director, “Mission to Argentina,” 
March 15, 1978.  
52 Western Hemisphere Department, “Briefing for Mission to Argentina,” March 7, 1979.  
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push the value of the peso below the level of monthly price increases, thereby 
reducing inflationary expectations and (theoretically) bringing prices back down.53  
The tablita had some perverse consequences for economic activity in 
Argentina. The forward-looking crawling peg led to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate; as the peso became overvalued, consumers switched to cheaper imports 
(which grew by 73 percent in 1979) and Argentine producers were forced to borrow 
heavily to stay afloat. 
The consequences of the new policy orientation are visible in Figure 5.1 which 
tracks a range of economic indicators over time.54  
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Figure 5.1 Economic Conditions in Argentina, 1975-2002 
An abrupt reversal in the current account and the reserves position occurs at 
                                                 
53 Argentina’s approach to expectations management using the tablita was not unique: Chile and 
Uruguay also used the schedule of pre-announced devaluations to control inflation in the late 1970s. On 
the operation of Argentina’s tablita, see Fernandez 1985; Schamis 2003: 134; Sjaastad 1989: 254-75.  
54 All economic data in figure 5.1 are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database.  
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the end of the 1970s. The current account was driven sharply negative by the real 
overvaluation of the peso. With the expectation of an unannounced devaluation in the 
near future, investors began fleeing from the peso on a massive scale.55  
In 1980, a large number of firms that had borrowed heavily when the peso 
became overvalued failed; to shore up their balance sheets, Argentine banks raised 
their interest rates to attract assets to offset their losses from delinquent loans. In 
March the first major Argentine bank failed; following the collapse of Banco de 
Intercambio Regional, the government was forced to take on the balance sheets of 
Banco de los Andes, Banco Oddoné, and Banco Internaciónal.56  
By April 1981 time had run out for the neoliberals. Remarkably, after five 
years in office Diz and Martinez de Hoz had survived longer than any other central 
bank governor or finance minister in Argentina’s postwar history. Martinez de Hoz 
left office confident that, in spite of the economic trauma that Argentines had endured 
in the last two years of his time as Economy Minister, the incoming military 
government would remain committed to broadly neoliberal policies. “The important 
thing is that Argentina has accepted the principle that retaining something moderately 
good is better than trying to get something perfect,” he remarked.57    
Summary of the First Period of High Neoliberal Influence, 1976-81 
 I characterized the IMF’s treatment of Argentina during this period as lenient. 
The loan negotiated in 1976 was, by regional and historical standards, generous. The 
Fund was willing to overlook the missed fiscal targets to enable the government to 
complete the program. The second arrangement, approved the next year, was 
unusually lenient in terms of conditionality: rather than spelling out binding targets for 
                                                 
55 Schamis 2003: 135.  
56 Epstein 1987: 998-99.  
57 Lewis Diuguid, “Argentine Finance Minister Ends Job with Confidence,” The Washington Post, 
October 2, 1980, pg. B3.  
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entire duration of the proposed loan, the conditions included in the 1977 SBA were 
only set for the quarter following the date of approval.  
 The Fund’s behavior in the first episode revealed a pattern that emerged again 
in later periods: the staff and management of the Fund pursued a course intended to 
provide economic and political support to a group of trusted likeminded authorities. 
The institution failed to pick up on other signals that might have suggested a more 
pessimistic view of the situation; in particular, the military government’s internal 
divisiveness and unwillingness to bear the costs of austerity should have indicated that 
the ability of the Fund-supported policy team to implement a sweeping reform and 
stabilization effort was limited.   
 I found little evidence for the alternative explanations in the details of the 
episode. The IMF’s lenient treatment of a regime engaged in widespread human rights 
abuses suggests limits to the external influences argument, as well as some 
uncomfortable facts about the institution’s selective view of politics in its borrowing 
countries. Under the Carter administration, Argentina was no friend of the United 
States, but the Videla regime did not suffer any consequences in terms of its treatment 
by the Fund.     
Episode 2: Neoliberal Consolidation, 1991-2001 
 The second period in which neoliberals had strong influence on policymaking 
is the lengthiest episode in the chapter. For a decade, American-trained officials 
controlled the economy ministry and central bank. Unlike the previous period 
discussed in the chapter, the turn to neoliberal economic management in 1991 took 
place in a democratic regime. But the two episodes bear some similarities. In both 
cases the new policy teams were brought in to resolve economic crises. In 1976, the 
Diz-Martinez de Hoz team took control of an economy that had been severely 
mismanaged by the previous government. The economists recruited in 1991 
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confronted an economy that had suffered two hyperinflation episodes. The first, in 
1989, forced the country’s President, Raul Alfonsin, to leave office early. His 
replacement, Carlos Menem, also faced severe inflationary pressures after taking 
power.  
In both periods, the neoliberal policy teams were able to engineer a few years 
of strong economic growth. One key difference is the extent of Fund involvement 
during the crises that followed the recovery. Whereas the military government was not 
under an active program when crisis conditions emerged in the late 1970s, the Fund 
was deeply involved in Argentina when the decline accelerated after 1998.   
My theory predicts that the IMF’s treatment should be especially lenient during 
the period. Indeed, I find a consistently generous pattern of treatment, the most 
remarkable aspects of which are the lack of structural conditionality in the series of 
loans negotiated after 1991 and the Fund’s willingness to repeatedly grant waivers for 
missed performance criteria. As the description of the episode in this section makes 
clear, it is hard to explain the Fund’s behavior without reference to the presence of 
trusted neoliberals within the government.  
The Neoliberal the Takeover of Argentine Economic Policymaking after 1991 
Argentina in 1991 was an unlikely candidate for a neoliberal takeover. The 
head of government, Carlos Menem, was a Peronist who, at the time of his election to 
the presidency in 1989, was called “an erratic populist and economic know-nothing” 
in the pages of The Economist.58 In the same way that economic breakdown spurred 
the turn toward neoliberals in 1976 it took a deepening crisis to force Menem to turn 
the top economic policy positions over to neoliberals.  
On January 30, 1991 President Menem signaled a clear break with his party’s 
past by firing his Peronist allies in the economy ministry and the central bank. They 
                                                 
58 “Argentina; Don't cry for me, Weimar,” The Economist, April 29, 1989, pg. 71.  
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were replaced by Harvard-trained Domingo Cavallo, who took over as Economy 
Minister, and Chicago-trained Roque Fernandez, who became the new head of the 
central bank.  
Markets reacted to the appointment of a new neoliberal policy team with 
euphoria. The Argentine stock market soared by 30 percent the day after the 
announcement.59 Cavallo and Fernandez promised to restore Argentina’s credibility 
with the IMF and international investors by destroying inflationary tendencies and 
making the Menem government’s initial moves toward market liberalization 
permanent and irreversible. An important component of this strategy involved a purge 
of interventionist Peronists in the economic bureaucracy. In the first three months after 
his appointment, nearly 300 “Cavallo Boys,” recruited from the neoliberal Fundación 
Mediterrenea think tank (established in the first period of high neoliberal influence) 
and from American universities and the World Bank and the IMF, were appointed to 
positions in the Ministry of the Economy, which had been merged with the Ministry of 
Public Works.60 In February and March Cavallo’s economic team worked tirelessly to 
prepare a radical program that would succeed where previous stabilization efforts 
carried out in the decade between the two periods of high neoliberal influence failed.  
Convertibility is Unveiled 
In late March Cavallo unveiled the Convertibility Plan, which was quickly 
passed by the legislature into law. Convertibility consisted of three main elements: (1) 
the Argentine currency was pegged to the dollar at a rate of 10,000 units of the 
                                                 
59 Nathaniel C. Nash, “Turmoil, Then Hope in Argentina,” The New York Times, January 31, 1991, pg. 
D1. 
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 184
national currency61 to $1 – only with legislative approval could the exchange rate be 
altered; (2) the domestic currency would be freely exchanged by the central bank for 
dollars and other foreign currency; (3) the Argentine central bank would be required to 
maintain foreign reserves to fully back the domestic monetary base.62 The previous 
two decades had witnessed a series of failed attempts to control inflation. 
Converibility represented a radical attempt to induce price stability in Argentina by 
essentially giving up an independent monetary policy.  
Convertibility was a bold stroke, but it involved some very serious risks. The 
success of the arrangement depended on the ability of the government to control 
spending. Since the central bank could no longer finance the government deficit, 
Argentina would have to consistently run surpluses – an unlikely outcome, given the 
country’s dismal fiscal performance throughout the postwar period. Another major 
risk to the program involved an overvaluation of the currency. By pegging to the U.S. 
dollar at an (arguably) overvalued rate, the competitiveness of the country’s export-
oriented producers was threatened. Ultimately, the sustainability of the Convertibility 
plan depended upon the perception of the credibility of the Argentine economic 
authorities. Any hints of a wavering commitment to the system would trigger severe 
speculative pressures.63  
The IMF’s economists had a number of reasons to regard Cavallo’s 
Convertibility plan with skepticism. Argentina had a poor track record of 
implementing “radical” stabilization efforts. The persistent fiscal difficulties posed the 
                                                 
61 In 1985 the peso was replaced with a new currency, the austral. At the end of 1991 the austral was 
replaced by the peso (10,000 australes = 1 peso = 1 U.S. dollar).  
62 The law allowed the central bank to issue foreign-denominated bonds for up to 20 percent of the 
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greatest risk to the system. Sterie Beza, former head of the Western Hemisphere 
Department, recalled that in the Fund’s view, the kind of monetary anchor that 
Argentina had implemented required “a very good fiscal policy. And for Argentina 
that would have represented a marked improvement from past experience.”64 The IMF 
staff report that accompanied a proposal for a new standby arrangement in July 1991 
warned that the convertibility scheme “requires that the fiscal objectives of the 
program be fully met.”65   
The Argentines waited until the Convertibility law was passed to begin serious 
negotiations with the IMF staff members. Discussions proceeded quickly, and by the 
end of June the authorities had come to agreement on the details of an 11 month, SDR 
780 million ($1 billion, 70 percent of quota) standby arrangement. The proposed 
program was not particularly generous, but Argentina’s financing needs had 
diminished: the government was expecting large receipts from a large-scale 
privatization effort, the trade balance had turned positive, and the country had six 
times the amount of foreign reserves it held when Menem took office in 1989.  
The 1991 Standby Arrangement 
The Executive Board approved a new standby arrangement on July 29, 
allowing the Argentine authorities to immediately gain access to $260 million in Fund 
resources. The program included a fairly standard list of performance criteria related 
to fiscal and monetary targets. It did not contain any binding structural conditions. The 
centerpiece of the 1991 SBA was a budget surplus target for the remainder of the year 
and the first two quarters in 1992. The Executive Directors were united in their 
support for the Cavallo-Fernandez policy team, though several continued to express 
                                                 
64 Quoted in Blustein 2005: 15.  
65 Staff report quoted in IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the 
IMF in Argentina, 1991-2001 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2004), pg. 17 (full text of the report available at 
http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/eval_07292004.html). Other sources that note the reticence with 
which the Fund viewed convertibility include Mussa 2002: 5; Veigel 2005: 341. 
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concerns about the sustainability of the reform effort in light of the country’s recent 
history. But overall the Executive Directors greeted the new policy team as a sign that 
Argentina was getting serious about reform. G.A. Posthumus, the Dutch ED, 
cautioned the staff and the Board members not to get “complacent” in light of “the 
relief that we all undoubtedly feel since Argentina’s embarkation on a program of 
stronger macroeconomic policies.”66  
The Convertibility Plan spurred an impressive economic recovery. In line with 
similar exchange rate-based stabilizations in Latin America, the economy entered an 
expansionary phase: GDP growth nearly topped 10 percent for the year.67 
Remarkably, this was coupled with lasting price stability, with inflation dropping to 3 
percent in the fourth quarter of 1991. Menem received a political payoff for 
improved performance by way of a strong showing by the Peronists in early midterm 
elections. And in an administration that had featured four Economy Ministers in its 
first year and a half, Cavallo’s position was secure: his approval rating among the 
Argentine public exceeded 50 percent, and “his international stature…soared since h
introduced his economic plan in March and successfully negotiated a $1 billion 
standby loan from the Internation
the 
e 
al Monetary Fund.”68 
                                                
The economic data that greeted the IMF mission in Buenos Aires to assess the 
country’s performance under the new SBA was disappointing: the Argentines had 
failed to meet three performance criteria, including two separate fiscal targets. In order 
to draw the remaining amount under the lending arrangements, Argentina would have 
to receive a waiver from the Board – which the IMF’s staff and management were 
quick to propose.  
 
66 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/91/102, July 29, 1991, pg. 55.  
67 Schamis and Way 2003.  
68 Nathaniel C. Nash, “Economic Reform Aiding Peronist Campaign,” The New York Times, August 29, 
1991, pg. A11.  
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On December 20 the Executive Board gathered to consider the proposal from 
the management and staff to waive the non-observed performance criteria and allow 
the Argentines to continue to draw on Fund resources. There was very little resistance 
from the Executive Directors, despite the fact that multiple targets had been exceeded 
in the October review. In fact, the tone of the discussion was overwhelmingly positive. 
One ED reflected: “in contrast with other occasions on which Argentina had been 
unable to meet its performance criteria, today many tangible results of the stabilization 
effort can be observed;” another expressed his “wish that all members were prepared 
to show such active commitment to implementing needed economic reforms.”69 The 
Board members treated the deviations as minor concerns – despite the fact that the 
fiscal targets were missed by wide margins – choosing instead to focus on the 
credibility of the Cavallo-Fernandez policy team and the structural reforms the 
government had pursued.70  
The approval of the waiver for non-compliance with the set of performance 
criteria in the 1991 SBA marked an emerging pattern that would characterize the 
Fund’s relationship with Argentina in the era of neoliberal consolidation in Argentine 
policymaking. The staff, management, and Executive Directors would invariably 
overlook noncompliance with fiscal targets – despite the early and persistent concern 
about fiscal performance under the Convertibility regime – choosing to focus instead 
on the policy team’s successful management of inflation and commitment to a broadly 
neoliberal policy agenda.  
                                                 
69 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/91/172, December 20, 1991, pg. 37, 43. David 
Peretz, the British Executive Director, did express concerns about “such a large slippage in attaining the 
program’s fiscal objectives. When the original program was discussed…this and other chairs 
emphasized the particular importance of fiscal policy and indicated some reluctance to agree to waivers 
if the program targets were not met.”  
70 In late October the policy team announced the implementation of Executive Decree 2284, which 
provided a sweeping liberalization of all aspects of the Argentine economy. The law contained 122 
provisions related to deregulation of trade, tax reform, capital market liberalization, reform of the social 
security system, liberalization of the labor market, among other areas. Office Memorandum, “Argentina 
– Economic Liberalization Measures,” EBD/91/296, November 12, 1991.  
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 Argentina Signs its First Multi-Year Agreement with the Fund 
Further evidence of the Fund’s increasing confidence in the Argentines came 
in the form of the negotiations, starting in late January, for a three year, $3.6 billion 
(193 percent of quota) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. The Argentines first 
pursued an EFF in 1983, but uncertainty about the prospects for such a generous 
program had prevented the IMF from seriously considering a multi-year package until 
the unified neoliberal policy team of Cavallo and Fernandez was formed.71  
The negotiations with the IMF over the country’s first multi-year program 
went very quickly with few obstacles. By late February the two sides had come to an 
agreement on an outline of the program, and on March 31 the Fund’s Managing 
Director, Michel Camdessus, brought the proposal before the Executive Board for 
approval. The EFF, in line with the greater access to Fund resources that it offered, 
included more conditions than in the previous two agreements. The program set fairly 
stringent targets for fiscal policies, including a budget surplus through 1992 (not 
including proceeds from the sale of state-owned enterprises). But the program was 
relatively light in terms of structural conditionality.72 The two structural performance 
criteria were the only binding structural conditions in any of the programs Argentina 
received over the next decade, and, as discussed below, the government had difficulty 
implementing even these modest structural reforms.  
The Executive Board enthusiastically supported the staff and management’s 
proposal. The Minutes of the Board’s discussion provide additional evidence to 
support my claim that the presence of neoliberals in the borrowing government helps 
reassure the Fund that the borrower can be trusted. One Executive Director praised the 
                                                 
71 The EFF was an important seal of approval from the Fund: it would help unlock debt relief under the 
terms proposed by the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady. Aggarwal 1996: 453.  
72 The proposed three year program contained structural performance criteria for the implementation of 
a tax reform bill and a reform of the social security system.  
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“radical – and, we hope – permanent change in the authorities’ policy attitude that lies 
at the heart of their success” – a shift toward consolidated neoliberalism that was 
“rapidly translating into a growing policy credibility for the authorities.”73 The 
presence of Cavallo in the Economy Ministry and Fernandez in the Central Bank did 
much to signal that to the Fund that the likeminded Argentine officials could be 
counted on to pursue the Fund’s preferred set of policies. A comment from the Belgian 
Executive Director is revealing in this respect. Jacques de Groote reminded his fellow 
Board members: “we can all recall how skeptically we viewed Argentina’s request [in 
June 1991] for a standby arrangement; with the benefit of hindsight, it was clearly a 
good decision to approve that request and to be rather generous in financing it.”74 The 
willingness of the Fund to give the neoliberals the benefit of the doubt seemed to have 
paid off.  
The news from Argentina was positive through most of 1992. Program reviews 
in both June and August showed that all of the quantitative performance criteria were 
met within comfortable margins.75 Convertibility continued to produce strong 
economic performance: inflation remained low, foreign reserves reached $10 billion, 
and foreign capital flooded into the country. Importantly, the external debt load, which 
had grown in the decade after the first period of high neoliberal influence, lightened 
considerably. In April, shortly after the approval of the IMF program, Argentina and 
the private banks reached agreement on a voluntary debt reduction, and in August the 
authorities secured a generous repayment schedule for official creditors. The events 
prompted the Financial Times to cautiously observe that “Argentina may be on the 
road to a fundamental economic recovery” thanks in large part to Cavallo, the 
                                                 
73 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/92/41, March 31, 1992, pg. 23 [italics added].  
74 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/92/41, March 31, 1992, pg. 50.  
75 Staff memorandum, “Argentina – Review under Extended Arrangement,” EBS/92/144, September 1, 
1992.  
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“Harvard-trained economist who provides the intellectual firepower for reform.”76 
But problems emerged again in the review of Argentina’s progress in the 
fourth quarter of 1992. Specifically, the government failed to carry out the reform of 
the social security system as specified in the agreement. The staff and management 
proceeded to bring a waiver before the Executive Board to allow the program to 
continue without interruption. None of the Executive Directors expressed serious 
concerns about the program in spite of the lack of progress on the structural 
performance criteria, and a waiver was approved on December 30.77  
The IMF’s concerns about the quasi-currency board abated during 1993, when 
the Argentine economy grew at 6 percent and annual inflation nearly hit single digits. 
The Fund’s staff and management were willing to overlook two persistent problems 
that had emerged. The first was the inability of the government to pass the reform of 
the social security system. In July 1993 the Board accepted another modification of 
the program to allow the authorities to push the date for legislative approval of the 
social security reform bill back. The other problem that the Fund noted was the real 
appreciation of the peso. Between March 1991 and the end of 1993 the currency 
appreciated by 50 percent.78 Yet the IMF did not apply any serious pressure to the 
Argentines to tighten fiscal policy as the current account balance turned negative. 
Further, the Fund expressed little concern about unemployment that had jumped to 
nearly 13 percent in Buenos Aires in 1994.79 
The Argentine economic policy team also discovered the support of 
international investors. In December 1993 foreign investors purchased – in a single 
day – over $1 billion in 10-year bonds issued by the government. The voracious 
                                                 
76 Stephen Fidler, “Don’t Cry for Argentina,” Financial Times, May 18, 1992. 
77 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/92/158, December 30, 1992.  
78 Minutes of the Executive Board meeting, EBM/93/99, July 14, 1993; IMF Independent Evaluation 
Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2001, pg. 17.  
79 Pastor and Wise 1999: 483.  
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appetite for Argentine dollar-denominated bonds fed a doubling of the country’s 
external debt (from $62 billion in 1992 to $142 billion in 1998), an increase that 
would have serious repercussions when economic performance weakened later in the 
decade.80 Figure 5.2 provides historical data on Argentina’s external debt; I have 
marked the implementation of Convertibility in 1991 for illustrative purposes.81 The 
figure shows the rapid debt buildup after 1994. 
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Figure 5.2: Argentina’s External Debt, 1980-2000 
The Convertibility system faced its first serious test at the end of 1994. Earlier 
in the year the IMF mission noted that fiscal progress had slowed, and the Argentines 
failed to meet the fiscal targets for the first quarter of the year. Nonetheless, the 
country passed its July review without facing a suspension or tightening of the fiscal 
                                                 
80 Jonathan Fuerbringer, “Argentine Notes Draw Investors,” The New York Times, December 10, 1993, 
pg. D16; Mussa 2002: 16.  
81 The spike in the figure in 1989 corresponds to the country’s descent into hyperinflation, a period 
which is discussed in the fourth episode in this chapter. The data on external debt are from the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance database.   
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performance criteria thanks to another set of waivers. Noting that her authorities were 
“happy to accept the waivers recommended in the proposed decision,” the American 
Executive Director, Karin Lissakers, remarked “with an election approaching, some 
relaxation of spending discipline might be expected, even in a team as determined as 
the Argentine authorities.”82 In late September Cavallo felt confident enough to 
announce that Argentina would not need the final two drawings under the Extended 
Fund Facility. Outside observers worried that the cancellation of the final tranches of 
the EFF indicated that the authorities had lost control of the fiscal situation in the run-
up to the May 1995 presidential elections, in which Menem sought reelection.83  
Termites in the Woodwork: The IMF and Argentina, 1995-1998 
In late December 1994 the Mexican currency crisis exploded. The exogenous 
shock triggered a confidence crisis among investors in Argentina, who ignited a 
massive capital outflow. Between January and April 1995 8 billion dollars – 
accounting for 18 percent of all deposits – left the country. The stock market lost 30 
percent of its value in the first two months of the year. Cavallo compared the events of 
early 1995 to the financial panic of 1929.84 The Argentines hoped that a series of 
auctions of short-term treasury bills would staunch the flow, but the severity of the 
crisis forced the Cavallo-Fernandez team to turn back to the Fund in late February to 
negotiate terms to restart the EFF.85 While investors continued to bet on an Argentine 
devaluation and the end of the Convertibility system, in March the Fund announced 
that it would allow the Argentines to draw on the remaining $400 million and would 
begin negotiation to supplement the existing arrangement with an additional $2 
                                                 
82 Minutes of the Executive Board meeting, EBM/94/64, July 18, 1994, pg. 15 [italics added].  
83 “The Foundations Have Been Laid,” The Economist, November 26, 1994, pg. 5 of Survey of 
Argentina; Martin Krause, “Argentina’s IMF Battle Doesn’t Excuse Wasteful Spending,” Wall Street 
Journal, December 30, 1994, pg. A7.  
84 Pastor and Wise 1999: 484; Calvin Sims, “Argentina, a Victim of Mexico's Fall, Tries to Recover,” 
The New York Times, March 12, 1995, pg. C12; Starr 1997: 98.  
85 “Peso Crisis May Force Argentina Back to IMF,” Financial Times, February 22, 1995, pg. 10.  
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billion. The stakes were high: the system under which Argentina had conquered 
inflation was at serious risk in the wake of the Mexican devaluation.  
In retrospect, the months following the Mexican crisis might have been an 
ideal time to leave the Convertibility system. The regional crisis presented a dramatic, 
unanticipated contingency that would explain the policy team’s choice without 
undermining the government’s credibility. But the Argentines showed a strong 
commitment to the arrangement. Cavallo announced a new set of austerity measures 
while the crisis in the financial system continued, and the country teetered but 
managed to avoid a total economic collapse. At this point the Fund’s position on the 
hard peg shifted from acceptance of the Argentines’ commitment to the system to 
outright support for the currency board.86 In September the Executive Board approved 
the $2 billion augmentation of the EFF along with waivers for missed performance 
criteria in the previous months. For the first time since 1977 Argentina was able to 
draw the full amount of the resources promised under an IMF lending program. 
In hindsight the period between 1996 and 1998 represents a squandered 
opportunity for the Fund to enforce policies that may have headed off the impending 
Convertibility crisis. Argentina signed two agreements, one in April 1996 and another 
in February 1998, during a period in which economic performance was steady but the 
warning signs about the sustainability of the Convertibility system accumulated. Yet, 
as discussed below, the IMF was very lenient in the two main areas of concern – fiscal 
policy and structural reforms – that many Fund officials identified as critical for the 
sustainability of the hard peg.  
The 1996 Standby Arrangement 
In February 1996 a Fund mission led by Tomas Reichmann of the Western 
                                                 
86 IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 
1991-2001, pp. 18-19; Mussa 2002: 21.  
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Hemisphere Department began negotiations with Cavallo and the central bank 
governor on a new agreement. Despite the fact that Argentina had exceeded the 
Fund’s targets for the fiscal deficit in 1995 by 144 million pesos, the IMF issued a 
waiver to allow the government to obtain the final drawing under the Extended Fund 
Facility and was receptive to the policy team’s interest in signing a new agreement. 
Negotiations were quick and easy, and in April the Executive Board approved the 
proposal for a 21-month, SDR 720 million ($1.04 billion, 46.8 percent of quota) 
standby arrangement. The proposed program was small in size, but relatively light in 
terms of conditionality. There were no binding structural conditions included in the 
agreement. Approval of the program raised Argentina’s outstanding obligations to the 
Fund to $4.5 billion (290 percent of the country’s total quota).   
At the outset of the 21 month standby arrangement the IMF’s staff members 
flagged fiscal performance as the crucial element of the program’s success. 87 The 
post-mortem issued by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) describes three 
reasons why fiscal consolidation was essential to the maintenance of the hard peg. 
First, the quasi-currency board abrogated monetary policy, making fiscal policy the 
only demand-management tool available to policymakers. Second, the central bank’s 
reserve requirement meant that the government needed to maintain sufficient external 
borrowing capacity to back up the financial system in the event of a crisis. Finally, an 
increasing debt burden threatened the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
exchange pesos for dollars at par.88  
There was a strong case, then, for the IMF to be tough on Argentina with 
                                                 
87 The executive summary that accompanied the Argentine authorities’ Letter of Intent reported that 
“there is general agreement on the need to maintain convertibility…The staff believes that it is crucial 
to monitor fiscal developments closely.”  See “Argentina – Request for Standby Arrangement,” 
EBS/96/45, March 15, 1996.  
88 IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 
1991-2001, pp. 23-24.  
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respect to performance on fiscal targets in the standby arrangement. But the IMF was 
anything but vigilant in enforcing fiscal consolidation. The Fund’s leniency has been 
well documented. The comprehensive report issued by the IEO summarizes the IMF’s 
weak enforcement efforts: “the IMF repeatedly accommodated Argentina’s slippages 
in meeting fiscal performance criteria from mid-1996 onwards, either to give the 
authorities credibility or in view of their good faith efforts in the face of political 
constraints.”89 Michael Mussa, who served as a high-ranking Fund official, notes that 
between 1995 and 1998 “the deficit of the Argentine government was within quarterly 
limits prescribed at the beginning of each year under the IMF-supported program less 
than half of the time.”90  
Noncompliance started as early as July, when Argentina’s fiscal deficit 
exceeded the target by $1 billion. In October the fiscal deficit target was raised from 
$2.5 billion to $6 billion. In both cases the Executive Board approved waivers for 
nonobservance of the fiscal performance criteria. Most worrisome was that the fiscal 
situation was deteriorating at a time when growth was strong and the central 
government’s receipts were up. Instead of tightening its fiscal goals for Argentina, the 
IMF became looser as the economy expanded through 1998. It is hard to understand 
the Fund’s willingness to tolerate deviations from the program without looking to the 
character of the Argentine policymakers. The IEO’s review suggests that, in spite of 
the pattern of noncompliance, within the Fund “there was almost universal confidence 
expressed in the authorities’ ability and willingness to implement the appropriate 
policies.”91  
                                                 
89 IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 
1991-2001, pg. 37.  
90 Mussa writes further “it is difficult to understand why the Fund did not make active use of its 
conditionality to press the Argentine government to maintain a more responsible fiscal policy” (2002: 
18-19).  
91 IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 
1991-2001, pg. 37.  
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Aside from fiscal policy, the IMF’s other major concerns related to structural 
factors within the Argentine economic system. Two issues loomed large from the day 
that Convertibility was implemented in April 1991. First, the Argentine labor market 
was excessively rigid. Sebastian Edwards enumerated the problems: “payroll taxes are 
close to 40%; collective bargaining procedures favor monopolistic behavior by unions 
and severely limit negotiations at the firm level; labor taxes earmarked for social 
services provided by unions are a source of corruption; and a surrealistic system of 
severance payments burdens small and medium enterprises.”92 The inflexible labor 
market practices were incompatible with the hard peg: since exchange rate 
manipulation was off the table, adjustment to negative terms of trade shocks had to 
come from a fall in real wages. The staff and management of the Fund were aware of 
this weakness and from the mid-1990s encouraged the Argentine authorities to pass a 
comprehensive labor market deregulation. In fact, the IMF tried to include the 
submission of labor market legislation to Congress as a prior condition in several 
agreements. But even the watered-down labor market reform bills that the government 
produced were rejected by the legislature; it was not until 2000 that a bill made it 
through Congress.93 It is remarkable that none of the programs after 1996 included 
even a single binding structural condition related to some aspect of the labor market 
regulatory system in Argentina.  
The second structural problem involved the central government’s fiscal 
relationship with the provincial governments. Briefly, Argentina suffers from a high 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance: the 23 provinces delegated most of the revenue-
raising in the country to the central government in Buenos Aires, while retaining 
                                                 
92 Sebastian Edwards, “The Americas: More IMF austerity won't cure what ails Argentina,” Wall Street 
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93 IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 
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significant autonomy in social spending.94 Argentine fiscal federalism was enshrined 
in a series of tax sharing agreements (coparticipación) which established the rules by 
which the central government shared taxes collected by the central government with 
the provinces. The system, which traced its political roots to severe center-region 
conflicts in the mid-1800s, had some perverse consequences: efforts by the federal 
government to raise tax revenues (in a country with weak extractive capacity) were 
undermined by increased spending in the provinces, which the government was 
obliged to fund.  
The IMF understood that coparticipación posed a threat to fiscal sustainability 
of the Convertibility system. In the first Executive Board meeting after the hard peg 
was implemented, one Executive Director expressed concerns about the long-term 
implications for Convertibility: “There are, of course, uncertainties. Perhaps the major 
one is the fiscal behavior of the provinces. Past experience shows that this is a 
particularly difficult area.”95 Menem was able to pass two bills in 1992 and 1993 that 
attempted to reduce the percentage share of revenues reserved for the provinces. The 
provincial governors accepted a reduced share of central revenues in exchange for a 
guaranteed minimum level of support (piso mínimo) below which the federal 
government “would not dip, regardless of actual revenue collection.”96 When times 
were good, the reform helped alleviate fiscal problems; when the economic situation 
worsened after 1998 the piso mínimo exacerbated the government’s economic 
problems.  
The IMF’s pressure on the Argentines to reform the fiscal imbalance between 
the provinces and the federal government was mainly rhetorical. While the Fund may 
                                                 
94 Argentina’s peculiar form of fiscal federalism has spawned its own literature, which I do not review 
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95 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/91/102, July 29, 1991, pg. 44.  
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not have been able to exert much influence on center-province relations due to the 
complex political dynamics at play, it also the case that the IMF did not even try to 
enforce changes in this area. Only in the March 2000 standby arrangement was reform 
of provincial revenue sharing system included as a (non-binding) structural 
“benchmark.” Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the IMF-Argentina 
relationship from 1991 onward was “the paucity of formal structural conditionality, 
particularly in the form of performance criteria;” further, “what little conditionality the 
programs contained was not vigorously enforced”97  
Cavallo Goes (But the Neoliberals Stay) 
 On the afternoon of July 26, 1996 Cavallo, by all accounts a difficult 
personality who clashed repeatedly with President Menem during his time in office, 
was removed after a heated argument with the President. After five and a half year in 
office Cavallo left as the longest-lived finance minister in modern Argentine history. 
Cavallo’s enemies within and outside the government rejoiced, but Cavallo’s ouster 
did not signal the shift away from the neoliberal policy team that had run Argentine 
economic policy since 1991.  
Menem immediately moved the Chicago-trained central bank governor, Roque 
Fernandez, to head the economy; another PhD economist from the University of 
Chicago, Pedro Pou, became the new central bank governor. The international 
financial community viewed the cabinet shakeup with relief. The Economist called 
Fernandez “a respected economic technocrat” and “another pillar of orthodoxy.”98 For 
financial journalist Paul Blustein, the appointments following Cavallo were evidence 
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that neoliberalism had become firmly entrenched in the economic policymaking 
apparatus: “Argentina’s transformed character was readily apparent in the sterling 
credentials and polished manner of the Economy Ministry’s top officials.”99  
The IMF’s officials were also reassured by Menem’s retention of neoliberals as 
the country’s top economic authorities. During a visit to Buenos Aires, the Managing 
Director noted that the relationship in the previous decade was strained over 
“important doctrinal differences.” With the neoliberal consolidation of economic 
policymaking in Argentina (as evinced by the smooth transition from Cavallo to 
Fernandez), “today there is no longer any doctrinal divide.”100 Camdessus expressed 
confidence that neoliberal policies would not be reversed “not just because I trust in 
the men who manage it, but because the process is irreversible.”101 
The IMF chose to focus on the ideational continuity among the policy elites 
rather than the signs that the broader political consensus that supported the neoliberal 
agenda since 1991 had started to unravel. The head of the Center-Left coalition in 
opposition to Menem complained that removing Cavallo was not enough: “we must 
change the dog, not its collar.”102 The labor movement, which had been relatively 
quiescent under the early years of the Peronist government, began to mobilize against 
high unemployment and budget cuts. On August 8 the central labor confederation 
announced a general strike against the IMF-led program; in late September a second 
general strike ended with 100,000 angry protesters camped in front of the presidential 
palace. Violent protests spread throughout 1997, including a series of clashes between 
villagers and police in several provinces that coincided with the visit by Michel 
Camdessus.  
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Divorce, Argentine-Style: The IMF and the Crisis, 1998-2002 
The Independent Evaluation Office’s report on the Fund-Argentina 
relationship in the 1990s concludes that, by 1998, “the information available at the 
time – the authorities’ poor compliance record with earlier programs, the unraveling of 
the political consensus that had backed the reform program of the early 1990s, the 
absence of a clear balance of payments need – would have been sufficient reason to 
end the program relationship.”103 Nonetheless the IMF plowed ahead with another 
three year Extended Fund Facility agreement worth SDR 2.08 billion ($2.8 billion, 
135 percent of quota) in February 1998.  
The 1998 EFF was a watershed for several reasons. It was a precautionary 
program, meaning that the authorities would only draw on Fund resources if a crisis 
hit. The Argentines hardly needed the funds in early 1998. In the previous year the 
government had floated a record amount of debt on international financial markets. 
But the global financial context in which the program was approved was uncertain. 
Financial crisis had spread across East Asia in late 1997, and contagion from Asia to 
other emerging market economies was not unthinkable.  
The precautionary EFF was also an extremely lenient program. It included the 
fewest number of binding conditions in any IMF agreement since 1977. The 
generosity and leniency of the proposed program prompted concern among the staff 
members outside of the Western Hemisphere Department. A memo from Teresa Ter-
Minassian, the new Deputy Director of the Western Hemisphere Department, to the 
Fund’s management highlighted serious concerns from the Research, Policy 
Development and Review, and Fiscal Affairs departments “about the adequacy of the 
proposed reform agenda for an extended arrangement.” A separate memo from the 
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Research Department at the time of Board approval warned that “the program is not 
ambitious enough to warrant Fund support in the form of a high access extended 
arrangement.”104 Ultimately the concerns fell on deaf ears: on February 4 the 
Executive Board approved the precautionary multi-year arrangement. 
Over the next two years the situation confronting the Argentine economic 
policy team steadily worsened. Some of the problems were of the government’s own 
making; many of the problems were not. A detailed examination of the conditions that 
led to the crisis and default of late 2001 is beyond the scope of this chapter, but several 
factors that set Argentina on a path toward financial ruin can be identified: (1) the 
dollar’s strong appreciation relative to the euro, which harmed Argentine 
industrialists; (2) the twenty percent fall in international agricultural prices, which 
harmed Argentine farmers; (3) a drawback of international investment in the wake of 
the East Asian crisis and the Russian default; (4) the devaluation of the Brazilian real 
in January 1999; (5) excessive deficit spending by the government in the period prior 
to the 1999 presidential election (which the Peronists lost to the Alianza105 candidate 
Fernando de la Rua).106  
In April 1998 the Fund’s Teresa Ter-Minassian noted in comments to the press 
that “the Argentine economy contains a sort of Molotov cocktail.”107 The 
sustainability of the country’s debt burden became more and more uncertain as the 
economic performance slackened. In 1999 output contracted by 3 percent. As tax 
                                                 
104 Staff memoranda are quoted in Blustein 2005: 51. Dissent among the staff is also reported in the 
IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina. I 
rely heavily on official reports and journalist accounts in the remaining section of the chapter. A 
twenty-year moving wall for internal memoranda and a ten year wall for Executive Board documents 
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105 The disintegration of the Radical Party in the mid-1990s led to the creation of a new Center-Left 
party, the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO), which captured much of the Radicals’ middle 
class support base. In 1997 FREPASO and the Radicals combined to form Alianza por Trabajo as a 
viable electoral alternative to Menem’s Peronist Party.  
106 On the conditions that led to the crisis, see IMF Independent Evaluation Office, Report on the 
Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2001, pp. 20; Powell 2002: 1-44. 
107 Clarin, April 3, 1998; Blustein 2005: 54 (quote).  
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revenues plunged in the midst of the deepening recession, investors became nervous 
and the cost to the government of external borrowing increased. Rather than use its 
leverage to enforce better fiscal discipline or to entertain a possible exit strategy from 
Convertibility, the Fund continued to place its trust in the hands of the Argentine 
policymakers. Neoliberals retained control of economic policymaking after the 
election of the center-left candidate Fernando de la Rua to the Presidency in October 
1999: José Luis Machinea, the Minnesota-trained economist who had played a central 
role in negotiations with the Fund in the mid-1980s, became the new Minister of 
Economy. Pedro Pou was retained as the head of the central bank.  
Argentina’s performance under the 1998 EFF was poor. It missed fiscal targets 
by wide margins, and the Congress dragged its feet on the passage of a new bill 
mandating changes to labor laws.108 By mid-1998 its trade deficit had widened. 
Nonetheless, waivers were approved in July and December 1998 and March 1999 to 
allow the program to continue, although the Argentines did not draw on the 
precautionary loan.  
By the time an IMF mission arrived in Buenos Aires in January 2000 to 
negotiate a new program to replace the expiring precautionary EFF, Argentina’s debt 
situation had become more precarious. Yet the Fund remained optimistic about the 
country’s fortunes for the next year, forecasting economic growth at greater than 3 
percent. The IMF mission, jointly led by Teresa Ter Minassian and Thomas 
Reichmann, focused on the key issues that plagued previous agreements: the central 
government’s fiscal balance, excessive social spending by provincial governors and 
the government’s willingness to cover provincial debts (totaling nearly $4 billion in 
1999), and the stalled labor market reform.109 In late February the lower house of 
                                                 
108 Ambito Financiero, April 2, 1998;  Ambito Financiero, July 21, 1998; Blustein 2005: 56. 
109 Buenos Aires Economico, January 14, 2000. 
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Congress finally approved the long-delayed “flexibilization” of labor laws, paving the 
way for the staff to submit a new Letter of Intent to the Executive Board.  
The new standby arrangement was approved on March 10. The program was 
for three years, and was quite generous at SDR 5.4 billion ($7.2 billion, 255 percent of 
quota). Argentina’s debt burden had spiked in the past two years, but it retained good 
access to external finance, so the policy team indicated that their intention to use the 
program as a precaution.110 Conditionality was light; the Argentine policymakers saw 
no great difficulties in achieving the modest fiscal targets, and, once again, the 
program did not include structural performance criteria. All of the structural content of 
the agreement was considered benchmarks, which would be assessed at the time of 
reviews, but if violated would not trigger an automatic suspension without a waiver.  
A series of political and economic events in the six months after the SBA was 
approved turned Argentina from a star pupil to a basket case with remarkable speed. 
By May the Argentine policy team led by Machinea and Pou was forced to implement 
emergency belt-tightening measures to achieve the budgetary targets in the agreement. 
The budget cuts generated massive protests organized by the CGT, the central labor 
organization. President de la Rua blamed the social discontent on the IMF, claiming 
that the 80,000 anti-austerity protesters on the Plaza de Mayo were “a wake-up call to 
international financial agencies, for them to pay proper attention to social solidarity as 
well.”111 The events caused consternation among investors, and Argentina’s easy 
access to external financing became uncertain. Consequently, Economy Minister José 
Machinea flew to Washington in August to gain access to the undrawn portion of the 
standby arrangement. He succeeded in getting the Fund to waive the nonobservance of 
                                                 
110 In the week before the Board’s approval of the standby arrangement, the Argentine government sold 
$1 billion in ten-year, dollar-denominated bonds. Tamar Han, “New Issues: Argentina Sells Some 
More,” Emerging Markets Debt Report, March 13, 2000.  
111 El Cronista, June 1, 2000, pg. 5.  
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the fiscal target for August (Argentina had missed the binding target by over $500 
million) and to raise the fiscal deficit ceiling from $4.7 to $5.3 billion.112  
A major political crisis in October forced the Fund and Argentina to take 
drastic actions to stave off an impending economic collapse. The Vice President, 
Carlos Alvarez, resigned in protest of bribes linked to the de la Rua government that 
were offered to Congressional representatives during the fight over the labor market 
bill. The spreads on Argentine debt – the difference between the price the U.S. pays to 
borrow and the price paid by the Argentine government to investors – began to 
increase rapidly, making service on the country’s $120 billion external debt much 
more onerous. Depositors became increasingly nervous about the possibility of a 
devaluation of the peso. Nearly $800 million in bank deposits were withdrawn from 
the country in October. 
The Fund acted quickly to put together a new package to help the Argentines 
preserve the Convertibility system and avoid a complete collapse. Staff and 
management focused on two issues: dramatically increasing Argentina’s access to 
external resources, and forcing the Argentine authorities to commit to a tighter set of 
fiscal targets. Between October and January 2001, the Fund cobbled together a $40 
billion augmentation (commonly referred to as the blindaje, or “armor”) of the initial 
agreement. The Fund increased Argentina’s access to SDR 10.6 billion ($14 billion, 
500 percent of quota). The remaining amount came from the other international 
financial institutions and creditors governments such as the U.S. and Spain.  
The fiscal policy was a source of tension within the institution. Some IMF 
economists – particularly those in the Policy Development and Review Department 
(which evaluates the content of all programs) – pushed for a tightening of fiscal and 
structural targets. But Machinea had a high-ranking ally in the Fund’s management. 
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The deputy managing director Stanley Fischer accepted the Argentines’ claims that 
most they could plausibly do in terms of the fiscal deficit in 2001 was $6 billion (the 
2000 agreement aimed at deficit of no more than $4.7 billion). The new Letter of 
Intent included fiscal performance criteria to limit the fiscal deficit to $6.5 billion. 
With the U.S Treasury firmly in support of the freeing of additional resources for the 
Argentines, the Executive Board unanimously approved the modifications on January 
12.113  
The January 2001 augmentation of the SBA did not succeed in restoring 
external confidence in Argentina. The data on fiscal performance from the first two 
months of the year indicated that Argentina had fallen out of compliance. On March 2 
the Economy Minister José Luis Machinea resigned in the face of the growing crisis. 
Machinea’s replacement, Chicago-trained economist Ricardo Lopez Murphy, took 
immediate action to get control of the fiscal situation. The IMF regarded the new 
Economy Minister as “a strong choice.”114 As a signal of the unsettled nature of 
Argentine politics, Lopez Murphy lasted less than three weeks. He resigned when his 
attempts to pursue a draconian austerity package were rebuffed by President de la Rua.  
Desperate to regain credibility with international investors, de la Rua brought 
back Domingo Cavallo to head the economy ministry. Cavallo’s headstrong 
tendencies emerged early in his second term as Economy Minister. In April he 
engineered the replacement of the central bank governor Pedro Pou with a more 
agreeable official; later that month, Cavallo proposed modifying the Convertibility 
system to tie the peso to a combination of the euro and the dollar. The announcement 
was regarded in financial circles as a warning of a future devaluation, heightening the 
flight from the banking system.115 
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115 di Tella and Vogel 2004: 3; Blustein 2005: 120.  
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With Cavallo once again helming Argentina’s economic policy, the IMF 
reviewed the progress of the standby arrangement in May. The news was bad: as 
expected, the government had badly missed its fiscal targets. Nonetheless, the Fund 
approved yet another waiver and allowed the country to receive another $1.2 billion 
tranche of the lending arrangement. The IMF’s approvals did not do much to assuage 
nervous financial markets. Argentina’s spread remained around 1,000 basis points; at 
this level of country risk, a default on external debt obligations became a serious 
possibility.  
Over the next three months Cavallo pursued a series of radical actions to save 
the Argentine economy. Each of these policies was carried out by Cavallo with little 
input from the IMF. In June the policy team announced a massive voluntary debt swap 
(the megacanje) that lengthened the maturities and changed the yields on around $30 
billion of foreign debt.116 This gave the Argentines a small amount of breathing room 
by deferring a large amount of interest payments until 2006. In an effort to stimulate 
exports to grow Argentina out of the crisis, Cavallo proposed a dual exchange rate for 
exports (1.08 pesos to the dollar). The policy was a de facto 8 percent devaluation and 
another signal to financial actors that the authorities’ commitment to Convertibility 
was wavering.117 Finally, in a last-ditch attempt to convince markets of the hard peg’s 
sustainability, Cavallo announced that the country would eliminate the fiscal deficit at 
both the federal and provincial levels. The markets regarded the announcement as 
entirely incredible, and spreads shot to 1,600 basis points.  
Uncertainty and the Fund’s Decision Making Process in September 2001 
In chapter 2 I argued that the IMF has to make decisions in the face of 
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uncertainty. Uncertainty in the lending process has multiple sources, and it implies 
that the IMF’s staff and management have difficult affixing a precise probability to the 
success of a program. At no time in the Fund’s long relationship with Argentina is this 
claim more clearly demonstrated than it is in the September 2001 decision to augment 
the standby arrangement by an additional $8 billion.  
In August the Argentines “requested the IMF for the rapid disbursement of a 
large amount of support” to prevent the country’s banking system from collapsing.118 
The Managing Director, Horst Kohler (who had replaced Michel Camdessus) decided 
to propose an augmentation of the unchanged existing program by $8 billion. A week 
before the Executive Board meeting to discuss the proposal, Kohler called a meeting 
with the senior officials at the Fund. The purpose of the meeting was to gather 
assessments of the prospects for Argentina’s program from the institution’s top minds. 
None of the meeting’s participants were enthusiastic about the program; in fact, most 
were quite pessimistic. But for my purposes the most revealing aspect of the accounts 
of the meeting is the inability of the group to generate a common subjective 
probability for the outcome under consideration. Individuals were willing to hazard 
guesses about the program’s chances: the estimated probability of success ranged from 
just above zero (expressed by Kenneth Rogoff, the new chief economist and head of 
the Research Department) to, at best, around 30 percent. Stanley Fischer, the Fund’s 
second in command, is reported to have commented at the end of the meeting that 
none of the people in the room could know with any certainty that the augmentation of 
the standby arrangement would or would not work. In his view, the Fund had to give 
the benefit of the doubt to the Argentine policy team. The minutes of the meeting 
indicate that the other supporters of the program noted that “precise quantification was 
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not really meaningful.”119  
The September 2001 Augmentation and the Collapse of the Argentine Economy 
Fischer’s view triumphed, and on September 7 the Executive Board approved 
the addition of an extra $8 billion to the standby arrangement. The approval enabled 
the Argentines to immediately draw on $6.3 billion in IMF resources – the second 
largest single disbursement in the institution’s history. The total resources in 
Argentina’s program amounted to 800 percent of quota.  
The approval was not unanimous, however. The Dutch and the Swiss 
Executive Directors abstained from the vote as a way of indicating their displeasure 
with an unsustainable program.120 The remaining EDs that cast their vote in favor of 
the program “appeared impressed by the strength of what they saw as the authorities’ 
resolve, and some wished to give them the benefit of the doubt on their ability to 
implement the measures they had announced.”121 The September augmentation briefly 
help improve market sentiments, but soon the spreads climbed back to 1,400 basis 
points. Over the next three months the Fund would “essentially adopt a passive 
stance” while Argentina hurtled toward a default.122  
The final collapse came in December. In the previous month Cavallo had 
announced a new tax package that, in the IMF staff’s view, “was not consistent with 
fiscal reality.”123 At the end of November the run on banks accelerated to the point 
that the banking system was losing $1 billion each day. On December 1 the 
government decided to place limitations on bank withdrawals and other personal 
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financial transactions (the corralito). Four days later the IMF pulled the plug on 
Argentina, announcing that it would not disburse the next $1.24 billion tranche of the 
standby arrangement. Officially, the violation of the fiscal deficit target by over $2 
billion was the reason for the program’s suspension. For a country in which foreign 
reserves could barely cover the domestic money supply, the IMF’s decision was 
essentially an admission of Argentina’s insolvency. After the remaining staff members 
left Buenos Aires and Cavallo returned from a last-ditch attempt to win support from 
the Managing Director, the capital exploded in violence. Cavallo resigned, then de la 
Rua; in three weeks, four different presidents were sworn in. On January 3, 2002 the 
interim president Eduard Duhalde officially declared that Argentina was in default on 
its debt. Three days later Argentina left the Convertibility system. After thirty years of 
nearly continuous engagement, the IMF’s relationship with Argentina had effectively 
come to an end.  
Summary of the Second Period of High Neoliberal Influence 
The second episode provides strong evidence against the view of the IMF as an 
efficient, technocratic institution. The evidence presented in the previous pages shows 
that the staff members were well aware of the risks engendered by the Convertibility 
arrangement: the issues of fiscal indiscipline, stunted structural reforms in the areas of 
the labor market and relations with the provinces, and the rapid buildup of debt were 
all on the Fund’s radar. Yet the IMF chose not to enforce those policies. Good reason, 
then, that former Fund official Michael Mussa calls the institution’s behavior in 
Argentina in the 1990s a “failure of intellectual courage.”124  
The Fund’s treatment of the neoliberals in the decade after 1991 was 
extraordinarily lenient. The first program in the episode, negotiated in June 1991, was 
completed with the help of waivers for noncompliance with multiple binding 
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conditions. Structural conditions in the 1992 multi-year arrangement were not 
enforced; later agreements did not include binding structural conditions. Another set 
of waivers allowed the Argentines to re-start the EFF after the Mexican crisis in late 
1994 and later augment the arrangement. The programs negotiated in 1996, 1998, and 
2000 were each completed only through multiple waivers for noncompliance with 
fiscal targets – in some cases, waivers were issued when the limit on the fiscal deficit 
was exceeded by wide margins. In 2000 to 2001, augmentations of the standby 
arrangement brought the size of the Fund’s disbursements to 800 percent of 
Argentina’s quota.   
The Fund’s treatment of the country during the period is best explained by the 
staff, management, and Executive Board’s trust in the top economic policymakers, 
who were universally American-educated economists. It is important to note, however, 
that the episode also provides the best evidence in favor of an explanation rooted in 
bureaucratic pathologies. Within the IMF there were staff members who expressed 
skepticism about the prospects for the IMF’s continued support for the neoliberals in 
Argentina. The skeptical voices came from outside the Western Hemisphere 
Department; this evidence suggests that the area department had become predisposed 
to take an optimistic view of the situation.125 Here the usefulness of the within-unit 
comparisons becomes apparent. It is hard to fit this argument with the evidence 
presented in the next episode which shows that the officials from the Western 
Hemisphere Department were very tough on Argentina in the years between 1981 and 
1985. If the area departments are always biased in favor of the states in their region, 
we would not expect to see variation across time.  
The comparison between this and the next episode also defuses one of the 
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other alternative explanations for the IMF’s leniency, which is that the institution did 
not want to suspend the program during a time of global financial instability and hence 
trigger a crisis. In this view the Fund was forced to make poor decisions because the 
alternative – fanning the flames of financial contagion – was worse. But the Fund was 
willing to suspend programs, as discussed in detail in the next section, at a time when 
Argentina threatened to become the second major domino to fall in a region-wide 
chain of sovereign defaults.  
The first two episodes belie the view of the IMF as the inflexible enforcer of 
austerity in low- and middle-income countries. The IMF was more of a sympathetic 
social worker than a tough cop in the episodes of high neoliberal influence.126  
Episode 3: The Turn toward Economic Nationalism, 1981-85 
 I turn in this section of the chapter to the Fund’s relationship with Argentina 
during a period in which neoliberals had a minimal role in Argentine economic 
policymaking. The differences in the IMF’s treatment of the governments during this 
episode are stark in comparison to the two episodes of high neoliberal influence. In 
line with the predictions of the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2, and the 
cross-national evidence presented in chapter 3, the IMF applied a heavy hand during 
the four years in which interventionist policymakers held sway.  
Episode 3 demonstrates the importance of likeminded officials in borrowing 
governments to the Fund; it also illustrates the limits of two prominent alternative 
explanations. Argentina fought a war with a powerful member of the institution and 
became a democracy in the four years after the end of the first episode of neoliberal 
influence. The story told in this section reveals that neither geopolitics nor domestic 
institutions had much of an impact on the Fund’s decision making.    
Things Fall Apart: The IMF and the End of the Military Regime 
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Between 1981, when General Videla and his team of neoliberal policymakers left 
office, and 1983, when the outgoing military government negotiated a new IMF 
lending arrangement, Argentina was plunged into the worst economic straits that the 
country had ever faced. The country’s economic orientation was erratic; successive 
policy teams of varying ideological stripes came and went while economic activity 
contracted and inflation reached new peaks.  
There were no serious negotiations with the Fund over a new loan before 1983. 
But the internal documents cataloging the IMF’s interactions with the different policy 
teams during the last years of the military regime provide evidence of how the 
character of the policy team influenced the staff and management’s view of the 
situation. 
The first policy team brought in after the removal of Videla was composed by 
homegrown officials that were sympathetic to interventionist and inward-oriented 
policies.127  The IMF viewed the developments in Argentina under the new team with 
growing concern. IMF staff members traveled to Buenos Aires at the end of August 
for an evaluation of the state of the economy; after two weeks spent analyzing the new 
economic team’s policy agenda, the head of the mission, Christian Brachet, presented 
a bleak assessment to the Fund’s Managing Director. Of particular interest are the 
references in Brachet’s assessment to divisions among the economic policymakers. 
Brachet’s briefing paper expressed concerns about “the credibility of the economic 
program as a whole…the mission could but be struck by the little confidence there 
remains in the economic team. Rumors of impending resignations or shake-ups in a 
cabinet much divided against itself and where most ministers remain first and 
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foremost representatives of sectorial [sic] interests continue unabated.”128  
In late 1981 a new member of military junta, General Leopoldo Galtieri, took 
control of the government. He swapped economy ministers, bringing Roberto 
Alemann, a self-described monetarist who had served as Minister of the Economy in 
1961-62, into the government.129 Klaus Veigel observes that “Alemann enjoyed 
excellent international contacts through his work as ambassador in the United States 
starting in 1962 and long-standing contacts with the banking community through his 
advisory function for the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS).”130 
 The Economy Minister intended to undo all of the policies carried out under 
the previous team; to that end, he made the highly unusual request to bring an IMF 
mission back to Buenos Aires for the second Article IV consultation in less than six 
months.131 The head of the IMF mission communicated to Jacques de Larosière (the 
Fund’s new Managing Director) that “the new authorities were much concerned with 
conveying to the Executive Board a more encouraging view of Argentina’s economic 
policies and prospects than that presented in the staff reports prepared in the aftermath 
of the discussions held with the previous administration.”132 Brachet’s memo is also a 
vivid reminder of the challenges facing Alemann: GDP had plunged by 11 and a half 
percent in the final quarter of 1981; unemployment, adjusted to account for 
widespread underemployment, was estimated at 12-13 percent; yearly inflation was 
tracked in December at around 130 percent; international reserves had dwindled to the 
point that they covered only four months of merchandise imports.  
   Alemann quickly instituted an austerity program, which seemed to set the table 
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for an IMF loan to follow. And if the strict orthodoxy of the Alemann program was 
not enough to sway the IMF, Galtieri’s close relations with the new Reagan 
administration meant that Argentina had the IMF’s most powerful member state on its 
side.133 
If Alemann was planning on going to the Fund, his plans were spoiled by the 
military’s surprise invasion of the Islas Malvinas on April 2, 1982. No evidence exists 
to suggest that the Fund was serious about reaching an agreement on a lending 
program between the time of Alemann’s appointment and the outbreak of hostilities; 
likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that the United States applied pressure to the 
IMF in the months before the war to extend support to Galtieri. The evidence that does 
exist, however, indicates that the Fund’s staff members were not fully convinced that 
Alemann’s program was sufficiently credible to merit IMF support. Take, for 
example, Brachet’s report on the Article IV negotiations, which contains the following 
comment: “while in general favorably impressed with the determination of the 
authorities, the mission could not shake itself of the impression that the new policies 
involved a risky, although perhaps unavoidable, political gamble. Their success would 
depend not only on the authorities’ ability to show rapid and measurable progress – 
against the considerable odds of a very recessed economy – but also on the degree of 
support they would receive from the President and the armed forces…the army 
remains much divided and weary of the repeated political and economic failures.”134  
Perhaps more convincing evidence for the argument that the policy team, in 
spite of Economy Minister Alemann’s strong personal connections to the international 
financial community, had limited credibility in the eyes of the Fund’s economists is a 
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note from Vito Tanzi of the Fiscal Affairs Department to Brachet. Tanzi writes that 
“there is a strange déjà vu quality to this report, at least for what concerns the fiscal 
policy part of it. Somehow I have the feeling of being transported back to 1976 when 
many of the relevant policy changes commented on in this report were also 
proposed.”135  
The IMF’s upper-level officials were certainly aware of the gravity of the 
economic situation in the first few months of 1982 – William Dale, the Deputy 
Managing Director, affixed a handwritten note to the copy of Brachet’s Article IV 
report for the Managing Director that read “a graphic description of an extremely 
difficult and dynamic situation” – yet there is nothing to suggest that the IMF staff 
members felt strong pressure to being preparing for a standby arrangement.136 This 
stands in contrast to the way in which the Fund rushed in to provide support for the 
neoliberals of the Diz-Martinez de Hoz period, who took over in a similarly chaotic 
economic environment.   
The defeat by British forces in the South Atlantic had profound political and 
economic consequences. By the time that the Argentine military capitulated at Port 
Stanley the economy was in horrendous shape. A large amount of capital fled the 
country as wealthy Argentines exchanged pesos for dollars to be deposited across the 
River Plate in Montevideo, Uruguay. The British government had imposed punishing 
financial and trade sanctions against the country. Argentina’s foreign debt exploded – 
and to make matters worse the war alienated the private creditors upon whom the 
regime depended for infusions of capital, lengthened maturities, and voluntary 
rescheduling.137  
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The Negotiations over a New Standby Arrangement 
 Officials from the IMF’s Western Hemisphere Department returned to Buenos 
Aires in September 1982.138 The Argentine policy team was now led by economy 
minister Jorge Wehbe (a former professor of law at Universidad de Buenos Aires who 
twice (briefly) served as economy minister) and central bank governor Julio Gonzalez 
del Solar (an MBA from Harvard (1943) and had been an alternate Executive Director 
with the Fund in 1956-57).  
A new regional dynamic induced by events in Mexico City gave more urgency 
to the negotiations. The global financial system had been rocked earlier in the month 
by the Mexican government’s announcement that it would cease payment on its 
foreign debt. Argentina’s capacity to continue debt service was questionable even 
before the Mexican default. The government had accumulated over $2 billion in 
arrears during the Malvinas conflict, and the total amount due to creditors at the end of 
1982 totaled nearly $13 billion. Meanwhile, the central bank’s reserves had dropped to 
under $4 billion.139 The Mexican announcement was a shock that induced private 
banks to turn off the lending faucet to Latin America. The prospect of region-wide 
chain of defaults had to at this point be taken very seriously by the IMF; Argentina 
was in terrible shape, and Brazil, the second biggest debtor in Latin America, was 
facing its own troubles. Without a quick infusion of funds from the Fund and the 
banks it was clear that Argentina would be the next domino to fall. A series of 
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just 54 days in office.  
139 Aggarwal 1996: 410-11.  
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sovereign defaults involving three major debtors would have devastating 
consequences for global financial activity.  
Against this backdrop the IMF mission went to Argentina in early September 
to start negotiations for a new loan, which would be the first since 1977. Gonzalez del 
Solar, the central bank governor, wanted to sign a multi-year agreement with the Fund 
under the Extended Fund Facility for the maximum amount allotted to the country 
(450 percent of quota, or SDR 3.6 billion).140 The EFF was the most generous loan 
offered at the time by the Fund, and was regarded as the most serious endorsement by 
the Fund’s staff and management of a country’s reform effort. At the time of the 
Argentine negotiations, Brazil was also in discussions with the IMF for an EFF; in 
March 1983 the Fund approved Brazil’s loan for the full amount (450 percent of 
quota).  
In light of the unique circumstances, we might expect the IMF to be amenable 
to the request for extraordinary support for the government’s new economic policy 
team, but the IMF’s economists did not look favorably on the request.141 Christian 
Brachet, head of the Fund’s Argentina mission, reminded del Solar in a telephone 
conversation that the EFF “would be geared not only to effect a major balance of 
payments adjustment but also to improve resource allocation with a view to 
strengthening the productive base.”142 The mission report expressed concerns about 
the ability of the economic team to carry out a strong set of reforms: “the economic 
team has significantly more experience of public affairs than its predecessor but the 
                                                 
140 Memorandum from Christian Brachet to Carlos Sanson, “Telephone Conversation with Argentina’s 
Central Bank Governor,” September 23, 1982.  
141 The IMF’s official historian, James Boughton, reports that the Director of the Western Hemisphere 
Department, Walter Robichek, “was receptive to the idea” of the EFF. Nonetheless, the staff members 
recommended against it, and Robichek in the end decided not to support the request for the EFF. See 
Boughton 2001: 332. 
142 Memorandum from Christian Brachet to Carlos Sanson, “Telephone Conversation with Argentina’s 
Central Bank Governor,” September 23, 1982.  
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strength of its mandate remains unclear…The mission thus may find that a clearer 
political consensus on the need for corrective action – as well on the nature of such 
action – than exists at present will have to be developed within Argentina before a 
workable program can be framed.”143 
The negotiations with Wehbe and Gonzalez del Solar over a new standby 
arrangement were contentious. The IMF’s officials were encouraged by management 
to take a tough line with the Argentines; in a handwritten note on the September 
mission briefing, the Managing Director Jacques de Larosière advised the staff to 
“present the ‘shock therapy’ as a 1st best solution.”144 The IMF staff was authorized by 
management to negotiate the terms for a 15-month SBA worth SDR 1.5 billion (187% 
of quota).145 The negotiations dragged on in to November; at the same time, the 
Argentines were engaged in furious negotiations with private creditors and the Bank 
for International Settlements on the terms for bridge loans worth $1.1 billion and $750 
million, respectively.146 The relationship between the Fund and Argentine officials – 
who felt that the IMF was being excessively stringent in the face of a near complete 
economic collapse and amidst rising political tensions in the run-up to the elections 
scheduled for October 1983 – became strained. In a memorandum for the Executive 
Directors of the G5 countries, the Director of the Western Hemisphere Department 
reported that “negotiations on Argentina from which he and the staff had returned the 
previous day, had been very difficult…no one on the Argentine side had tried to take 
an integrated view of the problem areas of the economy, nor quantify the magnitude of 
                                                 
143 Western Hemisphere Department, “Argentina – Briefing for Mission (Standby Arrangement),” 
September 22, 1982. Italics are added for emphasis.  
144 De Larosière’s handwriting, while somewhat messy, is legible. Note from William B. Dale to the 
Managing Director, “Study: Argentina – Briefing for Mission (Standby Arrangement),” September 22, 
1983.  
145 Memorandum from José Braz to Walter Robichek, “Negotiations with Argentina,” October 7, 1982. 
146 Boughton 2001: 332-33.  
 219
the problems.”147  
In November Jacques de Larosière unveiled the new strategy that the Fund 
would take to deal with the Latin crisis. The commercial banks wanted debtor 
countries to sign IMF agreements to lower the risk of default – but in exchange for 
IMF support, the Managing Director would force the banks to grant new money to fill 
the portion of the “financing gap” not covered by the IMF’s loan.148  This was partly a 
result of practical considerations: the Fund’s resources were simply not large enough 
to close the financing gaps facing most prospective borrowers in 1982-83. To organize 
the 325 commercial banks that were involved in Argentina, the largest (and most 
exposed) banks formed an Advisory Committee headed by the legendary Citibank 
chairman William Rhodes.149 Subsequent negotiations followed a triangular pattern: 
between the IMF and Argentina, Argentina and the banks, and the banks and the IMF. 
The outcome of the pressure from the IMF was the approval of a $1.5 billion increase 
in private bank exposure to accompany the SBA.150 
The remaining obstacle to the agreement was the balance of payments target, 
which the IMF limited to a deficit of no more the $500 million, and which the 
Argentines felt was too strict.151 Once Wehbe and del Solar finally acceded to the 
balance of payments target, the Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding 
containing the details of the program were signed and submitted to the Executive 
Board for approval.  
The Board discussed the staff’s proposal on January 24, 1983. The 15 month 
                                                 
147 Staff memorandum for G5 Executive Directors, “Subject: Argentina Briefing for G5 EDs,” 
November 1, 1982.   
148 See, for example, Boughton 2001: 333-34.  
149 Aggarwal 1996: 411-12; Boughton 2001: 334. 
150 Boughton 2001: 333.  
151 The current account deficit in 1982 was $950 million. The debate between the two sides revolved 
around how to count the $1.5 billion bridge loan from the banks; the IMF wanted to exclude it from the 
ledger, while the Argentines wanted it to count toward achieving payments equilibrium. Memorandum 
from Eduardo Wiesner to the Managing Director, “Argentina – Standby Documentation,” December 16, 
1982.  
 220
program was much more extensive than the previous agreements signed during the 
Diz-Martinez de Hoz years. In addition to the inclusion of the balance of payments 
target as a binding condition, the SBA included several structural performance criteria 
related to trade and payments.152 Some of the Executive Directors expressed concerns 
about the toughness of the program; the Belgian Executive Director, Jacques de 
Groote, stated that the proposed program “could impose such a heavy burden on the 
government as to exclude the possibility of complete observance.”153 The Board 
members’ uncertainty about the prospects for the program notwithstanding, the 
program was approved and the first SDR 300 million was disbursed in May.  
Britain’s Acquiescence with the Loan for Argentina 
The realist perspective on the politics of the Fund’s lending behavior highlights 
the ability of powerful member states to use the IMF to reward friends and to punish 
enemies.154 One of the more remarkable aspects of the 1983-84 program, then, is its 
very existence: it was approved while Argentina retained discriminatory financial 
measures against a country – Britain – with great influence within the institution.  
During the Malvinas War the Argentine government instituted Law 22591 
(“La Indisponibilidad de Bienes Britanicos”) which froze British assets in the country. 
British holders of Argentine bonds were prevented from selling the bonds and 
remitting the proceeds back to London. The law constituted an unapproved violation 
of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which prevents members from applying 
restrictions against other member states. This clear violation of IMF statutes should 
                                                 
152 The 1983 agreement included 15 separate performance criteria. The agreement required the 
elimination of (1) the system of special rebates for exports, (2) the foreign financing requirements for 
imports, and (3) external payments arrears, as well as a schedule for the elimination of the remaining 
multiple currency practices and restrictions on current international transactions. EBS/83/8, “Argentina 
– Staff Report for the 1982 Article IV Consultation and Request for Standby Arrangement,” January 10, 
1983.  
153 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/83/17, January 24, 1983; also cited in Boughton 
2001: 334.  
154 For example, Stone, 2002, 2004, 2008; Thacker, 1999. 
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have disqualified Argentina from being able to make a purchase from the Fund. To get 
around this problem, the IMF’s staff members from the Western Hemisphere 
Department were able to insert a condition that required Argentina to “reach 
understandings with the Fund on a precise schedule for the elimination by December 
31, 1983 of all restrictions on current payments and transfers.”155 The British 
Executive Director expressed his country’s desire for the Argentines to end the 
discriminatory practices as quickly as possible, but was apparently satisfied with the 
Argentine authorities’ promises, and threw his support behind the program. 
The lack of British resistance to the proposed loan is all the more surprising 
considering the opposition to the Argentine loan within the British government. For 
example, in parliamentary debate Labour Party member Dale Campbell-Savours 
contended that the Fund had been far too lenient with Argentina:  
 
I submit that the IMF has the power to impose 
conditions but for political reasons lack the will to do so. 
The clearest and nearest example to the hearts of the 
British people has been the notable case of Argentina 
and its attempts to use precious resources, which have 
been made available through the banking system, to 
fund its additional purchases of arms supplies. We all 
know that inevitably they will be used to shoot at our 
people in the south Atlantic…The question for the 
House to ask is whether the IMF went far enough in the 
correcting measures that it was required to demand of 
the Argentine junta. I believe that it did not.156 
 
Campbell-Savours’ sentiments were shared by many other MPs from both the 
Labour and Conservative parties. The fact that the IMF made the 1983 loan against the 
interests of powerful member suggests the limits of realist-oriented explanations for 
variation in the IMF’s treatment of borrowers.  
                                                 
155 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/83/17, January 24, 1983.  
156 House of Commons, International Monetary Arrangements, July 11, 1983, pg. 369.  
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The IMF had moved the date by which Argentina was to remove restrictions 
on financial transactions involving British entities to the end of July once it was clear 
that restrictions would be retained through the end of May. Throughout May and June 
there were a series of complaints issued by Nigel Wicks, the British Executive 
Director, about the persistent discriminatory practices by the Argentine 
government.157 Thanks to the modification of the terms of the agreement, in early June 
Argentina was able to draw the next $320 million from the SBA. As the end of July 
approached it became clear that Wehbe and Gonzalez del Solar’s efforts to deal with 
the restrictions issue were stymied by political opposition in the military government. 
The private banks’ consortium, the Advisory Committee for Argentina, warned the
Argentine officials that “the Committee is deeply concerned to learn that Argentina 
present would be denied access to IMF resources under the standby arrangement as a 
result of Argentina’s continuing discrimination in respect of current payments to 
IMF member country.”
 
at 
an 
 the 
                                                
158 The Argentines were able to obtain another extension of
deadline for the removal of discriminatory restrictions against British entities, this 
time pushing the date back to mid-August.159  
Performance under the 1983 Arrangement 
When the IMF mission visited Argentina in late August to determine whether 
the country could draw the next tranche of the SBA, it was clear that the program had 
finally gone off the rails. The British issue remained unresolved, but even more 
concerning from the perspective of the members of the IMF mission was the fact that 
the country was out of compliance with multiple binding conditions. The central bank 
 
157 For example, Wicks twice brought up the case of an unnamed British pharmaceutical company 
operating in Argentina that was unable to get import licenses to obtain goods of British origin. 
Memorandum from Nigel Wicks to Eduardo Wiesner, “Argentina – Discriminatory Restrictions against 
the United Kingdom,” May 4, 1983.   
158 Telex from the Working Committee for Argentina to Wehbe and Gonzalez del Solar, August 3, 
1983.  
159 Boughton 2001: 386.  
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governor flew to Washington DC in early September to plead the government’s case 
in the hope of getting a waiver from the Fund that would allow Argentina to obtain the 
much-needed funding. The Managing Director rejected Gonzalez del Solar’s appeal, 
and the program was suspended.160 When Gonzalez del Solar returned home empty-
handed on October 3rd, he was promptly jailed by a Patagonian judge for violating 
national sovereignty by helping to renegotiate the $220 million debt of the national 
airline, Aerolineas Argentinas, with several New York-based banks.161 The confusion 
over the status of the central bank governor (he was released after a few days) coupled 
with labor unrest and uncertainty over the outcome of the election scheduled for 
October 30 led private banks to postpone the disbursement of a $300 million tranche 
of the bridge loan.  
Argentina teetered on the precipice in the remaining months of 1983. Pressure 
on the IMF from the banks to release the final tranche of the SBA proved ineffectual; 
Argentina’s only lifeline was a series of postponements of the payments owed on the 
banks’ bridge loan. The relationship between the Fund and Argentine authorities had 
degraded to the point that the Assistant Director of the Western Hemisphere 
Department, Christian Brachet, reported “an undisguised sense of bitterness toward 
the Fund.”162 In December the IMF was given a chance to renew the relationship with 
a new set of policymakers in a democratic Argentina.  
The Democratic Transition and Turn toward Economic Nationalism  
 A new chapter in the IMF’s relationship with Argentina began on December 
10, 1983 when Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated as the new President of Argentina. 
                                                 
160 Boughton 2001: 386-87.  
161 Nathaniel C. Nash, “Argentine Intrigue Surrounds a Banker,” The New York Times, October 9, 1983: 
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Alfonsin was the unexpected victor of the first free elections in Argentina in a decade. 
He was the leader of a political party, the Union Civica Radical (Radical Party) that 
had not governed since the 1960s. Moreover, the Justicialista (Peronist) party had won 
every fair, contested election since 1945.163 
 The negotiations led by Alfonsin’s new economic team illustrate the limits of 
the domestic institutional explanation for IMF lending. There was no qualitative shift 
in IMF treatment of the country. Instead, the resistance of the new policy team to 
neoliberal ideas made for an extraordinarily contentious set of policy discussions that 
stretched for almost a year.  
Alfonsin’s new economic policymaking team consisted of Bernardo Grinspun 
as economy minister and Enrique Garcia Vasquez as central bank governor. Grinspun 
had served as trade secretary in the brief Radical administration in the 1960s; he was 
described in the American and British press as “a well-respected private banker who 
helped in Argentina's debt negotiations in 1975” as well as a figure that was “no 
stranger to banking circles in the United States and Europe.”164 Both Grinspun and the 
central bank governor were indigenously trained; Grinspun had become acquainted 
with Alfonsin while they were enrolled at Universidad de Buenos Aires. While Garcia 
Vasquez held economic beliefs that were somewhat closer to the Fund’s neoliberal 
ideas, Grinspun was an interventionist and a nationalist. Grinspun believed that his 
team’s economic policies should aim at restoring growth and raising real wages after 
several years of declining per capita wealth.165  
                                                 
163 The Peronist Party was outlawed at the time of the Radicals’ victory in 1966; at the time, the Radical 
Party candidate won with only 20-25 percent of the vote, since large numbers of Peronist supporters 
cast blank ballots. Erro 1994: 17.  
164 Grinspun had been Argentina’s representative to the Paris Club, the informal group of official 
creditors that meet to reschedule debt with developing countries. The first quote is taken from James L. 
Rowe, Jr., “Leaders Face Troubled Economy: The New Order in Argentina,” The Washington Post, 
November 27, 1983, pg. H6; the second quote is from The Economist, “Argentine Debt: Radical 
Rethink,” November 5, 1983, pg. 87.  
165 On the new economic team’s economic beliefs, see Erro 1994: 132; Manzetti 1991: 141; Veigel 
2005: 259, 261-62.  
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The IMF was not enamored with the new policy team. A mission had been sent 
to Argentina two days after the inauguration of Alfonsin to lay the groundwork for a 
new agreement.166 The mission reported “an atmosphere of conflict” between officials 
in the Economy Ministry and the central bank.167 Intellectual divisions within the 
government were also notable between Grinspun and his advisors and a group of U.S.-
trained technocrats in the lower rungs of the planning ministry, which was led by Juan 
V. Sourrouille.168 The IMF viewed Grinspun in particular with deep suspicion; one 
former top IMF official described him as a “walking disaster.”169 The gap in economic 
beliefs between Grinspun and Garcia Vasquez on the one hand, and the IMF on the 
other, would generate the toughest, most contentious negotiations in the Fund-
Argentine relationship.   
In early 1984 there was an even stronger imperative on the IMF’s part to 
quickly hammer out the details on a loan agreement than in previous years. Economic 
deterioration in the months prior to the presidential election meant that Argentina was 
“essentially a country without a currency.”170 The prospect of a default on the $41 
billion foreign debt – nearly half of which fell due in 1984 – continued to pose a threat 
to the international financial system. There was pressure on the Fund to extend support 
to the Alfonsin government for political reasons, as well. A banker observed at the 
time that “Grinspun will be asking the IMF not to be too harsh so as not to jeopardize 
                                                 
166 Manzetti (1991: 141) incorrectly reports that “Grinspun was opposed to a standby.” In fact, Grinspun 
had secretly met with the Fund preceding the elections in September 1983 (Veigel 2005: 253). The 
presence of the Fund’s staff just two days after Alfonsin took office, and the visit by Garcia Vasquez to 
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167 Memorandum from K. Burke Dillon to the Managing Director, “Mission to Argentina – December 
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the experiment in democracy. He'll probably get a sympathetic ear.”171 The United 
States provided vocal support for Alfonsin’s new democratic regime, as did several 
Western European governments. 
The Negotiations Begin 
The IMF mission to negotiate a new standby arrangement began at the end of 
January 1984. The mission arrived just after Alfonsin announced an economic agenda 
that included several seemingly incompatible goals: wage increases of 6-8 percent and 
a five percent increase in output coupled with a reduction in inflation and the fiscal 
deficit.172 The first issue that confronted the IMF team, led by Stanford-trained 
Eduardo Wiesner, was the size of the IMF’s support for the Grinspun-Garcia Vasquez 
team. Argentina faced a large financing gap in 1984, and the mission and the 
Argentine authorities agreed that support should amount to 125 percent of quota.173 
The Fund’s upper-level management was uncomfortable with the size of the proposed 
loan. William Dale, the second in command at the Fund, expressed his doubts in a 
handwritten note for the Managing Director: “I am doubtful that Argentina ‘deserves’ 
125% of quota…I think I would opt for 102% at this stage, reserving discussion of 
125% for later.”174 The mission left Argentina in February without agreement with the 
Argentine officials on the content of a stabilization program for 1984.  
In March the situation worsened. The Fund’s economists and Grinspun were at 
an impasse over the level of the budget deficit to be included in a standby 
arrangement. At the end of the month Argentina was facing $500 million in interest 
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payments, and the authorities began to drop hints that would not be able (or willing) to 
make the payment.175 Grinspun told the banks’ Advisory Committee that the country 
was on the cusp of negotiation a Letter of Intent with the Fund, but in reality 
Grinspun’s team had just started drafting their own program without consultation with 
IMF economists. To try to break the deadlock, Alfonsin sent the famed structuralist 
economist Raul Prebisch, then in his eighties, to IMF headquarters on March 23 for 
eight days of talks with staff and management to try to wrest some concessions from 
the Fund.176 The IMF insisted that the budget deficit could be no higher than 6 
percent; the Argentine authorities did not want to set a target below 9 percent (at the 
time, the fiscal deficit was around 14 percent of GDP).177 On March 31 Argentina 
avoided a default only through a last-minute $300 million loan put together by 
Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia; the remaining amount came from reserves 
and a $100 million loan from the banks’ Advisory Committee. The consequences of a 
missed payment would have been severe for highly exposed American banks: the 
March 31 deadline marked the date at which the banks were to report first quarter 
earnings.178 
The negotiations continued into the summer, with several breakdowns along 
the way. In a meeting with U.S. financial representatives, including Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, the IMF’s Joaquin Ferrán expressed concern that “the 
economic team did not have the sufficient power necessary to take the decisions 
necessary to bring the situation under control.” Responding to a question from Volcker 
about parallels between the Alfonsin administration and the Radical government’s 
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experience in the mid-1960s, top Fund official Sterie Beza expressed the belief that 
the IMF should hold a tough line: in the previous Radical administration, “people like 
Grinspun and Garcia Vasquez gradually had come around.”179  
Unable to come to an agreement on the fiscal question, Grinspun decided to 
pursue a new gambit. On June 11 he and Garcia Vasquez submitted their own Letter 
of Intent to the Fund’s Executive Board. Grinspun’s action was not necessarily a 
surprise to the Fund – in May he threatened to unilaterally submit a proposal if the 
IMF’s mission did not relent on the fiscal issue – but it was a serious breach of the 
IMF’s protocols.180 A statement from a key presidential aide at the time reflected the 
deep ideational divide between the Fund and the Argentines: “There was a 
fundamental difference of focus. The IMF’s formulas were recessionary, and we won't 
accept that.”181 
 The timing of the Argentines’ move was deliberate: June 15 marked another 
deadline for interest payments due. Grinspun and Argentina’s ambassador to the U.S., 
in a telephone call to Jacques de Larosière and other top management, emphasized the 
political constraints under which the government was operating, arguing that “the 
Managing Director had to understand the extremely charged political atmosphere in 
Argentina and to see the letter in its proper context.”182 The IMF was unmoved; in 
Boughton’s words, “to the Managing Director there was simply no question of the 
Fund giving a positive signal to creditors until a credible policy program was in 
place.”183  
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An Accord is Reached 
The disagreements between the Argentines and the Fund prevented an 
agreement from being reached through the rest of the summer and into the fall, despite 
several missions to Argentina and a personal visit from Grinspun to Washington DC 
to meet with the Managing Director in early August. Pessimism about the Argentines 
within the Fund turned to despair. The members of the failed IMF mission in late June 
concluded that any plans for future discussions with the Grinspun-Garcia Vasquez 
team about the loan may have to be scrapped: “there are serious questions whether 
such discussions would have a reasonable chance of success, unless the government is 
willing to undertake substantive policy changes that so far it has refused to 
entertain.”184 Argentina nearly missed another interest payment on August 15. At this 
point inflation was running at nearly 20 percent per month. Finally, in late September 
– 9 months after the first mission to Argentina – a breakthrough occurred. The 
Argentines’ capitulated and accepted a budget deficit target of 5.5 percent for 1985; in 
exchange, the Fund’s staff members decided to accept the persistence of wage 
indexation.185 
The rest of the year was devoted to finding a way to close the huge financing 
gap that Argentina faced. With interest payments and arrears projected to amount to 
$8 billion, the gap between the Argentine resources and payments could not be filled 
by the IMF alone.186 After furious efforts to secure financing by the Managing 
Director and his staff, the Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding were 
presented to the Executive Board on December 28, 1984 – a full year after 
negotiations on a lending program for Argentina were initiated – and, despite a 
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number of concerns expressed by individual Executive Directors about the prospects 
for the program, the Board supported the staff’s proposed program for Argentina.187 
The content of the 15- month program was similar to the 1983 agreement (though it 
included several additional performance criteria) and the size was actually smaller 
than the previous SBA in terms of proportion of Argentina’s quota (127.5 percent 
versus 187 percent in the 1983 SBA).188 The experience of the Alfonsin 
administration with the IMF in 1984 bears out Veigel’s claim that “the transition to 
democracy did not significantly strengthen Argentina’s bargaining power vis-à-vi
international c
s 
reditors.”189 
                                                
The new IMF program got off to a very rocky start. The Argentines had made 
one purchase for SDR 236.5 million following the Board approval at the end of 
December. In early February the IMF mission arrived in Buenos Aires to check on the 
government’s performance with respect to the performance criteria for the first 
quarter. The news was not good: Argentina was out of compliance with multiple 
binding conditions. On February 18, 1985 Joaquin Ferrán notified Economy Minister 
Grinspun and the central bank governor Garcia Vasquez that the IMF staff would not 
recommend a waiver to allow the program to continue.190 When the Argentine 
officials delivered the message from the IMF to President Alfonsin about the 
suspension of the program, Alfonsin requested their immediate resignations.191 A 
different policy team – which included a role for American-trained economists – 
would reverse course, implementing a new and drastic approach to stabilizing the 
Argentine economy after 1985.  
 
187 Boughton writes, “the Board approved the stand-by arrangement, but with somewhat less enthusiasm 
than was its custom” (2001: 397).  
188 EBS/84/251, “Argentina – Request for Standby Arrangement,” December 3, 1984.  
189 Veigel 2005: 281. 
190 Boughton 2001: 398.  
191 Grinspun rejoined the government – albeit in a much less influential position – as planning minister 
three weeks after his removal by Alfonsin. 
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Summary of the Period of Low Neoliberal Influence (1981-85) 
 The contentiousness observed in episode 3 provides a stark contrast with 
cordial relations and lenient treatment by the Fund in the two episodes of high 
neoliberal influence. Two agreements were signed during this period. The pattern for 
both agreements was similar: protracted, difficult negotiations produced loans that 
were more extensive in terms of conditionality and less generous than preferred by the 
Argentine authorities. Both agreements were suspended without consideration of 
waivers shortly after approval by the Executive Board.  
 The IMF’s treatment of the country between 1981 and 1985 fits with the 
expectations from my theoretical framework. The episode also demonstrates the limits 
of the alternative explanations. The episode is a most likely case for geopolitics: 
Argentina fought a war with an important member state just months before starting 
negotiations over a new standby arrangement. Britain did not try to block the loan, nor 
was it able to convince the Fund to rigorously enforce the provision in the loan forcing 
the Argentines to end their discriminatory exchange practices. Likewise, the transition 
to democracy in 1983 did not generate a distinct pattern of relations that are not 
predicted by ideational argument. The IMF was nonplussed by appeals from outside 
countries or from Argentine officials to take an easier line in support of a fragile new 
democracy in the southern cone.   
 One alternative explanation that does find some support relates to bureaucratic 
self-interest. In the wake of the Mexican debt crisis, the Fund’s resources were 
strained. Perhaps the institution’s willingness to suspend the loans and relative 
stinginess reflected concerns about overextension and the possibility that the 
Argentines would fall into arrears to the Fund. But the comparison between this 
episode and the post-1991 period is instructive: IMF funds were in great demand in 
the late 1990s, yet the institution was willing to raise its exposure in the country to 
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record levels by 2000.    
Episode 4: Neoliberals in a Divided Government, 1985-89 
 The fourth episode is the most difficult to characterize, both in terms of the 
degree of neoliberal influence and the IMF’s treatment. American-trained economists 
took important positions in government after 1985, but their influence over 
policymaking was constrained in ways that differentiate the period from the other 
episodes. The Fund initially greeted the emergence of likeminded authorities in the 
Alfonsin government with enthusiasm; later, the Fund’s patience wore thin as the 
government was unable to control inflation. Even though it is the most indeterminate 
case for my argument, the evidence strongly suggests that the presence of neoliberals 
in Argentina during this time period continued to serve as a signal to the IMF.  
The Return of Neoliberal Influence to Argentine Policymaking 
 In February 1985 there was little hope on the part of the IMF that the Radical-
led Argentine government could right the ship. The negotiations over the standby 
arrangement signed in December 1984 were torturous. Despite the country’s 
demonstrable need and the systemic risks of failing to deliver the government from the 
brink of default, the deep ideational divide between the Argentines and the Fund’s 
staff and management was a major stumbling block. The IMF seemed unwilling to 
expend resources on a government that it did not trust. Once the agreement was 
reached, the Fund suspended it after just one month.  
 Argentina was in deep trouble, and President Alfonsin needed to take action to 
restore the relationship with the Fund – but he was keenly aware that elements of his 
party were unfriendly to neoliberal ideas. His new economic policy team served two 
audiences. The new head of the central bank, Juan J. Alfredo Concepción, was a 
Radical Party stalwart and resembled Bernardo Grinspun, the recently removed 
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nationalist economy minister, in terms of his economic views.192      
The new head of the Ministry of the Economy, Juan Vital Sourrouille, was 
intellectually much closer to the IMF than his predecessor, and had no ties to the 
Radicals. His primary training in economics was at Universidad de Buenos Aires, but 
he had been exposed to American economic thinking through a year he spent as a 
visiting scholar at Harvard, and he had formed international contacts as an official 
with the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The new finance 
minister’s appointment was greeted with cautious optimism at the IMF and among the 
broader financial community.193  
Most importantly, Sourrouille elevated a group of politically unaffiliated, 
American-trained economists to positions of influence in the government. This core 
group would be integral to the design of a new strategy for managing the country’s 
economic problems and would help reshape the country’s rocky relationship with the 
Fund. Mario Brodersohn (PhD from Harvard, 1966) became the finance secretary, the 
Economy Minister’s second-in-command; Adolfo Canitrot (PhD from Stanford, 1966) 
and José Luis Machinea (PhD from the University of Minnesota, 1983) became 
undersecretaries in the Ministry of the Economy.194   
The Element of Surprise: The IMF and Plan Austral 
 The IMF began negotiations with the new team to restart the suspended SBA 
in March. At the same time, Sourrouille and core advisors were working secretly to 
                                                 
192 Kaufman 1990: 89.  
193 The New York Times reported that Sourrouille “appeared to be less abrasive than his predecessor, 
Bernardo Grinspun, and more committed to an economic discipline that bankers say is needed in 
Argentina …many [bankers] said that the 44-year-old Mr. Sourrouille…had pushed for export-oriented 
policies and an assault on inflation. These economic views generally are shared by Argentina's 
approximately 320 creditor banks and by the International Monetary Fund.” Nicholas Kristoff, 
“Bankers Warily Greet Shakeup in Argentina,” The New York Times, February 20, 1985: pg. 1. See also 
Nancy H. Kreisler, “Two Top Argentine Officials Resign; Played Key Roles in Debt Debate,” The New 
York Times, February 19, 1985: pg. 1.  
194 Lydia Chavez, “Argentina’s Bold Rescue Plan,” The New York Times, June 25, 1985: pg. 1; Wynia 
1992: 179.  
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devise a plan to wring inflation – which hit 1,800 percent in the second quarter of 
1985 – out of the Argentine economy for good. On April 15 Jacques de Larosière 
convened a meeting with Sourrouille, his advisors Brodersohn and Machinea, senior 
Fund management, and the head of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the assistant 
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Paul Volcker and David Mulford. As described by the 
IMF’s official historian James Boughton, over the course of four hours the Argentine 
policymakers sketched a rough outline of an unorthodox shock program to be 
implemented in June. The Managing Director and the U.S. officials offered their 
support for the program, and the IMF staff members began an unusual set of side-by-
side negotiations: one set was a public feint that focused on hammering out a typical 
IMF adjustment program; the other, secret set of discussions concerned the details of 
the June anti-inflation shock treatment for the Argentine economy.195  
 On June 11, to the relief of the country’s creditors, the Argentine authorities 
signed a new, more lenient Letter of Intent to restart the suspended standby 
arrangement.196 Few outside of Sourrouille’s inner circle and IMF were prepared for 
what followed three days later. On Friday the 14th of June the authorities implemented 
the so-called Plan Austral. The shock anti-inflation program included a wage freeze 
and the introduction of a new currency unit, the austral, to replace the badly devalued 
peso.197 The shock treatment in its first months had the intended effect: monthly 
                                                 
195 Boughton 2001: 399. At the time it was widely misreported that the IMF was blindsided by the 
announcement of the shock program in June (see, for example, Stiles 1987: 77; Manzetti 1991: 145); 
the recent release of archival materials confirmed that the IMF was aware of and involved in the 
planning for the heterodox approach taken by the Sourrouille team.  
196 The need for secrecy about the Argentines’ program extended even to confidential IMF documents 
for fear that a leaked communiqué might spoil the government’s plans. For example, a terse memo from 
Joaquin Ferrán to the Fund’s top management about the conclusion of negotiations made no reference 
to the imminent shock stabilization plan. Memorandum from Joaquin Ferrán to the Managing Director, 
“Argentina – Revised Stand-By Program,” June 10, 1985.  
197 The plan included four main components: (1) a freeze on wages and prices; (2) a major reduction in 
the fiscal deficit (to just 2.5 percent of GDP) and an end to monetary emission (the practice of financing 
the government deficit through the printing press; (3) the introduction of the austral, which was set 
equal to 1,000 pesos and was pegged at the rate of 1 austral = $1.25 (implying a devaluation of around 
35 percent); (4) a conversion table for existing contracts, the desagio, was designed to deal with the 
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inflation fell to from 30 percent to 6 percent in July and lower still in August and 
September.  
In the wake of the implementation of the Austral Plan, an IMF mission 
returned to Argentina to try to restart the standby agreement that had been approved 
the previous December. Privately, the Fund’s top officials expressed a large degree of 
uncertainty about the likely outcome of the stabilization effort.198 But after the 
experience with the policy team in the first years of the Alfonsin presidency, the staff 
and management of the IMF showed great faith in the ability of Sourrouille’s team of 
neoliberals to carry out the renewed program. On August 9 the Executive Board 
endorsed the program with considerable enthusiasm; Richard Erb, the acting Chairman 
of the Board meeting, summed up the opinion in the room:  
 
I recall that at the time of the initial discussion of the program in 
December, the Managing Director made a statement for the 
record reflecting the deep concerns and questions that Directors 
had about policy plans and the economic program of the 
Argentine authorities. I believe that it is fair to say, without 
creating a sense of unwarranted euphoria, that the spirit and the 
tone of the discussion today were quite different…Directors 
have qualified the program as bold, courageous, and 
dramatic.199 
 
The Argentine policymakers were able to draw on the heavily delayed $245 
million disbursement immediately. Another IMF mission in late August gave the 
authorities good marks for implementing the standby arrangement, freeing up another 
$245 million in funds. Argentina’s debt problem was eased by an additional $4.2 
billion in loans approved by the private banks’ consortium and by the rescheduling of 
                                                                                                                                            
anticipated sharp drop in monthly inflation. On the details of the Austral Plan, see Epstein 1987: 1000; 
Heymann 1991: 104-30; Kiguel 1991.  
198 See, for example, comments from Veigel’s interviews with Adolfo Canitrot and Jacques de Larosière 
in Governed by Emergency, pg. 297.  
199 Minutes of the Executive Board meeting, EBM/85/125, August 9, 1985. Erb is also quoted in 2001: 
400-01.  
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maturities due from April 1982.200 
 The success of the Austral Plan was dramatic but short-lived. In the first three 
months following the shock program, inflation declined precipitously and the fiscal 
balance improved thanks to improved revenue collection. The inflation-fighting 
success of Sourrouille team is clearly shown in Figure 5.3.201 
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Figure 5.3 Annual Percent Change in Consumer Price Inflation, 1981-88 
Pressure against the Fund-supported stabilization effort mounted in late 1985 
and early 1986. The central labor organization, Confederación General del Trabajo 
(CGT), was opposed to the program and, because of its historic affiliation with the 
Peronist party, was skeptical of Alfonsin and the Radicals’ agenda. Conflict within the 
economic policymaking team also began to undermine the stabilization effort. The 
central bank, led by Radical Party stalwart Juan J. Alfredo Concepción, contravened 
                                                 
200 IMF Western Hemisphere Department staff memorandum SM/86/35, “Argentina – Recent Economic 
Developments,” February 25, 1986.  
201 Inflation data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
 237
Sourrouille and his advisors’ preferences by loosening monetary policy through 
generous rediscounting to troubled banks and state-owned enterprises in politically 
influential provinces.202 The fiscal situation, while significantly better at the end of 
1985 than in the period before the Austral Plan’s implementation, remained fragile. 
Much of the improvement was based on unsustainable short-term conditions; in the 
absence of “a major fiscal reform aimed at improving government revenues on a 
permanent basis,” the prospects for the stabilization effort were doubtful.203 Political 
opposition from the Peronists and from within the Radical Party meant that a 
sustainable fiscal adjustment was not forthcoming. 
In late November 1985 an IMF mission returned to Argentina to assess the 
government’s adherence to the conditions in the renewed standby arrangement. The 
mission found that the Argentine authorities’ stabilization effort had veered off course, 
and the IMF suspended the program in December.204 
 The IMF was not yet prepared to cut the Sourrouille team loose. In February 
1986 the Argentine authorities visited IMF headquarters to convince the staff and 
management to waive the missed conditions in order to release the next tranche of the 
SBA and to extend the program (which was set to expire in March) through May. On 
March 10 the Executive Board considered the proposed modifications to the SBA. 
Fernando Nebbia, the Argentine Executive Director making the case to the Board on 
behalf of the government, reported that “although some of the performance criteria 
contained in the program were not met, my authorities are nevertheless satisfied that 
the overall thrust of the policy has been appropriate to achieve the objectives of the 
                                                 
202 Sourrouille and his advisors sought to limit the central bank’s rediscount policies, but, as Robert 
Kaufman observes, “since these banks were linked closely to local political machines and smaller 
businesses, threats to their liquidity provoked strong protests from most segments of Radical 
leadership” (1990: 89). See also Boughton 2001: 401; Erro 1994: 139; Manzetti 1991: 158.  
203 Kiguel 1991: 977.  
204 Boughton 2001: 401, 461.  
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program.”205 The other Executive Directors agreed: the modifications of the program 
were approved without objection, and the schedule of disbursements of the SBA funds 
was extended through May. During the Board’s debate over the proposal, one 
Executive Director argued that the IMF should continue to show flexibility in its 
treatment of the Alfonsin government in light of “the far-reaching nature of the 
measures implemented and uncertainties with respect to their actual impact on 
various aggregates…such flexibility was amply justified by the strong political 
determination shown by the authorities throughout the past nine months and by their 
continued adherence to the thrust of the adjustment program.”206 
 In early April the government announced that it was weakening some aspects 
of the stabilization program.207 The Fund viewed the developments with concern, but 
continued to put their trust in the team of neoliberals around the Economy Minister. 
An internal memorandum is revealing in this regard. Vito Tanzi of the Fund’s Fiscal 
Affairs department, following a visit to Buenos Aires to consult with the Argentine 
policymakers about reform of the tax system, reported to the Managing Director that 
the stabilization effort was “showing some signs of strains.” The “gloomy outlook” 
notwithstanding, Tanzi noted that, in the view of the Fund staff members and outside 
experts that he consulted, “the team now in control is the best Argentina is likely to 
have. They all recognized that the technical experts were making economic policy 
under tremendous political pressures, so that they argued that the Fund should support 
them in any way possible.”208 
                                                 
205 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/86/43, March 10, 1986. 
206 Italics in the quote from Alternate Executive Director A.A. Agah are added for emphasis. See the 
Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/86/43, March 10, 1986, pg. 54. 
207 The changes included a minor devaluation of the austral and a return to the crawling-peg system of 
exchange rate management, an increase in public utilities rates, and, most importantly, acceptance of 
private sector price increases and wage negotiations between industry and the unions. On the April 
1986 “flexibilization,” see Erro 1994: 147; Heymann 1991: 104; Kiguel 1991: 979-80 
208 Memorandum from Vito Tanzi to the Managing Director, “Technical Assistance – Argentina,” April 
25, 1986 [italics added for emphasis].  
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 The Fund’s commitment to the Argentines was tested again in May. Following 
the policy changes implemented early in the previous month, Argentina had fallen out 
of compliance with three performance criteria. The head of the IMF’s mission to 
Argentina was skeptical of the policy team’s ability to bring policies back into line, 
and, upon his return to Washington DC in mid-May, he recommended against issuing 
a waiver to allow the program to continue without a suspension.209 The Argentines 
were understandably concerned about the possibility that the program might be 
suspended. Inflation was rising again, and the country had fallen behind in clearing its 
arrears to external creditors. The Economy Minister decided to send his Minnesota-
trained undersecretary of the economy, José Luis Machinea, to Washington to 
convince the Fund’s top management that the missed targets should be waived. This 
would be no easy task: the government had missed multiple targets by significant 
margins, and there was seemingly little political will on the part of Alfonsin and the 
Radicals to tighten its policies to the Fund’s liking. Machinea was willing to commit 
to a reduction of arrears to outside governments, but made few promises beyond this. 
After a week of intense discussions with management and staff members, Machinea 
was able to convince the Managing Director, Jacques de Larosière, to recommend a 
waiver that would allow Argentina to make the final purchase under the renewed 1984 
standby arrangement, and the Fund’s staff presented a lukewarm endorsement of the 
proposed waiver to the Executive Board.210  
The Board discussion of the waiver on June 23, 1986 was more contentious 
than previous discussions related to the Sourrouille team’s policy proposals. 
Alexandre Kafka, the Brazilian Executive Director, proclaimed strong support for the 
waiver, arguing that “the stand-by arrangement with Argentina had far too many 
                                                 
209 The net domestic assets of the central bank, the budget deficit, and the level of external arrears all 
exceeded the targets set in the SBA. See Boughton 2001: 464.  
210 Boughton 2001: 465.  
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performance criteria…The staff had rightly placed less emphasis on those criteria than 
on the general thrust of Argentina’s remarkable achievements under the program and 
its policy decisions for the remainder of 1986.”211 Other Board members – particularly 
Western Europeans – were less supportive. Bernd Goos, the alternate ED from 
Germany, was forceful in expressing his concerns about the threats to the Fund’s own 
credibility in giving the Argentines repeated waivers. In his statement, Goos 
emphasized that, while he did not wish to question the credibility of the Argentine 
economic policymakers, he worried that the “experience under the program thus far 
could hardly be ignored when assessing the prospects for a timely reversal of the 
slippages.”212 Ultimately Goos and the rest of the Executive Directors were willing to 
give Sourrouille and his team the benefit of the doubt, and the waiver was approved, 
freeing up the remaining SDR 236.5 million.  
Did Private Banks Put Pressure on the Fund?  
To what extent was the approval of the waiver allowing Argentina to draw the 
last portion of the standby arrangement a result of pressure from commercial banks? 
The IMF’s seal of approval was necessary to unlock the final $600 million of the 
Advisory Committee’s $4.2 billion bridge loan. If the IMF refused to grant the waiver, 
Argentina would once again be on the cusp of default. A withdrawal of IMF support at 
this late stage in the program could potentially induce a new debt crisis at a time when 
other regional powers – Mexico and Brazil – were struggling to make payments. 
Indeed, two separate Executive Directors mentioned this pressure in the June 23 Board 
debate over the proposed waiver.213 Yet Argentina and the IMF had been down this 
                                                 
211 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/86/101, June 23, 1986, pg. 42.  
212 Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/86/101, June 23, 1986, pp. 47-48.  
213 See the comments by Executive Directors Lankester (the UK) and Lundstrom (Sweden) in the 
Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM/86/102, June 23, 1986. Note that Lankester argued that 
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road several times in the past, and the IMF had been willing to suspend lending 
programs in 1983 and 1984 when the systemic risks of an Argentine default were just 
as great, if not greater. The problems that the other Latin American states were 
experiencing should have induced more caution on the part of the Fund, given that its 
resources were both limited and in strong demand. Once the waiver was approved and 
the final amount of the SBA disbursed, the Fund’s exposure in Argentina reached its 
apex: the Argentines owed the IMF around $2.9 billion (224 percent of the country’s 
quota).214 Relatively few countries were in arrears to the IMF at the time, but it was 
not inconceivable, given the antagonism with which the labor unions, Peronists, and 
elements of the President’s own party viewed the continued servicing of the foreign 
debt, that Argentina could cease repayment to the Fund. The fact that the IMF was 
willing to give the Argentine authorities the waiver only after the visit by Machinea, a 
member of the Economy Minister’s core team of neoliberals, is further evidence that 
when the Fund confronts an unsettled political environment it is more likely to side 
with governments containing likeminded policymakers.    
 Inflation accelerated again in July, and in late August 1986 the authorities 
announced a renewed commitment to tight fiscal and monetary policies along with 
ceilings on wage and price increases. An important component of that commitment 
involved the replacement of the obstructionist Alfredo Concepción by José Machinea, 
whose visit to IMF headquarters helped unlock the last portion of the standby 
arrangement, as central bank governor. Machinea’s appointment was hailed by the 
Fund’s top management. The outgoing Managing Director, Jacques de Larosière, sent 
an unusually candid congratulatory message to Machinea upon the news of his 
appointment to head the central bank, writing that he was “particularly happy to learn” 
of the appointment and that the policy team could count on “the interest of the 
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management and staff in the success of Argentina’s economic program.”215  
Things Fall Apart (Again): the end of the IMF-Argentina Relationship, 1987-89 
With a new central bank governor in place, the Argentines immediately 
entered negotiations with the IMF to secure a new loan. The IMF’s negotiating team 
took a tougher line with the Argentines. The main point of contention concerned 
Argentina’s desire for a larger drawing that would include contingency clauses linked 
to changes in commodities prices.216 A worldwide decline in agricultural prices in 
1986-87 hit Argentine farmers particularly hard. The Argentines pointed to Mexico’s 
1986 agreement, which included clauses linked to oil prices, as a precedent for this 
type of contingent loan.217 The IMF’s staff and management regarded the Mexican 
arrangement as a highly unusual one that did not set a precedent for future loans, and 
pushed for a standard agreement with tightened fiscal policies and a reduced current 
account deficit.218  
Negotiations between the Fund and the Argentine officials continued through 
the rest of the year. A breakthrough occurred in January 1987 when Sourrouille and 
Machinea accepted the lower inflation and current account deficit targets insisted upon 
by the Fund and signed a Letter of Intent for a new $1.4 billion (SDR 1.1 billion, 100 
percent of quota), 15-month standby arrangement to the management.219  
Argentina faced a large financing gap in 1987: the Fund’s economists 
estimated that the country would need about $3 billion to stay current on its external 
                                                 
215 In a second note de Larosière wrote of his “particular pleasure…in view of the close working 
relationship” between Machinea and the Fund’s staff and management. Telex from the Managing 
Director to José Luis Machinea and Juan V. Sourrouille, September 2, 1986; Telex from the Managing 
Director to José Luis Machinea, September 4, 1986.  
216 Aggarwal 1996: 431-32; Boughton 2001: 466.  
217 Clyde Farnsworth, “Argentina Seeks IMF Loan Tied to Crop Price,” The New York Times, 
September 5, 1986, pg. 2.  
218 Boughton 2001: 466.  
219 Argentina also submitted a separate request for a condition-free purchase under the Compensatory 
Fund Facility (CFF) to counter the effects on export earnings due to the fall in commodities prices.  
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payments, and the Fund could only account for around one third of that amount.220 
The IMF’s new Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, decided to follow the 
“concerted lending” approach developed by his predecessor and sought guarantees 
from the banks that the financing gap would be filled before final approval of the IMF 
loan. With the understanding that the negotiations with the banks would be fruitless 
without at least some positive signal from the Fund, Camdessus submitted the Letter 
of Intent to the Executive Board to approve Argentina’s request for funding “in 
principle.” The proposal was submitted with the caveat that Argentina could not start 
to draw on the new standby arrangement until “satisfactory arrangements” for the 
financing of the balance of payments needs in 1987 were made.  
Submitting the program to the Board for approval at this early stage in 
negotiations with the banks was highly unusual. Typically, a program approved “in 
principle” would need to be fully financed in a relatively short period. A handful of 
Executive Directors expressed concern about the precedent that the new Managing 
Director was setting with the proposal. In addition, the reports from Argentina 
indicated that the economic circumstances were deteriorating. C. Richard Rye, the 
Executive Director from Australia, warned that the proposed program was a “high 
risk,” and several other representatives to the Board agreed with Rye’s 
characterization.221 During the discussion, several Executive Directors expressed 
concerns about the credibility of the Argentine policymakers. The goodwill which 
Sourrouille and the American-trained technocrats in the policy team engendered 
within the Fund over the past two years had begun to dissipate in the face of 
consistently bad news from Argentina. In the end, the staff’s continued trust in the 
Argentine policymakers helped convince the Executive Directors, and the new standby 
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arrangement was approved without objection. Argentina would have to wait until the 
financing arrangements with the commercial banks were sorted out to draw on the 
Fund’s resources.  
The discussions with commercial banks to fill Argentina’s financing gap 
proceeded slowly. Mario Brodersohn led the Argentine side of the negotiations with 
the banks’ consortium (still headed by Citibank’s William Rhodes), while the Fund’s 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus and two top officials from the Western 
Hemisphere Department, Eduardo Wiesner and Desmond Lachman, embarked on a 
global “road show” to sell the program approved in February to worried bankers.222 
Finally, in mid-June, Rhodes notified the IMF’s top management that banks had 
committed to cover 92 percent of the financing gap. On July 23 the proposal was once 
again brought before the Executive Board; final approval by the Board of the standby 
arrangement would release badly-needed funds to replenish Argentina’s diminishing 
reserves. The program approved in principle in February was not excessively stringent 
– nor was it excessively generous at 100 percent of quota. The main difference 
between this SBA and the previous standby arrangements was the inclusion of three 
separate performance criteria targeting the fiscal deficit.223 The Executive Directors 
were concerned about the “many policy slippages that had occurred since they had 
approved the program in principle back in February, but they felt that they once again 
had to give the authorities the benefit of the doubt.”224 With the supplementary 
financing committed through the banks’ Advisory Committee, the first drawing under 
the new standby arrangement was approved. In months following the July 1987 Board 
meeting, Argentina’s inability to gain control of economic conditions generated 
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tensions within the IMF and between the Fund and the World Bank over the right 
approach to dealing with the country; ultimately, the IMF’s patience would run out 
and it would be forced to cut ties with the Alfonsin government. 
Performance under the 1987 SBA 
It was clear by late August that the program was off track. The Economist 
reported that the Argentines would miss the fiscal performance criteria in the lending 
program “by a mile.”225 Worse, the elections on the sixth of September produced 
disastrous results for the Radicals: the Peronist Party won a majority in the legislature, 
and Peronists took control of a majority of the Provinces, as well. The next 
disbursement was scheduled for October 20, and without a significant tightening of 
policies it was unlikely that Argentina would be able to access the funds. Alfonsin’s 
frustrations emerged in a post-election speech to the central industrial union, in which 
the President lambasted the IMF for “trying to apply ridiculous prescriptions that have 
nothing to do with the people.”226  
But Alfonsin had little choice but to continue to delegate to the Machinea-
Sourrouille policy team in the effort to secure additional financing and avert a 
payments crisis. After discussions with IMF staff, the Argentine policymakers 
announced a new set of policy measures on October 14. In addition to a new freeze on 
prices and wages and a big hike in prices for public services, the policies mapped out 
by Sourrouille, Machinea, and the coterie of American-trained economic advisors 
were intended to attack the fiscal deficit and inflationary tendencies through deeper 
structural reforms of the Argentine economy. In order to achieve a 2 percent fiscal 
deficit target for 1988, the government sent Congress a set of tax reforms, a bill to 
improve revenue collection and reform revenue sharing between the central 
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government and the provinces, developed a schedule to reduce tariffs on imports and 
exports of agricultural products, and set a goal for the privatization of high-profile 
state-owned enterprises including monopolies in water and energy provision, the 
national telecommunications company, Entel, and the national airline.227 Upon the 
announcement of the reforms, the US Treasury approved a $500 million bridge loan 
for Argentina. The IMF’s staff and management remained broadly supportive of the 
Machinea-Sourrouille team, and the Managing Director approved the request to waive 
the missed conditions and to modify the existing lending arrangement for submission 
to the Board.  
The credibility of the Argentine authorities’ commitment to the program was at 
stake when the Executive Board met to discuss the proposal on December 2. The view 
among the EDs was that the prospects for the program were extremely uncertain and 
that the Argentines’ track record was poor and getting worse. As described by Fund’s 
historian James Boughton, the German Executive Director “best represented the view 
of the Board in concluding that he was supporting the case ‘with considerable 
reservations, and only because Argentina is an exceptional case.’”228 Two other 
European Directors advocated adding more binding conditions to the agreement 
before future drawings could be made, but the staff rejected the idea. In spite of the 
country’s highly unpredictable economic situation, the program was approved by the 
Executive Board – albeit with three Executive Directors abstaining from the vote, 
which is evidence of the divisions that the policy of continued support for the 
Argentines was opening up within the institution.229 
U.S. Pressure on the Fund Emerges 
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It is at this point in the episode that evidence for the influence of the United 
States on the Fund’s decision making emerges. We can speculate that the IMF staff 
and management’s leniency toward the Argentines in late 1987 reflected pressure from 
the Reagan administration, given its interests in protecting American banks and 
supporting an unstable democracy in the Southern Cone – but without direct evidence 
to corroborate the association this claim is nothing more than speculation.  
As a very simple test of the realist argument about the influence of the U.S. on 
Fund lending behavior, I used the Lexis Nexis database to search for references to 
Argentina and the IMF in major U.S. and World news publications in each year 
between 1976 and 2002.230 From the Lexis Nexis search results I selected all the news 
articles that discussed the IMF-Argentine relationship. I then searched among these 
articles for references to pressure from U.S. officials on the IMF. Of the 2,708 news 
articles that mentioned both the terms “IMF” and “Argentina” between 1976 and 1988 
there are only a handful that contain specific references to U.S. influence on the 
lending process. Notably, the first explicit references to American influence on the 
loans that the Fund made to the Argentines appear after the December approval by the 
Executive Board of modifications and waiver for missed performance criteria in the 
standby arrangement. For example, the Christian Science Monitor reported that 
“United States Treasury Secretary James Baker Jr. reportedly had to pressure the IMF 
                                                 
230 I searched on the terms “IMF Argentina,” which returned the largest number of articles. The number 
of articles returned by the search terms increased over time (to save space I only list results to 1988): 
Year Number of Results Returned in Lexis Nexis Search Year Number of Results  
1976 18 1983 336 
1977 12 1984 679 
1978 16 1985 417 
1979 12 1986 235 
1980 15 1987 327 
1981 35 1988 343 
1982 263   
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to grant a waiver to release the funds.”231 As I describe in the next section, the 
pressure from the U.S. on the IMF grew in the months following the December 
decision.  
The IMF and Argentina Reach a Breaking Point 
 Since their appointment in early 1985, Alfonsin had resisted enormous 
pressure from both the Radical stalwarts and the Peronist-affiliated labor unions to 
remove Sourouille and his neoliberal advisors. A stark reminder of the precarious 
position of the Sourrouille team came in November, when the Economy Minister and 
his finance secretary, Mario Brodersohn, were “booed and insulted continuously by 
hecklers” while attempting to give a speech on the government’s economic policies to 
a Radical Party convention. The economic problems emboldened a faction within the 
party that advocated a “neo-Keynesian alternative economic plan” and had opposed 
the neoliberals since their appointment. The leading proponent of the alternative 
approach, former central bank governor Guillermo Feldberg, observed that 
Sourrouille, Machinea, and the top economic advisors were viewed as “an alien body 
within the party.”232 But Alfonsin could not afford to jettison the Machina-Sourrouille 
team while the country faced an impending payments crisis and would be engaged in 
continuous negotiations with the Fund.  
 The contentious approval by the Executive Board of the waivers and 
modifications to allow Argentina to make a drawing on the standby arrangement 
revealed that some officials within the institution were beginning to lose faith in the 
Argentine policymakers. The skepticism that greeted the December proposal was 
                                                 
231 Tyler Bridges, “Argentina, sagging under foreign debt, gropes for a way out,” Christian Science 
Monitor, December 17, 1987, pg. 12. Aggarwal also makes reference to U.S. efforts to influence the 
IMF between October and December 1987 in Debt Games, pg. 437.  
232 Quotations from Tim Coone, “Economy Minister Faces Shaky Future in Argentina,” The Globe and 
Mail, December 26, 1987. See also Shirley Christian, “Argentina's Economy Seen as Out of Control,” 
The New York Times, April 18, 1988, pg. 14.  
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warranted: a January 1988 mission led by high-ranking Fund official Desmond 
Lachman found that Argentina had already slipped out of compliance with the fiscal 
targets. The projections indicated that Argentina would breach the 2 percent ceiling for 
the fiscal target by two and a half points. Worse, Argentina briefly fell into arrears to 
the Fund after the government missed a payment due at the end of January.233 Once 
again, the IMF suspended the program and the Argentines and IMF staff were forced 
to seek the Board’s approval for a waiver.  
 While the U.S. and other creditor governments put together a $550 million 
bridge loan to help Argentina clear its arrears to the Fund and stay current on its 
payments to the banks, the Argentines went to IMF headquarters to work out the 
details of a new Letter of Intent to restore the standby arrangement. The IMF and the 
Argentines reached a compromise of a 2.7 percent of GDP fiscal deficit target for 
1988. With a new Letter of Intent in hand, the staff and management brought the 
proposal to the Executive Board for approval.  
 As described by James Boughton, at the March 18 Board meeting the 
“Directors made a rare show of strength and insisted that the terms of the standby 
arrangement be strengthened before they would approve it.”234 The thrust of the 
Executive Directors’ objections to the proposal focused on two issues: (1) the 
persistent policy slippages, particularly in the fiscal area; (2) the lack of committed 
financing from private and official sources to cover the huge financing gap that the 
Argentines faced in 1988. Some EDs suggested that the program be suspended until 
sufficient financing was guaranteed; the Executive Director representing Argentina 
rejected the proposal on behalf of the government, and the Managing Director 
proposed instead that the SBA be modified to require that “sufficient progress” on a 
                                                 
233 Boughton 2001: 473.  
234 Boughton 2001: 474.  
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funding package be achieved at the time of the next scheduled drawing in May. 
Interestingly, the American representative to the Board, Charles Dallara, argued that 
there was no precedent for Camdessus’ proposal and sided with the Executive 
Directors advocating a suspension of the program until real progress was made on 
filling the financing gap. Camdessus pushed back again the American ED’s objection, 
claiming that the situation confronting the Board was “without precedence owing to 
the magnitude of the possible gap that could emerge over the next few months.”235 
Camdessus’ view won out, and the waiver and revisions to the program were accepted. 
The Argentines were once again able to draw on the SBA.  
The Fund’s Patience Wears Out  
The patience of the Fund’s staff and management was stretched to the breaking 
point when it became clear in May that the fiscal targets were exceeded. Negotiations 
over financing from private and official sources were at a standstill. Alfonsin’s 
government antagonized banks by missing several deadlines for interest payments. 
The President further infuriated creditors by suggesting that interest rates should be 
lowered to the “historical” rate of 4 percent, causing one banker to ask: “is this man 
living on the moon?”236 In June, the IMF’s staff and management reached agreement 
that the probability of the program’s success was close to zero, and the Fund officially 
suspended the standby arrangement.  
 The Argentine authorities visited Washington in late July in an attempt to 
restart the program. After three years of starts and stops with this policy team, the 
Fund’s staff and management were unconvinced that even a drastic policy shift could 
deliver a successful stabilization effort. Negotiations between the Argentines and the 
Fund continued into the fall. In early August the Economy Minister announced a new 
                                                 
235 Boughton 2001: 474 (quote). Much of this section draws on Boughton’s official IMF history, since 
the Minutes of this particular Board meeting are restricted.  
236 “Argentina: De Facto Default?” Latin American Markets, June 17, 1988.  
 251
shock treatment (“Plan Primavera”) to try to convince the IMF of the government’s 
seriousness. Sourrouille and Machinea publicly proclaimed that IMF support was 
forthcoming; in reality, the Fund had turned off the spigot.237 
The United States, which had been a relatively disinterested observer of the 
Fund-Argentine relationship until 1987, grew concerned about the consequences of the 
suspension of IMF funding. Desmond Lachman recalls that the United States leaned 
quite heavily on the IMF – and Camdessus in particular – to approve a waiver that 
would enable Argentina to begin drawing on Fund resources again. In Lachman’s 
view, “the IMF did not want to further tarnish its credibility by supporting something 
that was going to blow up.”238 On the horizon loomed the May 1989 presidential 
election; the Peronist candidate, Carlos Menem, was campaigning on a populist 
platform, including a call for a five year debt moratorium.239 When the IMF refused to 
move, the Argentines, with the backing of U.S. officials, took their case to the World 
Bank. Here American pressure was apparently more effective: on September 25 the 
Bank announced that it was extending a $1.2 billion loan with very weak 
conditionality to Argentina. The Washington Post and several other major news 
organizations reported that the Bank’s president, Barber Conable, “had been urged by 
the American government to get some help to the hard-pressed nation, lest the 
government of Raul Alfonsin become unstable.”240 By breaking the established 
                                                 
237 Jeremy Morgan, “Fears for an Argentine Crash Package,” The Guardian, August 5, 1988; 
“Argentina: New agreement to be signed with the IMF after ‘positive’' negotiations,” BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, August 2, 1988.   
238 Interview with Desmond Lachman, Washington DC, April 6, 2009. For more evidence of pressure 
from the U.S., see “Argentina: Not Much Luck,” Latin American Markets, July 29, 1988. 
239 Menem abandoned the moratorium later in the campaign. Shirley Christian, “Argentina Prepares 
Plan To Try to Rescue Economy,” The New York Times, August 2, 1988, pg. 1; Stephen Fidler, “May 
Vote Complicates Argentina’s Debt Crisis,” Financial Post, September 26, 1988, pg. 11. 
240 Hobart Rowen and Robert J. McCartney, “World Bank Agrees To $1.25 Billion in Loans to 
Argentina; Country to Make Major Economic Reforms,” The Washington Post, September 26, 1988, 
pg. A12; “World Bank takes a risk,” The Independent, September 27, 1988, pg. 23;  “IMF Fights for 
Territory,” The Independent, April 5, 1989, pg. 23; “Latin America's debt; Argentina finds a friend,” 
The Economist, October 1, 1988, pg. 91; “Twins That Won’t Tango,” The Economist, March 11, 1989, 
pg. 17.  
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tradition in which the Bank did not lend until an IMF program was in place, the World 
Bank’s actions opened a deep rift between the two international institutions.241  
The World Bank’s gamble was a poor one, because the new stabilization plan 
did nothing to stem the inflationary pressures in the Argentine economy. Inflation 
climbed to 17 percent in March and then to 34 percent in April. Sourrouille and 
Machinea continued to seek IMF support, but talks in January and February ended in 
failure, and in early March the World Bank suspended its program.242  With the 
country’s relationship with the international financial institutions effectively severed, 
Alfonsin acceded to the calls from the rank-and-file of the Radical Party and replaced 
Economy Minister Sourrouille and the remaining American-trained technocrats with 
“an old party hack” and “veteran Radical war horse” named Juan Carlos Pugliese.243 
José Luis Machinea was also replaced as head of the central bank by Enrique Garcia 
Vasquez. By the time that the Radical Party candidate Eduardo Angeloz was soundly 
defeated by Carlos Menem in the May election, the Argentine economy was on the 
cusp of hyperinflation. Monthly inflation shot from 78 percent to just below 200 
percent in July. Argentine firms led a massive flight from the austral, forcing the 
central bank to sell large amounts of dollar reserves to keep the currency afloat. When 
Machinea announced that the central bank would no longer exchange australs for 
dollars, the flight to the dollar “caused the virtual collapse of the price system in 
domestic currency.”244 Rioting and looting spread throughout the country in late May. 
With the Argentine economy in shambles, Alfonsin turned the presidency over to the 
Peronist successor five months before the official date of succession. Within a year 
                                                 
241 Interview with Christian Brachet, Washington, DC, March 31, 2009; Clyde Farnsworth, “Accord 
Seems Near on Roles of I.M.F. and World Bank,” The New York Times, March 30, 1989, pg. 1.  
242 “Argentina: Double Talk,” Latin American Markets, February 10, 1989.  
243 Erro 1994: 154 (first quote); Smith 1990: 26 (second quote). See also “Argentina: Down Tools,” The 
Economist, April 8, 1989, pg. 46.   
244 Schamis 2003: 137.  
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and a half, neoliberals would have a degree of control over economic policymaking in 
a manner not seen since in Argentina since the military government of 1976-81.  
Summary of the Period of Medium Neoliberal Influence in Argentina 
 The fourth and final episode provides further evidence of the importance of 
shared ideas to the Fund’s decision making process. The rise of a small coterie of 
American-trained advisors within the Economy Ministry generated a very different 
pattern of relations than prevailed in the third episode: the IMF enthusiastically 
embraced a “heterodox” stabilization program (the Plan Austral), and was willing to 
extend waivers for noncompliance at several points. The ability of the Minnesota-
trained economist José Luis Machinea to personally convince the Managing Director 
to recommend a waiver is strong circumstantial evidence in favor of my explanation. 
These episodes provide some of the most compelling evidence to support my political 
explanation for Fund decision making. It is impossible to understand how the Fund 
shifted from the tough line it took in February 1985 to the enthusiastic support of the 
Austral program four months later without taking the appointment of Sourrouille’s 
team of neoliberals into account. The political environment was as difficult under 
Sourrouille and his advisors as it was for the first policy team appointed by President 
Alfonsin, as was the country’s precarious economic situation. Faced once again with a 
pattern of noncompliance, the IMF had a clear political choice: it could suspend the 
standby agreement and risk dislodging likeminded economic policymakers that the 
staff trusted, or it could provide take a softer line, sacrificing some enforcement 
credibility while supporting a team that, in the staff’s view at the time, was “the best 
Argentina is likely to have.”245 For the first three years of the episode, the IMF was 
inclined to overlook missed targets in order to serve a broader political purpose. Only 
                                                 
245 Memorandum from Vito Tanzi to the Managing Director, “Technical Assistance – Argentina,” April 
25, 1986 [italics added for emphasis].  
 254
in the face of mounting evidence that the policy team was incapable of following the 
programs’ strictures did the Fund’s patience give out.      
 This period provides mixed evidence for the alternative explanations. It is the 
only period in which pressure from the United States government is readily apparent 
in written accounts of the negotiations. Clearly there was pressure on the Fund to 
support the Alfonsin government at a vulnerable economic and political point.246 But a 
remarkable aspect of the episode is that the efforts by the United States to force the 
Fund to approve a waiver to restore the suspended program in 1988 were 
unsuccessful. Even when powerful states have clear interests in specific programs, the 
ability to use the IMF for strategic purposes is not a given.  
Concluding Thoughts 
 This chapter was organized around four discrete episodes spanning a quarter 
century of Argentine economic history. In two of the episodes (1976-81 and 1991-
2001), neoliberal economic ideas were ascendant. A third period was marked by a turn 
toward economic nationalism (1981-85). In the final section I considered the 
relationship with the Fund in a mixed case (1985-89). The purpose of the within-unit 
episodic comparisons was twofold: (1) I wanted to see whether the degree of 
neoliberal influence tracked the IMF’s treatment of the country in each period (was the 
Fund’s treatment more lenient during the “high” episodes?); (2) I used material from 
the IMF’s archives to provide evidence that the degree of shared beliefs between the 
institution and the policy team was important in the Fund’s decision making process. 
On both counts the chapter was supportive: the variation in the Fund’s relationship 
with the Argentines across episodes matched the predictions from my theoretical 
framework; in addition, I found more direct evidence of the causal mechanisms 
                                                 
246 In March 1987 the government put down an attempted military coup. Democracy was preserved, but 
the legitimacy of Alfonsin’s rule was threatened by the uprising among the nationalist factions in the 
military. See Erro 1994: 150.  
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linking the IMF’s treatment of Argentina to the institution’s clear preference for policy 
teams composed of likeminded authorities in the internal memorandums and records 
of Executive Board meetings.  
The four episodes of Fund-Argentine relations, each featuring its own complex 
mix of actors (executives, economic policymakers, IMF officials, powerful states) and 
intentions, are not perfectly explained by any of the existing explanations. But 
combined with the quantitative evidence in chapter 3, the findings suggest that the 
ideational approach to IMF lending behavior I develop in the dissertation has powerful 
empirical implications (see table 5.2 below for a summary of the chapter’s findings).  
The case study also suggested that the IMF takes the broader political 
environment into consideration. I found a number of references in internal documents 
to the Fund’s perceptions of the political constraints under which various policy teams 
operated. However, the IMF was slow to adjust its treatment in light of mounting 
evidence from several episodes that the political consensus necessary to support 
stabilization and reform efforts was missing. For example, despite the fact that the 
difficult political circumstances confronting the policymakers in the fourth episode 
(treated here as a case of medium neoliberal influence) were no different than the 
problems faced by the non-neoliberals in the previous period, the Fund took a softer 
line with the new policy team. Later, the IMF’s fixation on the ideational character of 
the top policy elites meant that the institution overlooked evidence that the political 
consensus which supported Menem’s turn to the neoliberals in 1991 had dissolved. As 
the recession and austerity efforts began to generate widespread social discontent in 
the late 1990s, the room for the policy team to maneuver was constrained; at the end 
of the second episode, divisions within the Radical government led by President de la 
Rua presented serious obstacles to reform efforts – yet the IMF continued to support 
the neoliberal-led policy team with lenient treatment. 
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Table 5.2: Overview of Argentine Case Study 
Period Treatment by the IMF  
Degree of Neoliberal 
Influence 
Domestic Political 
Environment 
Alternative 
Explanations? 
1976-
1981 
Lenient: two 
programs 
signed during 
the period 
(1976 and 
1977). 
Conditionality 
is weak and 
weakly 
enforced. 
Government 
does not draw 
on second loan. 
High: central bank 
governor Adolfo Diz 
was Chicago 
economics PhD; 
economy minister 
Martinez de Hoz did 
not possess neoliberal 
credentials but was a 
friend of the IMF; other 
American-trained 
officials occupied 
advisory positions. 
Labor and 
opposition are 
quiescent under 
military regime, but 
the Diz-Martinez de 
Hoz economic 
policy team was 
constrained by the 
junta’s unwillingness 
to bear full costs of 
austerity and 
liberalization. 
Little evidence to 
link alternatives to 
treatment by Fund 
in the period. No 
evidence of 
pressure from U.S. 
to tighten terms, 
despite Carter 
administration’s 
concerns about the 
junta’s human 
rights abuses.  
1981-
1985 
Tough: two 
standbys signed 
following 
difficult 
negotiations. 
Both programs 
(January 1983 
and December 
1984) include 
numerous 
conditions and 
are suspended 
without 
waivers. 
Low: rapid turnover of 
officials and policy 
switching marked the 
final years of the 
military regime (1981-
83); officials in the new 
democratically-elected 
government were non-
neoliberals, skeptical of 
the Fund’s advice 
Unstable, divided 
military government 
precedes democratic 
transition in Dec. 
1983. Newly-elected 
Alfonsin government 
is divided between 
nationalists and 
liberals. Radical-led 
government does not 
have the support of 
powerful Peronist-
associated labor.  
UK does not try to 
prevent Fund from 
extending program 
in late 1983; tough 
treatment precedes 
and follows 
democratic 
transition. Basic 
policy 
disagreements 
between Fund and 
Argentines peak 
during this period; 
risk of region-wide 
default poses threat 
to banks, Fund’s 
resources.    
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Table 5.2 (continued)  
Period Treatment by the IMF  
Degree of 
Neoliberal 
Influence 
Domestic Political 
Environment 
Alternative 
Explanations? 
1985-
1989 
Mixed: lending 
arrangement 
restarted in June 
1985 and completed 
thanks to waivers 
issued in March and 
June 1986. New 
agreement signed in 
July 1987; waivers 
issued in December 
and March 1988. 
Program cancelled 
due to 
noncompliance in 
May 1988 in face of 
strong pressure 
from American 
officials. 
Medium: the 
appointment of 
Juan Sourrouille as 
economy minister 
brought a group of 
neoliberals into 
government, albeit 
in advisory 
positions until 
Machinea’s 
appointment as 
central bank head 
in Sept. 1986. 
Divisions within the 
Alfonsin regime 
remain, as 
neoliberals do not 
have the support of 
Radical Party rank-
and-file or labor 
unions. In 1985-86 
the policy team is 
divided between 
Sourrouille’s group 
in the economy 
ministry and Radical 
Party stalwart in 
central bank. After 
1987, Alfonsin 
struggles with 
Peronist-controlled 
legislature and 
provinces.  
Period marks the 
clearest case of 
external pressure on 
the Fund. Strong 
U.S. pressure 
emerges in 1987, 
but Fund suspends 
program in spite of 
lobbying from 
Treasury officials. 
Argentina continues 
to face problems 
servicing the 
external private 
debt, but little 
evidence that banks 
were able to 
influence IMF’s 
decision making 
during the period.   
1991-
2001 
Lenient: five 
separate programs 
signed during the 
period (July 1991, 
March 1992, April 
1996, February 
1998, and March 
2000). Multiple 
waivers issued for 
missed performance 
criteria; programs 
contain few 
conditions (only 
March 1992 EFF 
contains binding 
structural 
conditions). 
High: American-
trained economists 
(Cavallo, 
Fernandez, Pou, 
Machinea) control 
both the economy 
ministry and 
central bank 
throughout the 
period.  
Menem’s surprise 
turn to neoliberals in 
1991 is widely 
supported, giving 
policy team 
significant room to 
carry out reforms. 
The political 
consensus 
underpinning the 
reform effort 
unravels after 1996 
as recession and 
austerity measures 
generate social 
discontent; policy 
team under Radical 
government (1999-
2001) is constrained 
as political situation 
deteriorates.  
Period provides 
weakest evidence 
for the technocratic 
view of the Fund 
(fiscal discipline 
and structural 
reforms are 
recognized as 
important but not 
enforced); some 
evidence in favor of 
bureaucratic 
explanation 
(officials from 
outside Western 
Hemisphere 
Department raised 
concerns about 
leniency after 
1996).  
Table 5.2 provides summarizes some of the key findings in the Argentine case 
study. In the table I characterize the Fund’s treatment in each period, the degree of 
neoliberal influence, the domestic political environment, and the role of alternative 
explanations.  
This chapter focused mainly on explaining the Fund’s treatment of different 
policy teams between 1976 and 2001. In line with the cross-national evidence, the 
Fund’s elective affinity for teams composed of likeminded authorities resulted in 
better treatment. Also consistent with the statistical results (presented in chapter 4), 
neoliberal officials in Argentina appear to have benefited politically from their closer 
relationship with the IMF. Argentina had 24 finance ministers between 1970 and 
2000; three are considered neoliberals by the criteria I developed in chapter 3. 
Neoliberal economy ministers survived, on average, for 1,096 days; non-neoliberals in 
Argentina lasted, on average, less than a year (353 days).247 The difference is 
statistically significant (t = 2.26, p = 0.03). The difference in survival rates between 
neoliberal and non-neoliberal central bank governors mirrors the findings for finance 
ministers. The four neoliberal Argentine central bankers between 1970 and 2000 held 
office, on average, for 1,209 days. The average survival time for non-neoliberal 
central bankers in Argentina over the same period was 213 days (t = 5.06, p < 0.0000).  
 Domingo Cavallo understood that his neoliberal credentials helped him gain 
better treatment from the Fund. When asked to reflect on the importance of his 
Harvard background for his relations with IMF officials, Cavallo replied that his 
training was “enormously helpful in establishing a relationship of confidence.”248 The 
                                                 
247 A policymaker is coded as neoliberal if he or she earned a masters degree from a top-30 ranked 
American economics department or had significant experience in the IMF or World Bank. By these 
criteria, neither Martinez de Hoz nor Sourrouille or coded as neoliberal; when a looser definition that 
records these two as neoliberals is used, the average survival time for neoliberals is 1,323 days, 
compared to 216 days for the remaining economy ministers (t = 6.16, p < 0.0000).  
248 “Ayuda muchísimo el establecimiento de una relación de confianza.” Quoted in Heredia 2004: 329.  
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IMF faces enormous uncertainties in the lending process, and the presence of 
likeminded authorities helps reassure the staff and management that the authorities are 
going to make a good-faith effort to carry out the program. In Argentina, the IMF was 
“willing to give Domingo Cavallo more slack than Bernardo Grinspun. The Fund is 
more likely to take someone who shares our worldview at their word.”249 In my 
reconstruction of the Argentina-IMF story, shared economic ideas proved to be far 
more important than other factors – pressure from the U.S. and private banks, 
economic performance and systemic risks from an Argentine economic collapse, 
domestic political institutions – in explaining the variation in the Fund’s treatment of 
the country between 1976 and 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
249 Interview with Desmond Lachman, Washington DC, April 6, 2009. 
Chapter Six 
Conclusions – the Future of the Fund 
When the International Monetary Fund was created, capital was immobile, 
domestic currencies were exchanged at fixed parities, and many of the world’s poor 
countries remained tethered to colonial relationships with European powers. The 
lessons from the interwar period were fresh in the minds of the institution’s architects: 
competitive currency and trade practices, as well as unregulated cross-border capital 
flows, could have pernicious political and economic consequences. The world needed 
a multilateral institution to make resources available for countries experiencing short-
term balance of payments difficulties. An effective multilateral lending institution was 
essential to maintaining smooth international economic relations.  
Over time, the international economic and political environment changed 
dramatically, and the IMF changed with it. The Fund, once an obscure part of the 
Bretton Woods institutional architecture, became an important actor in world politics. 
It took a leading role in tackling a series of regional and global economic challenges – 
the Latin American debt crisis, the transition from socialist authoritarianism to market 
democracy in Eastern Europe, the wave of financial crises that swept the globe in the 
1990s, and the ongoing global crisis originating in the collapse of several large 
American financial institutions in September 2008 – and at each point its defenders 
suggested that the institution’s resources and policy advice fostered desirable 
outcomes (global economic stability and pro-market reforms), while critics bemoaned 
both the logic and consequences of the conditions attached to its loans. Neither side 
can deny that the lives of billions of people in low- and middle-income countries have 
been affected by decisions made in an office building on 19th and H Streets in 
Washington, DC. Whether the IMF has been, on balance, a force for good or ill in the 
world remains a topic of intense debate.  
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Overview of the Chapter  
This dissertation was motivated by several important questions about the 
Fund’s behavior in low- and middle-income countries: How does the IMF make 
decisions about the prudent use of its resources? Why is there so much variation in the 
IMF’s treatment of its borrowers? What are the political consequences of IMF lending 
arrangements?  
The argument in the preceding chapters relied on shared economic ideas to 
answer these questions. In this concluding chapter I review the logic of the argument 
and restate the key findings in the dissertation. Later, I consider a possible alternative 
interpretation of the empirical results related to the IMF’s treatment of borrowers. In 
the third and final sections of the chapter, I draw lessons for future research on 
international organizations and for the proposal to reform the IMF.  
Brief Review of the Argument and Evidence 
In the first section of the dissertation I developed a new theoretical framework 
to explain variation in the Fund’s lending activities in low and middle income 
countries. My argument consisted of two steps. First, I made the case that the 
structural constraints on the IMF are looser than portrayed in the conventional 
approaches to the institution. A number of factors contribute to the Fund’s autonomy. 
Unlike sovereign states the Fund does not face serious threats to its survival from 
competing institutions, and in contrast to the situation facing private investors, the risk 
that borrowers will renege on their debt to the Fund is low. The IMF does not depend 
on contributions from non-borrowing members to fund its operations. Additionally, as 
discussed in chapter 2, the informal rules that govern the institution’s activities have 
empowered the staff members and weakened the Executive Directors, who 
(ostensibly) are the representatives of the narrower interests of powerful member 
states.    
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Rather than view the IMF as an institution in thrall to the material interests of 
powerful states, private financial actors, or individual staff members, I argued that the 
Fund should be viewed as a purposive actor in world politics that is primarily driven 
by a set of economic ideas. The worldview of the Fund’s staff and management is 
shaped by a nexus of economic beliefs that I refer to as “neoliberal.”1 Neoliberal ideas 
have been dominant in top American economics departments for many years.2 These 
ideas are often portrayed as simple descriptions of an objective economic reality 
accepted by all serious economists (“good economics”), but the variation in the degree 
to which the core assumptions of the neoliberal consensus are contested by 
practitioners in different national settings belies the claim.3 The data I gathered on the 
training of upper-level management at the IMF demonstrated that, at its upper reaches, 
the institution is dominated by American-trained economists.  
The second step of the argument links the ideas that shape the Fund’s purpose 
to the choices that the staff and management make about the prudent use of the 
institution’s resources. In chapter 2 I argued that the prospects for IMF lending 
arrangements are highly uncertain; according to an internal staff memorandum, over 
                                                 
1 As defined in chapter 2, neoliberalism is a shared mental model that consists of three core assumptions 
(the market is the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources, market actors have rational beliefs, 
and free exchange of goods across borders is desirable) and three auxiliary policy recommendations 
(governments should pursue fiscal discipline, a country’s economic orientation should be outward, and 
countries should rely on markets for the allocation of goods and resources and for the setting of prices). 
2 Some argue that the neoliberal consensus in American economics is breaking down as experimental 
evidence from the branch of the discipline influenced by psychology, behavioral economics, 
undermines the assumption of rational behavior that forms one of the planks of the consensus. It is 
unclear how many inroads behavioralists have made in shifting the mainstream of the field. In Marion 
Fourcade’s assessment of the American economics discipline, “the assumption that people behave 
rationally was not seriously challenged until the recent emergence of behavior economics – but even 
that view remains marginal in economics today” (2009: 94). It is possible that the ongoing global 
financial crisis may force the leading lights in the discipline to rethink some of the deeply held 
assumptions at the core of the neoclassical consensus. But all academic disciplines are large ships that 
take a long time to turn around – and this is particularly true for one in which “training is homogenous 
and scientific rules are fairly rigid” (Fourcade 2009: 92).   
3 For a fascinating discussion of the differences between the economics profession in the U.S., UK, and 
France, see Fourcade 2009. Fourcade presents evidence from surveys administered to practicing 
economists in different countries that illustrate a large degree of discord – rather than consensus – on a 
range of basic economic principles (2009: 6).  
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75 percent of the structural adjustment programs concluded in the years between 1986 
and 1994 were suspended for noncompliance. The Fund’s economists have to contend 
with highly unsettled and complex political dynamics in the countries that seek to 
make use of the institution’s resources. An important point follows: the IMF is forced 
to make fundamentally political decisions in the face of strong environmental 
uncertainty. The IMF’s decision making process is not insulated from social and 
political relations in the developing countries that form its main constituency.  
The Fund’s loans are intended to support economic stabilization efforts and to 
prod countries to follow a beneficial path of reform, but the IMF’s powers of 
persuasion and coercion are limited. The presence of likeminded authorities in top 
policy positions in borrowing countries reassures the Fund that the team in control is 
likely to follow the institution’s preferred set of policies, and presents an opportunity 
for the institution to provide political support for policy teams that share the Fund’s 
commitment to the core set of neoliberal economic beliefs. Because the IMF likes and 
trusts fellow neoliberal travelers, I expected to observe that the Fund discriminates in 
its treatment of borrowers in favor of policy teams populated with likeminded 
officials.  
Indeed, in chapter 3 this is precisely what I found. In that chapter I made use of 
new, comprehensive data on the extent of conditionality and size of loans in 503 loans 
signed between 1980 and 2000 to test the argument, as well as a measure of the 
issuance of waivers for noncompliance with binding conditions (1980-1997). I also 
introduced the measure of the degree of neoliberal influence on policymaking (a 
variable I referred to as proportion neoliberal) which relied on information on 
educational background and work experience with the Bank and the Fund for over 
2,000 individuals to record whether top policymakers (executives, finance ministers, 
central bankers, and other important officials) were likely to hold neoliberal beliefs. I 
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found strong positive associations between my key explanatory variable and the size 
of loans and between proportion neoliberal and the presence of waivers. The indicator 
for the degree of neoliberal influence on policymaking displayed a strong negative 
relationship with the number of conditions in IMF loans. The results in chapter 3 were 
robust to numerous alternative specifications, the inclusion of a wide range of 
additional covariates, and the exclusion of outlying observations.  
Chapter 4 turned to testing an interesting implication of the theoretical 
framework and the result in the previous chapter: if likeminded authorities benefit 
from a systematic pattern of lenient treatment from the IMF, are there political payoffs 
for their ability to deliver good relations with an international institution that, for many 
poor countries, functions as an economic lifeline? I argued that neoliberal officials in 
borrowing country are particularly valuable to the political masters that determine 
their fate. Consequently, I expected to find that neoliberals under IMF programs 
survive in office longer than their non-neoliberal counterparts. Working with a large 
sample of top policymakers (539 finance ministers and 295 central bank executives in 
countries under IMF lending arrangements) and event history models, I found 
evidence in favor of the claim. Among countries under active IMF programs between 
1980 and 2000, the risk of removal was approximately 29 percent lower for finance 
ministers and 40 percent lower for central bankers that have neoliberal credentials.  
 In the second part of chapter 4 I investigated the possibility that, because 
likeminded officials are valorized by the Fund, the political influence of neoliberal 
economists might be correlated with the number of years a country spent under IMF 
lending arrangements. Indeed, I found a strong relationship between the degree of IMF 
involvement in a country and the proportion of the top policymaking positions held by 
individuals that share the Fund’s worldview, a finding that persisted even when I took 
steps to account for the possible endogeneity of the relationship. 
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The final empirical chapter in the dissertation was a qualitative comparison of 
four periods in Argentina’s long and bitter relationship with the IMF. The contours of 
the case illustrated the importance of shared economic ideas to the Fund’s decision 
making. During the two periods in which neoliberals were ascendant in Argentina 
(1976-81 and 1991-2001), the IMF’s treatment of the country was lenient; when 
officials that were less sympathetic to neoliberalism took control of policymaking in 
the first years of the new democratic regime in Argentina (1983-85), the Fund’s 
relationship with the country deteriorated. During a fourth period (1985-90) in which 
neoliberals had some sway over economic policymaking but were unable to 
consolidate their control of the top positions in government, the IMF initially rewarded 
the team with lenient and weakly enforced conditional loans; later, the Fund’s patience 
wore thin, and it suspended a program in the face of pressure from U.S. officials on 
the staff and management to continue to provide support for the Alfonsin government.    
As a test of my argument, the case study had several advantages: I could 
develop a better measure of ideational consonance than the noisy (but useful) 
indicators of neoliberal ideas I employed in the quantitative tests; I was able to pay 
close attention to the broader political context in which programs were negotiated; I 
was able to more closely examine the way in which the other explanations outlined in 
chapter 2 accounted for the facts of the case and, at some points, complemented my 
ideational explanation; and, finally, the within-unit comparative structure of the case 
allowed me to see how variation in the key explanatory variable affected outcomes 
(IMF treatment) while many other factors were held constant. While the other 
explanations were important factors at several points in the Fund-Argentine 
relationship, the evidence presented in chapter 5 allows me to make a strong case that 
the degree of ideational consonance between the policy team and the Fund is the most 
consistently important causal factor influencing IMF decision making in the 25-year 
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period I examine.  
The Argentine case study provided a number of instances that demonstrated 
the political calculus shaping IMF decision making. The IMF’s brand of politics 
focuses on the character of a small group of policy elites, but the archival materials 
suggested that the institution’s staff members did pay some attention to the political 
constraints under which the various policy teams operated. However, the episodic 
evidence indicated that the IMF’s support for likeminded policymakers sometimes 
came at the cost of a broader assessment of the extent to which the political consensus 
necessary for the implementation of tough stabilization and reform efforts had eroded.  
Are Neoliberals More Competent Policymakers?  
My argument outlined in the previous section is premised upon an assumption: 
the reason the Fund favors certain types of policy teams is that the institution’s staff 
and management have an elective affinity for likeminded individuals. The Fund 
cannot know with any calculable certainty whether the institution’s purpose will be 
served when it sits down with a prospective borrower to hammer out the terms of a 
lending agreement; consequently, the political and social preferences (or less 
felicitously, biases) of the IMF exert an important effect on decisions about the 
tightness of conditionality, generosity of loans, and response to the failure of 
borrowers to meet performance criteria.  
Others might interpret the findings in the dissertation differently.  Perhaps the 
Fund’s decision making has little to do with political dynamics: the staff and 
management prefer to work with neoliberals because these individuals are simply 
better suited to the task of managing economic policy. The socializing experiences 
that, in my argument, transmit neoliberal economic ideas to policymakers also confer 
a bundle of other attributes. Along with economic ideas, economists with advanced 
training from highly-ranked American economics departments may have technical 
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skills or innate abilities that make them more “competent” economic officials. This 
perspective assumes that neoliberal credentials are in themselves meaningful signals 
of a policymaker’s type. There is no need to refer to the ideas held by IMF staff 
members if all rational individuals perceive neoliberals to be better equipped to carry 
out stabilization and reform programs. It is not just that neoliberal officials in low and 
middle countries speak the same language as the IMF’s economists; they are fluent in 
the correct language.   
 It is not entirely clear what evidence to look for that would allow me to 
differentiate between the ideational mechanism I proposed in the dissertation and the 
competence mechanism. The problem is that ideas and technical abilities are 
intertwined.4 One possible approach, which I leave for future research, is to identify 
different sites of socialization that impart the same level of technical ability to 
policymakers but confer distinct economic ideas. The fact that there are distinct 
national styles of economics suggests one productive empirical avenue.5 Colonial 
relationships that drew graduate students to the French educational system in many 
African countries, for example, provide an opportunity to compare the IMF’s 
                                                 
4 This issue, which is framed as the indeterminacy of ideational and material factors, has given critics 
ammunition in their efforts to deemphasize the explanatory contributions of shared ideas in the field of 
International Relations. For example, Michael Desch, in a survey of research in security studies, 
proclaimed that ideational explanations “do not provide much additional explanatory power beyond 
existing theories” (1998: 158). Similarly, William Wohlforth has criticized the ideational explanations 
for the end of the Cold War, suggesting that the “question remains whether accounts focused on ideas 
really advance claims of causal importance that contradict findings about the role of material 
incentives” (2005: 167). Even one of the leading figures in constructivist IPE, Craig Parsons, accepts 
that “the basic problem for ideational argument is to separate the causal effects of actors’ beliefs from 
direct structural or institutional pressures” (2003: 10). Parsons develops an approach to distinguish the 
independent causal effect of ideas from the effect of material variables: if an intersubjective idea is 
posited to exert a causal impact on an outcome, we should observe that two actors in the same objective 
material position chose different outcomes because they held different ideas (“where ideas strongly 
crosscut prevailing lines of organization in a political arena, we can display their autonomous impact in 
robust, methodologically conservative ways…such cases will not prove that ideas matter everywhere, 
but they will establish that ideas can be major causes in politics”) (2003: 11-12).  
5 On the difference between practices in the economics professions in the U.S., France, and UK see 
Fourcade 2009. The differences in viewpoints discovered in Fourcade’s interviews between French and 
American economists are wide and persistent.  
 269
treatment of governments composed mainly of French-trained economists and its 
relationship with American-trained officials.6   
 There are reasons to approach the competence-based explanation of the 
findings with suspicion. Two questionable assumptions underlie the argument. The 
first is that economic policymaking is too complex to be left in the hands of non-
specialists (the engineers, lawyers, leaders of industry, and other generalists that serve 
in top positions in many low- and middle-income countries). If neoliberals are indeed 
more competent, it must be the case that they put their skills to use by consistently 
delivering better policy outcomes.7 In chapter 4 I gave examples of highly successful 
policymakers that were not trained in American economics departments – as well as 
several high-profile examples of venal U.S-trained and IFI-affiliated officials – which 
suggest that the case for differences in the baseline level of competence between types 
of policymakers (neoliberal and non-neoliberal) is weak.   
 The second problem is that competence in the realm of policymaking is private 
information that is not revealed until after an individual has gained office.8 It is 
                                                 
6 I thank Nicolas van de Walle for suggesting this point. Others have suggested to me in private 
conversation that not only are the best and brightest students disproportionately attracted to American 
economics departments, but that departments outside the U.S. are much weaker in training and 
consequently produce sub par economists. There is a circular logic to this claim: neoliberal ideas are 
objectively correct, which means that only socializing processes in which neoliberalism forms the 
normative basis for the technical training can produce competent practitioners. In my view, this extreme 
position reveals more about how ideas shape perceptions of competence than about the nature of 
individuals’ capabilities.   
7 Competence is a relational concept – it is only meaningful when it is for some defined purpose. A 
corrupt finance minister would be considered incompetent when the outcome of interest is delivering 
good public policies, but might be exceptionally skilled at lining his own pockets.     
8 In the literature on political business cycles, the concept of competency has been employed to explain 
manipulation of macroeconomic policy by opportunistic governments. As formulated most famously by 
Rogoff (1990), rational voters develop beliefs about the effectiveness of incumbent governments based 
on observed outcomes. Elected officials can increase the money supply just before elections, 
temporarily gaining the advantage of greater perceived competence before the post-election costs of the 
policy are revealed and voters discover the government’s true level of competency (see Keech 1995: 
58-61 for a review of other competency-based work on political cycles). In this well-established 
literature, competency is a property that can only be assessed based upon the observed performance of 
government officials. This property enables incumbents to insidiously manipulate the levers of fiscal 
and monetary policy to signal their own competence to observers.     
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difficult to measure skillful policymaking – informed observers are likely to disagree 
based on their own beliefs about what constitutes effective management of the 
economy (high growth rates versus more equitable distribution of income, for 
example) – and predicting whether an individual will be successful based on a set of 
observed characteristics is an even bigger challenge. Yet the competence argument 
presumes that, as a rule, economists with degrees from highly ranked American 
universities or experience working in the Fund or the World Bank are more skillful, 
and that this information is both accurate and widely known.  
In addition, the evidence presented in chapter 3 contradicts the argument about 
the greater competency of American-trained policymakers. Recall that I found a very 
strong relationship between the proportion of neoliberals in top policy positions and 
the likelihood that a borrower would receive waivers. If neoliberals possess a greater 
degree of policymaking competency, then they should not need the Fund to issue 
waivers to allow their government to continue drawing on the institution’s resources – 
the need for waivers, after all, indicates a failure to meet the policy targets specified in 
the Letter of Intent.   
 An example of a specific policymaker’s experience is helpful in demonstrating 
the limits of the competence argument. In 1982 Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard 
economics PhD with a reputation for brilliance, became head of Argentina’s central 
bank. As I mentioned in chapter 4 and detailed in a footnote in chapter 5, Cavallo’s 
first foray into policymaking was disastrous: after his policies exacerbated the 
country’s severe inflationary crisis he was replaced, just 54 days following the date of 
his appointment. In early 1991 Cavallo entered office again as Economy Minister; 
when he was removed in 1996, he had become Argentina’s longest-running economic 
official, and he had led the country through difficult reforms and into a period of 
economic recovery. Cavallo’s experience is evidence of the difficulties involved in 
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linking credentials to policymaking competency. Because economic conditions in low- 
and middle-income countries are by nature highly unsettled, it becomes extremely 
difficult to predict how well a policymaker will be able to handle the challenges that 
she confronts.  
It is hard to predict success even in settings in which information is plentiful 
and uncertainty is low. Professional football – which has been a surprisingly rich 
source of illustrative examples in the study of International Relations9 – gives us the 
“quarterback problem.”10 Scouts and coaches of teams in the National Football 
League, who have almost unlimited resources and access to minute details on each 
player’s physical characteristics and performance record, have found it nearly 
impossible to predict the success of quarterbacks in the league. Many quarterbacks 
that were sure bets coming out of their college experience turn out to be busts once 
they meet competition at the professional level. Professional football teams cannot 
accurately use the massive of amount of information at hand to predict the capabilities 
of their most important players. While football and economic policymaking do not 
share many characteristics, the “quarterback problem” belies the assumption that the 
IMF is able to use credentials to accurately assess the relative competence of top 
economic officials that are sitting across the negotiating table.  
Instead, I think it is more accurate to argue that the Fund perceives that fellow 
neoliberals are more competent policymakers.11 This claim is perfectly compatible 
                                                 
9 Kirshner 2000.  
10 The term comes from Malcolm Gladwell, who uses the example of quarterbacks to demonstrate that 
“there are certain jobs where almost nothing you can learn about candidates before they start predicts 
how they’ll do once they’re hired.” The performance of teachers is also very difficult to predict based 
on observed characteristics: according to the research cited by Gladwell, “test scores, graduate degrees, 
and certifications—as much as they appear related to teaching prowess—turn out to be about as useful 
in predicting success as having a quarterback throw footballs into a bunch of garbage cans.” Malcolm 
Gladwell, “Most Likely to Succeed,” The New Yorker, December 15, 2008.  
11 Returning to the realm of sports, Gladwell (2008) arrives at a similar argument: “there is nothing like 
being an N.F.L. quarterback except being an N.F.L. quarterback. A prediction, in a field where 
prediction is not possible, is no more than a prejudice.” 
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with the ideational explanation I advance in the dissertation. Since it is not possible, in 
my view, to predict ex ante whether an individual will make a successful or 
unsuccessful finance minister or central banker, the IMF’s staff members have to rely 
on their beliefs about the nature of economic competence and which actors are likely 
to have it.  
Lessons for Research on International Institutions 
 The most obvious implication of the findings reported in the dissertation is that 
closer investigation of the interests of international organizations offers empirical 
payoffs. For many mainstream scholars in International Relations, it does not make 
sense to spend time investigating the sources of the IMF’s interests. For realists, 
international institutions like the Fund do the bidding of their powerful members.12 In 
the so-called rational design approach, the behavior of international institutions is 
shaped by the institutional features determined by important member states. The 
difference between the two approaches is that the rational design proponents have a 
more capacious view of state interests: states care about solving collective problems 
that lead to suboptimal outcomes (in addition to worrying about their relative power 
and security). 13 Many scholars that look within the institution for clues about the 
Fund’s behavior assume that bureaucrats rationally respond to incentives for 
aggrandizement, even if these actions by individual staff members generate perverse 
behaviors by the institution as a whole.  
 Barnett and Finnemore argued that “scholars of IOs [international 
organizations] need to recognize that there is variation in IO interests and that to 
                                                 
12 Mearsheimer 1994; on the IMF specifically, see Dreher and Jensen 2007; Stone 2002, 2004, 2008; 
Thacker 1999.  
13 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal summarize this approach to the study of international institutions: 
“our basic strategy is to treat institutions as rational, negotiated responses to the problems international 
actors face” (2001: 768).  
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understand that variation requires unpacking the international organization.”14 The 
research presented in the previous pages illustrates the power of their claim. We 
should not simply assume that the institution responds strategically to obvious 
material incentives. Peering into the institution to see how it actually works revealed 
an organization that is driven by principled beliefs more than the pursuit of material 
interests. The nature of the institution’s work explains why materialist explanations 
miss much of the story: powerful states have delegated significant autonomy to the 
Fund to solve difficult problems experienced by low- and middle-income countries. 
The purpose of the Fund is not given by external environment; it is up to the 
institution’s officials to interpret the nature of the problems and to determine which 
tools can solve the problems. 
My theoretical approach in the dissertation dovetails with recent research that 
treats the international financial institutions as social actors that are shaped by distinct 
institutional cultures.15 The common thread in this line of research is that the Bank’s 
and the Fund’s activities are to a large extent the product of the informal rules, norms, 
and ideas that constitute the cultural milieu of each institution. As Catherine Weaver 
notes in her study of the World Bank, these social elements “provide staff with a 
certainty about missions that allows them to pursue tasks with sustained efficiency in 
the face of environmental uncertainty.”16  
This research and the work that emphasizes the rational design of institutions 
agree on one key point: states find it useful to delegate authority to international 
institutions to manage difficult challenges in world politics. Where the two streams 
part is over the issue of whether the key variables that shape how institutions carry out 
                                                 
14 Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 4.  
15 See Abdelal 2007 on the IMF’s push for capital account liberalization; Barnett and Finnemore 2004 
on the evolution of IMF conditionality more generally; Weaver 2008 on hypocrisy in the World Bank’s 
good governance and anti-corruption agenda.  
16 Weaver 2008: 28.  
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their mandates are located in the formal design of the organization or in the social 
processes that enable individual staff members to make sense of their environment. I 
am not disputing that the architecture of the Fund – the legal relationship between the 
staff and management and Executive Directors, the weighted voting system, the 
division of the institution into regional subunits, the way that the institution is financed 
and selects its top officials, etc. – is important. It clearly is. But my research does 
correct the notion that these structural elements are all that we need to know about the 
Fund in order to understand its lending behavior. 
Do these findings offer lessons for other international institutions? The purpose 
of the dissertation has been to understand the behavior of a specific organization, but 
my findings suggest, more generally, that the self-defined social purpose of 
international organizations is at least as important as the marching orders given by 
powerful member states. However, there are some clear scope conditions for the 
theory. The International Monetary Fund is unique in several ways, and these unusual 
aspects of the institution limit the degree to which the theoretical predictions can be 
applied to other international organizations.  
There are three aspects of the Fund that make an ideational explanation 
particularly useful in this setting. First, the complexity of the task at hand – managing 
global financial stability – means that states have been willing to delegate a 
particularly large degree of authority to the institution.17 Related to the complexity of 
the external environment is the peculiar relationship between the Fund’s staff and 
management on the one hand, and the supposed representatives of state interests 
within the institution, the Executive Directors, on the other. The capacity for interested 
member governments to influence the content of IMF programs through official 
channels is limited, because the staff members have significant informational 
                                                 
17 Barnett and Finnemore 2004.  
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advantages. By the time the proposal is brought before the Executive Board, the 
content of the agreement is for all intents and purposes decided. Some suggest that 
government officials use informal means to lean on staff and management, but, aside 
from a handful of high-profile cases of meddling by Treasury officials, there is no 
evidence that the IMF consistently favors countries that score highly on the measures 
of U.S. strategic interest used in the dissertation.  
The third unique characteristic of the Fund is the degree of ideational 
coherence within the institution. The International Monetary Fund is composed of 
around 2,600 staff members, the majority of which are US-trained macroeconomists; 
in Ngaire Woods’ description, “the institution prides itself on being cohesive, 
consistent, and tightly disciplined.”18 At the upper reaches of the institution, the 
profile of top officials is remarkably similar. The fact that the Fund is a cohesive, 
tight-knight organization enables the Fund to act independently of sovereign s
the international system that might seek to use the institution.
tates in 
he 
                                                
19 The contrasts between 
the Fund and less formal organizations, such as the World Trade Organization and t
Bank for International Settlements, are stark.20 The other international institutions are 
more frequently viewed as forums in which states interact rather than as actors in their 
own right.  
While there are limits to the distances that the theoretical insights of the 
dissertation can travel, the research points to other productive avenues for future work 
 
18 Woods 2006: 7.  
19 A comment by Koremenos et al reinforces the notion that the degree of the IMF’s independence is 
unusual: “states rarely allow international institutions to become significant autonomous actors” (2001: 
762).  
20 The IMF is unique even by comparison to its sister institution, the World Bank. The Bank is a much 
larger and less organized institution, with operations spanning the globe and a less rigidly enforced 
chain of command (Woods 2006: 7). Economists obviously play an important role in shaping the World 
Bank’s agenda, but the institution includes many non-economists in important positions. The 
consistency of the ideas held by Fund officials, from the division chiefs to the newly minted PhDs in the 
Economist Program (EP), marks the IMF as an international institution without a clear parallel in the 
international system.   
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in International Political Economy. I developed a research design that allowed me to 
rigorously test the observable implications that emerged from a theoretical framework 
organized around shared ideas. It has been difficult to test ideational arguments using 
quantitative methods. Relying on the socialization processes that are likely to transmit 
ideas to individuals gives scholars a way to measure the presence of ideas across a 
large number of cases.21 The measure is admittedly noisy, but it has a very desirable 
attribute: it allowed me to test my explanation against a number of alternatives on 
relatively large samples in chapters 3 and 4. In this way I could address the “how 
much do ideas really matter?” critique that is commonly aimed at ideational research 
in IPE.  
The findings also suggest a novel mechanism linking the IMF to the diffusion 
of neoliberalism in the developing world. As reviewed by Simmons, Dobbin, and 
Garrett, research in International Relations on the diffusion of economic liberalization 
focuses on four top-down mechanisms: coercion by powerful states and international 
institutions; competition among governments for foreign investment; learning by 
governments from successful (and unsuccessful) exemplars; and mimesis by states 
that conform to global standards of institutional forms and behavior.22 The mechanism 
that I propose is rooted in domestic political processes. By raising the costs that 
leaders expect to pay for the removal of IMF-friendly officials, the presence of the 
Fund generates clear incentives for leaders to keep neoliberals in power. Most of the 
research on the role of international organizations in diffusion fixates on IOs as 
coercive instruments or teachers of norms; the findings in chapter 4 imply that the 
                                                 
21 Other examples of research that uses biographical data, including educational background, to measure 
ideas include Busby and Monten 2008; Chwieroth 2007a; Kogut and Macpherson 2008; Spilimbergo 
2009.  
22 Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2008) provide an exhaustive summary of the state of research on 
international diffusion processes.  
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transmission of neoliberal ideas from the IMF is mediated by domestic politics.23  
Finally, the findings can be viewed as evidence that the recent rediscovery of 
Knightian uncertainty in IPE yields new insights into the behavior of international 
institutions.24 Uncertainty, as conceptualized by the economist Frank Knight, is a 
distinct state of the world in which probabilities cannot be accurately calculated and 
attached to potential outcomes. Not all situations that agents in world politics find 
themselves in are characterized by strong uncertainty. Many settings involve 
predictable patterns of relations in which information may be limited (or unequally 
distributed), but the underlying state of the world is known with relative certainty. 
Nonetheless, the return of the concept of Knightian uncertainty to the study of political 
economy is a useful reminder that some situations are so unpredictable that “agents are 
unsure as to what their interests actually are, let alone how to realize them.”25  
The distinction between risk and uncertainty has “empirically observable 
implications.”26 When uncertainty reigns, agents cannot rely on their material interests 
to make decisions. If all possible paths look equally risky, rational decision makers are 
paralyzed. Instead, agents “rely on social devices to reduce uncertainty.”27 In chapter 
2 I argued that in the absence of institutions that enable organizations to conver
underlying uncertainty into calculable risk, social and political relations become an 
important part of the decision making process. Future research in International 
t 
                                                 
23 My argument bears resemblance to Way’s (2005) domestic political explanation for the diffusion of 
capital account liberalization, which focuses on the political security of leaders.  
24 For discussions of Knightian uncertainty by economic sociologists, see Bandelj 2008; Beckert 1996, 
2002; DiMaggio 2002; Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001; in comparative and international political economy, 
see Blyth 2002; Woll 2008. Denzau and North 1994 discuss uncertainty from the perspective of 
microeconomics.   
25 Blyth 2002: 9.  
26 Woll 2008: 11.  
27 Woll 2008: 12. For example, in a study of Western firms’ decisions to invest in post-Communist 
Europe, Nina Bandelj documents how “in conditions of high uncertainty, foreign investors and 
postsocialist hosts act practically: they rely on social and political clues, such as following opportunities 
in countries where they already have contacts, pursuing options that they hear about from their 
networks, and judging prospects based on the political commitments by the government in power, even 
though economic conditions may not be very promising” (2008: 98).  
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Political Economy may benefit from closer attention to the social devices that enable 
agents – individuals, firms, organizations, and states – to make decisions when rational 
calculations are not possible.  
Implications for the Future of the Fund 
My findings have implications for the ongoing debate about the Fund’s role in 
the world economy. In 1982 and 1997 the world needed a well-functioning 
multilateral financial institution; in 2009 the IMF is again central to the effort to 
restore global economic stability. One of the consequences of the global financial 
crisis that erupted in September 2008 has been the reemergence of the Fund as a 
central player in the world economy after a period in which steady growth of 
economic output, the massive buildup of reserves in a number of countries, and the 
restoration of capital flows after the crises of the late 1990s severely curtailed the 
demand for IMF loans. In the current economic climate, creditor states either cannot 
afford to offer bailouts or are unwilling to take the risks of deploying capital to needy 
countries. The financial crisis has for the foreseeable future destroyed the possibility 
of individual states mobilizing resources to assist countries on the perch of collapse; as 
former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman notes, “even in the event of 
economic crises in strategically important areas, such as Pakistan, major economic 
assistance from the United States or key European nations is unlikely. Instead, the 
IMF will have to be the primary intervenor.”28  
 It is only a slight exaggeration to note that there are about as many proposals 
for the reform of the IMF as there are economists working in think tanks in 
Washington.29 Two issues, however, are most prominent. The first involves expanding 
                                                 
28 Altman 2009: 10. In chapter 2 (footnote 65) I discuss China’s unwillingness to make a loan to 
Pakistan in November 2008, despite the massive reserves held by the Chinese government and security 
risks involved in an economic meltdown in Pakistan.  
29 Leadership selection is one common target for reform. Traditionally the head of the Fund is selected 
from a Western European country. Russia’s advocacy on behalf of Josef Tosovsky, the former Czech 
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the IMF’s resources, which (until very recently) amounted to around $250 billion. 
Compared to the size of international capital markets the Fund’s resources are meager. 
One proposed change is for member states to up their contributions to the institution. 
Indeed, after the April 2009 G20 meeting, the institution’s large member states have 
committed to replenish the IMF’s coffers to the tune of $1 trillion; delivering on this 
promise would do much to allay concerns about the Fund’s financial firepower.30 
The other plank for reforming the institution to restore its legitimacy revolves 
around the distribution of voting rights. Proponents argue that redistributing votes in 
the Executive Board to better reflect the changing distribution of international 
economic power – China, India, and Brazil gain, and the small European states lose – 
would imbue a new sense of fairness to the Fund.31    
 My research suggests that these reforms, useful as they may be, will not result 
in significant changes in the IMF’s lending behavior. Lasting change depends on a 
reorientation of the IMF’s purpose – and this hinges on a shift in the economic beliefs 
held by top management and staff.  
There is widespread recognition that the international financial institutions are 
in the middle of a crisis of legitimacy. Many elites in the developing world no longer 
regard the IMF’s staff members as “experts to whom they can turn for practical, 
impartial advice. They experience the IMF as an institution which sets down terms and 
                                                                                                                                            
central banker, as a competitor against the French choice (and eventually selection), Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, touched off a bitter debate about the opaque process by which the Executive Director is 
appointed. Strengthening the Executive Board is another perennial proposal for the reform of the 
institution (see Mussa 2002: 70; Woods 2006: 204-05). Some have proposed that the Fund scale back 
conditionality to target only “macro-critical” areas of borrowers’ economies; still others concentrate on 
reforming the way in which the IMF is financed.  
30 An alternative way of expanding the Fund’s resources comes from the financial historian Harold 
James, who proposed that the IMF begin to manage some of the massive pool of global savings. In 
James’s view, if the Fund “oversaw a significant part of the reserves of countries with surpluses, it 
would be in a strong position to take bets against speculators or stabilize markets when prices moved in 
a disorderly way” (2009: 166).  
31 Eswar Prasad’s proposal to auction voting rights to the highest bidding governments was intended to 
solve both funding and representation problems at once. “Getting the IMF’s Groove Back,” Financial 
Times, October 30, 2008.  
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demands responses from them.”32 The Fund and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank 
continue to bring their traditional views on economic policy to bear on problems that 
are unprecedented and, in the view of many observers, require more creative thinking 
than the IFIs have been willing (or able) to provide.  
In the opening chapter of the dissertation I noted the former South African 
finance minister Trevor Manuel’s comments about the “sameness” of the IMF’s staff 
members (“they go to the same Ivy League Universities and get their PhDs”).33 This 
view is widespread in the developing world.34 The IMF’s legitimacy problem runs 
deeper than dissatisfaction about voting shares or lack of resources. An institution has 
legitimacy when agents believe that the institution’s rules and norms should be 
followed.35 In many parts of the developing world policymakers no longer believe that 
the IMF provides fair and efficacious policy guidance. The view that conditionality 
has been inconsistently applied and inconsistently enforced has merit, as the results 
from the analysis in this dissertation demonstrate.  
In my view, the IMF faces a tripartite choice. It can attempt to reduce 
uncertainty by becoming much more selective in its approach to lending.36 It can 
become an automatic disbursement mechanism of the kind envisioned by Keynes. In 
both scenarios conditionality would become superfluous.  
In the third scenario, the IMF could use conditionality more effectively by 
involving analysts that are less committed to a set of neoliberal economic beliefs and 
                                                 
32 Woods 2006: 188.  
33 Quoted in Quentin Peel, “Political will for meaningful reform of IMF is still lacking,” Financial 
Times, March 17, 2009: pg. 2. 
34 For example, Artis Kampers, Latvia’s economic minister, expressed frustration with the Fund’s 
suspension of a lending program: “representatives sitting in Washington and educated at Yale do not 
fully understand what is going on in Latvia.” Quoted in Andrew Ward, “Latvia Warns IMF over 
Delayed Aid,” Financial Times June 22, 2009.     
35 Hurd 1999.  
36 There is evidence that the IMF is moving in this direction. It has designed a new lending facility for 
“pre-qualified” countries with a demonstrated track record of good macroeconomic management. 
Mexico is the first to draw on this new lending facility.   
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more concerned with how policies are actually made in developing countries. The 
Fund may need to trade off some degree of control and influence for a more effective 
and legitimate approach. Rather than focus on empowering a coterie of top-level 
economic officials to try to create credible reform programs, the institution would do 
better to take local institutions, culture, and public support into account. Rather than 
attempting to induce ownership of lending programs, the IMF should explore the 
political roots of ownership.37  
Critics might respond that this would put the Fund in the undesirable position 
of having to make “inherently more political decisions about to whom they should 
lend.”38 This misses the point: by nature of its mandate, the IMF has no choice but to 
make political choices. Since the 1980s the IMF has consistently chosen to focus on a 
small group of policymaking elites in borrowing countries. Its lending activities show 
a clear political preference for policymakers that share the neoliberal beliefs held by 
the Fund’s economist. There is not much evidence that this strategy has been 
particularly successful.  
The reform proposals neglect this issue by focusing almost exclusively on the 
formal architecture of the institution.39 The central lesson of the dissertation for the 
reform of the Fund is that ideas are as much a part of the life of the organization as the 
rules that govern membership and voting. On the one hand, the dissertation concludes 
on a pessimistic note for observers who think that the Fund in its current form is 
ineffective: dominant ideas such as neoliberalism are slow to be replaced, and the 
pattern of behavior pursued by the IMF in its capacity as a lender to needy countries is 
                                                 
37 Ngaire Woods also makes the point that the effectiveness of the institution is reduced by lack of 
attention to political and cultural factors in borrowing countries: “the Fund and Bank are ill-served by 
staff who have not had the opportunity to acquire deep knowledge of the particular circumstances 
within a country or of the culture of recipients and beneficiaries” (2006: 207).  
38 Woods 2006: 190.  
39 For example, Mussa 2002: 69-71.  
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not likely to change until new ideas circulate within the institution. On the other hand, 
my argument implies that the IMF’s behavior is not solely determined by long-
standing institutional rules that are potentially even more resistant to change than 
ideas.  
There is no magic formula for the reform of the institution, just as there is no 
variable that explains all of the variation in the Fund’s lending activities. But a view of 
the IMF as a purposive actor that is shaped, in part, by ideas is a more hopeful and, if 
the evidence in the dissertation is at all convincing, more realistic portrayal than a 
view of the Fund as handmaiden to powerful interests.    
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Description of Variables and Data Sources in Chapter 2 
 
Dependent variables1 
 
Number of binding conditions: the total number of performance criteria in each high-
conditionality agreement. 
 
Number of structural binding conditions: the total number of structural performance 
criteria (binding conditions that specify major economic policy changes rather than 
just meeting a macroeconomic target) in each high-conditionality agreement.  
 
Log of size of loan/quota: the natural log of the ratio of total size of loan disbursement 
(in millions of SDRs) to a country’s quota (in millions of SDRs).  
 
Waivers: takes a value of 1 if a waiver is approved by the Executive Board in a year in 
which a country has an active IMF program.  
 
Multiple waivers: takes a value of 1 if multiple waivers is approved in a single 
decision by the Executive Board in a year in which a country has an active IMF 
program. 
 
Independent variables 
 
Time counter: a counter variable that counts the number of years since 1980.  
 
Use of IMF credit/quota: ratio of total use of IMF credit and administrative resources 
(in billions of SDRs) to the total IMF quota (billions of SDRs).2  
 
T-bill rate: the nominal US Treasury bill rate, which is a benchmark for world interest 
rates.3  
 
Reserves/debt: Ratio of international reserves to total external debt.4  
 
GDP per capita growth: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita.5  
 
Log of GDP: the natural log of gross domestic product.6 
 
                                                 
1 The dependent variables are constructed from documents obtained from the IMF’s archives.  
2 Dreher and Vaubel 2004. 
3 Dreher and Vaubel 2004. 
4 World Bank, Global Development Finance CD-ROM (2003). 
5 World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004). 
6 World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004). 
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Debt/GNI: Ratio of total external debt to gross national income.7  
 
Government Consumption: government consumption as a percentage of GDP.8 
 
Inflation: the annual rate of consumer price inflation.9   
 
Regime type: Polity2 measure, taken from the Polity IV project. The Polity2 
democracy score computed by subtracting a measure of autocracy, AUTOC, from a 
measure of democracy, DEMOC; the score ranges from -10 (least democratic) to +10 
(most democratic). The AUTOC and DEMOC scores are indexes of scores on 
different institutional factors (such as the competitiveness and openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints on the executive recruitment, competitiveness of political 
participation, etc.).10  
 
Instability: variable takes the value of 1 if the Polity2 regime type indicator changes 
(in either direction) by at least three points during a three year period.11 
 
Left government: The Database of Political Institutions records the political party of 
the chief of government and the largest party in government. The DPI discerned the 
ideological orientation of parties by considering party names (defined as parties with 
social democrat, communist, socialist, or left-wing in the name); if the ideology of a 
party was not obvious, the coding team relied on regional and country-specific 
publications that assess party orientations. DPI’s coding was cross-checked with 
Inglehart and Huber’s (1995) survey of party experts. I code the variable as “1” when 
either the chief or the largest party in the governing coalition is recorded as a Left 
party.12  
 
Pre-Election: an indicator that takes a value of one if a legislative or executive 
election is scheduled in the next six months. Since political business cycles should 
only be present in competitive elections, I only included elections with multiple 
candidates/parties (denoted by a score of 5 or above in the Database of Political 
Institution’s electoral competitiveness index).13   
 
Post-Election: an indicator for elections that occurred in the previous six months. 
Since political business cycles should only be present in competitive elections, I only 
                                                 
7 World Bank, Global Development Finance CD-ROM (2003). 
8 World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004). 
9 World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004). 
10 Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Regime 
Transitions, 1800 – 2002,” Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity.  
11 Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
12 Philip Keefer, DPI2006 Database of Political Institutions (December 2007). 
13 Philip Keefer, DPI2006 Database of Political Institutions (December 2007). 
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included elections with multiple candidates/parties (denoted by a score of 5 or above 
in the Database of Political Institution’s electoral competitiveness index).14   
 
Veto players: a count of the total number of veto players in a political system. In 
countries where legislatures are not competitively elected, this takes a value of 1, 
indicating that only the executive wields a check.15  
 
Openness: an update of the Sachs and Warner openness indicator, the measure takes a 
value of 1 in periods of openness and 0 if the country is closed. A country is coded as 
closed if any of the following conditions hold: (1) the average unweighted tariff rate > 
40%; (2) the average core non-tariff barrier frequency on capital goods and 
intermediaries > 40%; (3) the annual black market premium > 20%; (4) the country 
has a functioning marketing board for a major export good; (5) a socialist economic 
system.16  
 
Debt rescheduling: takes the value of 1 if a Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement 
was concluded within six months (on either end) of the date of approval of an IMF 
agreement.17  
 
US military aid: the annual amount of US military assistance. Military assistance 
consists of grants and credits for military purchases, funding for the training of foreign 
troops, and transfers of military equipment under a variety of US aid programs.18  
 
U.S. Affinity: a measure of dyadic interest similarity built from roll-call votes within 
the UN General Assembly. The variable ranges from -1 to 1 with higher values 
indicating closer voting profiles between dyads. The measure employed in the analysis 
looks at similarity of voting with the United States.19  
 
Proportion Neoliberal: measures the proportion of the economic policymaking team 
that shares neoliberal economic beliefs. The economic policymaking team is 
composed of the executive and the main economic authorities in a country, as 
indicated by the signatories of IMF agreements. Policymakers are coded as neoliberal 
if they (1) earned an MA or higher at a top-ranked American economics department or 
(2) have significant experience with the IMF or World Bank.20  
                                                 
14 Philip Keefer, DPI2006 Database of Political Institutions (December 2007). 
15 Philip Keefer, DPI2006 Database of Political Institutions (December 2007).  
16 Wacziarg and Welch 2003, 2008. Expansion and improvement of trade openness measure developed 
in Sachs and Warner 1995.  
17 http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/pays 
18 US Agency for International Development, US Overseas Loans and Grants (known as the 
Greenbook) 
19 Taken from Gartzke 2006. 
20 I relied on several different sources to gather background information for policymaker, including 
Proquest’s Digital Dissertations database, Gale’s Biography Resource Center, International Who’s 
Who, The Statesman’s Yearbook, Who’s Who in International Organizations, and numerous country- 
and region-specific editions of Who’s Who. Some finance ministries and central banks provide 
biographical information on their websites. I also obtained digital records of the American Economic 
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Table A.1: Summary Stats. for Conditionality Data (Based on Sample in Table 3.3) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
No. of perf. criteria 423 12.38 2.89 6 30 
No. of struc. perf. criteria 423 1.51 2.25 0 21 
Use of IMF credit/quota 423 0.30 0.07 0.19 0.46 
U.S. Treasury Bill Rate 423 6.65 2.62 3 14.1 
Counter 423 10.78 5.81 0 20 
Reserves/debt 423 13.05 25.64 -0.17 291.39 
Debt/GNI 423 91.57 87.54 0.49 1087.76 
Per Capita GDP Growth 423 -0.27 5.53 -30.9 16.54 
Log (GDP) 423 22.75 1.60 19 27.34 
Proportion Neoliberal 423 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Regime type 423 0.27 6.84 -9 10 
Veto Players 423 2.40 1.62 1 9 
Pre-Election Period 423 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Left Government 423 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Debt Rescheduling 423 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Openness 423 0.45 0.50 0 1 
U.S. Affinity 423 0.06 0.27 -0.30 1 
U.S. military aid 423 18,708.5 143,913.7 0 1,654,229 
 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Loan Size Dataset (Based on Sample in Table 3.6) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Size Quota (logged) 445 4.22 0.75 2.65 7.31 
Use of IMF credit/quota 445 0.30 0.07 0.19 0.46 
U.S. Treasury Bill Rate 445 6.66 2.63 3 14.1 
Reserves/debt 445 13.14 25.26 -0.17 291.39 
Debt/GNI 445 88.76 86.07 0.49 1087.76 
Per Cap. GDP Growth 445 -0.19 5.39 -30.9 16.54 
Log (GDP) 445 22.78 1.60 19 27.34 
Proportion Neoliberal 445 0.10 0.18 0 1 
Regime type 445 0.33 6.83 -9 10 
Post-Election Period 445 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Left Government 445 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Debt Rescheduling 445 0.44 0.50 0 1 
U.S. Affinity 445 0.06 0.28 -0.31 1 
U.S. military aid 445 17,796 140,360.2 0 1,654,229 
                                                                                                                                            
Review’s membership survey. Because the background information was generated from a wide range of 
sources, I made sure to cross-check the coding against multiple sources to ensure consistency.  
 287
 288
Table A.3: Summary Statistics for Waivers Dataset (Based on Sample in Table 3.8) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Waivers 697 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Multiple Waivers 697 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Use of IMF credit/quota 697 0.29 0.07 0.19 0.42 
U.S. Treasury Bill Rate 697 6.86 2.74 3 14.1 
Reserves/debt 697 12.41 23.41 -0.17 291.40 
Debt/GNI 697 91.22 97.43 0.49 1087.76 
Per Cap. GDP Growth 697 -0.16 5.29 -30.9 16.54 
Log (GDP) 697 22.80 1.58 19 27.17 
Inflation 697 83.89 581.53 -14.94 11,174.9 
Gov’t Consumption 697 14.13 5.81 2.98 54.51 
Proportion Neoliberal 697 0.12 0.20 0 1 
Regime Type 697 -0.05 6.86 -9 10 
Instability 697 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Election 697 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Left Government 697 0.31 0.46 0 1 
U.S. Affinity 697 0.04 0.26 -0.31 1 
U.S. military aid 697 23,194.4 158,449.2 0 1,678,010 
Debt rescheduling 697 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Spline_1 697 -234.63 595.28 -4096 0 
Spline_2 697 -81.82 159.18 -840 0 
Spline_3 697 -115.55 245.06 -1344 0 
 
APPENDIX B 
Robustness Checks for Influential Observations 
 I rely on deviance residuals to identify outlying observations that might bias 
the results reported in chapter 3.1 The residuals are calculated from the comprehensive 
models reported in the body of the chapter (the specifications in tables 3.3, 3.6, and 
3.8 with each of the covariates included). Observations that have large deviance 
residuals are poorly explained by the statistical model; for example, large positive 
(negative) residuals calculated from the results in table 3.3 indicate agreements that 
have many more (fewer) binding conditions than predicted based on the values of the 
explanatory variables. As a rule of thumb, a deviance residual on an observation that is 
greater than the absolute value of 2 constitutes an outlier and is worth investigating. It 
is important to note that there is no widely accepted cutoff point above which an 
observation can be considered unusual or potentially influential. Visualizations of the 
distribution of the residuals provide the most effective way to identify potentially 
problematic data points.2 The plots in the following pages draw attention to some 
obvious outliers. I focus here on whether the results stand up when the outlying 
observations are excluded, rather than devoting attention to exploring the reasons for 
the observation’s poor fit.   
I start by plotting the residual for each observation against that observation’s 
predicted outcome value (the predicted number of conditions, size of loan, and 
probability of receiving a waiver). In figure B.1 I track the smoothed deviance 
                                                 
1 Deviance residuals resemble the raw residuals obtained in linear regression; raw (or natural) residuals 
are simply the difference between the fitted and observed values of Y. In large samples the raw residuals 
in OLS regressions are symmetrically distributed around zero with constant variance, but in count data 
the residuals, even in large samples, are heteroskedastic and asymmetrically distributed. Deviance 
residuals are normalized and are roughly symmetric, thus paralleling raw residuals in linear regression, 
and are an effective way to diagnose problems in maximum likelihood models of the type used to 
examine the determinants of the number of conditions and the presence of waivers (see Cameron and 
Trivedi 1998: 141-42; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2003: 122-23).  
2 Jonathan Fox, in a treatise on regression diagnostics, argues that “numerical criteria are no substitute 
for graphical examination of the residuals” (1991: 33).  
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residuals (on the y-axis) against the predicted number of binding conditions based on 
the Poisson model reported in table 3.3.  To facilitate the identification of specific IMF 
agreements, each observation is listed by country name in the plots.  
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Figure B.1: Smoothed Residuals vs. Predicted Number of Binding Conditions 
Most of the residuals are distributed fairly evenly around 0, but a handful of 
agreements that contain more conditions than expected appear in the top quarter of the 
plot. Perhaps by including these unusual observations I obtain misleading estimates 
about the effect of my key explanatory variable, proportion neoliberal. To get a better 
sense of which IMF agreements I should be concerned about, I plotted the deviance 
residuals against the year in which an agreement was signed.  
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Figure B.2: Smoothed Residuals Tracked over Time, Binding Conditions Data 
Six agreements, starting with Argentina’s late 1984 standby agreement and 
ending with unusually detailed programs signed by South Korea in December 1997 
and Bulgaria in September 1998, stand out. In the reanalysis of the impact of 
proportion neoliberal on the total number of binding conditions I exclude the six 
outlying agreements.   
I follow the same strategy to identify outliers in the data on the number of 
structural binding conditions. Figure B.3 plots the smoothed deviance residuals 
calculated from the negative binomial model in table 3.3 against the predicted number 
of structural conditions.  
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Figure B.3: Smoothed Residuals vs. Predicted No. Binding Structural Conditions 
Figure B.3 draws attention to a cluster of unusual observations: each are 
predicted to have around 2 structural conditions, yet the actual agreements contain 
many more structural conditions than expected. Five of the countries are usual 
suspects – agreements from Benin, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bulgaria, and Korea were 
identified in the previous figures as unusually detailed agreements that are worthy of a 
closer look. In addition, according to the figure, an agreement signed with Haiti 
appears to be an outlier. To see which specific agreements are unusual in terms of the 
number of structural conditions, I plot the deviance residuals against time in figure 
B.4.  I use the plot to identify the six outliers in the structural conditionality data, 
which are removed from the subsequent reanalysis.  
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Figure B.4: Smoothed Residuals Tracked over Time, Structural Conditions Data 
In table B.1 I reanalyze the data on the total number of binding conditions 
(column 1) and the number of binding structural conditions (column 2) with the 
outlying agreements omitted from the analysis. The findings continue to provide 
support for the central claim in the chapter: borrowing countries with a greater 
proportion of neoliberal economic policymakers tend to receive programs with fewer 
conditions. The six observations removed from each specification due to very high 
deviance residuals do not appear to affect the main conclusions from the data analysis. 
The coefficient for proportion neoliberal in the first column in table B.1 is slightly 
smaller than the result reported in the comprehensive model with the outliers included, 
but the size of the effect of the key explanatory variable on the number of structural 
conditions increases when the outliers are taken out. There is no evidence that the 
findings in chapter 3 related to the extent of conditionality in IMF loans between 1980 
and 2000 are strongly influenced by a small number of extreme observations. 
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Table B.1: Determinants of Binding Conditions, Outliers Removed 
 No. performance criteria No. struc. perf. criteria 
Independent variables (1) Poisson (2) Negative binomial 
Time Counter 0.018*** 0.115*** 
 (0.003) (0.023) 
Use of IMF Credit/Quota t-1 0.197 -0.046 
 (0.106) (0.850) 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate t-1 -0.016** -0.039 
 (0.005) (0.050) 
Reserves/Debt t-1 0.0003 -0.003 
 (0.0002) (0.003) 
Debt/GNI t-1 0.0002* 0.0003 
 (0.00006) (0.0005) 
Log GDPt-1 0.005 -0.122* 
 (0.006) (0.055) 
GDP Per Capita Growtht-1 -0.002 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.011) 
Proportion Neoliberal -0.179*** -1.241** 
 (0.048) (0.410) 
Pre-Election Period -0.018 -0.187 
 (0.023) (0.158) 
Left Government 0.024 -0.043 
 (0.017) (0.145) 
Regime Type t-1 -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.002) (0.018) 
Veto Players  0.002 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.075) 
U.S. Military Aid t-1 3.06x10-8* 4.88x10-7** 
 (1.53x10-8 ) (1.64x10-7) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 -0.052 -0.751** 
 (0.037) (0.260) 
Debt Rescheduling 0.064*** -0.077 
 (0.019) (0.112) 
Openness t-1  -0.198 
  (0.161) 
Constant 2.184*** 2.085 
 (0.167) (1.275) 
No. of observations 417 417 
Log likelihood -960.290 -598.532 
Wald χ 2 349.64 90.01 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; outliers removed. *p<10%; 
**p<5%; ***p<1% 
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I follow the same strategy for the models of the size of IMF loans and the 
issuance of waivers: I start by plotting the deviance residuals against the predicted 
outcome to identify possible outliers; I then specify the outliers in graphs of residuals 
against time, and re-analyze the data with the poorly predicted observations omitted.3  
 Figure B.5 displays the plot containing the smoothed residuals compared to the 
predicted size of IMF loans; figure B.6 shows the distribution of residuals over time. 
Most of the observations are scattered evenly, but our attention is drawn to two 
agreements that were much larger than expected: Korea’s 1997 standby arrangement 
and Turkey’s agreement from 1999.  
 
                                                 
3 The statistical platform I use in the dissertation (Stata 8.0) cannot calculate deviance residuals 
following the xtpcse command, which produces the Prais-Winsten coefficients with panel-corrected 
standard errors in table 3.6 in the chapter. In order to obtain the deviance residuals to identify outliers in 
the loan size data, I estimated a generalized liner model with standard errors clustered on country. The 
GLM model produces parameter estimates that are very similar to the estimates obtained using the 
xtpcse command that I use to produce the results in table 3.6 in the chapter.  
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Figure B.5: Smoothed Deviance Residuals vs. Predicted Loan Size (Logged) 
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Figure B.6: Deviance Residuals Plotted Over Time, Loan Size Data 
Table B.2 explores the fragility of the findings related to the determinants of 
the logged size of IMF loans when the two extreme observations are excluded from 
 296
the analysis. The findings from the chapter stand up; in fact, the size of the coefficient 
on proportion neoliberal is slightly larger when the extraordinarily generous Korean 
and Turkish loans are removed.   
Table B.2: Determinants of Size of IMF Loans, Outliers Removed 
 Natural log of loan size/quota 
Independent variables PCSE, AR(1) 
Total Use of IMF Credit/Quota t-1 -0.926 
 (0.586) 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate t-1 0.105*** 
 (0.015) 
Reserves/Debt t-1 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Debt/GNI t-1 0.0005 
 (0.0004) 
Log GDPt-1 0.106*** 
 (0.024) 
GDP Per Capita Growtht-1 -0.011 
 (0.006) 
Proportion Neoliberal 0.439* 
 (0.177) 
Post-Election Period 0.354*** 
 (0.103) 
Left Government 0.116 
 (0.063) 
Regime Type t-1 -0.005 
 (0.005) 
U.S. Military Aid t-1 -3.63x10-7*** 
 (1.09x10-7) 
U.S. Affinity t-1 0.226 
 (0.150) 
Debt rescheduling 0.084 
 (0.059) 
No. of observations 443 
R2 0.26 
Wald χ 2 149.74 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 
Results from generalized linear model, robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses; outliers removed. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
Looking at the plots of the residuals calculated from the logit models of 
waivers reveals that the model fit is not particularly good; there is a cluster of 
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observations in both figure B.7 and figure B.8 in the top left quadrant, indicating many 
countries received waivers that, based on the values on the explanatory variables, were 
very unlikely to receive waivers.  
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Figure B.7: Residuals versus Predicted Probability of a Waiver 
HAITIHAITIHAITI
HAITIHAITII I
HAITIHAITI
HAITI
HAITI HAITI
DOMINICAN REP.DOMINICAN REP.I  
DOMINICAN REP.
DOMINICAN REP.DOMINICAN REP.DOMINICAN REP.JAMAICAJAMAICAJAMAICA
JAMAICA
JAMAICA
J MAICAJ I
J MAICAJ MAICAA I
JA AICA
JAMAICA
MEXICOMEXICO
MEXICO
MEXICOMEXICOMEXICO MEXICO
MEXICO
MEX O
EXICO
MEXICO MEXICO
MEXICO
GUA EM LA
GU TEMALAGUATEMALAGU EM LA
GU TEMALAGUATEMALA
GUATEM LAGUA E LAONDUR SH NDUR S
HONDURAS
HONDUR S
HONDURAS
ONDUR S
HONDURASHONDUR SEL S LVADOREL S LV DOREL SALVADOR 
EL SALV DOR
EL SALV DOREL S LV DORL LL L
EL SALVADOREL SALVADOREL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
NIC R GUA
NIC R GUI ANICARAGUANIC R GUA
NICARAGUA
C ARICOS A ICCO ICA
COSTARICA
COST RICC IC STA ICT I
COST RICA
COSTARICA
COSTARICACOST RICA
COSTARICA
COS ARICA
I
PA AM
P N P N
PANAM
PA AMP M
PANAMA
NPP N
PANAMA
PANAM
PANAM
VE EZ E
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
L
V EZUELAVEN ZUELA
E U DORECU DOR
ECU ORCU DOR
ECU DORCU DOR
C DORU DORE OC DOE
P RU
PERU
PERU
PERU RUPERU
P R
PERU
P RU
BRAZIL
BRAZILBRAZILBR ZIL
B ZIL
BRAZIL
BRAZIL
I
B L VIBOLIVI
BOLIVIA
B LIVIABOLIVIB IVIAB V
B LIVIA
I IB LIVIB LIVI
R G YP RAGU Y
C ILE
C ILE
CHILE
HILE C ILE
CHILE
C I
CHILE
ARGENTINA
ARGENTINA
ARGENTIN
ARGENTINA
RGENTINA
ARGENTINA
UR G YR GU Y
URUGU Y
RUGU YUR GU YU UGU YU G YRUG Y
URUG YR G Y
POL NP AN
NDP L N
HUNGARYHUNG RYNG YNG Y
HUNG Y
HU GARY
H G YH NU
SL VAK EPUBLICSL VAK EPUBLICLB IA B NI G RIBU G IA
BULGARIA
B L IIA
A IAOLDOV
MOLDOVA
LDOV
MOLDOVAM L
RO NI
NI I
ROMANIA
R NII A
USSI
R SSI
I
ESTO IA
ESTONIES O IA
IST NI
LATVIA
LAT TVIL TVI
L THU NIITHU NII IIT I
UK NEUK AI E
UKR E
R S
BEL S
E IG RG A
G I E  BISSAUGUI EA BISSAUG I E  BISSAUI  II  II  IIN  IG BIAA BIA BI
GAMBI
MGA BI IGAMBI
GAMBIA
BI
IM LM IM
MA I
MALI
A II
M I
A I
IM LII
SE LNE LS LSE EG L
EG LS E A
SE EG L
NSE EG LSE E LS G LS LES G L
IN
B I
BENI
B I IBEN
MAUR T NIAM IT NI
M I ANI
M U TANIA
MAURIT NIA
M RIT NIAMAURIT NIA
IT I
MAURITANIA
R T NIA
IT NI
M URITANIA
IT NI
T IAT INI RNI ENI ERIGNI NIG RI NI R
INI EI
NIGER
IV Y STIV RY O STIV Y ST
IV Y CO STIV Y O STI O Y C ST
IV RY TI Y C ST
IV RY COAST
IVO Y COAST
IVORY COAST
IV  T
IV RY STIV Y STIV RY CO ST
G INEA
I
IG I E
B RKIN  F SOKI  F OBURK  FASO
BURKINA FASO
RKI  F SOB K  FAAG H
HG
GH
GH N
GHT GO
TO T
TOGO
TOGO OG
TOG
TO O
GT
TOGO
TTT O
TOM ONC NM OCA R NE O N
N
NIGER ANI NI RIA
NIGERIA
NI E I
ONO
G
G BON
GAB N
B
O B NBB N
B NG N
G OL F ICAN REP. F ICAN REP.N  FRICAN REP.C  F ICAN REP.
E  I  .
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.
C T AL F ICAN REP.
AL FRICAN REP.
R L FRICAN REP.
CC N O
C OU
UGAND
AU DA
UGANDUGANDA
GK YK K K YK YK
KEK YK
KENYA
T Z I
T Z
ZT ZA
IT Z I IBURU DIB UND D ID HI PI
T PPI H PI
TH P
THI PIA
Z BZ AZ Z II
Z I
ZI BWEZ B E
Z B BWE
B BWEI BWEZ W
AWI
WL WII IM
MALAWIM L WI
MALAWI
WIL WL W
MALAWI
L I
M WI
D ASCD SC RM D SC R
M D SCM D SCA
CA
C
MAURITIUUR T UTIU
MAURITIUS
R TIUO COM O COR C
CO OO O
LG IG IIALG I
RI
ALGERIA
T ISIT ST ST IST S SS D N KU K Y
T K Y
TURKEY
T KEYK KE
T KEY
EGYPTTE YP
JORDANJORDAN
JORDA
J RD N
JORD
JJ
H I INI DI IN
INDIA
IP KK NK N
P KIS
P IS
PAKIST N
KIST N
PA IST
P KIST N
P KISTAN
P HL E H
DE H
B NGLADESH
L E HB L HB NB L DE H
L DE HB NGL DE H
L E H
RI L NKARI K
SR  LANKASR  A KS I L NKASRI K
S I LANKA
SRI LANKA
 K
P LPN N PN P L L
P
PN
T D
TH IL D
VI T MIE
HILIPPI ES
PHI PPINES
PHIL PPINES
PINES
P IPPINES
HI IPP NES
PH LIPPINES
P IL PI EHI PPI E IPPI ES
HILIPPI ES
HI I I ES
PHILIPPINES
PH LIP INE
PHI IPPI ES
PHILIPPI ESPH LIPPINES
P  .G. .G.
P  .G.
 .G.PU  .G.
P  .G.
-1
0
1
2
3
D
ev
ia
nc
e 
R
es
id
ua
ls
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Predicted Probability of Multiple Waivers
 
Figure B.8: Residuals versus Predicted Probability of Multiple Waivers 
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To see whether the results of the logit models of waivers reported in chapter 3 
were unduly influenced by poorly predicted observations, I re-analyzed the data with 
the outliers – observations with residuals that are greater than 2 – omitted. The results 
of the logit models are reported in table B.3. The proportion neoliberal variable, 
which was by far the most important determinant of waivers in the comprehensive 
models described in the chapter, remains positive and significant. When the 
observations with large positive deviance residuals are removed, the relationship 
between my key explanatory variable and the presence of waivers is strengthened.  
Taken together, the evidence presented in the appendix confirms that the key 
conclusion from the chapter – borrowing governments in which neoliberals have 
control over economic policymaking receive larger loans with fewer conditions and 
are more likely to receive waivers for missed performance criteria – are not affected 
by potentially influential individual observations.     
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Table B.3: Determinants of Waivers (1980-1997), Outliers Removed 
 Waiver issued Multiple waivers  
Independent variables (1) Logit (2) Logit 
Use of IMF credit/quota t-1 5.237** 3.394 
 (1.814) (5.511) 
U.S. Treasury Bill rate t-1 -0.236*** 0.018 
 (0.067) (0.119) 
Reserves/debt t-1 0.004 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Debt/GNI t-1 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Log GDPt-1 0.156 0.385** 
 (0.086) (0.131) 
GDP Per Capita Growtht-1 0.012 -0.097* 
 (0.025) (0.047) 
Gov’t Consumption/GDPt-1 0.072*** 0.045 
 (0.022) (0.052) 
Inflationt-1 0.0003* -0.0005 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Proportion Neoliberal 3.422*** 7.228*** 
 (0.804) (1.239) 
Election  -0.216 0.120 
 (0.339) (0.566) 
Left Government -0.999*** -3.706*** 
 (0.296) (0.655) 
Regime Type t-1 0.040 -0.011 
 (0.022) (0.044) 
Instability t-1 -0.413 -0.934 
 (0.327) (0.792) 
US Military Aid t-1 -1.49x10-6 -3.61x10-6 * 
 (8.04x10-7) (1.69x10-6) 
UN Voting Affinity t-1 -0.157 0.715 
 (0.577) (1.200) 
Debt Rescheduling 0.890*** 1.576** 
 (0.278) (0.539) 
Constant -6.607** -17.103*** 
 (2.134) (3.723) 
No. of observations 669 661 
Log likelihood -227.897 -69.028 
Wald χ 2 137.21 190.91 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 0.0000 
Binary logit, robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses, 
with three cubic splines (not reported); outliers omitted from the analysis. 
*p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
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APPENDIX C 
Sensitivity of Chapter 4 Results to Outliers 
 The presence of outliers – observations that are poorly predicted by the 
statistical model – can generate misleading parameter estimates in event history 
models. Following chapter 3 I examined plots of deviance residuals to diagnose 
outliers in the data on the treatment of borrowers by the IMF. I found that removing 
poorly predicted observations from the models did not affect the conclusions; in fact, 
the relationship between proportion neoliberal and the size of loans and the presence 
of waivers was strengthened once outliers were omitted.  
 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones make the following recommendation in their 
treatise on the use of event history models in social science: “plots of deviance 
residuals against the duration time or against the observation number can assist the 
researcher in identifying aberrant observations or clusters of observations.”1 In 
keeping with the spirit of the robustness checks in the appendix that accompanied the 
results in chapter 3, and following the advice given by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, I 
plot the smoothed deviance residuals calculated from the Cox models of political 
survival in tables 4.5 and 4.5 against the duration time. Figures C.1 and C.2 give the 
plots for finance ministers and central bank governors; the figures indicate that there 
are quite a few observations with large deviance residuals clustered around low values 
of the duration tracker (listed on the X-axis). The pattern of clustering indicates that 
Cox proportional hazards model underestimates the probability of failure for a subset 
of observations; that is, individuals with large deviance residuals should have survived 
longer than they actually did. A smaller cluster of observations in both plots are 
outliers on the low end – these policymakers survived longer than predicted by the 
model.   
                                                 
1 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 130.  
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Figure C.1: Deviance Residuals versus Time in Office, Finance Ministers 
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Figure C.2: Deviance Residuals versus Time in Office, Central Bankers 
To assess the degree to which unusual observations are affecting the results obtained 
in the event history models of the survival of policymakers under IMF programs, I 
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removed all of the outlying observations, using the absolute value of 2 for the 
deviance residuals as the cutoff. Tables C.1 and C.2 present the results for the two 
types of economic officials. 
Table C.1: Determinants of the Survival of Finance Ministers, Outliers Removed 
Covariates DV: Survival of Finance Ministers (in days) 
Neoliberal  -0.401* 
 (0.184) 
Caretaker/Transition Govt. 2.728*** 
 (0.339) 
Inflation  22.446*** 
 (2.063) 
Inflation × ln(t) -3.611** 
 (0.348) 
GDP growth -0.008 
 (0.011) 
Currency Crisis 0.394* 
 (0.201) 
Mixed Regime 0.327* 
 (0.167) 
Presidential Democracy 0.481* 
 (0.191) 
Parliamentary Democracy 0.278 
 (0.224) 
∆Leader 1.345*** 
 (0.126) 
  
Number of observations 1223 
Number of subjects 515 
Number of failures 374 
Time at risk 307619 
Frailty parameter (θ) 0.097, p = 0.011 
Log-likelihood -1734.076 
Wald χ 2 292.65 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 
Note: coefficients from Cox proportional hazard model with country-specific 
frailty terms sampled from a gamma distribution; standard errors in parentheses 
below coefficients. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
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Table C.2: Determinants of the Survival of Cent. Bank Governors, Outliers Removed 
Covariates DV: Survival of Cent. Bankers (in days) 
Neoliberal  -0.543* 
 (0.229) 
Inflation  23.867*** 
 (2.919) 
Inflation × ln(t) -3.590*** 
 (0.467) 
GDP growth -0.042* 
 (0.018) 
Currency Crisis 0.072 
 (0.322) 
Mixed Regime -0.190 
 (0.263) 
Presidential Democracy -0.375 
 (0.300) 
Parliamentary Democracy -0.168 
 (0.368) 
∆Leader 0.585** 
 (0.204) 
  
Number of observations 834 
Number of subjects 283 
Number of failures 180 
Time at risk 239597 
Frailty parameter (θ) 0.543, p = 0.000 
Log-likelihood -790.666 
Wald χ 2 111.32 
Probability > χ 2 0.0000 
Note: coefficients from Cox proportional hazard model with country-specific 
frailty terms sampled from a gamma distribution; standard errors in 
parentheses below coefficients. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1% 
Importantly, the conclusions I reached based on the survival analysis in chapter 
4 do not hinge on the presence of a few unusual observations in the data. Neoliberal 
finance ministers and central bank governors under IMF programs last, on average, 
longer than non-neoliberals, when outliers are omitted from the analysis. The 
coefficients in tables C.2 and C.2 on the neoliberal variable are larger than those 
reported in the models in chapter 4 that include poorly predicted observations. In light 
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of the extreme variation in survival times, it is heartening that my results are not being 
driven by one or a few unusual policymakers.   
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